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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

One of the most important, but also most difficult, components of examining the historical past is evaluating the events and actors within their own historical contexts. To historians undertaking this task, there is often as much to be learned from process as outcome. Examining the context in which decisions were made—the various priorities, interests, and principles that were weighed and debated—illuminates the course of history as far more than an arrangement of disparate events and dates. Although not centered on a particular geographic or temporal theme, the essays in this issue traverse the realms of both politics and culture as they challenge their readers to seek deeper understanding of the difficult choices made by historical actors.

Two of our essays examine the tension between maintaining domestic stability and improving foreign relations. Exploring the actions of the Southern political elite and the general public, Maxwell Ulin ’17 illustrates how insecurities over segregation and race relations led Southerners to firmly oppose involvement in the United Nations by the mid-1950s. In his essay focusing on the 1970s oil embargo and energy crisis, Amin Mirzadegan ’17 demonstrates how President Gerald Ford, President Richard Nixon, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prioritized maintaining positive relations with Iran in light of the Cold War over the economic impact of higher oil prices.

Although focusing on different regions, two of our essays explore the barriers preventing national unity and the efforts made to overcome them. Isabelle Taft ’17 examines how the memory of the Civil War shaped the fraternity Sigma Alpha Epsilon’s history and national expansion. Initially, remembering the sacrifices made by Southern members for the Confederacy led the fraternity to remain confined to the South. However, by the mid-1880s, SAE expanded nationally, motivated by a desire to overcome sectionalism and the destruction of the war. Looking internationally, Maris Jones, Brown University ’15, explores how music shaped Brazilian national identity, a process that both included and excluded Afro-Brazilians. By incorporating symbolic cultural elements of marginalized communities into Brasilidade, the government helped to transform Brazil’s diverse population into a nation with a collective identity, but also masked racial and class disparities.

Rhetoric also provides insight into historical actors’ sources of motivation. Concentrating on the period before the War of 1812, Zoe Rubin ’16 offers an in-depth study of how Republicans wielded the label of “Tory” as a political weapon against Federalists. By characterizing Federalists in this way, Republicans not only revealed their anxieties regarding partisan politics, but also contributed to the Federalists’ downfall. Moving into the 20th century, Raleigh Cavero ’15 analyzes how United Nations representative William F. Buckley’s human rights rhetoric in the fall of 1973 foreshadowed the emergence of the neo-conservative-conservative alliance in the 1980s. In branching away from the traditional stances of their parties, both Buckley and the neo-conservatives adopted classic liberal language, creating a rhetorical link that would later transform into a tangible alliance.

As we look back on the past, we are profoundly grateful for the work of our editors, particularly our graduating seniors, Emma Fallone, Julie Lowenstein, Olivia Pollak, Andrew Tran, and Lauren Wackerle. We would especially like to thank Jacob Wasserman for all of his work on the Review and for being such an incredible source of wisdom. Thank you also to the students who were generous enough to allow us to share their pieces of historical work with us. We hope you enjoy reading them as much as we have.

Sincerely,
Emily Yankowitz, Editor in Chief
Eva Landsberg, Managing Editor
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141 FORESHADOWING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE
William F. Buckley’s 1973 Term at the United Nations
Raleigh Cavero
During the first half of the twentieth century, Southern senators and representatives were among the most fervent supporters of international organization and cooperation. However, after 1950, the Southern opinion dramatically reversed. The question of what caused this profound aboutface has puzzled historians. By examining the role of race in Southern isolationism and constructing a chronology of the South’s political reversal, Maxwell Ulin ’17 offers one explanation. In his study, Ulin argues that Southern opposition to the United Nations first emerged among politicians, before expanding to the public, as Southerners became worried about the fate of domestic segregation in the increasingly diverse, racially progressive international arena. By examining a wide range of sources, he ultimately demonstrates that Southern opposition to internationalism was primarily motivated by the politics of race, rather than from socioeconomic upheaval.

By Maxwell Ulin, TD ’17
Written for “The American South, 1870-Present”
Professor Glenda Gilmore
Edited by Simon Horn, Julie Lowenstein, and Noah Daponte-Smith
“This treaty,” Senator Jeff Sessions declared before the US Senate, “is unnecessary in fact and dangerous to our sovereignty.” The day was December 4, 2012. On that cold winter morning, the junior senator from Alabama had taken to the floor to oppose Treaty Document No. 112-7, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Thirty-five other senators, including all but six members of the Southern delegation, joined him in opposition. “We do not need the United Nations bureaucrats changing [disability law] in our country in the name of worldwide application,” argued Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma. “I do not support…potentially over-zealous international organizations with anti-American biases that infringe upon American sovereignty,” Inhofe concluded. “Let’s do more for the disabled worldwide,” Sessions urged, “but let’s do it without enmeshing our nation into another binding international organization that will cause more grief than benefit.” The Senate’s debate to ratify the UN convention in 2012 served as a reminder of how deeply some Americans, particularly in the South and Midwest, continue to distrust the United Nations.

Yet in the American South, politics surrounding the UN have not always been so hostile. Indeed, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Southern senators and representatives stood among the strongest supporters of international organization and cooperation. In rallying nationwide support for the League of Nations, for example, President Woodrow Wilson relied heavily upon the help of Southerners in Congress like Carter Glass of Virginia and John Williams of Mississippi. In March of 1920, only Southern Democrats stood overwhelmingly in favor of the League of Nations when it came time for Senate ratification. Moreover, between 1935 and 1945, 99 percent of congressional Southern Democrats supported US participation in the United Nations, the World Bank, and other venues for international cooperation, compared with just 73 percent of Democrats from elsewhere. By these standards, until 1950 the American South had proven the most consistently internationalist region of the country.

Suddenly, however, Southern congressional opinion changed. In 1953, Southern senators began voicing their growing opposition to multilateralism through overwhelming co-sponsorship of the Bricker Amendment, a proposal to limit the President’s treaty-making powers that all but directly challenged American participation in the United Nations. In 1954, Southerners in Congress proved less disposed than their Northern counterparts towards reauthorization of the Mutual Security Act, a foreign aid program meant to continue the efforts of the Marshall Plan. By the late 1950s, Southern representatives were casting considerably fewer votes for measures supporting multinational organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Development Association (IDA), International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and World Bank than were their non-Southern colleagues. After nearly 40 years of zealous, Wilsonian multilateralism, Southern politicians overturned the region’s foreign policy doctrine in the span of a single presiden-
tial administration.\textsuperscript{5}

The Southern bloc’s attitudinal reversal raises a number of questions: what happened to change Southern opinion, and when specifically did that change occur? Did Southern opposition in Congress reflect a shift in regional sentiment generally, or were Southern politicians acting independently of constituent opinion when they reversed their stances? Perhaps most interestingly, what regional concerns and interests prompted the South’s unique foreign policy overhaul?

Scholars have sought to answer these questions over the past half-century, but their accounts offer conflicting causes and chronologies for the South’s isolationist shift. Political scientist Paul Seabury, for example, posits that the South’s wartime industrialization may have weakened sectional interests in free trade and enabled the region’s parochial sentiments to undermine Southern internationalism.\textsuperscript{6} Foreign policy theorist Charles O. Lerche, Jr. points to similar forces of socio-economic change, but argues that isolationism principally emerged as part of a populist reaction to the rapid pace of regional transformation.\textsuperscript{7} By contrast, scholars like Joseph Fry and Alfred O. Hero Jr. assert that Dixie’s anxieties surrounding segregation prompted Southerners to decry the increasingly diverse, racially progressive international arena.\textsuperscript{8} Moreover, writers on this topic disagree as to the specific turning point in Southern opinion; Seabury dates the beginning of the South’s decline in UN support to 1949,\textsuperscript{9} while Lerche and Fry assign the moment to around 1953, and Hero to 1956.\textsuperscript{10} Existing scholarship thus paints a confusing picture of potential timelines and causes for the region’s attitudinal shift.

This paper seeks to enhance current understandings of the topic in two ways: first, with the benefit of hindsight, these pages seek to affirm Hero’s and Fry’s causal arguments emphasizing the role of race in Southern isolationism. While both Seabury’s and Lerche’s explanations have merit, both strongly imply predictions for the future of Southern foreign policy that remain unrealized decades later. As current senatorial opposition to UN measures shows, Southern opinion surrounding the United Nations has neither conformed to the national average, as Seabury suggests, nor returned as Lerche predicts to its formerly internationalist tendencies.\textsuperscript{11} Evidently, reasons for the shift prove more deeply ingrained in the fabric of Southern politics than either Lerche or Seabury suspected. Hero’s and Fry’s attribution to race—long considered the central organizing principle of Southern politics\textsuperscript{12}—offers the clearest and most convincing explanation for the region’s lasting foreign policy adjustment.

Second, this paper strives to clarify the chronology of the South’s political reversal. Taken individually, scholars offer fragmented pictures of the South’s foreign policy overhaul; Lerche, Seabury, and Fry analyze Southern elites by tracking votes of the region’s congressional delegation, while Hero centers his analysis on popular opinion polls directed generally at the Southern public. These incomplete studies produce conflicting accounts
When Southern opinion on the United Nations truly changed. Read together, however, the assembled data reveal a complex, graduated process in the evolution of Southern international opinion. This essay thus seeks to consolidate the work of existing scholarship and paint an even more detailed picture of these developments through the inclusion of newspapers, current events, and constituent correspondence.

Based on a range of materials and research, it appears that Southern opposition to the United Nations emerged into two distinct phases: in the first stage, Southern elected officials, activist groups, and other members of the region’s political elite began dissenting from the United Nations as early as 1950, initially in response to the UN Genocide Convention. In the second, broad-based, popular opposition, only emerged in force around 1956-1957, as setbacks to white supremacy both at home and abroad led to a rise in Southern racial sensitivities. Southern politicians’ opposition to UN efforts, therefore, actually presaged their constituents’ general distrust of the organization. At all levels of the opposition movement, however, politicians, activists, and ordinary white Southerners largely came to distrust the United Nations as a result of Southern insecurities surrounding segregation and fears that the enemies of Jim Crow would use the racially diverse international arena to end the Southern way of life. Hence Southern opposition to the United Nations stemmed less from contemporary forces of socio-economic upheaval than from the enduring politics of race.

“A NOBLE BEGINNING”: SOUTHERN INTERNATIONALISM, 1945-1950

In 1945, Southern internationalism waxed triumphant. On April 25th, delegates from across the world met in San Francisco to lay the grounds for a United Nations Organization. The conference, steered principally by Southern leaders like Senator Tom Connally of Texas, produced the United Nations Charter, a constitution that in many ways reflected the original Wilsonian vision at the heart of the failed League of Nations. Given President Wilson’s Virginia heritage and Georgia upbringing, Southerners as a whole championed Wilson as the first president “of Southern blood” since the Civil War and even claimed ownership of the late president’s foreign policy doctrine.13

With national opinion finally behind such an organization after the war, Southern politicians saw the opportunity to realize Wilson’s vision and rectify the isolationist wrongs of the past quarter century.14 “The failure of the League of Nations in the eyes of many people is the fault of this country,” wrote The Houston Post in 1945.15 Had we joined the League of Nations in 1920, Texas’ Longview Daily News argued, “World War II…doubtless would have been avoided.”16 Indeed, as Tennant S. McWilliams notes in his book The New South Faces the World, Southern elites “seemed to rejoice in the possibility that their benighted region had, after all, produced an idea that would rescue the world from itself.”17
As a result, when approval of the UN Charter finally came to a Senate vote on July 28th, 1945, every Southern senator voted in favor of ratification.18

Southern papers heaped praise on the emerging United Nations Charter. “Charter Is a Big Step But Only a Start,” read the front page of The Southern Weekly, a conservative Southern newspaper.19 “The [UN] charter, regardless of its details, can be a ‘solid structure’ upon which to try to build security,” wrote The Shreveport Times from Louisiana that July.20 “[R]atification of the United Nations charter,” penned The Atlanta Constitution days after the Senate vote, “is cause for nationwide gratification.”21 Connally, the architect of the UN Charter, also received praise for his work back home. “[T]here is reason to believe that now and even more so in time we [Texans] shall take greater pride in the part he [Sen. Connally] played at San Francisco,” The Big Spring Daily Herald declared.22 Similarly, The Houston Post deemed Senator Conally’s efforts “a noble beginning.”23 Overall, it seems, the Southern press maintained a positive opinion of the emerging United Nations throughout 1945 and the late forties as a whole.24

Contemporary polling data also reveal that Southern public opinion of the United Nations remained equal to, if not slightly higher than, that of most Americans through the late forties. According to a poll taken in late 1946, 74 percent of Southerners favored maintaining UN permanent headquarters in the United States, compared with 72 percent of Northeasterners, 68 percent of Midwesterners, 65 percent of Plains States residents, 64 percent of those from the Rockies, and 76 percent of Far Westerners.25 Similarly, when UN officials began to seriously consider relocation to Europe in 1948, 68 percent of Southerners considered the potential move a “bad thing,” while only 57 percent of Northeasterners, 63 percent of Midwesterners, and 56 percent of Westerners shared a similar opinion.26 In April of that same year, while less than half of Americans outside the South approved of sending US troops to Palestine as part of a larger UN force, 57 percent of Southerners favored the idea.27 Throughout the late 1940s, Southerners proved just as likely, and in some cases more likely, than other Americans to believe that the United Nations should be strengthened, that the United States should strive to make the United Nations a success, and that the United Nations’ work on the world stage “thus far” had proved satisfactory.28

Regional polling differences prove even more striking when we discount those who registered “no opinion” or “undecided” from the equation. For example, while 69 percent of both Southerners and Northeasterners judged the United Nations to have done a “good” or “fair job” in May of 1946,29 87 percent of Southerners who had a clear an opinion thought favorably of the United Nations’ work, compared with just 75 percent of Northeasterners who held a given view. Overall, Southern public opinion in the late forties appears to have been slightly more favorable to the UN than public sentiment elsewhere.

Additionally, constituent letters to senators from this period further demonstrate Southerners’ generally positive views of the United Nations. Among those collected by
various Senate offices around this time, letters received by North Carolina Senator Clyde Roarke Hoey prove particularly instructive.\textsuperscript{30} Beginning in July 1947, letters from across North Carolina arrived in concentrated bursts at the Senator’s Washington office and continued throughout the next three and one-half years. Many letters came from churches, women’s clubs, youth groups, and other community organizations representing often hundreds of people.\textsuperscript{31} A number of others came from distinguished public figures across North Carolina, including newspaper editors, university officials, and state senators. Virtually all of these letters urged for the expansion of the United Nations’ military authority to form the basis for what they termed “world federation.” As the effort culminated in January 1950, Senator Hoey brought forth to the Senate a petition bearing the names of one hundred and fifty North Carolina public leaders in favor of world federation. Signatories included many of the state’s leading bankers, business owners, university presidents, labor organizers, and local commanders of the American Legion. Also listed were all members of the Governor’s Council of State and other prominent North Carolina politicians—including one “S. J. Ervin, Jr.” of the State Supreme Court.\textsuperscript{32} Clearly, North Carolina political activists and public leaders held the United Nations in high regard as the decade began.

At the same time, however, Southerners appeared to harbor major misconceptions about the intended role of the United Nations in world affairs. In particular, most Southerners conceived of the United Nations exclusively as a militarily-focused, peacekeeping organization. Throughout multiple surveys of Southern opinion at mid-century, between 55 and 80 percent of Southerners listed preservation of peace as the United Nations’ central objective, while less than one fifth of those polled ascribed any other objective to the organization.\textsuperscript{33} Many in the Southern press reflected this misconception in articles and editorials, as well. As it happened, in the lead up to Senate ratification for the UN Charter in 1945, several Southern newspapers quite tellingly heralded the creation of a “World Security Charter,” including major publications like the \textit{Atlanta Constitution}.\textsuperscript{34}

Indeed, based on constituent correspondence from at least one state, Southern popular support for the United Nations was often explicitly founded upon this assumption. Virtually all of the more than eighty pro-UN letters received by Senator Hoey’s office referred solely to the organization’s peacekeeping responsibilities. “There is strong sentiment in NC for [strengthening the United Nations] as the only means of averting war,” Clarence Walton Johnson of Asheville wrote in July 1947.\textsuperscript{35} Phrases like “to prevent war” and “to maintain peace” almost unfailingly followed calls in these letters for a stronger United Nations. In a telegram to Senator Hoey the following year, for example, Thomas W. Hicks called explicitly for “making the United Nations capable of enacting interpreting and enforcing world law to prevent war [sic].”\textsuperscript{36} Similarly, Peter Cooper of Salisbury wrote in 1948, “I can see now no other way than a world government of limited powers adequate to prevent war and preserve peace.”\textsuperscript{37} While the presence of these security-related phrases
may at first seem unremarkable, they subtly qualify constituents’ support for international organization. Constituents’ failure to reference any other objectives of the United Nations suggests that they might not have even conceived that others existed.

Admittedly, Southern misconceptions surrounding the United Nations were understandable. Having witnessed the destructive effects of two world wars, allied leaders in the 1940s had sought principally to establish the United Nations as an institutional mechanism for preventing conflict. Authors of the UN Charter reflected the primacy of this objective by presenting it first in the preamble’s list of justifications for the UN’s founding. Moreover, leaders in Washington helped affirm popular understanding of UN objectives; having negotiated much of the initial framework for international cooperation in 1944, US Undersecretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. described the proposed United Nations as “an organization that will make possible...effective international cooperation for peace and security.” Two years later, President Harry S. Truman proved even more forceful in emphasizing the UN’s peacekeeping role, as he declared to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, “Our sole objective at this gathering is to create the structure...[to] provide the machinery which will make future peace not only possible but certain.” Hence at the close World War II, public discussion of the United Nations focused almost exclusively upon the body’s collective security role, creating an understandable popular conception of the organization as intended for peacekeeping alone.

Critically, however, the United Nations maintained a number of additional organizational goals outside of its role as peacekeeper. In addition to preventing armed conflict, Chapter I, Article 1 of the 1945 Charter commits the United Nations to fostering economic cooperation, as well as to “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” This latter commitment came at the behest of American civil rights groups and various developing nations at the San Francisco Conference, who insisted that the Charter include clear and explicit human rights provisions. Still, the Charter’s “domestic jurisdiction” clause, inserted by Senator Connally and other American negotiators, assured that human rights guarantees within the Charter remained non-binding. The UN Charter’s human rights language proved practically toothless and, as evidenced by the constituent letters, failed to shape early public understanding of either the document or UN objectives. Nonetheless, these provisions would become critical in the formulation of the United Nation’s early policy agenda, placing the newly formed organization on a collision course with white Southerners racial interests.
Within five years of the United Nations’ inception, popular misconceptions of the United Nations became glaringly apparent, as global politics of the postwar period drastically reshaped UN priorities. As the onset of the Cold War polarized international affairs, the United Nations became increasingly incapable of taking decisive military action in conflict zones without the objection of at least one of two opposing powers on the Security Council. This fact robbed the United Nations of its capacity to assume a meaningful peacekeeping role in most Cold War affairs. As a result, UN officials began channeling their energies increasingly towards the advancement the United Nations’ secondary goals, including the promotion of human rights and racial equality. As journalist Earl Conrad presciently wrote in late 1946 for the Chicago Defender, “Matters concerning…Negro Americans and other oppressed minorities have entered the United Nations to stay.” As a result, by shifting its focus towards human rights, the United Nations provoked an increase in global pressure for change upon the South's racial hierarchy.

By late 1948, official UN actions had entered into direct conflict with Southern racial interests. On December 9 of that year, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention, as it was otherwise known, declared acts of genocide and mass extermination in violation of international law, and proposed that perpetrators face domestic or international prosecution. Critical to white Southerners, however, was the Convention’s definition of the word “genocide”; under Article II of the Convention, genocide included any act of violence “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Lynchings, commonly committed against blacks throughout the South, would thus qualify as genocide under the convention and lie subject to some form of legal punishment. Since the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution deems any treaty or international agreement “the supreme law of the land,” approval of the Genocide Convention by the US Senate in 1948 would have amounted to the enactment of a federal anti-lynching law, albeit with limited means of enforcement. The Convention thus threatened to dismantle an important tool in the maintenance of white of supremacy, placing the agreement in direct conflict with Southern whites’ racial interests.

Additionally, on December 10, 1948—one day after the General Assembly’s approval of the Genocide Convention—the same UN body voted to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As with the United Nations Charter, the UDHR declared that all individuals are entitled to basic rights “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color…national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Unlike the UN Charter, however, the UDHR tasked the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights with responsibility for crafting a potentially binding international covenant. With majority control of the UN commission, a coalition of Communist and developing nations overcame US opposition to add detailed enforcement mechanisms to the emerging document.\textsuperscript{54} Hence, whereas the founding principles of the UN Charter were unenforceable, equal rights provisions in the UDHR would mandate an immediate end to racial codes if adopted by the United States.

Despite the apparent threat that both treaties posed to segregation, neither the Genocide Convention nor the UDHR received substantial attention from the Southern press. Indeed, most US papers in late 1948 prioritized coverage of other matters of interest during the UN summit, such as Korea’s induction as a member of the General Assembly and Israel’s bid for membership status.\textsuperscript{55} In particular, a number of prominent American newspapers, including major Southern publications, focused their UN reporting on the Soviet Union’s anti-western pronouncements.\textsuperscript{56} As a consequence, most newspaper outlets sidelined their coverage of both the Genocide Convention and UDHR, leaving the majority Americans, including Southerners, without substantial knowledge of either international treaty. So uninformed were most Americans in this regard that at least one top UN reporter noted his surprise at how little public attention either agreement had aroused in the United States.\textsuperscript{57}

While Southerners as a whole remained largely unaware of either treaty’s implications, however, Dixie’s political elite was quickly forced to grapple with UN actions. Since both the Genocide Convention and UDHR required Congressional approval, Southern representatives in Washington found themselves in 1950 opposed to not one but two international agreements sponsored by the United Nations. Both agreements proved more than just contrary to the South’s regional interests; they struck at the heart of white Southerners’ insecurities by threatening to upend the region’s strict racial hierarchy. Wilsonian or otherwise, the United Nations had effectively called for an end to the Southern way of life, a fact that gave at least some Southern legislators pause. “Of course, no one considered when they voted to ratify the United Nations Charter that they were doing anything that would upset our domestic laws,” Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi wrote to a concerned constituent in 1950.\textsuperscript{58} Ironically, the very organization they had once championed posed a direct threat to their greatest domestic concern.

Moreover, as a forum for international debate, the United Nations quickly became a source for vocal criticism against Southern discrimination in the postwar period. Encouraged by UN discussions of racial oppression in South Africa and elsewhere,\textsuperscript{59} African-American civil rights groups joined forces with Communist and non-aligned UN member states to highlight the injustices of Jim Crow and segregation.\textsuperscript{60} In October 1947, the NAACP filed a petition dubbed \textit{An Appeal to the World} to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The petition, written by W.E.B. Du Bois and publicly presented by the Soviet
Union, boldly declared:

It is not Russia that threatens the United States so much as Mississippi; not Stalin and Molotov but Bilbo and Rankin; internal injustice done to one's brothers is far more dangerous than the aggression of strangers abroad.\textsuperscript{61}

In 1951, just three years after UN adoption of the Genocide Convention, the Communist Civil Rights Congress (CRC) offered up a petition to the United Nations, alleging that the treatment of African Americans in the South effectively amounted to genocide. Amounting to a lengthy treatise, the CRC's petition detailed 153 killings and 344 other violent crimes committed against African Americans in the United States over the preceding six years.\textsuperscript{62} “[H]istory has shown that the racist theory of government of the USA. is not the private affair of Americans but the concern of mankind everywhere,” the document concluded.\textsuperscript{63}

These cases served, among others, to publicly castigate Southern states for their overtly discriminatory policies, and to expose their injustices to the international community.

UN condemnation of Jim Crow endangered American foreign policy interests, as US officials sought to navigate the delicate terrain of early Cold War diplomacy. As Europe's overseas empires collapsed in the wake of World War II, a new class of non-white, developing nations emerged to play a crucial role in power struggles between the US and Soviet Union. Between 1941 and 1950, 17 such nations had either declared or won independence from their former colonizers, and by 1951, 35 majority non-white nations had become members of the UN General Assembly.\textsuperscript{64} These so-called “Third World” nations viewed contests between the two superpowers in terms of their own racial and anti-colonial interests. Consequently, as both American and Soviet leaders sought allies throughout the developing world, racial injustice in the American South could often sway non-white nations’ diplomatic allegiances more than either superpower’s economic ideology.\textsuperscript{65}

Moreover, seizing the opportunity, the Soviet Union began casting itself in contrast with the United States as the defender of racial egalitarianism. As one State Department report on the United Nations indicated, “The division of opinion on many issues…has sometimes tended to follow a color line, white against non-whites, with Russia seeking to be recognized as the champion of non-whites.”\textsuperscript{66} As a result, repeated criticism and exposure of Southern racial codes at the United Nations and other international fora transformed segregation from a domestic problem into a full-blown national security concern. “Finally,” wrote one black reporter to W.E.B. Du Bois in 1947, “we are beginning to see that America can be answerable to the family of nations for its injustices to the Negro minority.”\textsuperscript{67} For perhaps the first time in history, the United States faced considerable international pressure to right the country’s racial wrongs, and the matter took on a heightened sense of importance.

Furthermore, existing US treaties with the United Nations threatened to offer a
new means of dismantling Jim Crow through domestic litigation. The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution specifically stipulates that treaties ratified by the US Senate bear the full force of federal law. As a result, ratification of the UN Charter created opportunities for civil rights groups to challenge Southern racial codes as violations of the treaty. While the Charter’s equal rights provisions were explicitly non-binding, that did not stop civil rights groups and activist judges from attempting to use them to their advantage. In October 1947, for example, the NAACP asked the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) to file an amicus curiae brief in two civil rights cases before the Supreme Court. Both suits, eventually consolidated into one landmark case known as Shelley v. Kraemer, involved the use of so-called restrictive covenants to keep blacks out of residential neighborhoods, and the NAACP sought to argue that these evictions constituted a violation of the UN Charter’s human rights provision.

While the AAUN ultimately rejected the NAACP’s argument, another effort at litigation proved initially successful. In April 1950, a three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals unanimously ruled in the case of Fuji v. California that the UN Charter invalidated California’s Alien Land Law. In his opinion, Judge Emmet J. Wilson argued that by explicitly preventing Japanese Americans from owning California property, the state’s Alien Land Law stood in direct violation of the UN Charter, which called on member state to guarantee basic rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” While the state Supreme Court invalidated Wilson’s ruling two years later, the case demonstrated how liberal judges might interpret the UN Charter to upend de jure segregation. At least one constituent took note; in a letter to Senator Eastland, Dr. J.A. Rayburn of Pontotoc, Mississippi, attached a newspaper clipping on the Fuji case. “My son John Jr. has just handed me the enclosed,” Rayburn wrote. “It looks dangerous to me. What are we coming to in this country?” Writing back, Senator Eastland agreed: “[T]he lower court’s decision will have been helpful in revealing how dangerous these treaties actually are and how we must be on guard constantly about their ratification.”

Put simply, the United Nations proved a far different organization in its first six years of existence than the one white Southerners had originally envisioned. At the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, white Southerners viewed the resulting organization as the realization of Wilson’s internationalist ideals; while the Charter may have included some seemingly inconsequential language on human rights, they expected the organization to function as a world peacekeeping force alone. Moreover, Southern politicians likely envisioned that UN member states would principally include white imperialist powers of pre-war era, just as the League of Nations had. What they got instead was an increasingly racially diverse organization with a strong commitment to promoting human rights and racial equality. Indeed, the United Nations’ egalitarian principles proved not just a nuisance but a threat to Jim Crow and racial segregation, policies that provided the foundations
for white supremacy and Southern society generally. Given all of the unanticipated consequences of UN ratification, Southern politicians might have understandably exhibited buyer’s remorse.

“A THREAT TO OUR WAY OF LIFE”: THE RISE OF ELITE OPPOSITION, 1950-55

Early signs of elite Southern opposition to UN emerged in 1950, as the Senate took up consideration of the UN Genocide Convention. As chair of the upper chamber’s Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally of Texas managed to indefinitely stall efforts to bring the Convention up for a vote. Nevertheless, members of the Senate’s Southern Democratic Caucus took to the floor that year in protest of potential treaty ratification. In February, for example, Senators James Eastland and John Stennis of Mississippi jointly inserted testimony into congressional record to urge rejection of the Genocide Convention. “[The] United Nations Genocide Convention…if ratified, would compromise our system of constitutional government,” read the inserted letter. In May of that same year, Senator Clyde R. Hoey spoke in opposition to the Convention; “I cannot conceive of the Senate adopting this treaty in its present form,” North Carolina’s senior senator declared. “The American people are not willing to surrender [their policing authority]…under the pretense of preventing mass murders.” Had the UN Convention somehow made its way to the Senate floor, numerous other Southern senators would have undoubtedly spoken out in opposition.

At the same time, senatorial constituent letters began reflecting a marked shift in opinion. After pro-UN organizers sent their culminating petition to Senator Hoey’s office in January, for example, constituent letters being sent to Hoey on UN matters ceased entirely. This hiatus of sorts lasted until February 1951, when a letter arrived from Senator Irving E. Carlyle of the North Carolina General Assembly. While unrelated to federal legislation, Carlyle’s letter discusses a state General Assembly resolution passed two years earlier to allow federal officials to negotiate the formation of world government through the United Nations. In both tone and content, Senator Carlyle’s letter proves highly telling:

Dear Senator Hoey:
You are familiar with the Resolution adopted by the 1949 General Assembly of this State intended to strengthen the United Nations. This week, a Resolution has been introduced and is now pending before the Senate, to repeal this 1949 Resolution…Those of us who believe in the strengthening of world law and who are opposed to isolationism…would appreciate it very much…if you could write a letter to be used before the Committee…expressing your support for the 1949 Resolution.”
In its context, Carlyle’s letter demonstrates a marked shift in the political climate of North Carolina. Whereas in 1950, constituents had been writing in overwhelming numbers for Washington to expand UN authority, by 1951, supporters of a stronger UN were playing defense back home. The exchange thus reveals that anti-UN sentiment had increased among North Carolina legislators during this time, and that the observed shift occurred sometime around 1950.

That year, two consequential events transpired that might have influenced public opinion of the United Nations: Senate deliberations on the UN Genocide Convention and US intervention in the Korean War. While events during Korean War negatively impacted Americans’ views of the United Nations, polls showed that opinion only declined after Communist China’s entry into the conflict in December 1950, about ten months after Hoey’s office stopped receiving letters in support of UN Senatorial consideration of the Genocide Convention, however, began just four days after Hoey’s office received the culminating petition letter. Hence debate over the Genocide Convention appears to have proved critical in scuttling North Carolinian support for expanded UN powers.

Opposition to the Genocide Convention, however, marked just the beginning. As it happened, Southern congressional hostility to the United Nations emerged in full force in early 1953 as the Senate took up consideration of a new, radical piece of legislation. S.J. Res. 1, the third installment of what papers dubbed “the Bricker Amendment,” entered Congress on January 3rd of that year. The bill’s sponsor, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, was a freshman senator with little political clout and a long-running isolationist streak. His amendment, inspired by former American Bar Association President Frank Holman of Utah, proposed a radical shift in American diplomatic power by severely limiting the President’s treaty-making authority. Under Bricker’s proposal, treaties could alter domestic law “only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.” In addition, Congress would be empowered “to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization.” The passage S.J. Res. 1 proposed a seismic shift in diplomatic authority by seeking to place severe constraints upon US engagement in international compacts.

The Bricker Amendment principally emerged from both racial and constitutional concerns regarding the UN Genocide Convention and UDHR. Indeed, as debate over the amendment raged throughout the early 1950s, the amendment’s anti-UN objectives became less speculation than accepted public knowledge. In April 1953, for example, The New York Times described the bill as “directed particularly against the United Nations covenants on genocide (mass murder), humans rights, and women’s rights.” In February of the following year, Gordon B. Hancock, a prominent African-American journalist, wrote for the Negro Associated Press, “The object of the Bricker Amendment is to free the United States from any limitations from the UN which might restrain this country in its anti-
Negro attitudes.” However amendment supporters may have sought to portray Bricker’s proposal as a matter of high-minded constitutionalism, the bill’s underlying, racially conservative agenda proved clear.

Joining with a large cohort of isolationist Republicans, much of the Senate’s Southern bloc co-sponsored the Bricker proposal. This group included important Southern foreign policy leaders such as Richard Russell, chair the Southern Democratic Caucus and later architect of the segregationist Southern Manifesto. Russell’s senior counterpart, Walter George, so ardently supported Bricker’s proposals that he introduced a bill of his own with even stronger constraints on the treaty-making power. In a telling statement, Georgia’s foreign policy giant remarked of the Southern bloc, “Many of our people are fearful and suspicious of the way the treaty-making power...has recently been used.”

Meanwhile, throughout senatorial debate on the Bricker Amendment, hundreds of constituent letters began flooding the offices of Southern senators in support of the resolution. As was the case during the early period, a remarkable number of these letters came from what might be called the South’s socio-economic elite—lawyers, business owners, local politicians, and even descendants of the region’s plantation aristocracy. Unlike earlier correspondence, however, these messages demonstrated an increasingly anti-UN sentiment. In January 1953, for example, V. H. Torrey, Jr. of Vicksburg, Mississippi, wrote that he supported Senator Eastland’s sponsorship of the Bricker Amendment, claiming that the resolution would protect American rights from “efforts to destroy them through means of covenants and treaties under the United Nations.” Another Mississippi letter read, “[Government by treaty] is still a serious threat to our way of life...In my opinion this generation is not ready for an international government.” Writing to Senator Richard Russell, E.F. Avery of Wildwood, Georgia, complained, “The United Nations looks like the Divided Nations to me...Why don’t we use our own tax money to develop our own underdeveloped areas here in the United States?” Clearly, just as Southern congressional opinion of the United Nations had shifted over the previous two years, so, too, had those of senators’ most activist constituents.

Because these letters represented the views of only a small subset of Southern voters, however, constituent correspondence alone presented a skewed picture of Dixie’s general foreign policy outlook. In reality, survey data suggest that most non-elite Southerners continued to harbor comparatively positive opinions of the United Nations throughout the early 1950s. As debate over the Bricker Amendment raged in 1953, for example, polls revealed that most Southerners disagreed with the statement that the United Nations was “too powerful in world affairs” and felt the organization had “justified its existence.” When asked in April 1954 if the United Nation made it “harder for us to do the things we’ve wanted to do in the world,” Southerners proved about as likely as Northerners of the same race to say that it had made US objectives easier. In July of that year, an AIPO poll
indicated that 78 percent of Southerners approved of the United Nations, compared with 73 percent of Northeasterners, 77 percent of Midwesterners, and 80 percent of Westerners. Hence while Southern politicians’ foreign policy views changed rapidly in the early fifties, Southerners back home maintained relatively positive opinions of the UN not much different from before.

Southern popular opinion as a whole, however, apparently did little to shape the votes of Dixie’s representatives in Washington. On February 26, 1954, 18 out of 22 US Senators from the former Confederacy voted in favor of the Bricker Amendment. Of the eight Southern senators still in office who had voted to ratify the UN Charter in 1945, only two, William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) and Lister Hill (D-Alabama), opposed Senator Bricker’s attempt to effectively scale back the powers of that organization. Moreover, while over 85 percent of the Southern bloc voted for S. J. Res. 1, the Senate as a whole fell just short of the two-thirds—or 66 percent—needed to approve the proposed constitutional amendment. Southern support for Bricker thus substantially surpassed the senatorial average, with Southerners a full 25 percent more likely to have voted for the amendment than their non-Southern colleagues. Hence the South not only voted to effectively undermine the organization it had helped to create but did so in higher numbers than other regional blocs. As Joseph Fry concludes in his book Dixie Looks Abroad, “this vote demonstrated the region’s overwhelming rejection of any international involvement or influences that impinged on Southern race relations.”

Following the failure of S. J. Res. 1, Southern congressional support for the United Nations and other multilateral commitments fell further. From 1954 onwards, House and Senate roll call votes reflected increasing levels of Southern opposition to American participation in UN affiliates such as the IMF, IDA, IAEA and World Bank. Moreover, growing Southern animosity towards the United Nations appears to have impacted regional opinion of multilateral organizations generally. In 1950, 88 percent of Southern congressmen voted to support monetary contributions for international organizations, compared to just 63 percent of House members from elsewhere. By the time Congress revisited the issue in 1957, however, 62 percent of the Southern bloc voted to substantially cut those same international contributions, while only 39 percent of non-Southerners voted do so. Southern support in the US House for the Mutual Security Program, having stood at around 87 percent in 1949, dropped precipitously in votes thereafter to a low of 41 percent in 1957, just as non-Southerner support for the program rose from 60 to 70 percent. By the end of the decade, only a small minority of Southerners in Congress continued to support international organization and cooperation outside of an explicitly military sphere.

While the rise of Southern congressional isolationism during this period may have stemmed in small part from membership turnover, many of these anti-multilateralist votes came from the very Southern senators and congressmen who had faithfully supported in-
ternational organizations in the early 1950s. Of the 58 Southern congressmen who voted in 1959 to cut contributions to international organizations, 15 had previously voted in favor of those payments nine years earlier. Similarly, 45 Southern US House members who had supported to original Mutual Security Act of 1949 opposed reauthorization within at least a decade. Shifts in Southern congressional opinion thus resulted not only from changes in the delegation itself but from a substantial policy reversal among older members.

Close examinations of these votes further suggest racial incentives behind the Southern bloc’s foreign policy reversal. For example, demographic studies of 1950s congressional districts reveal that the higher the African-American population of a given Southern district, the more likely its representatives were to oppose multilateral groups like the United Nations between 1953 and 1961. This phenomenon likely reflected the particularly acute racial insecurities of these areas, as white fears of both the collapse of Jim Crow and black enfranchisement proved especially severe where African Americans were numerous. Moreover, Southern congressional hostility to international organizations rose in concert with sectional opposition to foreign aid spending, particularly when intended for the few non-white, Third World nations emerging at this time. The fact that Southern opposition to the United Nations coincided with what were clearly racially-based foreign policy positions on foreign aid suggests how changes in Southern foreign policy as a whole during this time derived from domestic racial concerns.

Furthermore, even after deliberations on the Bricker Amendment, scores of anti-UN letters continued to flood Southern senatorial offices throughout the late 1950s. In a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, for example, Ruth A. Myers of Summerville, South Carolina, urged the famed segregationist to support a renewed Bricker Amendment, declaring, “We don’t want the UN to have the power to change our way of living, which it has now.” From Clarksdale, Mississippi, Maggie R. Sample lamented in a 1959 message to Senator Stennis, “The United States is no longer master of its own foreign policy… We have put ourselves in the hands of the United Nations.” “[A]s an organization with power above our Constitution it [the UN] is no good,” Lucille Windham of Macon, Georgia, wrote in May 1955. “The American people are tired of being governed by…treaties to satisfy foreign governments.” Those most moved to write on UN matters, therefore, appeared to harbor far lower opinions of the organization and multilateralism generally than did constituent writers five years earlier.

As with Dixie’s congressional delegation, letters from the South disapproving of the UN often reflected underlying racist or xenophobic sentiments. While only a few letters proved overtly racist, many writers employed racially charged language to justify their positions. Indeed, phrases like “states’ rights,” “our heritage,” and “our way of life” used in several letters had long served as code for white Southerners in their defense of Jim Crow
and racial segregation.

Adding to these indicators, roughly half of the letters sent to Southern Senators came from members of highly conservative or nativist organizations, such as Daughters of America and the American Legion. Of these groups, by far the most active was Daughters of the American Revolution (D.A.R.), a group with a longstanding history of overt racism. In April 1953, D.A.R. National Defense Chairman Mrs. Bruce D. Reynolds tellingly explained the group’s opposition to the United Nations, declaring that the United Nations “has caused unrest [and] discontent by preaching equality to peoples centuries apart economically, culturally, and militarily.” Racial prejudice and anxieties thus lay at the heart of UN hostility in these constituent letters, reflecting the organization’s growing connection to American racial politics. These constituent letters, however, reflected the opinions of only a fraction of the Southern public, drawing most from the ranks of Dixie’s highly informed political elite.

At the popular level, however, polling data suggest that broad-based Southern opinion looked favorably upon the United Nations until the late 1950s. Between 1946 and 1956, for example, polling on UN performance throughout the South yielded relatively consistent results, with Southerners at least as likely as Northerners to respond that they were satisfied with the organization’s work “so far.” Throughout this same period, as well, clear majorities of Southerners consistently supported establishing a United Nations police force. Through the mid-1950s, therefore, Southerners generally maintained more positive views of UN affairs than did their own representatives in Washington.

“KEEP THEM OUT”: THE LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT, 1956-1960

Southern popular opinion of United Nations only began to shift around 1956, several years after the Southern congressional bloc had begun withdrawing their support for the organization. Whereas Southerners had been less apt to disapprove of the United Nations than had other Americans in 1954, for example, they proved more inclined than all but Westerners to do so in late 1957. Similarly, while most polls in the early period showed that Southerners believed “that it was important for us to make the UN a success” in numbers at least equal to those in the rest of the country, by late 1960, only 77 percent of Southerners thought so, compared with 86 percent of non-Southerners.

Despite the difference in timing, Southern popular hostility to the United Nations exhibited racially charged sentiments similar to those demonstrated earlier by Southern politicos. Critically, growing divisions among Southerners on foreign policy questions came to mirror differences in racial views. Before the late 1950s, only small differences in international opinion existed between racially conservative and liberal Southerners, and members of both groups proved equally inclined to support the United Nations. By
1956, however, Southern segregationists and conservative newspapers exhibited greater hostility towards international cooperation than did their more racially liberal counterparts. In 1956, two NORC polls found that Southern segregationists were about 50 percent more inclined than integrationists to favor termination of US membership in the United Nations. By and large, racist Southerners preferred to rely on America’s European and Western allies than through the United Nations, which had supposedly become dominated by a Communist, anti-United States coalition.

This racialized foreign policy dogma reflected a broader increase in Southern racial anxieties towards the end of the 1950s, as events both at home and abroad threatened to upend Southern whites’ conception of racial hierarchy. At home, the US Supreme Court issued a series of crippling blows to school segregation, most notably in 1954 with Brown v. Board of Education and then the following year with Brown II. These rulings placed segregationists on the defensive and engendered a greater sense of urgency among white Southerners to protect Jim Crow. At the same time, global developments of the late 1950s marked the relative decline of white hegemony abroad, as numerous African nations began winning colonial independence after decades of European rule. Soon, many of these new countries began seeking official UN membership status, arousing deep discomfort among many racially conservative Southerners. “[O]nly qualified nations with stabalized [sic] experience, sound political and financial government [should] be admitted to the United Nations,” one Mississippian wrote to Senator Stennis in 1960. “None of the new African tribe governments meet these qualifications. Keep them out [of] UN and United States out of Africa if we expect to remain free and solvent.” As Dixie’s racial insecurities intensified, white Southerners increasingly began to equate pro-UN internationalism with racial liberalism. One segregationist interviewed in 1960 on world affairs summed up Southern resistance to engagement with non-Western countries:

We feed these people and they don’t like our ways. We don’t like theirs either, and we will let them be if they will reciprocate. But they want to run our private affairs and rewrite our Constitution when they are unable to run their own intelligently.

Clearly, many white Southerners resented the hostility of non-white UN member states to Southern racial codes, as well as the increasing racial diversity of the United Nations in general. Thus, by the close of the 1950s, Southern international opinion as a whole finally caught up with that of Washington’s Southern bloc, but not until after several years of an unusual policy disconnect.
A REVOLUTION IN REVERSE: EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCIES IN SOUTHERN OPINION

Given the prolonged discrepancy between elite and popular opinion, it may seem as if Southern opposition to the United Nations developed in a politically backwards order. After all, it is intuitive to believe that politicians would reflect—not precede—changes in home state opinion. Lerche regards this as a safe assumption, and indeed, substantial research over the years seemingly validates the representation argument. When it comes to the United Nations, however, Southern shifts in opinion pose serious challenges to this assumption, as politicians and regional activists turned against the organization before the majority of constituents.

In the end, the historical uniqueness of Southern politics offers arguably the most plausible explanation for the observed enigma. Throughout much of Southern history, structural forces produced a decidedly elitist bent to the region's politics. At one level, poll taxes, the white primary, and other suffrage requirements throughout the South limited electoral participation. At another, Democratic Party dominance of the region robbed Southerners of viable political alternatives that could provide mechanisms of accountability for politicians. Moreover, even among eligible voters, a combination of disinterest and lack of information produced stunningly low rates of voter turnout. All of these factors served to enhance the influence of wealthy, educated elites at the expense of ordinary Southerners. As historians Numan V. Bartley and V.O. Key, Jr. note, rural elites from areas of heavy black populations repeatedly employed these advantages to seize control over the direction of Southern politics. It would thus seem unsurprising if a similar group of elite activists guided the direction of Southern foreign policy during this time.

Additionally, Southerners’ comparative lack of political knowledge—particularly on foreign affairs—likely worked to produce initial difference between elite and mass opinion. With regard to the United Nations, Southerners as whole tended to be far less informed on UN activities than did Northerners. In 1955, for example, only 19 percent of Southerners compared with 34 percent of Northerners had ever heard of UNESCO, and an even smaller ratio of Southerners of than of Northerners who had heard of it could articulate a rough description of its purposes. Lack of popular awareness in the South on UN issues likely produced profound information asymmetry between elites and the ordinary Southerners. As the United Nations shifted focus rapidly during this time, it follows that information gaps would produce differences in elite and mass opinion.

With these facts in mind, a clear picture emerges to describe the staggered decline of Southern support for the international system. Throughout the early 1950s, many racially conservative Southerners remained unaware of the United Nation’s shift to promote
racial equality, and thus maintained positive views of the organization. At the same time, Southern political elites—a group particularly disposed towards writing letters to their representatives—responded more immediately to UN efforts with a growing hostility to the organization. Just as they had guided Southern politics on numerous occasions before, activist elites drove Dixie’s elected officials to adopt anti-UN positions in the early 1950s, a period when most Southerners retained favorable views of the United Nations. Hence Southern opinion split in the wake of racially progressive UN measures until the latter half of the decade, at which point the Southern public became more generally aware of UN actions. It is thus clear that positional shifts among Southern politicians presaged larger changes in regional opinion, and that Southern racial concerns provided at all levels the primary impetus for change.

THE TURN WITHIN: IMPLICATIONS AND AN ENDURING PAST

Fifteen years after ratification of the UN Charter, Dixie’s foreign policy doctrine had reversed itself entirely. Once the nation’s most outspokenly internationalist regional bloc, by 1959, Southerners had come to antagonize the very international system they helped to create. This drastic behavioral shift occurred within an unusually brief span of time, lasting fifteen years at most, and shaped course of American foreign policy in lasting ways. Stages within this change revealed profound information asymmetries between wealthy and ordinary Southerners and reflected a repeated theme in the region’s history—namely, the outsized influence of conservative elites upon Dixie’s elected representatives. Most importantly, events from this period show that Southern opposition to the United Nations did not emerge from the region’s economic upheaval, parochial culture, or any unique conception of sovereignty. Rather, Dixie’s unilateralist foreign policy derived from Southern whites’ own quest to maintain segregation and racial hierarchy at all costs. Seen through the lens of Jim Crow, it appears that the United Nations fell victim to the South’s racial insecurities. Viewed more broadly, the South’s mid-century foreign policy overhaul reflected a consistent theme in international history—namely that political constituencies in general interpret international affairs through a distinctly domestic lens.

In another sense, the rise of Southern hostility to the United Nations reflected the dawn of a new international era. For the first time in over three hundred years, the armies of Europe and the West receded across the globe throughout the postwar period. As Europe’s aged empires collapsed, so did the notion that Western civilization—and, by extension, the white race that formed it—was inherently superior to the darker-skinned peoples it dominated. In place of these colonial powers, non-white, Third World nations began for the first time in generations to govern themselves. As these new developing countries occu-
pied an increasing number of seats in the UN General Assembly, the darkening complexion of the United Nations appeared a sign of things to come. Given the pressure placed upon American white supremacists by the United Nations and its members, the end of Southern segregation can be seen as part of a much larger narrative, namely the global collapse of white supremacy. As white Southerners watched the world shift rapidly against their way of life, it only made sense that they should respond in kind. In this context, the abrupt fall of Southern internationalism proves highly understandable.

“The clerk will call the role,” Senator Chris Coons solemnly declared from atop the president’s desk. As the acting president pro tempore on December 4, 2012, the young Democratic Senator from Delaware bore witness throughout the day as progressives had grown increasingly despondent. By this point, members of the Senate's internationalist wing were resigning themselves to the inevitable: the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was, quite amazingly, about to fail. Over the course of that winter day, it became increasingly clear that the 67 votes needed for passage were simply nowhere to be found, and that a coalition of Southern and Midwestern Republicans stood poised to successfully stonewall the treaty. Ultimately, the Convention failed by six votes, effectively undermining US participation in a non-binding task force to advance global disability rights. “I said off the floor that this was a shameful day for the Senate, and I meant it,” Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa spat. Many observers were equally shocked. How, they wondered, could so many United States Senators oppose a measure so simple and so benign? As Senate business drew to a close, however, and as Southern opponents of the treaty left the chamber triumphant, ghosts of the South’s enduring past trailed close behind them.

NOTES

1. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this paper employs Julius Turner’s definition of the “the South.” Turner defines the term to include all eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma, which as a territory remained under Southern control throughout most of the Civil War. See Julius Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), 131.


4. Ibid., 9.


11. The Uncertain South, 273.

12. To quote from V.O. Key, Jr.’s seminal work on Southern politics, “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro. It is at times interpreted as the politics of cotton, as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrats…in the last analysis…[w]hatever phase of the Southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.” See Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949), 5. Key’s emphasis on the primacy of race in Southern political life runs throughout his work on the topic and informs much of modern scholarship on the issue to this day.


15. “Connally Shows Way,” Houston Post (Houston, TX), July 1945: found in Peter Molyneaux, Southern Weekly, July 11, 1945, 7.


22. “Connally’s Contribution,” Big Spring Daily Herald (Big Spring, TX), July 1945, reprinted in Molyneaux, Southern Weekly, July 11, 1945, 7.


28. AIPO 412 2/4/48 (3,185); NORC 157 and NORC 164 3/3/49 (1,300); NORC 143, 6/21/46 (1,307); NORC 243, 8/21/46 (1,286); AIPO 384; AIPO 386, 12/1/46; NORC 154, 12/4/47 (1,293); NORC 155, 2/25/48 (1,271); AIPO 417, 4/21/48 (3,165); NORC 160, 7/30/48 (1,300); AIPO 435, 1/5/49 (3,112); NORC 164, 3/3/49 (1,300); NORC 165, 4/19/49 (1,300); NORC 167, 6/30/49 (1,284); and NORC 171, 11/11/49 (1,300): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 230.

30. Granted, a number of developments in North Carolina made the state uniquely disposed towards the United Nations. As one of the boyhood homes of Woodrow Wilson, North Carolina took particular pride in Wilson’s accomplishments as president. Hence, many North Carolinians remained especially committed to the late president’s internationalist ideals. In 1937, political scientists at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill formed the Southern Council on International Relations. The group served to promote Wilsonian internationalism throughout the Southeast and translate much of those ideals into support for US involvement in World War II. In 1941, North Carolina’s General Assembly became the first legislative body in history to endorse the profoundly internationalist principles of world government. Indeed, United World Federalists first emerged from a convention of world government supporters in Asheville, North Carolina. Nonetheless, relative shifts in support for the UN among North Carolinians may well prove illustrative of fluctuations in sentiment across the South.

31. To offer an example, in April 1948, Pastor George W. Blount of the West Burlington Methodist Church submitted a world government petition with over 57 signatures. “We have five hundred members,” Blount wrote. “Not all of them have had the opportunity to sign this, but I feel that all would do so. These people feel…that a world government…is our only hope for preserving peace.” See 22 April 1948, Ibid., Box 184. Blount’s letter is but one of several letters representing large numbers of North Carolinians that cannot possibly be included in the space here.

32. 17 January 1950, petition, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 184, David M. Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Durham. “S. J. Ervin, Jr.” clearly refers to future United States Senator Samuel J. Ervin, who was serving on the North Carolina Supreme Court at the time of this petition. Senator Ervin would prove a staunch opponent of the UN actions generally.


35. 10 July 1947, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 184.

36. Telegram, March 1948, Ibid.

37. 13 February 1948, Ibid.


50. US Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

51. In initial negotiations over the Genocide Convention, US State Department officials successfully lobbied for language to limit significantly the scope and impact of the proposed treaty. While void of clear enforcement, however, Southern politicians still viewed the agreement as a potential justification for federal prosecution of lynching cases. See Brucken, *A Most Uncertain Crusade*, 171-9, and Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 129.


55. See *Augusta Chronicle* (Augusta, GA), December 9, 1948, and *Dallas Morning News* (Dallas, TX), December 10, 1948. On December 9th the Chronicle included a front-page story on Korea's induction into the UN while making no reference to the Genocide Convention's upcoming vote that afternoon. Similarly, on the following day, *Dallas Morning News* prioritized coverage of Israel's UN membership bid over passage of the Genocide Convention, which received only passing mention in the subsection of a larger page-two article.


59. W. E. B. Du Bois first suggested the idea of a UN petition to the NAACP's UN representative in a memorandum from late September 1946. In it, Du Bois notes, “The necessity of a document of this sort is emphasized by the fact that other groups of people, notably the Indians of South Africa, the Jews of Palestine, the Indonesians and others are making similar petitions.” See Papers of the NAACP, Part 14: Race Relations in the International Arena, 1940-1955, Group II, Series A, General Office File, United Nations, fol. 001439-014-0361. Also see Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire*, 85 for further background on how other international racial justice campaigns influenced black civil rights groups.


63. Civil Rights Congress, *We Charge Genocide*, xi, found in Ibid., 64.

64. “Chapter I: Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,”


68. US Const. art. VI, cl. 2.


72. Ibid.


74. Letter to J.A. Rayburn, 30 April 1950, Ibid.


76. May 1950, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 211, “The UN Genocide Treaty, 1950.”

77. 14 February 1951, issue correspondence, Ibid.

78. At first, joint US-UN operations in Korea proved effective at combating the southward aggression of communist forces under Kim Il-Sung. Under the leadership of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, allied troops managed to repel Kim’s army and even push Northern forces to the Chinese boarder. As Chinese forces entered the conflict and began making headway in against US troops, however, many Americans felt that other members of the United Nations had not contributed sufficiently to aid the coalition force. Polls inquiring on American satisfaction with the United Nations before and after Communist China’s entry into the conflict reveal a significant decline in public opinion for the organization nationwide. See NORC 288, 9/20/50 (1,254), and NORC 295, 12/28/50 (1,258), cited in Hero, *The Southerner and World Affairs*, 232.


84. C.E. Morgan to Senator James O. Eastland, 18 April 1953, ser. 3, subser. 1, Box 84 Eastland
Collection.


89. 100 Cong Rec S 2374-75 (1954).

90. 244.


92. See “International Organizations Contributions (H. J. Res. 334). Passage of bill,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 6 (December 13, 1950), 262-3; and “Gross (R Iowa) amendment to cut an additional $7,039,958 from the funds provided for United States contributions to international organizations: House Roll Vote No. 30,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13 (April 17, 1957), 338-9.


95. A map of this change reveals a relatively even distribution across the former Confederacy. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac 6, 262-3; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13, 338-9.

96. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac 5, 426-7; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 7, 262-3; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 9, 252-3; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 11; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13 (358-9).

97. Ibid., 430. It is important to note that before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Southern voting laws significantly restricted black access to the franchise, such that even in black-majority congressional districts, Southern whites continued to dominate electoral politics and elect white representatives to Congress. Counterintuitively, therefore, districts with large African-American populations tended throughout the early twentieth century to elect the most racially conservative members of the Southern congressional bloc.

98. Ibid., 398, 419, & 430.

99. Ruth A. Myers to Senator Strom Thurmond, 29 April 1955, , Correspondence Series, Box 14, fol. 157, Strom Thurmond Collection, Clemson University Library.

100. 15 January 1959, File Series 2, Subseries: Passports, Visas, Peace Corps and UN, Box 5, fol. 47, John Stennis Collection, Mississippi State University Library.


the-american-revolution-more-black-members.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The D.A.R. maintained a long record of excluding blacks members. The organization’s racial views proved so backward that Eleanor Roosevelt renounced her membership.


104. NORC 143; NORC 243; AIO 384; AIO 386; NORC 164; NORC 155; AIO 417; NORC 160; AIO 435; NORC 164; NORC 165; NORC 167; NORC 307; 5/24/51 (1,282); NORC 314, 11/22/51 (1,237); NORC 325, 5/28/52 (1,262); NORC 341-2, 6/30/53 (1,291); NORC 347, 8/21/53; NORC 337, 2/11/53 (1,291); NORC 351, 1/21/54 (1,300); NORC 374, 8/4/55 (526); NORC 386, 4/20/56 (1,226); and NORC 339, 11/15/56 (1,286): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 230.

105. NORC 155; NORC 157; NORC 158, 6/2/48 (1,295); NORC 162, 11/23/48 (1,300); AIO 462, 9/29/50 (1,500); NORC 307, 5/24/51 (1,282); AIO 517, 7/2/53 (1,545); AIO 574, 11/7/56 (1,505); and AIPO release of 11/18/56: cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 229.


108. AIPO 637, 10/18/60 (2,993): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 238.

109. In 1946, for example, college-educated white Southerners who said that blacks were inherently less intelligent and who opposed Truman’s civil rights program proved about as likely as racial progressives to believe in strengthening the United Nations. See Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 389.

110. Ibid., 397.

111. NORC 386, 4/20/56 (1,224), and NORC 390, 6/26/56 (1,275): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 398.


113. Walter Sillers to Senator John Stennis, telegram, 1 September 1960, File Series 2, Subseries: Passports, Visas, Peace Corps and UN, Box 5, fol. 47, John Stennis Collection, Mississippi State University Library.


115. Ibid., 420.

116. The Uncertain South, 26.


118. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 303-4; Lerche, The Uncertain South, 158.

119. Between 1920 and 1946, no Southern state exceeded a voter participation average of over 30 percent in elections for United States Senate, compared with New York’s and Ohio’s averages of 60 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Turnout for congressional elections proved even more abysmal, ranging between 14.5 percent and 25 percent, compared with New York State’s 55 percent average. See Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 489-90, 501, 506.

120. Ibid., 307-9; and William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 678.

121. For specific instances, see Ibid., 9, 329; and Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance.


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DIXIE TURNS WITHIN

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**TITLE IMAGE**

Associated Press. President Truman and American Delegation Watching Senator Tom
As a result of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil embargo and decision to institute dramatic production cuts that quadrupled the price of oil, the United States plunged into a national energy crisis in the 1970s. By examining internal correspondence and meeting records from the Ford Memoranda of Conversations, Amin Mirzadegan ’17 argues that despite their rhetoric claiming otherwise, President Richard Nixon, President Gerald Ford, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger prioritized maintaining positive relations with Iran over attempting to curtail the spiraling price of oil. Ultimately, this choice played a key role in the fall of the Shah’s government and Saudi Arabia’s supersession of Iran as the United States’ crucial ally in the Middle East.

By Amin Mirzadegan, SM ’17
Written for “Energy in American History”
Professor Paul Sabin
Edited by Simon Horn, Maxwell Ulin, and Graham Ambrose
“I will do everything I can to hold down the price of foreign oil. The American people cannot afford to pay such prices, and I can assure you that we will not have to pay them.” President Richard Nixon’s address from the White House about the national energy crisis on January 19, 1974 called upon millions of Americans to have faith in their president’s efforts to curtail the skyrocketing price of oil and end its ravaging of the American consumer’s wallet. Just a few weeks earlier on October 20, 1973, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had declared an oil embargo on America and much of the Western world while also instating massive production cuts that quadrupled the price of oil by 1974. Nixon’s efforts to hold down oil prices were ultimately futile: by the time he left office in August 1974, prices were still 215 percent above the pre-embargo level, even though the embargo ended in March 1974. Oil prices continued to increase from 1974 to 1978, rising by 18 percent during President Gerald Ford’s time in office. There were, of course, limits on the extent to which the president could control foreign oil prices. But did Nixon and Ford do everything in their power to attempt to lower prices? This paper will argue that Nixon’s claim that he would do anything he could to decrease oil prices was disingenuous and that he did not in fact consider lowering oil prices an immediate strategic objective. Internal correspondence and meeting records from the Ford Memoranda of Conversations show that the White House carefully weighed the value of pressuring Iran to lower oil prices against the benefits of maintaining strong relations with Iran for the sake of fighting communism in the Middle East.

Nixon and Ford, along with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, possessed the power to exert pressure on the Shah and fight the oil price increases from 1974 to 1976. Yet both administrations abstained due to political calculus: to them, the value of maintaining positive relations with the Shah of Iran outweighed the adverse economic effects of higher oil prices. These men believed that a short-term increase in oil price was a necessary tradeoff for a stable Middle East, and that future increases in global oil production would bring prices back down to normal levels. In the Cold War atmosphere of the 1970s, achieving geopolitical aims was of primary importance to Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford; dealing with short-term oil supply problems and domestic economic suffering came second. Ironically, and inadvertently, this strategic choice caused the demise of the Shah’s government, a severe souring of American-Iranian relations, and Saudi Arabia’s supplanting of Iran as America’s main strategic ally in the Middle East.

PRESIDENT NIXON

Nixon’s relationship with Shah Reza Pahlavi of Iran had its origins in the 1950s, when Nixon was Dwight D. Eisenhower’s vice president; however, his strategic partnership with the Shah began in earnest in 1969. On July 26, 1969, in the middle of an international
tour, President Nixon made a fateful speech at a stopover in Guam. Nixon’s proclamation, which would come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, stated, “We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.”6 The Doctrine was initially aimed toward satisfying Nixon’s 1968 campaign promise of an honorable withdrawal from Vietnam via the “Vietnamization of the Vietnam War.” But a consequence of Nixon’s promise to “furnish military and economic assistance when requested” was an explosion in the amount military aid provided to US allies in the Persian Gulf, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia.7 Simultaneously, Britain’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 created a power vacuum that the Shah, with financial and military backing from America, eagerly filled.8

The Shah had grand visions for his country. As his coffers filled with oil revenues in the 1970s, he embarked on Iran’s Fifth Development Plan (1973-77), Iran’s version of China’s “Great Leap Forward” that increased public and private sector investment from $36.8 billion to $69.6 billion and increased Iran’s military spending from $844 million in 1970 to $9.4 billion in 1977.9 Nixon gave the Shah unlimited access to America’s arsenal, and the Shah eagerly spent his country’s petrodollars on American military equipment.10

The source of the Shah’s newfound wealth was the skyrocketing of oil prices, which started in November 1973 with the OPEC oil embargo and production cuts. On November 25, 1973, the Arab countries of OPEC placed an embargo on the United States and other Western countries in retaliation for their support of Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Unlike the rest of the Arab oil producers, Iran did not participate in the embargo. However, the Shah pushed the most aggressively for the price increase, lifting the posted price of crude oil from $4.30 to over $10.11 The sudden hike in oil prices ravaged the American economy in early 1974. America’s Gross National Product (GNP) plummeted by six percent between 1973 and 1975, and unemployment doubled to nine percent.12 Although these adverse economic effects alarmed the Nixon administration, Nixon himself had developed an intimate strategic and personal relationship with the Shah. As a result, Nixon did not balk at the skyrocketing oil prices even though his personal ally represented the driving force behind OPEC’s biggest price increases. Thus, Nixon’s effort to reduce oil prices consisted of writing a letter to the Shah haltingly asking for some moderation with regard to the oil price increases. In The Prize, historian Daniel Yergin refers to this letter as “a very strong private letter to the Shah,” but Yergin fails to address that the appeal was nothing more than a letter, a mere statement on a piece of paper.13 When the Shah rebuffed Nixon with a “brief and unforgiving” response, Nixon essentially folded and continued to sell increasing numbers of armaments to the Shah. If Nixon were serious about lowering prices, he had incredible leverage at his disposal: America was the Shah’s main military arms supplier, and the US could have cut military supplies just as easily as Iran had
hiked oil prices.

Nixon undoubtedly recognized the detrimental effect of high oil prices on the American and global economies: inflation in America reached 11 percent in 1974. Yet he nonetheless refused to exert pressure on the Shah because of Iran’s importance to his administration’s Cold War grand strategy. Cheap oil was important for America’s economic prosperity, but not as critical as keeping Iran as a strong ally and bulwark against Communism in the turbulent Middle East of the 1970s. Instead, Nixon made public proclamations about the necessity of conservation and how he was attempting to pressure the Middle Eastern oil producers to reduce prices. In a November 25, 1973 address to the nation, the President preached conservation and touted his “Project Independence,” an energy conservation and development plan. “Tonight I ask all of you to join together in moving toward that goal,” Nixon implored, “with the spirit of discipline, self-restraint, and unity which is the cornerstone of our great and good country.” Nixon shrouded his lack of action with patriotic rhetoric and appeals to “discipline” and “self-restraint.” Ironically, while Nixon preached to his citizens and called upon them to make personal sacrifices, he failed to communicate that he was scarcely applying pressure on the Shah at all, and that in 1974 the United States was still selling $8.4 billion in military supplies and services to Iran.

Nixon’s exchange with Iranian Foreign Minister Ardeshir Zahedi in 1970 revealed an even deeper divide between Nixon’s public statements and his private actions regarding oil prices and the Shah. On May 14, 1970, Nixon hosted a meeting at the White House for foreign ministers of the Central Treaty Organization, an alliance of anti-communist countries in Asia. At the end of the meeting, Nixon called Zahedi over to a small room off the Oval Office, and he requested that Zahedi relay a message to the Shah: “Tell the Shah you can push [us] as much as you want [on oil prices],” The Shah would never forget this implicit blessing. Nixon had given him the confidence to aggressively pursue higher prices in the coming years.

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER

Secretary of State Kissinger was Nixon’s closest adviser during his presidency, and Nixon became even more dependent on Kissinger to guide foreign policy as he became mired in the Watergate scandal in early 1974. Steven Bosworth, director of the State Department’s Office of Fuels and Energy, said in 1974 during the Watergate scandal that “‘there was no real decision-making apparatus in Washington — other than Henry Kissinger.’” Although Kissinger’s formal title was Secretary of State, he also became heavily involved in formulating American energy policy during the embargo and proceeding years. His unique brand of realpolitik as a Cold War strategy calculated that Iran was a better long-term ally than Saudi Arabia.
Kissinger’s logic was manifold. Primarily, Iran had consistently opposed using oil as a weapon to force America’s hand in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which Kissinger believed showed restraint and sophisticated geopolitical understanding. In contrast, Saudi Arabia heavily depended on oil as a means of placing pressure on the US to reduce its support for Israel. The fact that Saudi Arabia was willing to leverage oil against the United States convinced Kissinger that Saudi Arabia was not willing to work with America on national security issues. He thought of Saudi Arabia as little more than a sparsely populated country that happened to have large oil reserves; it was not a nation suited for a major/important role on the world stage like Iran. Even before the embargo in May 1973, Kissinger stated to Deputy Secretary of Defense Bill Clements, “We wouldn’t give a damn about Saudi Arabia if it didn’t have most of the oil in the region.”

Finding the Shah a keen political thinker, Kissinger also enjoyed being able to strategize with the Shah and appreciated hearing the Shah’s perspective on Middle Eastern affairs. In his diary, Asadollah Alam, the Shah’s closest adviser and Minister of the Imperial Court, recounted how Henry Kissinger “was full of praise for [the Shah], saying how much he wished President Ford could emulate his example.” Kissinger calculated that high oil prices for a few years would be an acceptable price to pay for appeasing a strong leader and close ally like the Shah.

In addition to his personal admiration for the Shah, Kissinger also valued the Shah as an important deterrent to Soviet aggression in the Middle East. During a meeting with Defense Secretary James Schlesinger at the Pentagon on August 9, 1973, Kissinger expressed concern that he would not have any idea what to do if the Soviets were to attack Iran. Suggesting a potential preventative measure, Schlesinger responded, “In Iran, for example, if we were to fly in some F-lls, we convey a message.” Schlesinger understood Iran’s strategic significance, and he was willing to put the US Air Force through a risky operation to protect Iran from Soviet aggression. Kissinger responded that they needed tangible military plans to protect their “main asset” in the Middle East.

While Kissinger was making such plans to defend Iran and the Shah, he was also making contingency plans with the Shah to invade Saudi Arabia and capture its vast oil fields if a crisis occurred between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis seemed aware that Kissinger was plotting against them; in an August 1975 letter from former US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins to then Treasury Secretary William Simon, Akins wrote, “Zaki Yamani has told me he is convinced we are now working closely with the Shah and that in the next Mideast war the Shah will be sent across the Gulf to occupy the Arab oil fields.” Akins relayed the Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani’s concern with Kissinger’s bias against Saudi Arabia. Thus, while Kissinger’s personal relationship with the Shah was flourishing, the America-Saudi Arabia relationship was deteriorating.

In the sphere of geopolitical value, Kissinger unabashedly favored the Shah over
Saudi Arabia. But even in terms of energy policy, Kissinger seemed to support the Shah despite his more aggressive price policies. According to Daniel Yergin, “By far the most aggressive and outspoken country [in terms of increasing oil prices] was Iran.” While Iran argued for $11.65 as the new posted price per barrel at the December 1973 OPEC meeting in Tehran, Saudi Arabia pushed for the lowest price within OPEC, at $8 per barrel. Since the Shah was the primary oil price hawk and Saudi Arabia was the dove, it would make sense that even somebody as smitten with the Shah as Kissinger might set aside personal biases and support Saudi Arabia’s efforts to increase oil production and decrease prices. However, Kissinger’s conversations with White House officials proved that his preference for and support of the Shah extended into resistance toward decreasing oil prices, which runs counter to the Nixon and Ford administrations’ claims that they were working to decrease prices.

In a November 1974 conversation between Kissinger and Treasury Secretary Simon, Simon questioned the Shah’s arithmetic calculations regarding a potential price increase, but Kissinger was quick to come to the Shah’s defense:

Simon: The Shah’s addition was wrong.
Kissinger: In foreign policy the Shah is the only one we can count on. He’s offered to buy C-5’s to keep our production lines open; he’s offered to let us refuel in a Mideast war. I think the Saudis use him as an excuse. Within two years we will be awash with oil.
Simon: I couldn’t agree more. When the North Sea, the North Slope and Mexico come in, that will do it.26

Kissinger and Simon’s comments reveal their belief that the high oil prices were a temporary aberration caused by unnaturally tight demand from 1973-74. The North Sea and the North Slope were notoriously difficult drilling operations that were not financially feasible until prices increased, and Kissinger and Simon believed these fields would fill the gap in supply and US dependence on OPEC would diminish within two years. Their confidence that there was plenty of oil and it was simply a matter of time before other projects began producing and drove the oil price down again stands in stark contrast to the “limits of growth” theory published in 1972, which essentially affirmed M. King Hubbert’s Peak Oil theory. It seems that White House officials had a radically different view about the global oil supply compared to the general public, perhaps explaining why Nixon and Kissinger were not as concerned with the temporary oil supply crunch.

This conversation also reveals numerous reasons why Kissinger valued maintaining a positive relationship with the Shah. For one, Iran’s massive military purchases kept American factories busy during an economic downturn. Additionally, the Shah offered to provide
the US with military support in a crucial region of the world. Kissinger also criticized the Saudis directly after extolling the Shah, juxtaposing his opinions of the two countries and capturing his strong feelings about the two countries.

However, some officials within the White House did not share Kissinger’s unquestioning loyalty to the Shah. In a May 1973 conversation between Kissinger and Deputy Secretary of State Bill Clements, Clements suggested that Kissinger was not giving due consideration to Saudi Arabia’s strategic significance:

Mr. Clements: This Shah-Saudi relationship is overplayed. [Saudi Arabian King] Faisal is looking for signals from the US. He is worried that his direct communication with us is not as strong as Iran’s. It’s improving and he hopes in time it will be equally good. But he has serious misgivings about an Iranian battalion in Oman. These cables talking about how the Shah and Jordan could take over Saudi Arabia in case of a rebellion are bad business.
Mr. Kissinger: Why is it bad business?
Mr. Clements: We can get in an awful jam.
Mr. Clements: We should be giving more attention to Saudi Arabia itself. There are many things we could do to strengthen its position. The Shah is telling everyone how unstable Saudi Arabia is. He’s been forecasting doom for the last five years.30

Although Saudi Arabia’s role in targeting America in the November 1973 embargo might have eventually soured Clements’ view of Saudi Arabia, in May 1973 he nevertheless beseeched Kissinger to “strengthen its position” and pay more attention to the country. Clements also referred to Kissinger’s contingency plans for Iran and Jordan to invade Saudi Arabia as “bad business,” to which Kissinger responded, “Why is it bad business?” implying that he did not see shortcomings of disregarding Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty.

Kissinger and Clements were not contriving a rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia just for contingency’s sake— the animosity was very real. The fundamental difference between Iran and Saudi Arabia, aside from their Shiite and Sunni religious divide, was economic, primarily stemming from a difference in opinion over the pace of oil production. Producers like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates were content to let their oil sit in the ground because they had much larger proven reserves than Iran and their economies could not absorb the petrodollars in the near-term. Iran, on the other hand, had built its entire 1970s budget plan on increasing oil prices to finance the Shah’s rapid industrialization and arms purchases. The Shah knew that his proven reserves were significantly smaller than Saudi Arabia’s, so he wanted to extract as much as he could while oil prices were high. Iran pushed for 10 to 20 percent annual oil price increases from 1974 until 1977, while Saudi Arabia preached moderation and often called for price freezes.31
Therefore, there was a fundamental conflict within OPEC: the Saudi Arabian camp wanted lower prices and slower, prolonged production, while the Shah and his allies within OPEC pushed for cutting production to increase prices.

Saudi Arabia had another motive for seeking lower prices: fear of Iran’s rapid development and ascension. The high oil prices were strengthening Iran vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia: while the Shah was able to pour the petrodollars into Iran’s economy and military, Saudi Arabia’s smaller economy could not handle the influx of petrodollars. In effect, the Saudis were forced to invest the petrodollars in foreign countries and offshore accounts rather than in their own domestic economy. In a conversation with President Nixon in July 1974, Treasury Secretary Simon brought up this fundamental difference in the two countries’ production philosophies:

Simon: In discussions with other Ministers I said Saudi Arabia has probably 150 years of production left, whereas Iran has only 15 years. Maybe Iran will build its industry and then when the oil runs out, they can take you and get the oil back.

Simon cautioned the Saudi Arabian ministers that Iran would develop at such a breakneck pace that even when they ran out of oil, they would simply seize Saudi oil fields because they would be industrially and militarily superior. This was not the only instance where Simon would show his belief that Iran was a threat to the region’s stability and that Saudi Arabia thus was a more valuable strategic asset than Iran.

**TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON**

If Kissinger was the Shah-loving, realpolitik-embracing Secretary of State, William Edward Simon was his Saudi-leaning foil in the Nixon and Ford White Houses. Simon, an investment banker by trade, had served as the senior partner in charge of the government and municipal bond trading desk at the famed Wall Street firm Salomon Brothers until President Nixon tapped him in January 1973 to serve as Deputy Secretary of the Treasury. In December 1973, Nixon chose Simon to administer the Federal Energy Administration and serve as Nixon’s “Energy Czar” during the 1973 crisis. He then served as Treasury Secretary from May 1974 to January 1977, presiding over the tumultuous transition of power from Nixon to Ford and their accompanying energy policies.

Simon was a champion of free markets. Since the oil market was dominated by two main producers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, his simple calculus was that the easiest solution to the oil supply problems from 1973-76 was to align with Saudi Arabia, the supplier that was pushing for lower prices and provided the greater quantity of reserves in the long term. He also believed the Shah was untrustworthy and reckless in his pursuit of military domi-
nance. Simon sympathized with the Saudi rulers’ feelings of insecurity caused by an ascendant Iran and thought Saudi Arabia was being unfairly demonized for its role in the oil price increases. Simon recognized that the Saudis were the most dovish members of OPEC and that the Shah was the main price hawk. He thus reasoned that America would be better off in the long-term if aligned with the Saudis, both because of their larger reserves and because of Simon’s own close personal relationship with Saudi Oil Minister Zaki Yamani, who actually stayed at Simon’s home in McLean, Virginia during visits to Washington, D.C. Simon even maintained a private back-channel communication line with Yamani to avoid going through Kissinger.

Simon did not believe in Nixon and Kissinger’s Cold War realpolitik. He was a numbers man, and the numbers pointed toward warming relations with Saudi Arabia and cooling relations with Iran. Simon calculated that the Saudis had 150 years of oil reserves while the Shah only had 15 years, so from a numbers perspective, America’s long-term energy needs would be better satisfied by aligning with Saudi Arabia. Simon also saw the Shah as “a nut … He wants to be a superpower. He is putting all his oil profits into domestic investment, mostly military hardware.” Simon made sure his comments were publicly known, evidencing his low regard for the Shah.

According to a piece published in Foreign Policy by V.H. Oppenheim in the winter of 1976, Kissinger supported Iran’s hawkish pursuit of oil price increases in 1974 because he wanted the Shah to be able to finance military purchases to strengthen Iran as a buffer against the USSR and an ally of Israel. The Shah saw the high oil prices as a temporary issue that would allow him to develop his military rapidly for a few years, after which more non-Middle Eastern oil fields would add to global production and push the price back. According to Oppenheim, Kissinger also pushed for price increases because the higher prices would boost US corporate profits from the production stage while strengthening America vis-à-vis Japan and Europe, who were more vulnerable to Middle East oil price spikes since they imported a greater percentage of their oil from the Middle East.

In addition to his skepticism regarding Kissinger’s actions with oil prices, Oppenheim also wrote that the Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Schlesinger stated that the Saudis wanted to prevent the price spikes after the embargo was lifted, but Kissinger and the American government discouraged them. Ambassador Akins said in 1976, “the Saudis were open to negating the price increases pushed for by the Shah but the administration repeatedly was against it.” Unlike Oppenheim, this paper does not argue that Kissinger, Nixon, and Ford pushed the Shah to increase global oil prices. Rather, the Nixon and Ford administrations did not resist and perhaps even condoned the price increases. For them, energy policy was a tool for achieving geopolitical aims.

Although Oppenheim’s view was rather alarmist and not widely shared, it was not a unique one. Jack Anderson, a Washington Post investigative journalist, argued in 1978 that
Kissinger and Nixon had been planning to arm the Shah since the late 1960s, when they knew that the British withdrawal from the Middle East would create a power vacuum, and so they did nothing to stop him from increasing oil prices in 1974. The Shah wanted to purchase more military hardware from the United States, so he continued to raise oil prices in 1974. Even though the American domestic economy was suffering, Kissinger and Nixon did not forcefully intervene with the Shah.

In a letter written by former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins to Secretary of Treasury William Simon in August 1975, Akins explicitly referred to the Saudi belief that Henry Kissinger was duplicitous about oil price increases. Akins wrote, “He [Saudi oil minister Zaki Yamani] told me he ‘knows’ Kissinger is following the old Enders’ line of speaking about lower oil prices but in secret doing everything possible to jack them up. This will enable him to unite the consumers in a front against the producers, particularly the Arabs.” According to Akins, Kissinger also threatened Yamani with political retribution if Saudi Arabia did not cease its price increases. Meanwhile, the Shah was calling for a 15 percent price increase, and Kissinger was not protesting. Akins captured Kissinger’s price duplicity when he wrote, “Yamani also said the Shah told him that while in the States ‘the Americans’ understood why the oil price increases had to be established. Prince Saud, who was at the meeting with the Shah, confirmed that the Shah had indeed said this. Kissinger denied it to Yamani, of course.”

Ironically, though Saudi Arabia was the price dove compared to hawkish Iran, Kissinger was pressuring Saudi Arabia on prices rather than Iran. Perhaps Kissinger was not opposed to price increases. Instead, he was acutely aware of the political tool he wielded and knew who should be increasing the prices. Kissinger valued America’s relationship with Iran more than its relationship with Saudi Arabia, and he was very reluctant to place pressure on the Shah to lower prices.

Nixon shared this reluctance to place any pressure on the Shah to reduce oil prices. He viewed the price increases as a necessary price for stability and maintaining America’s close relationship with the Shah, the new policeman of the Middle East. In a conversation between Nixon and Treasury Secretary Simon in July 1974, Nixon advised Simon to push King Faisal of Saudi Arabia for oil price cuts during his visit. “I have already raised with King Faisal privately,” Nixon said, “and you can do the same, that current oil prices cannot go on. This, of course, will have to be done very privately. I doubt that you can do very much as long as the Shah holds up the prices, but we want to explore whatever might be possible.” The juxtaposition of Nixon’s approach toward Saudi Arabia and Iran was apparent: the stern, enforcing line of “current oil prices cannot go on” put the onus of reducing oil prices on the Saudis, while Nixon’s passive, almost fatalistic line (“I doubt that you can do very much as long as the Shah holds up the prices”) showed his view of the non-negotiability of the Shah’s price increases. Simon pushed back and asked if he could put pressure on the Shah to reduce prices:
Simon: Is it possible to put pressure on the Shah?
Nixon: You are not going there.
Simon: No. We thought we would let them sweat a bit while we were discussing goodies with the Arabs.
Nixon: He is our best friend. Any pressure probably would have to come from me.\textsuperscript{46}

Nixon explicitly referred to the Shah as “our best friend” and admonished Simon for even suggesting that he could put pressure on the Shah. The pressure that “probably would have to come from” Nixon never materialized.

Three weeks later on July 30, 1974, when Simon had returned from his Middle East trip, he once again warned Nixon that the Shah was threatening to cut production, much to Saudi Arabia’s chagrin. Simon relayed King Faisal of Saudi Arabia’s request that Nixon help rein in the Shah’s hawkish pursuit of higher oil prices. Nixon responded, “We have to see what we can do. I will have to meet and talk with the Shah.”\textsuperscript{47} Nixon did not ask Simon to deal with the Shah, he asked him to deal with King Faisal, Anwar Sadat, and nearly every other nation’s leader. Instead, Nixon insisted that he himself would have to apply the pressure and negotiate with the Shah. Nixon dealt with the Shah with greater sensitivity than he did with the leaders of other Middle Eastern countries both because of Iran’s geostrategic significance and because lowering oil prices was not one of Nixon’s immediate concerns in 1974.

While Kissinger shared Nixon’s view that the Shah deserved special treatment, Simon’s background in economics and his role as Treasury Secretary provided him a different perspective. Simon viewed the world in a fundamentally different manner than Kissinger and Nixon; he focused on American price stability and international financial markets rather than Cold War proxy battles and “pillars of stability” in the Middle East. Simon, as Treasury Secretary, was alarmed by inflation and high oil prices. He told Nixon in 1974, “The situation is troublesome — there are a number of producers with a lot of money, nowhere to spend it, and the banks and financial markets are in trouble. Oil prices have created great instability in the international financial markets.”\textsuperscript{48} His primary economic mission was to reduce oil prices in the most efficient manner possible, and that path lay with Saudi Arabia.

Kissinger, on the other hand, believed his primary duty as Secretary of State was advancing US political power through \textit{realpolitik}. “I don’t want to run economic policy,” Kissinger stated in a November 1974 conversation with Simon, “I just want to give it a conceptual basis.”\textsuperscript{49} Kissinger was acutely aware of his economic ignorance, yet he nevertheless made fundamentally economic decisions about oil prices that wreaked havoc on the American economy.

Simon was willing to significantly curtail American support for the Shah, or at least
step up to him and force him to back down on price issues. This would place him in conflict with the adamantly pro-Shah Kissinger. As early as the summer of 1974, tensions were boiling within the White House. During a conversation between Kissinger and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, the two men discussed various contingency plans for bringing down the price of oil. The most pragmatic plan was to arrange reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states in order to remove the impetus and public reason for the Arab producers’ push for higher oil prices to punish America for supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur War. They also discussed more outlandish plans, such as seizing Abu Dhabi, which Schlesinger brought up on two separate occasions during their conversation in the Pentagon over breakfast:

Kissinger: Another oil crisis would be bad.
Schlesinger: We might have to seize Abu Dhabi.
Kissinger: Do we have contingency plans to handle Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia?
Schlesinger: It would take a lot of men and ships. We could put a couple of brigades in Diego Garcia.\(^50\)

Kissinger and Schlesinger, two men in the upper echelon of the Nixon administration, earnestly considered invading Abu Dhabi in order to prevent future oil price increases. Schlesinger only brought up the Shah as an insult to Bill Simon: “Simon is talking about breaking the Shah. That’s crazy.”\(^51\) Kissinger responded that “He [the Shah] is the one real element of stability,” and then they moved on to discussing other contingency plans. The Shah was considered nearly untouchable within the State and Defense departments. Kissinger and Schlesinger would rather have resorted to invading Abu Dhabi than even consider talking to the Shah about decreasing oil prices.

If Simon had any window of opportunity in the summer of 1974 to advance his pro-Saudi view, it vanished in August when Nixon resigned. Simon now had to persuade an entirely new president to see his point of view. Kissinger, on the other hand, ensured that the transition from Nixon to Ford did not pose a problem for his Middle East agenda. In Ford’s foreign affairs briefing with Kissinger during his first week in office, Kissinger made sure that he carried on Nixon’s affinity for and favorable policy toward the Shah into the Ford Administration:

Kissinger: But we can’t afford another embargo. If we are faced with that, we may have to take some oil fields.
Ford: Like the Gulf and Iran.
Kissinger: Not Iran. I oppose Simon because Iran wouldn’t join an embargo.\(^52\)
Ford’s first inclination was to lump “the Gulf and Iran” together in terms of political importance, but Kissinger quickly separated the significance of the two entities and dismissed Ford with two words: “Not Iran.” Kissinger also carried his rivalry with Simon over the Shah into the Ford White House.

DOHA AGREEMENT

Kissinger and Ford resisted Simon's calls for price moderation until an internal war within the White House caused Simon to broker a production deal with Saudi Arabia in December 1976, referred to as the “Doha Agreement” by historian Andrew Scott Cooper. The accord created a two-tier pricing system in OPEC and abated the pace of price increases. At the OPEC meeting in Doha in December 1976, Saudi Arabia and the UAE agreed to increase their oil price by 5 percent, while the rest of OPEC increased theirs by 10 percent. However, Saudi Arabia boosted production on such a large scale that oil prices actually declined.

The two-tier pricing system created at the Doha Conference represented a remarkable turning point in the Shah’s relationship with the White House. The White House had finally taken decisive action against the Shah’s monomaniacal pursuit of higher oil prices, and White House officials had gone behind the Shah’s back to execute the plan. The Ford administration at last made an impact on preventing rapid oil price increases, but not until American consumers had already suffered through years of inflation and economic stagnation.

Inadvertently and ironically, the Doha Agreement in 1976 caused a near collapse of Iran’s economy in 1977. Because of the two-tier pricing system, oil production in Iran had nosedived. The resulting economic catastrophe played a major factor in the Shah’s overthrow in 1979, completely undermining the “two pillar” strategy of the Nixon Doctrine that Kissinger had fought so hard to enforce.

CONCLUSION

The American people paid a high toll for the sustained OPEC oil price increases from 1973-1977. Inflation, unemployment, and gas lines caused much anguish and suffering. Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford all had opportunities to prevent or at least slow these prolonged price increases, had they pressed the Shah of Iran to increase production. Instead, White House leaders allowed a foreign dictator to squeeze American consumers in exchange for providing a buffer against Soviet encroachment in the Middle East. Under the Nixon and Ford administrations, grand strategy and Cold War politics took precedence over domestic economic and energy supply problems. Nixon and Ford’s public statements
about fighting foreign oil producers to lower prices belied their actual actions and intentions. Nixon and Kissinger passively resisted and even condoned the price increases as a mechanism for achieving geopolitical aims. The American government in the 1970s was willing to make disadvantageous economic allies for the sake of Cold War political objectives, causing domestic economic distress and impacting future stability in the Middle East. One could argue that by not ceasing the Shah’s hawkish oil price increases and selling him American armaments, Nixon enabled him to attempt to industrialize and militarize Iran at breakneck pace, ultimately accelerating and precipitating his downfall in 1979. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 dissolved the “two pillar” strategy and pitted Iran against Saudi Arabia in an economic battle, while also alienating Iran from the United States and aligning Saudi Arabia and the United States even more closely.

NOTES


3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


11. “Crude Oil Price History Chart.”


13. Ibid, 626.


17. Cooper, The Oil Kings, 42.
25. Ibid.
28. Hubbert’s theory is that “peak oil” will occur when the maximum rate of petroleum extraction is reached, and after that period of terminal decline will ensue. Therefore, Hubbert posits that a finite supply of oil exists in the world and that the supply will reach its peak extraction by 1970.
29. The most visible sign of OPEC's supply cuts was the “gas lines,” the many-hour-long lines that formed at gas stations in 1974. The public’s access to information about global oil supply was obviously very restricted, so it is understandable why they would see the gas lines as a sign of permanently shrinking global oil supply.
32. Ibid.
35. Cooper, “Showdown at Doha,” 578
36. Ibid.,
38. Cooper, The Oil Kings, 176.
42. Anderson, “Saudis Suspect an Iran-US Plot.”
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
53. Cooper, “Showdown at Doha.”

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TITLE IMAGE

The profound devastation caused by the American Civil War, as well as the transformation that occurred in its wake, forever altered America’s national identity. Zooming in, Isabelle Taft ’17 examines how the war’s legacy shaped the character of the fraternity Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE). Analyzing publications, correspondence, and speeches, Taft reveals how the memory of the Civil War influenced SAE policy—initially functioning as a barrier against Northern expansion, it eventually became a source of motivation for extending the fraternity’s reach above the Mason-Dixon line. Yet, even as a national fraternity inspired by the goal of overcoming sectionalism, SAE retained its link to Southern history and culture.

By Isabelle Taft, SM ’17
Written for “Problems in American Historical Memory the Civil War”
Professor David Blight
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Edited by Andrew Tran, Bernard Stanford, and Noah Daponte-Smith
William Brandon was already known as one of Sigma Alpha Epsilon’s guiding lights when he took the stage at the fraternity’s 1914 convention in Chicago. SAE, founded at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa in 1856, had survived the Civil War to become one of the nation’s largest fraternities, with 15,000 members—within striking distance of the older, better known and originally Northern Delta Kappa Epsilon. An Alabama judge and University of Alabama alumnus, Brandon had previously served as Eminent Supreme Archon—national president—and gained a reputation as an excellent orator. Brandon was proud to declare his roots in the “Sun-kist hills of Alabama” and his romantic toasts, with titles like “Down Where the Magnolias Bloom,” could bring to its feet an audience comprised of brothers from all over the nation. At the Chicago convention, “General Brandon,” as he was called because of his service in the Spanish-American War, was so overcome with fraternal feeling that he declared, “My father surrendered at Appomattox, but I surrendered at Chicago!”

The remark was meant to convey that this convention had been truly first-rate. But it also showed that only in the context of his national fraternity gathering could this Son of the South fully renounce sectionalism. It demonstrated the Civil War was still a potent presence in the minds of many Americans any time they gathered across sectional lines. And it indicated that, to Brandon at least, the fraternity symbolized the importance and power of the nation itself. Where his father had surrendered to Federal troops, Brandon had surrendered to the nationwide embrace of Sigma Alpha Epsilon. Brandon was met with riotous applause. An observer wrote that the phrase “seemed to express the spirit of the convention precisely. All of us surrendered at Chicago ... it was a willing surrender, for we were not conquered by arms of steel or at the cannon’s mouth, but we surrendered to the spirit of brotherly affection.” Brandon’s address celebrated both the nationalization of the fraternity and a new era of unity for the country, even as he waxed poetic about “the classic shades of old Tuscaloosa” where SAE was born. He spoke of surrender, but it was not clear what he had given up.

As the weekend wore on, other convention events would highlight simultaneously the fraternity’s old Southern roots and new national outlook. Eminent Supreme Archon Marvin E. Holderness, a Vanderbilt alumnus, celebrated the fraternity’s “conquest of nation-wide extension” from her Southern origins, and the convention’s banquet featured entertainment in the form of an orchestra that first played the fraternity anthem “Sing, Brothers, Sing” and then launched into “Dixie,” to furious applause from the 500 attendees. Memories and remembrances of the war and the Old South shaped the convention from beginning to end.

By the time Brandon took the stage in Chicago, nearly sixty years had passed since the founding of Sigma Alpha Epsilon in 1856, fifty years since the Civil War and thirty since the establishment of SAE’s first chapter north of the Mason-Dixon Line. Brandon
was correct to declare SAE a national fraternity, and such claims were ubiquitous within the fraternity and without. *Baird’s Fraternity Manual*, an almanac of Greek life that offered data about each organization’s chapters and less objective assessments of their strength and overall quality, declared in 1912 that SAE and a few other fraternities founded after the war that were “originally distinctively Southern, have completely lost that character.” *Baird’s* listed 102 SAE chapters, of which 46 were above the Mason-Dixon Line or west of the Mississippi.7

But Brandon’s speech and its themes of Southern pride and heritage, valiant military sacrifice, and the righteousness of SAE’s national expansion from the South show that a “distinctively Southern” character persisted within the fraternity, which is today the only national fraternity founded in the antebellum South.8 That a Southern character should persist is hardly surprising. The fraternity was only five years old when the Civil War began, and roughly 330 of its 500 members, spread over 14 chapters, fought for the Confederacy (an additional seven fought for the Union).9 More surprising, then, is that the fraternity was able to triumph on the battlefield of national extension – appealing to young men all over the country – while also actively commemorating the war and especially celebrating the valor of Confederate soldiers and the unique culture of the South.

The dark days of the Civil War and the damage they did to the fraternity have become as much a part of SAE’s origin story as the founding itself. Because fraternity culture places great importance on teaching each pledge the fraternity’s history and retelling that history at celebrations and special occasions, the origin story loomed large in the conscious of each active brother. For the first few decades after the war, that story made the establishment of chapters in the North unacceptable. But after the mid-1880s, the story transformed into a rationale for Northern extension — through nationalization, SAE could show that it and the South as a whole had triumphed over sectionalism. Nationalization of the fraternity, a mission rendered more meaningful by the memory of the war, enabled Southern members to escape the shame of loss of the war by conquering the nation and insisting that the South had been made new. Through national expansion of the fraternity, Southern SAE brothers could understand the United States as not only the government that had defeated the Confederacy, but also as the landscape of their brotherhood – an understanding that did not require the renunciation of Southern heritage or the Confederate cause. By 1930, SAE had achieved fully national status, and in the process carried the celebration of the Old South and Confederate valor into universities across the United States.

**THE ORIGINS OF SIGMA ALPHA EPSILON AND THE CIVIL WAR**

Sigma Alpha Epsilon was founded before the war, but the four years of the war eventually became more important in establishing fraternity lore, fraternity heroes, and a
vocabulary of manliness. For the first twenty years after the war, its memory also confined SAE to the South. When the push for Northern extension finally began in the mid-1880s, the memory of the war rendered the establishment of each Northern chapter meaningful as a demonstration of the fraternity’s, and the South’s, triumph over adversity.

The first meeting of Sigma Alpha Epsilon took place on March 9, 1856, in an “old Southern mansion and by the flicker of dripping candles.” In attendance were eight Alabama natives who were students and friends at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa. Of the seven living by the time of the Civil War, six would enlist in the Confederacy, and three of them died. Their leader, considered the founder of the fraternity, was Noble Leslie DeVotie, who would graduate that July as class valedictorian. DeVotie was the son of a Northern-born pastor who married into one of Montgomery, Alabama’s leading families. He grew up in Marion, Alabama and entered the state university in 1853.

During the antebellum era, American colleges generally attracted three types of students: wealthy young men seeking a college education because it was the gentlemanly thing to do; poor or middle-class students preparing for careers in the clergy; and those enrolled at military academies, who were generally middle-class and sought a practical education for careers as engineers, teachers, and lawyers. Colleges in the South generally attracted more of the first group—they were more expensive and geared towards the wealthy. Perhaps as a result of their homogeneity, they were slower to develop fraternities, which functioned in Northern colleges as a way for wealthy men to disassociate from their poorer classmates.

The first Greek-letter secret societies were formed at Union College in New York in the 1820s; by the 1850s they had spread throughout New England, the Middle Atlantic and, to a lesser extent, into the South and the Midwest. Fraternities provided a social break from the monotony and regimentation of university life. The curricula generally offered almost no flexibility, requiring every student to take Latin, Greek, and mathematics, and administrators tightly controlled all facets of life. At the University of Georgia, for example, students could not leave town without the express permission of the faculty.

By the time of the founding of SAE, three northern fraternities—Delta Kappa Epsilon, Alpha Delta Phi, and Phi Gamma Delta—had established chapters at the University of Alabama. Taking their cue from the national fraternities, the SAE founders almost immediately began expanding into other Southern universities. The second chapter was established at Vanderbilt in 1857. Generally, a new chapter was established when a brother wrote to a student at the institution in question, usually with the referral of a mutual friend. Thomas C. Cook, one of the early members of Alabama Mu, left Tuscaloosa to attend Princeton but continued to work for the fraternity, writing to a Martin Fleming at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill about the possibility of starting a chapter.
there. “The above named Society is strictly a Southern Institution, and has for its object the advancement of literature and the promotion of friendship,” Cook wrote. “If you have ever seen the DKE, ours is almost like it.” Within a few months, Fleming had submitted his petition to start a chapter to the founders at Alabama Mu and had received permission to begin fraternity meetings.¹⁷

But while the founders of SAE planned from the beginning to expand their organization, their constitution explicitly confined extension to the South.¹⁸ Even so, some brothers raised questions about Northern extension within the fraternity’s first two years. After beginning fraternity meetings, Martin Fleming of North Carolina Xi wrote to Cook again to ask whether SAE might reconsider the constitutional ban on Northern chapters. Cook responded that “the constant agitation of the Slavery question” and other differences of opinions between the South and the North “almost precludes the possibility of a harmony of feeling” between fraternity brothers from different sections.¹⁹ Meanwhile, chapters spread across the South. By the time of the war, SAE boasted 14, mostly at the South’s leading institutions, including the College of William & Mary and the University of Virginia.²⁰

Two years after Cook’s letter to Fleming, the impossibility “of a harmony of feeling” exploded into the Civil War. For the rest of their lives, the early members of SAE would have a special place in fraternity lore: not only had they helped to found the organization, they had bravely defended their homeland during America’s darkest hour. Their cause mattered not, a Northern SAE historian wrote in 1893, for “theirs were true hearts… there is not one of them of whom Sigma Alpha Epsilon is not proud.”²¹

Across the country, universities represented large repositories of battle-eligible young men. This was particularly true in the South, where white men were a smaller proportion of the population than in the North, making the participation of college men more crucial—80 percent of Southern white men of the appropriate age enlisted, compared to half of Northern white men. Military colleges, naturally, were a particularly important source of manpower. Before the war, the South boasted nearly 100 military schools or cadet corps, and when the military institution students were counted alongside other university students, the South’s college enrollment rate for white men ages 16 to 19 was four percent, compared to New England’s 2.5 percent.²² By the start of the war, two of SAE’s fourteen chapters served military colleges—Pi at the Georgia Military Institute and Chi at the Kentucky Military Institute.²³

All Southern colleges, military or civilian, contributed mightily to the Southern war effort. Institutions such as South Carolina College shut down completely during the war as students and faculty enlisted in the Confederate army, and the University of Georgia suspended classes during the last years of the conflict for the same reason.²⁴ Among fraternities, SAE’s record of Civil War service was considered particularly impressive. When the war broke out, the fraternity had about 500 members, 376 of whom enlisted, all but
seven in the Confederate Army. SAE’s enlistment rate of 75 percent towered above Delta Kappa Epsilon’s 45 percent, and a writer for Phi Delta Theta’s *The Scroll* declared in 1913 that “to none was [the war] more disastrous than to SAE.” Even before the battles began, the war had inflicted a casualty on SAE: Noble Leslie DeVotie, drowned on February 12, 1861 after falling off a dock at Fort Morgan, Alabama where he was stationed as a chaplain in the Confederate army. The fraternity claims him as the first casualty of the Civil War.

As it was for white Southerners writ large, the Civil War for SAE was a story of collective suffering. But it was also a story of individual moments of heroism that in later decades would become a kind of liturgy for the fraternity, filling the pages of fraternity histories and inspiring reverential toasts and retellings in the pages of *The Record*. The story of the Georgia Military Institute’s Georgia Pi—“the chapter that went to war”—was a favorite, constantly retold at conventions and Founder’s Day banquets. Fraternity historian William Levere described it as “enfolded in the imagination of the fraternity as containing all those priceless elements of chivalry, courage and honor which the noble of the earth esteem of greater worth than even life itself.” A member of the chapter who joined in 1857 and lost an arm and his younger brother in the Confederate service listed off Georgia Pi’s record in a Founder’s Day toast in 1907: all 41 members enlisted and provided one brigadier-general, two colonels, four majors, sixteen captains, nine lieutenants—34 commissioned officers. Ten died. The chapter itself ceased to exist in 1864 when General William Sherman burnt the university to the ground on his March to the Sea, calling it a “hatchery for young rebels.” “He spoke truly,” declared the speaker.

By the end of the war, only the chapter at Columbian College (later George Washington University) known as Washington City Rho was still intact. Gradually, students returned from the war and began to rebuild the universities “with a courage equal to that they had shown on the battlefield,” according to Levere. The Civil War had become the reference point for all subsequent SAE activities, the moment of glory and valor to which all others would be compared. The first chapter to revive was Virginia Omicron at the University of Virginia, followed by Georgia Beta at the University of Georgia, which was brought back to life by three Georgia Pi brothers who had returned to the Georgia Military Institute to find it burnt to the ground.

The Civil War catalyzed greater changes in Southern universities than in Northern ones. A number of colleges had been destroyed by the Union army, the presence of four million freedmen raised questions about who the colleges should serve, and widespread poverty forced the institutions to change their educational offerings to provide more vocational skills. It was in this landscape of economic and political turmoil, social transformations, and great loss that SAE began to expand again after the Civil War. New chapters were founded in Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, and Tennessee, and chapters that had been destroyed by the Civil War were revived.
At the 1879 convention in Nashville, the fraternity voted to begin publishing a quarterly newsletter, called The Record. Modeled after the fraternity newsletters published by older Greek organizations, The Record published transcripts of speeches delivered at the conventions, essays and poems submitted by brothers, clippings of newspaper articles relevant to the fraternity, biographies and obituaries of prominent brothers, and articles from other Greek organization publications, as well as letters from each chapter. The first issue declared that the publication would be “broad, liberal, progressive”—befitting an organization that already viewed itself as modern and expansive. Early on, The Record introduced to the fraternity the literary forms that would memorialize the Civil War within its pages for the next several decades.

One of the primary forms of commemoration was biographies of fraternity alumni who had fought in the war. The second issue of The Record featured a biography of Noble Leslie DeVotie, explaining that he was working as a minister in Selma, Alabama when “the tocsin of war sounded” and the men of the town “flocked around the Confederate standard, and with patriotic ardor took up arms to battle for the cause they esteemed right, dear, and most sacred,” and praising him for joining the Confederacy as a chaplain. DeVotie, as the fraternity founder, would surely have been venerated regardless of his record in the war. But for rank-and-file brothers, service to the Confederacy became the lifetime achievement that justified the inclusion of their obituaries in The Record. William A. Elliott, who graduated from Bethel College in 1860 and died in 1881, is hailed for enlisting, “heart and soul, in the Confederate cause” and eventually rising to Captain of a cavalry unit. The five-paragraph obituary is mostly devoted to describing his Confederate service and the aftermath of the war: “For four long years, through sunshine and storm, he battled for the Sunny South. And when the ‘conquered banner was folded forever,’ he came home and applied himself to repairing the ravages of war.” Neither his career after the war, nor the name of his wife is mentioned. In the same issue, an obituary for Albert L. Harris, who died in 1879, is similarly devoted to describing Harris’s activities during the war—even though “on account of delicate health” he could not enlist and instead served as “a manufacturer and furnisher of necessary army supplies.” Similar biographies would appear in the pages of The Record until the early 1930s.

Much of the literary content of The Record also addressed the Civil War, touching on themes of battle valor, national reconciliation and societal change in the South. “The Cross in the Valley,” a poem exclusively published in the January 1882 issue, lyrically depicts the grave of a “boy-hero dead,” and describes how it summons visions of the glorious Southern past:

The tocsin of war, shrilly sounding,
Again seems to ring o’er the land;
And thrilled by the resonant music
   See! Marshal the musketed band!
...
And sadly we gaze on the picture
   That time can not dim or efface;
   That picture which tells the grand story
   Of failure unblent with disgrace

The narrator concludes that the crosses that mark fallen Confederate soldiers are signs “that shall bind in the Southland / The living and dead evermore; / Till Time, weary-worn with its burden / Shall die on Eternity’s shore!” The poem’s author, J.O. Wright, had graduated from the Kentucky Military Institute in 1870 and was working as a bookkeeper in Louisville, but found time to write the Civil War-themed poem and evidently concluded that the magazine of his old fraternity was the best place to publish it. More than 15 years after the war, with the fraternity on the cusp of national expansion, the landscape of the South still called to mind the bloody conflict and the tragic yet dignified Confederate loss in which SAE brothers had played a substantial role.

“The Song of Sandy Bacon,” written in the style of Edgar Allen Poe’s “The Raven” was recited at the 10th reunion of the University of Georgia’s Class of 1870, and published in The Record in June 1884. The poem’s titular character is a boy from “the pine-lands dreary” who is inspired by a traveling preacher to “quit the drowsy old plantation” and attend the University of Georgia to “take his stand among the nation” — a journey emblematic of the transformation of the Old South into the “New.” But though young Sandy Bacon has broken with his father and his family’s traditions to create for himself a different future, at the university he is inspired by the heroes of Georgia’s past. The poem names to “Georgia’s roll of honor” Alexander Stephens, a US Representative, vice president of the Confederacy, and later a US Senator; Robert Toombs, US Senator and Confederate Secretary of State; and Confederate and later US Senator Benjamin Hill—all graduates of the University of Georgia. These men, the poem continues:

Filled the land with civil glory,
Thrilled the land with martial glory,
   Wrought a work that we adore;
Fought for Georgia’s fame and honor,
When the despot’s heel was on her
   Thus their fame and glory won her
   Loved allegiance evermore.
And their living, gracious memories
On our inmost bosoms’ core
Shall be graven evermore.

As it was read at the 10th reunion of the class of 1870, the poem likely represented, in some way, the feelings of the men about their own college experience. Perhaps some of them saw themselves as Sandy Bacon, rising from the farm to gain an education; perhaps others came from wealthy families but had met Sandy Bacons at the university, which became less socioeconomically exclusive in the decade-and-a-half after the war. To survive in the economically depressed post-war South, Southern universities had to lower tuition in order to expand and open their doors to a greater number of students.  

But Civil War memory did not merely manifest itself in the poems and obituaries found in the pages of The Record. Memories of the war also shaped fraternity policy, first as a barrier to Northern extension and then, in a dramatic shift, as fuel for Northern extension. By expanding throughout the country, SAE brothers could ultimately cast off the sectional shame of defeat and prove themselves the equals of any Northern man. But that would take time. The question of Northern extension was raised at the 1867 Nashville convention, the fraternity’s first after the war, with nine chapters in attendance. The lone proponent of Northern extension was a member of Mississippi Gamma; the issue was quickly settled against him. An 1858 initiate of North Carolina Xi railed that the proposal suggested that the Northerners were “not only taking the ‘niggers’ of the South—but the Fraternity as well.” Northern extension was thus precluded by memories of the loss of the war and the institution of slavery—a loss that had shaken the racial and gender hierarchies of the South. To risk the takeover of the fraternity, an institution created to celebrate elite white manhood, by Northerners would have been unthinkable. Instead, the brothers focused on expansion within the South and embraced reconstruction of the fraternity with the same zeal with which they had fought the armies of the North. “Her sons rallied to [SAE’s] standard as did the men of the Confederacy to the South,” wrote one fraternity historian in 1887. The Confederacy was gone, but the fraternity was still in its youth, an institution its Southern members could build just as they had tried to build a new government.

The work of Southern extension led to the establishment of 17 additional chapters throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Annual conventions were held at cities such as Nashville, Tennessee, Richmond, Virginia, and Augusta, Georgia. The publication of The Record in 1880, “an event unequaled in importance by any that had occurred in the postbellum history of the fraternity” marked a major milestone for the fraternity and showed it was hoping to compete with national fraternities. The fraternity had established itself as among the foremost Southern fraternities, and it had a reputation for being forward-looking, leading Baird’s Manual to praise it in 1883 for its members who “rank high socially and intellectually in the ‘New South.’”
It was only a matter of time, then, before the question of Northern extension would be raised again. The Record's very first issue included an editor's note suggesting that the fraternity was weakened by its confinement to the South, though it also sounded a note of pride that SAE had succeeded “by the greatest exertions of an impoverished people,” and an article by a brother who urged the fraternity to consider extending North to demonstrate its “high moral and intellectual standard. On these two qualities we challenge the Union for superiority.” Here, then, was a shift: a new confidence and willingness to embrace competition with the North—still spoken of more readily as “the Union” than as part of the same country. The desire to challenge the fraternities of the North led Oliver E. Mitchell of Georgia Beta (the University of Georgia) to offer this resolution at the 1881 convention in Atlanta: “That every Chapter in the Different States lying on the line of the Southern States, and all other Chapters embraced in this Frat, be urgently requested to abolish the old custom of confining this Fraternity to exclusively Southern States, and that they be urged to press on their work, knowing no South, no North, no east, no West.” The Record and convention minutes say nothing about how this resolution was received. Decades later, SAE historian William Levere discovered that the convention's recording secretary had expressed doubt that the editor of The Record would want to publish the resolution at all. And William B. Walker, like Mitchell a member of Georgia Beta and a supporter of Northern extension, wrote Levere to say that he, too, had given a speech in favor of establishing chapters north of the Ohio River, but “was cut short by a motion to adjourn for dinner.” He was allowed to conclude the speech the next day, but it “fell flat at that time.”

The transcript of each debate over Northern extension has been lost to history, if it ever existed. Decades later, however, a W.E. Edmondson of North Carolina Xi recalled in an address to a national convention that in the early 1880s, the fraternity was full of “fire-eaters” who refused to go North. “As I remember, they said we would be spread out too thin, that we would lose everything that we had already gained by our high principle and every bit of our splendid ritual, and all those things could not stand to go North,” he said. Meanwhile, in private, some fraternity members were quietly corresponding about the benefits of Northern extension, and others wrote to The Record to express their support for heading North.

Though divided, the fraternity seemed to be moving towards embracing Northern extension as a demonstration of sectional power and worthiness. The actual realization of the long-discussed expansion in 1883, however, came as a surprise to the fraternity’s rank and file. Notice of the new chapter appeared suddenly and with no fanfare in an issue of The Record, in the form of a letter of the kind routinely submitted by each chapter to describe its members, major activities and overall prospects. Tucked among the other chapter letters, the note from the members of Pennsylvania Delta is easy to miss, and does not acknowledge its own significance. “We, being a new chapter, of course, have very little
to say,” wrote the new secretary. He and his brothers attended Gettysburg College – “a peculiarly unfortunate location for the first northern chapter,” noted an SAE historian in 1893. A pair of brothers from the South had persistently written letters to the fraternity headquarters, until they won a visit from the vice president, who was sufficiently impressed by the brothers and their friends that he initiated them.

The existence of a Northern chapter, however, did not mean the question of Northern extension was settled. Pennsylvania Delta struggled to attract members (perhaps because SAE was too culturally Southern, Levere later speculated) and could not persuade skeptical Southern SAEs to support additional chapters in the North. Within a year, the new editor of The Record, an alumnus of Georgia Beta, had published an article arguing that Northern extension required too many resources that might be better spent on updating the fraternity catalogue or investing in chapter houses. At the 1884 convention, the extension committee recommended revoking Pennsylvania Delta’s charter. Though the motion failed, it sent an unfriendly signal to the new chapter. Meanwhile, Delta’s chapter letters suggested the fraternity appoint an ambassador to Northern colleges to expand the number of chapters above the Mason-Dixon line. But the chapter grew less optimistic about its own prospects. “We have had a great many difficulties here … We have received letters from only a few chapters. Why don’t all correspond?” The failure of existing chapters to correspond with Gettysburg may be the clearest sign that Southern SAEs were hesitant to embrace a Northern chapter. Besides the conventions and issues of The Record, correspondence between chapters was the primary method of building fraternity cohesion. Too Southern to appeal to young men on its campus, and too Northern to win support from SAE at large, Gettysburg struggled and disbanded by the end of 1884.

But after this strange false start at Gettysburg, the establishment of a chapter at Ohio’s Mount Union College, called Ohio Sigma, was greeted warmly. Brothers of Kentucky Chi (the Kentucky Military Institute) had helped start the chapter in April 1885, and in its July 1885 chapter letter Virginia Tau (Richmond College) lauded the extension. “See to it brothers that you Sigmatize the whole North,” the chapter secretary wrote, heralding the missionary zeal with which the SAE men of the New South would undertake fraternity nationalization over the next decade. At the convention in Nashville later that year, a motion to restrict the fraternity to the South was trounced; just three out of 16 chapters present supported it.

The era of SAE as a strictly Southern fraternity was coming to an end. A member of Georgia Beta’s class of 1868 looked back at the early post-bellum years in a convention speech in 1899 and reflected, “In the South we had the right at that time to be sectional; and we have worked out through that happy sectionalism that preserved our manhood and our respect, I believe, a broader nationality that will help to carry along this Republic of ours to the great destiny that waits it in the immediate future.”
The convention speaker described the fraternity’s original sectionalism as essential to cultivating its identity. Springing forth from its cradle in the antebellum South, SAE would nationalize not by abandoning its past, but by simultaneously celebrating its progress and its legacy of Confederate service and Old South values. SAE embodied the New South mythology. Its success demonstrates the appeal of that mythology to the nation as a whole, and the potency of that mythology in shaping national memory of the Civil War.

SAE IN THE NEW SOUTH AND THE NATION

William Danner Thompson graduated from Emory College in the spring of 1895, but he did not leave behind Sigma Alpha Epsilon. His younger brother, Albert, still attended Emory and was also a member of SAE’s Georgia Epsilon chapter. William, working at a greenhouse in the brothers’ hometown of Atlanta, inquired constantly about the success of the fraternity. “Write me soon and tell me who you got,” William wrote in September 1895, eager to hear about the quality of the chapter’s first pledge class since his graduation. Later that month, he urged Albert to “be careful about having any fights with Thetas—will hurt you,” apparently concerned that the reputation of SAE at Emory could be damaged by disagreement with another fraternity. He continued, “Glad to hear you got six men, we are getting on top at Emory very rapidly.” William was excited about the 1895 Cotton States and International Exposition in midtown Atlanta’s Piedmont Park. December 28 was set aside as “Day of SAE,” and he believed it would “certainly be a big thing for the fraternity.”55

The above correspondence reveals the centrality of the fraternity in its members’ lives, a trend more publicly evident in chapter letters written to the Record editors describing preparations for banquets, furious efforts to recruit “select” men of high “social and intellectual status,” and the need for all brothers to learn about SAE’s history.56 Even between biological siblings, at least between the Thompsons, Greek brotherhood dominated the conversation. But it was not enough for this brotherhood to simply exist—it had to be “on top.” William Thompson was eager to see SAE rise above the other fraternities at Emory and project its strength and influence to society at large through events such as “Day of SAE” at the exposition. The brothers’ exchange is also noteworthy for what it does not include. Here there is no handwringing over Northern extension. By 1895, SAE had chapters in Connecticut, Colorado, Michigan, Massachusetts, and New York, as well as Ohio and Pennsylvania.57 The Thompsons’ father, William S. Thompson, traveled frequently to New York for business, and by 1897 William himself would be attending law school at Columbia University and working in his spare time to strengthen the SAE chapter there, founded in 1895.58 The Thompsons were focused on social and professional success on the national stage. They were thoroughly men of the New South.

But the New South had not forgotten the Old. At Emory’s commencement in June
1897, the prizewinning junior oratory told of a “crystal current” flowing from the age of the Cavalier to the present: “It was shown in the deeds of Southern soldiers who fought so valiantly for a wounded honor. It breathed in the golden sentences of Henry Grady as he vindicated the Southern cause.” A year later, a student not only praised Henry Grady—himself a brother of Chi Psi at the University of Georgia—but channeled him (or, less generously, copied him) for an entire speech, delivering “a modest message to Southern young men” that celebrated the New South while noting, “I do not come to make apology for the ‘Old South’ and her civilization, for I believe that all that is best in the South to-day is ‘native and to the manner born.’” Like Grady, he raised “the negro question” to answer it with the claim that the white South had given former slaves all they deserved. For Grady, and for the young men so self-consciously identifying themselves with his ideas, the Old South should not be disowned.

The same held true in Sigma Alpha Epsilon’s lore: progress should be celebrated, but so, too, should the glorious Southern past. The young men of the New South embraced the fraternity’s nationalization as a demonstration of their own power and influence. Certain figures in particular pursued national extension with military zeal, seeking to conquer the whole nation for SAE and pointing to their own lack of sectionalism as a sign that the South had been made new, thanks to its own flexibility and magnanimity. A convention speaker in 1894 claimed that the same spirit that had led “the Southern planter to plow down blood-stained trenches in his cotton field, and begin to rear another social order, also animated Southern educators and collegians.”

In other words, SAE brothers were part of the elite group forging the New South future. After his fraternity days, William Danner Thomson would become a high-profile Atlanta lawyer, bank president and member of Emory’s board of trustees. More famous SAE brothers include the likes of William Yates Atkinson and Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar. Atkinson, of Georgia Beta, would receive a ringing endorsement in The Record when he ran for governor of Georgia in 1894. That endorsement opened by stating “No young Georgian in public life takes higher rank,” and ended, laudingly, “Mr. Atkinson stands for all implied by the phrase ‘New South.’” He would achieve further notoriety five years later when he personally confronted a mob attempting to lynch Sam Hose, a black man accused of murder, urging them to turn him over to the authorities instead. Lamar, a brother of the University of Mississippi chapter, served in the Confederate army but later became a US representative, senator and eventually Supreme Court justice. Shortly after he was appointed Secretary of the Interior in 1885, The Record declared that his 1874 eulogy of Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner “did more perhaps to restore harmony between the North and South than any other one cause” and noted approvingly his position that “the prosperity of the south almost wholly depends upon the existence of friendly relations between it and the North.” Later, the novels of William Faulkner, who was also a member of
the chapter at the University of Mississippi, were lauded in the pages of The Record. The 1912 edition of Who's Who in SAE listed two current or former state governors, a lieutenant governor, 18 current or former state senators, a US senator, and six US congressmen, all from the post-war era. As the New South elite rose, however, they held onto visions of the war as a crowning moment of glory for the South, and visions of the Old South as a place of beauty and goodness. The nationalization of the fraternity offered new opportunities to share those visions with young men from across the country.

The name most often associated with SAE's aggressive national expansion throughout the 1890s is Bunting, for the four Bunting brothers of Tennessee—Frank, Will, Harry and George, who wrote the endorsement of Governor Atkinson mentioned above. The four brothers spent their college careers furiously writing letters to gather information about SAE's status on university campuses, strengthen existing chapters, and develop new ones across the country. Harry Bunting had joined SAE in 1886, after the establishment of Ohio Sigma, but worried about persistent wariness towards Northern extension. One brother, Tom Mell of Georgia Beta, had apparently had a traumatic childhood experience with a carpetbagger thief, and the Buntings feared more generally that “some misguided brother whose family had lost its slaves by the war” might oppose their work. But these worries did not come to fruition. The brothers mapped out a plan to “plant the banner of Sigma Alpha Epsilon from Plymouth Rock to Golden Gate.” Harry Bunting referred to his fellow expansionists as “expansion shock troops” and spoke of “the conquest of the Northland.” With time the Bunting brothers had planted chapters at Stanford, Pennsylvania State, Ohio State, Trinity College, Harvard, Purdue, Nebraska, Bucknell, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Bunting offered a high-minded justification for this militaristic expansion regime: his father had been a Confederate soldier, but he had three Union Army uncles and wanted to “obliterate sectional hate.” Not only were the Buntings eager to point to nationalization as evidence that SAE had transcended stereotypical Southern backwardness, they believed a fully national SAE could actually reduce the likelihood of another “fratricidal war.” “This patriotic motive added a sort of religious fervor to our passion for Northern extension,” Bunting reflected in 1937. Similar rhetoric characterized convention speeches and Record articles throughout the period from 1885 to 1900. The fraternity celebrated its conquest of sectionalism and its power to enact national healing even as it paid special tribute to the South.

The healing of the sectional rift—with SAE itself serving as evidence of its completion—empowered Southern brothers to praise the Confederates and their ideology even as they celebrated their new nationalization. The first explicit mention of “The Lost Cause” in an SAE publication came in 1886 with the printing of a speech by W.E. Wooten at the At-
lanta convention that year. Wooten declared that “as southern citizens we will ever fondly cherish the belief that truth was on our side and that those principles which actuated our States to secede were those of right and justice. Through four long years did our heroes strive to gain what they considered their rights.”70 The same issue of The Record reprinted the entirety of Grady’s famous speech at Delmonico’s in New York.71 The New South was creating space for Southerners not only to proclaim a different future, but rewrite their past. Pleasant Stovall, an alumnus of Georgia Beta, wrote an essay praising the United States for producing both Robert E. Lee and Abraham Lincoln, and urged his audience to recognize that “he who allows partisanship to interfere with history is not American.” He then flipped the typical narrative of the Civil War by claiming that it was the Union, not the Confederacy, that had been in rebellion: “It was the Lincolns who rebelled against the Lees … Lincoln first declared that this nation could not exist ‘half slave and half free.’ Up to that time it had so existed – acknowledged by the Constitution.” Stovall declared himself pleased with the outcome of the Civil War, but implied that to assign wrongness to either side would be an unpatriotic partiality.72

For their part, Northern chapters seemed unbothered by this. Ohio Sigma invited her brothers to come up from Dixie, and pledged to reciprocate with visits to their institutions as well.73 At the convention of 1887, a Southern brother offered a toast to “Our Northern brothers – once our foes, now our brothers, and much beloved in the Union.” A member of Ohio Sigma responded with a poem he had written, “The Blue and the Gray:”

Southern chivalry, undaunted  
Wrestled plaudits from the North,  
While fair Dixie’s veteran heroes  
Praised their victor’s noble worth.  
Greek with Greek in valiant conflict,  
Long dispute the pennant’s sway.  
Never Spartan hosts were braver  
Than the ranks of Blue and Gray.  
...  
So while toiling up life’s hillslope  
Hand in hand, both Blue and Gray,  
March we on in mystic kinship, bond of true fraternity.74

The Civil War was being transformed from fratricidal slaughter to fraternity bonding opportunity. And the war provided a literal bonding opportunity when conventions were held near battlefields. The fraternity members toured the battlefields around Atlanta
in 1891, causing one Alabaman (a young man born after the Civil War) to muse, “Once we fought there, now we meet there in brotherly love.”75 The next year, the convention was held in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and the group toured Lookout Mountain to visit a war relic stand and carry home souvenirs; The Record declared the scene an example of the “beneficent influence of college fraternities.”76 During the dedication of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park in 1895, the Chattanooga Alumni Association organized an event for visiting SAE. The Chattanooga Daily Times covered the event and wrote “the very fact that a fraternity of purely Southern origins should make such a record in Northern institutions is itself an unmistakable indication of the amity existing between the two sections. Indeed it has been a powerful force in cementing together the people of the once disrupted nation.”77 What the Thompson brothers hoped for was taking place: SAE was winning praise from the broader public for not just overcoming a sectional divide, but also for actively closing it.

Meanwhile, both Northern and Southern SAE brothers continued to romanticize the Old South and employ indulgent stereotypes about Southerners. One convention speaker, The Record reporter opined, gave a welcome speech in Nashville “of the eloquence which only men of the South can use to effect.” The speech itself described Alabama as a land “where the sun shines a trifle warmer and clearer, where the magnolia and the violet grow,” employing familiar motifs about the landscape of the Sunny South.78 At fraternity events in the North, such as Founder’s Day banquets or conferences, it was common for a brother to present a toast to the South. “Oh for a beaker full of the warm South,” swooned one New England brother. The Province Beta convention, which comprised the mid-Atlantic states, included a toast to “SAE in the South,” as did a Founder’s Day celebration in California.79 No other region is consistently toasted or mentioned by brothers at their regional events. Joining SAE meant embracing a certain way of thinking about the South, and men all over the country were happy to sign up.

Similar rhetoric, rituals, and praise for the fraternity’s capacity to transcend sectional divides would remain a staple of SAE culture for decades. SAE celebrated the Spanish-American War in 1898, the nation’s first major military conflict since the Civil War, as a strong showing of national unity. The Record published lists of brothers in the service, newspaper clippings, and first-hand accounts of veterans’ experiences abroad. One lengthy account by Champe S. Andrews, who had served as a delegate to nearly every convention of the 1890s, focused on the historical irony of completing training for this American foreign war near the Tennessee battlefields where members of his father’s generation had slaughtered each other. His company comprised 114 men, and from 96 he collected information about their fathers. Of those 29 were the sons of Federal soldiers, 52 of Confederates, and the rest of foreigners or non-combatants. “I can remember well how strange it seemed
at first to be camped alongside of the men from the Green Mountains on a battle-field, where, thirty five years before their forefathers and ours had poured out their life’s blood in a conflict as fierce as only a fratricidal conflict can be. But now what a change!” he wrote. The soldiers from Vermont and Tennessee visited each other in the camp, he observed, and seemed more eager to spend time with each other than men from their own states. He credited “the benign influence” of SAE and other national fraternities with this change. The Civil War was now an even more valuable part of the SAE self-narrative: it had been a crisis in which SAE brothers proved their valor and manliness on the battlefield and afterwards their magnanimity and patriotism by helping to rebuild the nation.

It is a sign of how essential the Civil War was to SAE lore that it did not lose its central place in the fraternity narrative even after the Spanish-American War—which was most impressive to Champe Andrews and, apparently, The Record’s editors, when viewed through the prism of the Civil War—and later World War I. Brandon, who announced his “surrender” at Chicago in 1914, was a veteran of the Spanish-American War, having served as a captain and major of the 2nd Alabama Volunteer. Yet the Civil War, which ended three years before he was born, and past sectional conflict loomed larger in his mind than the national unity displayed by the war in which he had actually fought. The persistence of the Civil War in fraternity memory helped preserve SAE’s Southern distinctiveness, even as the fraternity trumpeted its progress and national outlook. Further, the story of Confederate valor and righteousness ensured that SAE went national on its own terms—Northern expansion was not a capitulation to Yankee values nor even, as Brandon claimed with a rhetorical flourish, a kind of “surrender.” Northern expansion was a way to “Sigmatize the North” and obtain recognition of the legitimacy of the Confederacy and the traditions of the Old South. For white men across America, the “Sigmatization” was another plank in the indomitable structure of their legally and socially enshrined dominance over women and minorities.

At the time of the founding of most fraternities in the mid-1800s, colleges and universities were so homogenous that there was no need to officially exclude non-white men. By the early 1910s, that was changing. Jews and small numbers of women, African-Americans and Asian-Americans matriculated at the nation’s universities, and American fraternities responded by codifying whiteness, maleness and Christianity as prerequisites for membership. SAE was certainly no exception, and convention minutes show that the brothers were concerned not only with keeping out the wrong sort of men, but also with establishing standards of exclusion that had some scientific validity. This was more difficult than they anticipated. At the same convention at which Brandon declared surrender—but was actually celebrating a victory for the South—the brothers debated whether their constitution should limit membership to “the Caucasian race” or “any white man.” Unable to
find any friend, acquaintance or credentialed expert who could say precisely what constituted “the Caucasian race,” the constitution committee turned to the records of the United States Congress. They found an exchange in the Senate in which a member had argued that “white man” was a perfectly good standard because, although no one is technically white, “White man has well defined meaning in the minds of the people of the world and therefore that phrase would be a most certain and definite guide.” The statement had never been challenged, so the brothers of SAE decided to adopt it for their own constitution. “It doesn’t sound very sentimental, it doesn’t have a very learned twang about it,” a committee member admitted, “but it means what it says.” The story of the Civil War as a triumphant moment for white American manhood, rather than a reckoning that demanded America rethink its racial hierarchies, surely helped convince the fraternity of the legitimacy of their whites-only policy—even when the evidence of its absurdity was right in front of them.

As the decades passed, the Civil War gradually became a less dominant motif in SAE discourse. But the war and its memory are embedded in the organization’s DNA and enshrined in its headquarters in Evanston, Illinois, the Levere Memorial Temple. Built in the late 1920s and dedicated in 1930, the building housed offices for national fraternity administrators, America’s only fraternity library and museum at the time, and a chapel featuring stained glass windows depicting the history of America and the history of SAE’s participation in America’s wars. Today, there are panels for the Spanish-American War, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War. There is a plain window where, someday, the fraternity will place a panel to commemorate the brothers who fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the center of the chapel stands the DeVotie or Peace window, the largest image in the room and impossible to miss, just behind the altar. The window depicts Jesus standing in between a Union and Confederate soldier. Underneath the window are the words “Pax Vobiscum”—peace unto you. It is an image that celebrates reconciliation of long-lost brothers, now united in fraternity by Sigma Alpha Epsilon. Generations of SAE brothers and alumni have taken it in as part of their cultural inheritance, and accepted its narrative of shared sacrifice and shared valor. But that narrative is not a neutral one. It is the product of careful work by SAE members during the early days of national expansion to ensure that as the fraternity spread, so would its reverence for Confederate heroes and the Old South. Brandon was able to speak of “surrender” in 1914 because he actually surrendered nothing at all. In the decades after the Civil War, the nation’s white college men welcomed SAE’s Southern pride with open arms.

NOTES

ONCE OUR FOES, NOW OUR BROTHERS

283. DKE was founded at Yale in 1844 and boasted 17,600 members by 1912.


7. Baird, *Baird's Manual of American College Fraternities*. 7th ed. 1912. 12; 279-283. For the purposes of this paper, I define “the South” as those states in which the fraternity had established chapters before 1883, when it realized “Northern Extension” by opening a chapter at Gettysburg College. Those states are, in the order they gained an SAE chapter: Alabama, Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.


14. Ibid, 32, 33, 37


ISABELLE TAFT


34. The Record, Vol. LII, No. 2 (May 1932): 300. Other than biographies of the founders, the latest biography or obituary focused on an otherwise rather unremarkable brother’s Civil War service was published in 1932, about William Townes Boyd, one of the founding members of the Virginia Upsilon chapter at Hampden-Sydney College. Most of the chapter’s members fought in the Confederate Army, and The Record notes that the 89-year-old Boyd is the “only one who can tell us of those perilous days and beautiful friendships which were cemented by the bonds of SAE seventy-two years ago.”
38. Cohen, “Reconstructing the Campus,” 187. The average tuition at 85 Southern institutions in 1870 was over 120 dollars. A decade later, the average cost of 112 Southern colleges had dropped to 43 dollars.
41. Van Burkalow, “Fraternity History,” xxi, xxv.
42. William Raimond Baird, American College Fraternities: A Descriptive Analysis of the Society System in the Colleges of the United States, 2nd ed. (New York: Frank Williams, 1883), 137.
47. Levere, The History of Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity Vol. I, 419-420. Levere quotes letters between alumni of Alabama Mu, Georgia Delta and Sewanee discussing how Southern men attending Northern universities might establish SAE chapters. K.S Tupper, Letter to the Editor, The Record, Vol. I, No. 4 (Oct. 1881): 155. Tupper wrote that he was in favor of Mitchell’s resolution on Northern extension. “We can find as good material no doubt in the North as in the South, and it is now time that we should forget all sectional
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enmities.”

52. Van Burkalow, “Fraternity History” 322.
68. Levere, *Who’s Who in SAE*. The governors were John Creppe Wickliffe Beckham of Kentucky and Albert Waller Gilchrist of Florida. Additionally, Thomas C. Barrett was lieutenant governor of Louisiana. The US Senator was John Hollis Bankhead of Alabama.

81. Who’s Who in S.A.E, 32.
84. The Record, Vol. LI, No. 1 (March 1931): 32, description of the Memorial Chapel. I observed the other war panels when I visited the Levere Memorial Temple from Nov. 20 to Nov. 24, 2015.

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“ONCE OUR FOES, NOW OUR BROTHERS”


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SECONDARY SOURCES


TITLE IMAGE

Through its complex colonial history, Brazil has become a nation of stunning ethnic diversity. Its citizens categorize themselves into over 100 racial categories which overlay deeprooted social and political power imbalances. How, then, can a unified Brazilian culture be drawn from such a heterogeneous nation? In tackling this weighty question, Maris Jones, Brown University ’15, turns to music as a shaping force in the invention of brasilidade—a national identity which, she argues, simultaneously incorporated and excluded Afro-Brazilians. As the original progenitors of samba, Afro-Brazilians saw their musical style enthusiastically adopted but whitened by a government that continued to enact discriminatory racial policies against them. Yet in the later 20th century, a reclamation of samba by a number of politically active groups transformed the genre once again into a symbol of Black identity. Far more than merely a facet of culture, Brazilian music was a historically potent tool that played a part in shaping national identity.

By Maris Jones, Brown University ’15
Written for “Senior Seminar: Politics and Symbols”
Professor David Kertzer
Faculty Advisor: Erika Helgen
Edited by Christine Wang, Graham Ambrose, and Katherine Shy
Lamartine Babos’s 1933 carnival march entitled “História do Brasil” (“History of Brazil”) opens with the question: “Who invented Brazil?” The questions of who invented the Brazilian nation and how are quite compelling to Brazilianist scholars considering the country’s history. Originally home to a series of sparsely populated Amerindian tribes, what would one day become Brazil was colonized by Portugal in 1500, proclaimed an independent empire in 1822, and evolved through often violent political transitions from a constitutional monarchy to the present federal republic. What’s more, the Brazilian population is comprised of numerous ethno-racial groups that have contributed to the development of the nation as it exists today. From the dense rainforest of the Amazon River basin and the desert hinterlands of the sertão in the north, to the bustling metropolitan centers and thunderous Iguaçu Falls in the south, Brazil is as multifaceted geographically as it is culturally. With such diversity alongside its complex political history, discerning “quem foi que inventou Brasil” (“who invented Brazil”) proves a formidable challenge.

The difficulty of answering Babos’s question leads to the even more daunting task of explaining how nations are generally conceptualized. Benedict Anderson famously defines the nation as “an imagined political community.” Different peoples, Anderson argues, imagine nations as communities “because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comrade-ship.” Anderson is particularly interested in the processes through which people come to imagine themselves as sharing temporal and physical space with others who happen to reside in their borders and how communities of interest are formed as people read novels and newspapers that interpolate them as members of a collective, national group. Scholars, such as Anthony Marx, have taken Anderson to task for assuming that this process does not require institutional action by the state to establish mass political cohesion. Others, like Peter Wogan, have criticized Anderson for focusing so intently on print capitalism over orality, subsequently implying that the illiterate masses are excluded from the nation or cannot form their own nations. When expanded to include other forms of media, however, Anderson’s framework becomes useful for understanding Brazilian nationhood, given the importance of music and broadcast radio in the development of national identity beginning in the 1930s. As a tool in nation-formation, radio enabled national media to enter private homes of citizens all over the country, transforming their lives and connecting them with national leaders and symbols in unprecedented ways. For the first time, far-flung regions were linked to a much larger network of instantaneous communication that would transcend class and cultural lines and craft a new, more unified national identity. Despite the vast differences among Brazilians’ lived experiences, defining brasilidade (“Brazilianess”) is inextricably tied to how the nation is imagined as a community—one with an accepted set of national symbols, myths, and rituals forged by shared experience and information.

Much of what defines a nation stems from its people’s contrast with alterity; the
cultures or value systems a given nation defines itself against play a crucial role in shaping how that nation’s people conceive of themselves and of their communities. For a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-lingual country like Brazil, imagining the national community requires an amalgamation of different symbolic elements to give the illusion of inclusivity. In Brazil, music has played a central role in this process of national identity formation. When he wrote the first history of Brazilian music, A música no Brasil (“The Music of Brazil”), in 1908, Guilherme de Melo set out to find “the ethnic laws which governed the formation of the genius, spirit and character of the Brazilian people and their ethnology.”

Further clarifying, Melo added, “that is, how the Portuguese people changed under the influence of the American climate and contact with Indians and Africans, resulting in the crossbreed or, to be more precise, the Brazilian.” Considering the multicultural mosaic of Brazil, looking to music as a font of brasilidade makes sense. Using Peircean semiotics as a basis, Thomas Turino reasons that popular music is a sign-vehicle that allows disparate things to be brought together, thus suggesting that they are coexistent in a way that is coherent for mass listenership; “music has a great multiplicity of potentially meaningful parameters sounding simultaneously, and its status as a potential collective activity helps explain its particular power to create and affect group identities.”

As a symbol, and a structure within which symbols and myths are used and disseminated, music has played a very specific and important role in building Brazilian national identity. This is because “music integrates the affective and identity-forming potentials of both icons and indices…and is thus a central resource in events…[for] creating social unity, participation, and purpose.”

This essay contends that music was an essential tool in establishing Brazilian national identity and that this creation process simultaneously included and excluded Afro-Brazilians. The complex history of race relations in Brazil shows how the rhetoric of inclusion fundamental to the myth of racial democracy has allowed widespread inequality to be overlooked. This paper then examines policies of the Estado Novo (“new state”) and Brazilian President Getúlio Vargas to argue that the incorporation of symbolic cultural elements of marginalized communities into brasilidade does not guarantee them equal rights. The musical genre of samba is taken as an example of how the state acculturated and whitened Afro-Brazilian cultural forms and transformed samba into a national symbol of the Brazil. The final section posits that Afro-Brazilian’s cultural reclamation of carnival samba in Salvador allowed the development of a performative and resistive black identity. This argument is supported by analysis of carnival songs presented by carnival groups Ilê Aiye and Olodum to exemplify of how citizens have reclaimed elements of Brazilian national identity to critique the state.
Despite deep-set inequality and underlying racial tensions, Brazil is often heralded both at home and abroad as the land of racial “exceptionalism.”\(^{10}\) In the seminal work, *Casa-Grande & Senzala* (*The Masters and the Slaves*; literally “big house and slave quarters”), Brazilian sociologist Gilberto Freyre argues that because of the “benevolence” and *plasticidade* (adaptability) of Portuguese imperialism, Brazil evaded the traps of racism and racial discrimination seen in the United States.\(^{11}\) He refutes the idea that Brazilians are inferior because of their mixed-race heritage and points to the positive cultural outcomes that resulted from *mestiçagem* (miscegenation).\(^{12}\) Freyre supposes that long-standing practices of miscegenation in Brazil birthed an *além-raça* (meta-race) more resilient than the sum of its parts.\(^{13}\) Originally published in 1933, *Casa-grande & Senzala* is crucial to understanding the history of race relations and the denial of racism in Brazil. Freyre’s emphasis on the amalgamation of African, Indigenous, and European racial and cultural elements gave rise to the myth of racial democracy—the belief that whites and non-whites live harmoniously in Brazil.\(^{14}\) Within such a racial democracy existed a “mulatto escape hatch,” a concept proposed by Carl Degler referring to the space ceded to multi-racial individuals amounting to an intermediate social position between whites and blacks that allowed for Afro-Brazilian social mobility.\(^{15}\)

Nevertheless, unlike race-conceptualization in the US, race in Brazil is not understood within a black-white dichotomy—rather, it is a color spectrum, a tripartite classification of white, mulatto, and black.\(^{16}\) Since the mid-twentieth century, the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) has utilized five categories to record racial data for the census: *branco* (white), *pardo* (brown or mixed-race), *preto* (black-skinned), *amarelo* (yellow or Asian), and *indígena* (indigenous). Although these are the official census categories, there is a range of terms that persist in everyday usage to describe one’s color or race including *mestiço* (mixed-race), *moreno* (ambiguous brown color referring to skin and hair), and *negro*, which constitutes a conglomeration of *pardo* and *preto*.

Historically, it has been uncommon to hear the terms *preto* or *negro* used to identify individuals. Instead, Brazilians have employed informal descriptive terms to assign racial classification. The 1976 IBGE *Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domocílios* (National Survey of Sample Households) allowed Brazilians to self-determine their race or color instead of using the designated census categories.\(^{17}\) In this instance of “open” self-identification, Brazilians separated themselves into 136 different color categories.\(^{18}\) The colors ranged from the standard food-related *chocolate* (chocolate), *canela* (cinnamon), and *café-com-leite* (coffee with milk) to the more obscure *puxa-para-branca* (leaning towards white) and *burro-quando foge* (undefined, drab brown; literally, “donkey when it escapes”).\(^{19}\) Similarly, in the 1995 DataFolha survey, which also allowed “open” self-identification, Brazilians
divided themselves into 62 color categories. In both surveys, many of the terms described individuals of African descent and allowed Brazilians to distance themselves from blackness and its negative connotations by placing themselves closer to the whiter end of Brazil’s color hierarchy.

The question then becomes: How do you get individuals to subscribe to a collective racial and cultural identity, such as negro or afro-descendente (“afro-descendant”), when they have consistently been told by society through hegemonic discourse that they should leave their blackness behind in favor of a culturally whiter raça brasileira (“Brazilian race”)? It should be noted that as a result of nearly four hundred years of involvement with the Atlantic slave trade, Brazil imported nine times more enslaved people than were brought to mainland North America. Significantly, more than fifty percent of the Brazilian population has African ancestry and Brazil has the second largest population of African-descendant people, second only to Nigeria. However, people shy away from referring to someone as “black” outright for fear of being rude. The whiter one’s racial classification, the higher a person’s assumed status will be within Brazil’s social hierarchy, leading many Brazilians to use seemingly whiter racial categories like moreno to describe those who might otherwise be identified as afro-descendente or negro.

The afro-descendente and negro terms carry political weight. Activists in the movimento negro (black movement) have endorsed “race first” politics since the 1970s with the hope that they would promote racial unity in fight for equal rights, and in the 1990s they attempted to combat statistical erasure of Afro-Brazilians with the campaign “Não deixe sua cor passar em branco, responda com bom c/senso” (Don’t let your color pass into white, respond with good census/sense). Rather than approximating to whiteness by choosing to identity with fairer racial categories, individuals of African descent who assumirem (to assume or embrace) negro as a racial moniker identify themselves by heritage, rather than skin color, in opposition to Brazil’s traditional colorist racial hierarchy. The numbers demonstrate the impact of such campaigns. In comparison to the 2000 census, the percent of pardos increased from 38.5 percent to 43.1 percent in 2010. The proportion of pretos also grew from 6.2 percent to 7.6 percent of the population.

Brazil has a long history of marginalization and structural inequality in which a small, white elite has dominated the poor, non-white masses and largely excluded them from the political process. Moreover, even though Brazil has maintained a long political tradition of voting—albeit with various age, gender, racial, property, and literacy stipulations—Brazil was “a case study of elections without democracy.” During the Brazilian Empire, from 1822-1889, Brazilians elected representatives to a Chamber of Deputies, but the true power remained with the emperor and his appointed officials. Likewise, the military dictatorship, which lasted from 1964-1985, held indirect elections through an electoral college and its five presidents were imposed by the military high command.
What’s more, Brazil’s racial diversity has never been reflected in its structures of power. Even though approximately 51 percent of the 190,732,694 people living in Brazil self-identified as preto and pardo for the 2010 census, of the 513 officials elected to the Brazilian national congress in 2014, only 103 (20 percent) identify as negro. These numbers make it particularly difficult to understand democracy in Brazil as representative rule by the people, when there is little to no black political representation.

Inequality in Brazil has long been masked by the myth of racial democracy combined with the conflation of race and class. What’s more, these racial and class disparities have been further concealed by the state’s inclusion of symbolic cultural elements from marginalized communities. In particular, Brazil is known for the cultural contributions of the descendants of Africans to Brazilian national identity. These include the traditional dish feijoada, a black bean and meat stew improvised upon by enslaved blacks; samba, a popular dance and music style that finds its roots in African polyrhythm and is often freighted with nationalist meanings; Candomblé, a syncretic religion combining aspects of Christianity and West African traditional belief systems; the concept of malandragem, a lifestyle of idleness, fast living, and petty crime; and capoeira, a dance-like martial art form created by enslaved Africans. Likewise, soccer—an integral part of Brazilian national identity that venerates Afro-Brazilian star players such as Neymar, Jr. and Pelé—was sponsored by the government beginning in the 1940s with the funding of the national soccer team and establishment of National Sport Council. Each of these aspects of Afro-Brazilian culture were once excluded from, then later incorporated into the national rhetoric in various forms at different moments in history. Yet despite their contributions, Afro-Brazilians have been subjected to racial discrimination, criminalization, and limited access to education and employment, all while racial democracy is still somewhat disseminated as a national ideology. Ironically, as Robert Stam notes in his book Tropical Multiculturalism, “the same Europeanized elite that conveniently invokes its mestiço culture and its ‘foot in the kitchen’ steadfastly refuses to empower the mestiço majority.”

The Brazilian government spent decades trying to whiten the country and many officials believed that through practices of miscegenation Afro-Brazilians would eventually cease to exist. Scientific racists, like novelist-medical professor Afrânio Peixoto, supported this way of thinking, stating, “It will take us perhaps three hundred years to change spiritually and bleach our skin so that we become, if not white, at least disguised and thus lose our mestiço character.” Brazil’s leaders furthered embranquecimento (whitening) efforts through both indirect means like education, popular media, and watering-down and nationalizing of Afro-Brazilian cultural expressions as well as more directly through government-sponsored European immigration, and public health programs, as well as the proactive sterilization of black women. As a part of the whitening project, the Brazilian elite utilized public education as a mechanism to encourage young Afro-descendants to
abandon group cultural practices like Candomblé and capoeira and move towards “civilized” white cultural norms. In 1921, the interior state of Mato Grosso made a land concession for developers from the United States, but when the press revealed that the organizers were recruiting African-Americans, the president of Mato Grosso immediately canceled it. Subsequently, congressional deputies Andrade Bezerra of Pernambuco and Cincinnato Braga of São Paulo proposed a bill to prohibit the entry of “human beings of the black race” into Brazil, inciting a heated debate in the Brazilian National Congress. While this bill did not pass, other congressional deputies proposed similar ones suggesting color bars for immigration. After the Revolution of 1930, the provisional government of Getúlio Vargas held a Constituent Assembly, and Article 121, Section 6 of the Constitution of 1934 incorporated Deputies Bezerra and Braga’s principle of national quotas for immigrants. Before his deposition in 1945, Vargas enacted an immigration decree-law declaring “the necessity to preserve and develop the ethnic composition of the population, the more desirable characteristics of European ancestry.” Since the framers of the 1946 constitutions only specified that immigration would be regulated by law and did not introduce a new body of immigration regulations, Brazil continued to operate under this standard until the 1980s. These means of whitening simultaneously incorporated and suppressed blackness while privileging whiteness.

As part of the collective common sense, a known but unacknowledged racial binary divides Brazil. On the one side, blackness is associated with baseness, low culture, backwardness, animality, poverty, hyper-sexuality and degeneracy. Whiteness, meanwhile, is symbolic of progress, modernity, humanity, virtue, high culture and wealth. This binary notably influences Brazil’s colorist, racial hierarchy and Afro-Brazilian’s access to jobs. After the abolition of slavery with the Golden Law in 1888, whites received preferential treatment in the hiring process both in rural and urban areas. In the countryside of São Paulo state, extended families of European immigrants monopolized the colono (settler) contracts and occupied the most sought-after jobs on the wealthier plantations in the region, forcing Afro-Brazilians to seek employment on less-profitable coffee plantations or to take on precarious seasonal jobs that did not pay well enough to attract whites. With regards to urban life, the São Paulo City Census of 1893 shows that European immigrant workers were also preferred in cities, as “72 percent of employees in commerce, 79 percent of factory workers, 81 percent of transport workers, and 86 percent of artisans were foreign-born.” The government-sponsored immigration particularly affected Afro-Brazilian women in the city by further pushing the Brazilian beauty ideal toward a more Europeanized standard and placing a higher value on features such as long straight blonde hair, light-colored eyes, and fine thin noses. This ideal also influenced the preferences in the job market. The phrase boa aparência (good appearance) appeared on job postings beginning in the 1940s, as a requirement for positions where individuals would come into contact with the general
public entering a business or shop, indicating that one should possess the preferred European features described above; simply put, Afro-Brazilians need not apply. This standard excluded black women from certain jobs, even if they met all of the other qualifications for the job, and this took a psychological toll on the constantly rejected women. In a society dictated by racial hegemony, the desires of the ruling class are universalized and directly affect the political, bureaucratic, intellectual and cultural realms of civil society through their implied economic and coercive powers. It is through the process of racial hegemony that the myth of racial democracy and the whitening ideal are propagated and reinforced even within communities of African descent.

When questions of race and racial discrimination are raised, “We are all Brazilian” is often the response, presenting a liberal-democratic ideal that there is only one people. Implicit in this phrase is the idea that nationality and citizenship are universal to all Brazilians regardless of color. Thus, acknowledging racial discrimination is considered “un-Brazilian” because of the myth that “Brazil is a ‘color blind’ society that grants equal rights and opportunities to all of its citizens.”

THE VARGAS ERA AND THE USE OF POPULAR CULTURE IN NATIONAL IDENTITY FORMATION

The rhetoric of inclusion inherent in statements like “We are all Brazilian” was further distilled into national discourse under the rule of populist-corporatist leader Getúlio Vargas and his Estado Novo, which persisted from 1937 to 1945. This was especially notable in his policies promoting Afro-Brazilian popular culture as central to brasilidade. After losing the 1929 election, Vargas first rose to power during the Revolution of 1930 and later established authoritarian rule. His regime deposed the Old Republic’s “café-com-leite” politics, which had been dominated by agrarian oligarchs and planter elite from the states of São Paulo, with its coffee industry, and Minas Gerais, with its dairy interests. Using the financial crash of 1929 to his advantage, Vargas centralized the Brazilian government with military force, quickly dissolving the National Congress, instituting an emergency regime, and assuming complete policy making authority. In 1933 elections were held for a Constituent Assembly, which subsequently produced the Constitution of 1934. This same collective became the Chamber of Deputies and formally elected Vargas to a four-year term. Vargas would later overturn the 1934 constitution in 1937 in favor of a new constitution he called the Estado Novo; what started as a coup-induced democracy became a full-fledged dictatorship.

Since those who supported Vargas ranged from intellectuals and radicals on both political extremes to the emerging urban middle class and artists, a compromise state emerged and no group was able to monopolize power as the planter elite once had.
its early days, the Vargas regime promised an open government accessible to a broad spectrum of society through corporatism, a rhetoric that resonated strongly with Brazil’s disenfranchised. Corporatism’s conceptualization of society as a “body” comprised of interest groups differentiated and ranked by their productive or economic function allowed Vargas, the “brain,” to offer the populace a new means of seemingly direct political influence — a “peripheral nervous system” of clientelism. The concept of corporatism also applied to the government, and each ministry Vargas established — including the Department of Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion — acted as an appendage as he strove for ordem e progresso (order and progress).

Under the Estado Novo, popular culture developed into a unifying implement central to the establishment of a fortified Brazilian identity. As a result, popular culture — radio, film, sports, music, newspapers, and magazines, among other forms — were radically altered and became subject to government propaganda, subsidization, and censorship. Fashioning the Brazilian national identity required strategic curation on the part of the Vargas regime. Public radio provided the means by which to reach the masses while articulating and disseminating a message of inclusion.

Government radio programs, including the nightly Hora do Brasil (“The Brazil Hour”) varied in success — except for those broadcast by Rádio Nacional (National Radio), which maintained widespread popularity. In a 1943 interview, station director Gilberto de Andrade stated, “Rádio Nacional is a station that does not merely broadcast programs of purely popular nature.” He continued, “Although we do not neglect the recreational side of radio, we seek to attract the sympathy of the public with a presentation of highly patriotic, educational, and cultural foundation…It is a work of national construction.” While Rádio Nacional already promoted Afro-Brazilian popular music as the cultural essence of the nation before establishing a relationship with the Estado Novo in 1940, the Vargas regime took this belief to heart. Rádio Nacional’s star-studded programming and ability to respond to popular taste within the parameters delineated by the government allowed it to flourish at the nexus of state and market; its influence in shaping new trends in popular music could not be matched, as it projected local trends like samba from Rio de Janeiro onto the national stage.

While he was not the most charismatic dictator, Vargas recognized the political importance of popular culture as a means to solidify support for his government and improve Brazil’s international image. Many of the most widely recognized aspects of Brazilian national identity grew out of policies implemented by Vargas. Key among his policies were sponsoring the national soccer team, establishing national radio, and promoting carnival parades of the samba schools of Rio de Janeiro — making samba e futebol two of the most recognizable symbols of Brazil abroad.

These tactics were so effective that samba found itself incorporated into US Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy. Announced in 1933, the Good Neighbor Policy was the Roosevelt administration’s primary foreign policy of non-interference and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of Latin American countries with the ulterior motive of asserting US influence and promoting trade with the region. Vargas fully supported the Good Neighbor Policy, believing that it would energize the dissemination of Brazilian national identity and subsequent cultural products. He was right. In an effort to encourage US-Brazil relations, Vargas served as one of Carmen Miranda’s patrons anticipating the valuable propaganda her 1939 New York tour could provide for Brazil. The radio star, samba singer, and actress Carmen Miranda—dubbed the “white Ambassador of Samba” with her appropriated tutti frutti head wrap—embodied the stereotypical exotic image of Brazil while performing in the United States. Walt Disney’s films Saludos Amigos (1942) and The Three Caballeros (1944) further captured this extrapolated vision of Brazilians through the hyper-friendly, musically inclined parrot Zé Carioca, who played music masquerading as samba. Using music as a unifying force, the Vargas regime had successfully created a marketable Brazilian national identity that was even endorsed by its powerful neighbor, the United States.

Back home in Brazil, Vargas enacted his popular culture policy on carnival practices in the nation’s then capital of Rio de Janeiro. In addition to the economic rationale of tourism, the policy promoting carnival “sought to play a role in strengthening the nation’s new sense of its own identity as at least partly Afro-Brazilian through such powerful instruments as music and dance.” Vargas’s policies required escolas de samba (samba schools) to emphasize the percussive sound of the music. In addition, Vargas’ policies towards samba schools dictated that the parades organized by each school were required to represent patriotic, nationalist themes. Many of these national symbols incorporated elements of Afro-Brazilian culture, such as costumes reminiscent of traditional dress and head wraps worn by black women in the northeast. This was an unsurprising development, given that “reconsideration of the importance of African cultural influence was the single most important element in Brazil’s collective inquiry into national character.”

By the mid 1950s, the themes and practices that defined Brazilian national identity had been solidified. However, despite the seemingly universalist message of Vargas-era cultural symbols, Brazil remained far from inclusive for the very Afro-Brazilians whose traditions inspired much of the country’s new national identity. Rather than accept Afro-Brazilians as an equally valid component of the nation’s cultural milieu, ruling elites continued with their efforts to whitewash black traditions while appropriating the most attractive elements of Afro-Brazilian culture for national consumption. The history of samba music offers an especially illustrative example of how aspects of Afro-Brazilian culture became whitened and nationalized during this time, with the practice having only recently reclaimed some of its original African roots.
A HISTORY OF SAMBA

Music, and samba in particular, is a key aspect of African-descendant culture in Brazil that seemingly “outgrew” the confines of its origins. The Brazilian samba musician Sinhô once stated, “Samba is like a little bird: it belongs to whoever catches it.” This simile addresses the universality of samba following the implementation of Getúlio Vargas’ nationalist cultural policies: anyone can catch the bird, and thus samba belongs to everyone. At the turn of the century, samba began its journey of acculturation into the national imagination, though not before being altered to meet the standards of the white elite. Each sub-genre of samba is a testament to the number of times that samba as a rhythm, a dance, and as a unifying concept of national identity in Brazil, has been taken up by different groups of people. When samba was “caught” by white middle-class Brazilians from the asfalto (asphalt; the city, where streets were paved) of Rio de Janeiro, they projected an image of genuineness onto samba as it exists on the morro (hillside community with little or no urban infrastructure; also known as a favela). There, they reasoned, samba belonged to the poor preto and pardo residents of the morro. Yet, by insisting that Afro-Brazilians prevailed as the sole holders of symbolic capital of authenticity, white Brazilians pigeonholed blacks into the role of folkloric cultural producers, making them living artifacts in the exhibit of Brazilian national identity. The white elite further twisted the significance of samba music through socio-political control, as authoritarian president Getúlio Vargas imposed stringent regulations on the development of carnival and samba-enredo (parade samba), forcing blacks to emphasize, and to a certain extent stereotype, particular aspects of their culture. If samba is a bird, it—along with its Afro-Brazilian creators—has been caged for a long time.

Samba first developed within the communities of Afro-Brazilian migrants from the northeast of Brazil as they encountered people from various musical backgrounds in Rio de Janeiro. It initially flourished around Praça Onze in the neighborhood of Cidade Nova at parties hosted in the homes of baianas, women from the northeastern region of Bahia. This early variation of samba drew heavily from West African antecedents and popular Afro-Brazilian musical forms like lundu and maxixe, performed primarily by string instruments accompanied by percussion. These early forms of samba were largely seen as sensual, uncultured, and unsophisticated by the white Brazilian elite. In a letter to the Jornal de noticias (News Journal) of Bahia in 1901 a reader wrote, “I am referring to the great celebration of Carnival and the abuse being made of it…and also to the way this celebration of Civilization has become Africanized among us.” Truly outraged by the overt aural expression of blackness, the reader continued, “I find that the authorities should prohibit those [African drum sessions] and Candomblés that in such quantity are overflowing on our streets these days, producing such great cacophonous noise,” and could not resist vilifying “those masquerades dressed in [typical black costumes] singing their traditional samba,
because all of that is incompatible with our current civilized state.” Nevertheless, the polyrhythmic nature of samba further evolved in the neighborhood of Estácio, making it better suited to dancing and parading, in addition to giving prominence to the cuíca (squeaky friction drum), surdo (bass drum) and tamborim (small, loud, circular frame drum played with a stick). Not unlike the rodas de samba (samba circles where musicians gather to play samba; usually held at bars), this revamped version of samba spread among the lower classes and soon received widespread acclaim, elevating the Estácio style to the “definitive samba.”

Until the late 1920s, samba remained relatively unknown outside the culture of working-class Afro-Brazilians. However, the practice soon flew into the hands of middle-class whites of Vila Isabel, such as Noel Rosa, who had access to record companies and radio stations. To this day, Rosa remains one of the most well-known composers of Brazilian popular music. A songwriter who played the guitar and mandolin who made his big break with “Com que roupa?” (“With which clothes?”) at the start of the Estado Novo, Rosa regularly participated in rodas de samba in the primarily Afro-Brazilian favela communities of Mangueira and Salgueiro. He brought the sounds and ideas from those morros into the broadcasting studio for the mini-program he co-hosted on the radio called Samba e outras coisas (“Samba and other things”).

Although he died at the age of 26 from tuberculosis, Rosa was one of the most prolific samba writers of his time and he was readily praised for his poetic ability to deftly chronicle politico-cultural realities in a few witty lines. A great many of his lyrics incorporated nationalistic themes: Rosa’s 1932 song, “São Coisas Nossas” (“They Are Our Things”) is an example of how the composer explores the link between samba and national identity. The title of this samba harkens back to Anderson’s idea of the nation as an imagined community with a shared, collective identity. This shared identity is made up of elements that belong to the song’s participants, as opposed to an outside group or entity. The listener is constantly reminded in the refrain that all of the items listed are “our things” and given a sense of possession of the different facets that come together to create Brazilian national identity. Throughout the song, Rosa reflects on things that are typically Brazilian, ranging from the mixed-race morena to the trams that once crisscrossed the city of Rio de Janeiro. “São Coisas Nossas” begins with the narrator wishing to be a pandeiro (circular frame drum with metal jingles, similar to a tambourine) and longing to play guitar in a shack. This imagery brings to mind the aforementioned morro-asfalto dichotomy; it is the authentic, impoverished environment in which samba was born that is worthy of melancholic nostalgia.

Notably, the second verse of “São Coisas Nossas” turns to the figure of the malandro. An iconic figure in Brazilian popular culture, and a motif in Rosa’s songs, the malandro is a clever, “flashy, petty criminal disdainful of work and domesticity…usually represented
as an Afro-Brazilian man in stylish attire…living by his wits in the brothels and gambling dens of the city.”

Rosa sings:

_Malandro que não bebe_,
Que não come
Que não abandona o samba
Pois o samba mata a fome,
Morena bem bonita lá da roça,
Coisa nossa, coisa nossa
O samba, a prontidão
E outras bossas,
São nossas coisas, são coisas nossas!

The _malandro_ that doesn’t drink,
That doesn’t eat
That doesn’t abandon samba
Because samba kills hunger,
The beautiful _morena_ from out there in the country
Our thing, our thing
Samba, pennilessness
And other fashions
They’re our things, they’re things of ours!

Like many aspects of samba music, the _malandro_ icon is built upon various stereotypes and cultural practices of Afro-Brazilians and the _malandro_’s stylish aesthetic is based on an entity in Afro-Brazilian syncretic religion named Zé Pelintra. The _malandro_ embodies many of the negative characteristics associated with Afro-Brazilians, yet he is an exalted “symbol of outlaw glamour…an ideal to which many _sambistas_ [samba musicians] aspired.”

The lyrics of “São Coisas Nossas” give the impression that samba has the ability to make one forget one’s problems. The _malandro_ figure in the song does not eat or drink and is able to survive on samba, not unlike the living conditions of some marginalized Afro-Brazilians, who despite having little to nothing are still invested in cultural production. Of Rosa’s _malandros_, historian Bryan McCann writes, “[They] are not merely colorful characters, they are the performers and guardians of the essence of popular culture in its purest form.” Parallel to the position of authenticity occupied by Afro-Brazilians as cultural producers for the Vargas regime, “The _malandro_ feeds off of popular culture and separates himself from other kinds of worldly concerns. In doing so, he embodies a fundamental aspect of national culture and becomes one of “our things.”

In some ways, the _malandro_ became an icon of Afro-Brazilian belonging in national identity. Still, in the end, the state possessed both the product of popular culture and the producer, and eventually the Vargas regime attempted to sanitize samba lyrics by censoring use of the _malandro_ figure.

Afro-Brazilians sold their compositions to white Brazilians, indirectly reaching broader audiences “at a time when police still arrested or beat samba musicians under spurious vagrancy laws.” In the transition from _samba do morro_ to the overtly patriotic _samba-canção_ (samba song) of Noel Rosa and Heitor Villa-Lobos, middle-class whites profited by bringing the sound of the _morro_ to mass audiences, and the majority of Afro-Brazilian _sambistas_ remained poor. When samba was “caught” by these white artists, the emphasis on percussion was reduced for the purpose of recording, and samba artists from Vila Isa-
bel made samba into a high art through poetic lyrics. By implementing motifs such as the *malandrin*o as the preeminent mouthpiece of Brazilian culture, Rosa mediated between *asfalto* and *morro* while simultaneously solidifying the presentation of Afro-Brazilians as the keepers of an authentic samba, and subsequently Brazilianess.

Rosa’s reinterpretation of samba both supports and refutes the inclusionary myth of Brazil’s racial democracy. On the one hand, the samba “bird” was inclusively developed by the *asfalto*, which retooled its sound to cater to wider audiences throughout Brazil. On the other hand, white middle-class musicians like Rosa believed that the bird still belonged to the authentic *morro*, suggesting that the genre still remained racially relegated to the Afro-Brazilian community. The spotty benefits Afro-Brazilians received in response to their music’s popularity reflected similar contradictions; while Afro-Brazilians were held in high regard for their contribution to samba music, few Afro-Brazilian musicians profited financially in any way from their musical and cultural contributions. Even on the radio, an aural medium, *sambistas* were white Brazilians, with only limited exceptions. In this way, samba became both inclusive and exclusive to Afro-Brazilians, placing the art form in an awkward sociocultural position.

From white musicians, Getúlio Vargas’ regime also caught the samba bird. Because of the inclusive, overtly nationalist message behind the songs of Rosa and his peers, samba was taken up as a manifestation of Brazilianess and promoted by the government. A resulting sub-genre of samba, known as *samba-exaltação* (exalting samba), is often associated with the work of Ary Barroso, specifically the well-known “Aquarela do Brasil” (“Watercolor of Brazil”) debuted in 1939. Barroso did not view his sambas as propagandistic, but nonetheless they achieved mass popularity through Rádio Nacional and were supported by the government. His sambas depicted the beauty, richness, and grandness of Brazil, the lyrical content invoking a primordial link between folkloric samba and national identity, which complemented the Estado Novo’s rhetoric. Like Rosa, in addition to utilizing an orchestral sound, Barroso maintained that, “pure samba…is the samba of the *morro*, out of place in the city below.”

*Samba-exaltação* was also important to Brazil’s promotion of racial democracy, celebrating “Afro-Brazilian culture as the source of national identity, albeit in a way that consigned Afro-Brazilians themselves to a folkloric, idealized, and static past” and presents romanticized images of the experiences of the enslaved. *Samba-exaltação* illustrates once again how Brazil’s racial elite appropriated samba for its own purposes while portraying another version of the genre as authentic to substantiate claims of racial democracy. The white middle and upper classes presented *samba do morro* as authentically rooted in the black underclass while simultaneously asserting that national samba must be refined through their expertise. This further emphasized the notion that in Brazil, “black”
and “national” cultural associations proved mutually exclusive. In this instance, not only did samba become an appropriated cultural symbol but also a means of reasserting black cultural inferiority.

Moreover, though samba do morro was typically seen as “authentic” by white Brazilians living in major cities, much of what spectators perceived as authenticity resulted from a constructed framework of national regulation. In order to both advance nationalist themes and preserve supposedly Afro-Brazilian aspects of the samba, Getúlio Vargas’s government imposed strict rules upon parade samba, also known as samba-enredo. Federal regulations, for example, limited samba-enredo to the use of string and percussive instruments in order to retain what outsiders might perceive as an authentically Afro-Brazilian sound.Officials also required escolas de samba (samba schools) to have an ala das baianas (wing or contingent of Bahian women), linking their parade directly to the Bahian women who first hosted samba parties in the Praça Onze. At the same time, the government also asked escolas to perform sambas with nationalistic themes. Because the escolas de samba relied heavily on government sponsorship for funding, Vargas’ control of samba-enredo thus trapped Afro-Brazilians in the static role of constructed authenticity.

When Sinhô claimed that “Samba is like a little bird: it belongs to whoever catches it,” he referred to the universality of samba that allows it to be able to be interpreted in different ways, at different times, by different people. Samba do morro, samba-canção, samba-exaltação, and samba-enredo embody the dynamics within the genre of samba. The history behind each sub-genre shows how samba is caught and never belongs exclusively to one group at any given point in time. This can especially be seen among the attitudes of sambistas toward samba as a concept, as white sambistas projected labels of authenticity onto the Afro-Brazilians and samba do morro.

Afro-Brazilian cultural elements were carefully selected and incorporated into the national imagination, and the Vargas regime played a particularly important role in making samba a part of the cultural economy. Beyond the blatant appropriation of a black musical genre, the Vargas government’s regulations on samba schools—in particular, that percussive elements of the music be maintained and that the enredo always have a nationalistic theme—were intended to forcibly construct images that would incorporate blacks into the patchwork of Brazilian identity. The apparent incorporation of blackness into whiteness in the case of samba has thus functioned to further Brazil’s myth of racial democracy. Consequently, the means by which Vargas’ government perpetuated this ideal constrained and oppressed the very culture it sought to promote.

With history in mind, Brazil’s attempts to promote samba’s most “authentic” aspects appear out of place. Not only does the music’s wide variety of subgenres make this task difficult, but the tradition’s various historical contributors make exclusive cultural ownership of the medium impossible. What samba’s history does reveal is that contributions to
a nation’s identity do not guarantee citizenship for its creators—in this case, impoverished Afro-Brazilians. Herein lies the irony of Brazil’s façade of racial democracy: attempts to appear racially and culturally inclusive of marginalized communities are in fact oppressive of black culture. Until Brazil fully allows Afro-Brazilians to express their cultural practices as an integrated part of Brazilian society, authentic features of samba music may remain elusive.

THE RE-AFRICANIZATION OF CARNIVAL AND SAMBA

Thirty years later, carrying on Getúlio Vargas’ legacy of state controlled carnival practices, the 1964 coup d’état and subsequent military regime stringently censored cultural production in Brazil. President Artur Costa e Silva issued Ato Institucional Número Cinco (Institutional Act Number Five; AI-5) on December 13, 1968. AI-5 allowed censorship of mass media forms including music, film, theatre, television, and the press, among other linha dura (hardline) authoritarian policies such as the institutionalization of torture, suspension of habeas corpus, and the brutal suppression of oppositional political movements. Censors targeted music because of its strong influence in Brazilian society, especially on the youth, and many singers and songwriters went into exile and wrote protest songs. For those who endured in Brazil, the Serviço de Censura Federal (Federal Censorship Service) required artists to submit their compositions for approval before recording. Similarly, it was mandatory for all carnival groups and escolas de samba of Rio de Janeiro—regardless of size—to submit extensive dossiers detailing their plans for carnival, including themes, float and costume design sketches, and the lyrics to their samba-enredo for inspection. Historian Paulina L. Alberto asserts that “under the military dictatorship [...] ideologies of brasilidade and racial democracy took on an even more totalizing, indeed suffocating character.” By propagating these deeply entrenched ideas originating in Vargas Era cultural policies, she argues, “the military governments sought to enforce the image of a racially harmonious, Africanized Brazil at home and abroad, while preempting the development of homegrown or US-or African-inspired, racially oppositional politics.” As a result, “these objectives led them to emphasize Brazil’s Africaness in terms of a folkloric, ancient, and depoliticized African presence, heavily mediated by cultural and racial mixture and contained by the process of nationalization.” Nevertheless, despite the widespread musical censorship, violent oppression, and further imposition of the racial democracy ideology during the dictatorship, marginalized Afro-Brazilian carnival groups were subversive and critical of Brazilian cultural politics through their song lyrics and afro-aesthetic symbolism.

In the book Ritual, Politics, and Power, David Kerzer writes that “through symbolism we recognize who are the powerful and the weak, and through the manipulation of
symbols the powerful reinforce their authority.” At the same time, Kerzer also notes, “the weak, too, can try to put on new clothes and to strip the clothes from the mighty.” This contesting of power can be observed in the development of political and social movements in Brazil through the use of symbolism in music. As the carnival practices and samba of Rio de Janeiro evolved, the genre made its way back to its northeastern roots and was transformed once more. Although the escolas de samba incorporated an increasing amount of Afro-Brazilian elements, carnival practices throughout Brazil were overwhelmingly Eurocentric. However, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the participants in carnival festivities in the Bahian streets of Salvador became significantly darker.

With the rise of afoxés (a secular manifestation of Candomblé), blocos índio (carnival groups utilizing Amerindian symbolism), and blocos afro, the residents of Salvador began to reinterpret black traditions, institutions, and socio-political organizations. In an effort to describe this progressive phase, Antônio Risério coined the term “re-Africanization” in his 1981 book Carnaval Ijexá. Re-Africanization significantly altered the regional identity of Bahia’s largely afro-descendant population and disrupted Brazil’s racialized social hierarchy. This movement gave the marginalized black majority a new way to conceptualize their ethno-racial identity and inspired many blacks in Salvador to eschew the once common practice of mestiço self-identification in favor of connecting to a distinct negro collective.

Blocs afro in particular embodied a markedly Afrocentric vibe. These celebrations rose in popularity throughout Salvador and encouraged individuals to assume a politicized, black identity. The first bloco afro, Ilê Aiyê (literally, “house of this world” in Yoruba), was founded in 1974 by Apolônio de Jesus and Antonio Carlos do Santos, better known as “Vovô do Ilê” (“Grandpa of Ilê”), in the marginalized neighborhood of Liberdade. Arguably, the foundation of this bloco afro precipitated the re-Africanization movement in Bahia as Ilê Aiyê embraced the concept of “Negritude—a belief system [that] was one facet of a wider, insurgent recognition of things African, or of the ‘diaspora.’” This collective organizing around racial identity did not go unnoticed by the military regime. In a 2012 interview with Correio Braziliense, Vovô recalled, “Qualquer tipo de movimentação e você já era tachado como comunista. E não foi diferente com a gente: fomos perseguidos pela polícia. O pessoal achava que queríamos tomar o poder” (“Any kind of mobilization and you were immediately branded a communist. And it was not any different for us: we were persecuted by the police. They believed we wanted to take power”). The regime was further agitated by the fact that the 1960’s Black Power movement in the United States served as a font of inspiration for Ilê Aiyê. As it happens, the group was originally called Poder Negro (“Black Power”), but the then-president of the Federação dos Clubes Carnavalescos (Federation of Carnival Clubs) and retired naval officer Arquimedes Silva, along with a friend in the polícia militar (military police), advised the bloco not register under this name, claiming that it possessed foreign and negative connotations. Nevertheless, the fact that
the American Black Power movement was Ilê Aiyê’s initial namesake speaks to the influence of black American political movements on the performative aspects of Afro-Brazilian identity in that era, despite the military dictatorship’s efforts to preempt the development of race-based oppositional politics.

Ilê Aiyê brought together black youth seeking autonomous representation and culturally specific entertainment with meaningful content. The group’s work resulted in “a new sociological baseline in which there were mobilized participants, who embraced tradition, while seeking to engage modernity that was transforming Salvador.”112 In opposition to the notion of returning to an “African” tradition, this move was self-consciously pitched as engagement with a resolutely contemporary and avant-garde Afro-diasporic consciousness, one grounded not only in a tendentious notion of “memory” but also in a longstanding awareness of transnational contacts and linkages among black cultures.112

Every year since its first carnival, Ilê Aiyê has paraded under an Afrocentric theme that either critiques Brazil’s dominant historical narrative or highlights the struggle of the African diaspora globally. Subsequently, the group spent its first three years parading accompanied and surveilled by trucks filled with soldiers, but according to Vovô, “nunca teve mais polícia do que gente no bloco” (“there were never more soldiers than people in the bloco.”)113 From its founding through 1988—the hundred-year anniversary of abolition of slavery in Brazil—Ilê Aiyê’s annual carnival theme was named after an African civilization, nation, or tribe. Subsequent themes celebrated significant events in Brazilian history. These include the 1991 theme Revolta dos Búzios (the “seashell revolt,” an antislavery rebellion of 1798) and the 1995 theme Zumbi 300 Anos-Organização de resistência negra (Zumbi three hundred years—organization of black resistance) in honor of the leader of Palmares, a well-known quilombo (community of self-emancipated individuals).114 To this day, subscribing to the idea of a black ethnocentrism, Ilê Aiyê maintains a strict black-only membership—a policy that has been interpreted as “racist” by some, including an anonymous editorial on February 12, 1975 in the major Salvador newspaper A Tarde with the headline: “Bloco racista, nota destoante” (“Racist bloco, dissonant note”).115 Moreover, to further their “race-first” approach, the group has sponsored events like the Deusa do Ébano (“Ebony Goddess”) pageant that exalts the beauty of the black woman in Brazil. In addition to its cultural activities, Ilê Aiyê also has focused on social engagement and youth by founding A Escola da Mãe Hilda (“Mother Hilda’s School”), its own neighborhood elementary school, in 1988, and Banda Erê, a bloco established in 1992 to teach percussion to children and adolescents in the community. The group also started a professionalizing school in 1997 that provides students with the skills they needed to successfully enter the workforce and offers citizenship classes illuminating the questions of black history and racism.116

Of Ilê Aiyê’s various carnival songs, its first, “Que Bloco É Esse?” (“What Group Is This?”)117 from 1975, remains one of the group’s best known. Several notable Afro-Bra-
zilian artists, including Gilberto Gil and Criolo, have covered the song. From its opening question, “Que Bloco É Esse?” tone of the lyrics are aggressively self-affirming. On the one hand, it gives the sense of a self-assured person asking a question they already know the answer to—a question they will soon answer for those who are unaware:

 Que bloco é esse? What group is this?  
Eu quero saber! I want to know!  
É o mundo negro That we came to show you  
Que viemos mostra prá você We are crazy blacks  
Somos criolo doido We are pretty cool  
Somos bem legal We have coarse hair  
Temos cabelo duro Wear it only as an afro  
É só no black power

On the other, the question “What group is this?” captures the sense of bafflement that must have been felt by the white elite of Salvador as they saw Ilê Aiyê parading for the first time. The rest of the lyrics further encapsulate a sentiment similar to the one behind James Brown’s 1968 song “Say it Loud—I’m Black and I’m Proud.” The singers have swagger and know their worth, even if white people cannot see it; if they did, the song argues, white people would go to great and dangerous lengths to become black:

 Branco, se você soubesse White man if you knew  
O valor que o negrão tem, The value of the big black man  
Tu tomava um banho de piche, branco White man, you would bathe in tar  
Pra ficar negrão também to be big and black too

In parading with this song, Ilê Aiyê proudly embraces the group’s blackness, including the aspects that they surely have been told are negative: their craziness, their coarse afro hair, their malandragem (astuteness or cleverness). In fact, the song rejects the community-owned malandro seen in Rosa’s “São Coisas Nossas.” In assuming their blackness, the singers embrace these characteristics, cherish them and refuse to share them with the white people that have taken pieces of their culture for so long. Lines like, “Não te ensino minha malandragem, nem tão pouco minha filosofia, não” (“I will not teach you my malandragem, no not even a little of my philosophy”) demonstrate that the historical cycle of “borrowing” and “appreciation” was completely transparent to Afro-Brazilians in the group. Thus, Ilê Aiyê tried to lyrically establish conditions—such as the rejection of sharing of a “communal” cultural feature of malandragem with white Brazilians—to avoid being complicit in the process of appropriating their own culture.
Where Ilê Aiyê is the guardian of tradition, Grupo Cultural Olodum represents an innovation on tradition that further popularized blocos afro. Olodum (Yoruba for “the moment of creation”) was founded in 1979 and firmly established its place in Salvador’s carnival scene in 1983. Unlike Ilê Aiyê, which rose to prominence from the periphery, Olodum was founded in the historic neighborhood of Pelourinho in the center of Salvador. The group’s membership was comprised of a hodgepodge of vagrants and outcasts—prostitutes, homosexuals, gamblers, drug addicts, intellectuals, and bohemians—in addition to a few former members of Ilê Aiyê.

These members brought with them Ilê Aiyê’s connection to cultural and political influences from Africa and across the African diaspora. However, in direct contrast to Ilê Aiyê’s militant, self-affirming negritude, Olodum allowed whites and mestiços to join the group and was more explicitly involved in the black political struggle. According to former Olodum president João Jorge Santos Rodrigues, the group strove “to take the ideas of [black civil rights] thinkers out of the classroom and lecture halls and to share them with people who had been beaten by the police many times.”

Olodum began with work with social action projects in the early 1990s with the foundation of Escola Olodum. These included artistic activities for young people, such as courses in drumming with the Bloco Afro Olodum Mirim for children, afro-dance, cultural entrepreneurship, and leadership.

Within the context of Olodum’s formation, samba transformed once again. Continuing in the tradition of re-Africanization, samba in Pelourinho developed a new rhythm called samba-reggae that incorporated elements of African-American funk and Jamaican reggae into the samba rhythm. Compared to the escolas de samba of Rio de Janeiro, Olodum used bare-bones instrumentation when performing. The group placed a heavier emphasis on percussion than other samba groups, employing instruments like the surdo, caixa, repique, and timbáu (hand drum) to produce a unique sound. Significantly, the use of the timbáu and the two-stick technique adopted to play the repique recalls practices common in Candomblé music. In the 1990s, Olodum’s samba-reggae music rose to international fame, with the group performing alongside Michael Jackson and Paul Simon.

In 1988, in honor of the one-hundredth anniversary of Brazil’s abolition of slavery, Olodum performed “Protesto do Olodum” (“Olodum’s Protest”), paralleling the hardships faced by people in Africa to the racial inequality experienced black people in Brazil:

Brasil Nordestópia
Na Bahia existe Etiópia
Pro Nordeste o país vira as costas
E lá vou eu

Northeastern dystopia Brazil
Ethiopia exists in Bahia
The country turns its back on the Northeast
And there I go

Taking a more direct lyrical approach than Ilê Aiyê, “Protesto Olodum” clearly points to
issues faced in their community and calls for action. At the time, Pelourinho was in a state of degradation, and prostitution had become a major issue in the neighborhood. “Protesto Olodum” criticizes the dystopian state of the Northeast region, comparing it to Ethiopia. Given the Northeast’s large non-white population, the racial parallel proves hard to ignore. The majority of Brazil’s wealth and power were, and remain, in the skyscrapers of the whiter Southeastern cities that exist in blissful isolation of the poverty and suffering of their country. Even after the fall of the military dictatorship 1985, Brazilians still lived in a highly militarized state that instilled fear into its citizens—a fact that Olodum denounces in the song along with the toxic effect of Brazil’s governance on its people:

E o terror já domina o Brasil
Faz denúncia Olodum Pelourinho
E lá vou eu

Brazilian leadership
Polluting force and elite

In the final verse, the song also cites well-known anti-Apartheid figures from South Africa, including Desmond Tutu and Nelson Mandela—taking a jab at the implicit segregation and racial inequality in Brazil.

Over the years, as the prices of t-shirts and other paraphernalia rose well outside of the budget of most Brazilians, Olodum has lost much of its support from locals in Salvador. Even though the bloco afro continues to sponsor programs for Afro-Brazilian youth, their focus has been geared more towards making money off of, and performing for tourists, at the behest of the government. What’s more, to guarantee the presence of black faces within the ranks of carnival participants, Olodum “gives away the fantasia [costume] to Afro-Brazilian participants. They willingly admit that when there is a majority white participation, carnavalesque performances lack their well-renowned energy and vitality. And, as a bloco afro, how can they parade without black people?”

Taken together, Ilê Aiyê and Olodum represent how the process of re-Africanization can create collective identity, as well as how Afro-Brazilian identity can serve as an organizing tool for community action. These two groups were the first “cultural manifestation of a decidedly politicized black movement that existed under cover during the not-yet-ended military dictatorship. The leadership of those blocos afro became leaders of the United Black Movement Against Racial Discrimination.” Nevertheless, they also promote a universal, prescriptive kind of black identity that could be considered exclusive. Even though their aesthetic grew out of black transnationalism and incorporates elements of reggae, soul, and funk music, blocos afro tend to invoke traditionalist representations of Africa and black-
ness in how they visually present themselves. “African garb” – emphasizing patterns, head-dresses, and bright, typically pan-African colors – has become a required uniform of sorts. This, in part, has to do with both the national and Bahian state government sponsored tourism, which has promoted African culture to Brazilian and foreign tourists through carnival, *capoeira*, *Candomblé*, and the folkloric music and dances of Bahia. As the most recognizable institutions of the black movement in Brazil, Olodum and Ilê Aiyê have played an integral role in raising Afro-Brazilian consciousness. However, because of their connection to the tourism industry and carnival, the *blocos afro* are forced to rely heavily on support from politicians and government officials for survival.

Even while those very same officials work to continue to their disadvantage and that of black Bahians. The *blocos* do not benefit sufficiently for their participation – as they constantly run the risk of not having enough sponsorship or financing – while their survival is dependent upon those who threaten them. These struggles for the *blocos’* survival remained despite the continued growth of carnival and tourism in Bahia – a growth advanced through the continued promotion of Afro-Brazilian culture as the primary attraction.

Although *blocos afro* distanced themselves from the racial democracy and *brasilidade* ideologies emphasized by the cultural policies of the Estado Novo and the military dictatorship seeking to incorporate Afro-Brazilians into government visions of national identity, their cultural production was once again influenced by government interest. And yet, their continued existence is an argument for the power of music and the inseparability of culture and politics in Brazil.

**CONCLUSION**

We began with the question “quem foi que inventou Brasil?” – who invented Brazil? From the lyrics of “História do Brasil,” written during the Vargas Era, Lamartine Babo would have us believe the answer to his question rests in the hands of three groups: “Foi Seu Cabral!” (It was Mr. Cabral!), Pedro Álvares Cabral, the Portuguese nobleman and navigator who initiated European settlement of Brazil in 1500; it was the fictional character “Ceci [who] fell in love with Peri,” a Portuguese maiden and a Guarani chief respectively, from José de Alencar’s 1857 nationalist novel *O guarani*; and it was the iconic figures the couple lyrically transforms into, Iaiô and Iaiá (gendered terms of endearment historically used by enslaved Africans to refer to their master’s children that became stereotyped terms of courtship between older Afro-Brazilians in the 1930s). Babo’s lyrics declare the invention of Brazil a peaceful, collective effort by Europeans, Amerindians, and Africans...
by domesticating the interracial union from O guarani and superimposing a tinge of Afro-Brazilian-ness. Importantly, “História do Brasil” reflects Gilberto Freyre’s description of the development of Brazilian culture in Casa-grande e senzala and exposes the pervasiveness and essentiality of the racial democracy myth to Brazilian history and national identity.

While no single entity can be charged with the “invention” of Brazil, individual actors and groups certainly played an important part in determining what shape Brazilian national identity would eventually take. By exploring the factors that contributed to redefining brasilidade, this essay contends that music has functioned as an important tool within Brazilian political life and shaped how the country came to imagine its national identity. Moreover, complex history of race relations in Brazil demonstrates how the rhetoric of inclusion fundamental to the myth of racial democracy allowed widespread inequality to be overlooked. Under the leadership and policies of Getúlio Vargas, Afro-Brazilian culture was thrust into the mainstream and transformed into a state-controlled apparatus employed to unify the Brazilian people. This process of nation identity formation simultaneously included and excluded Afro-Brazilians. After years of cultural relegation, samba became an integral part of Brazilian identity—first through informal, cultural appropriation, then through government-sponsored campaigns of whitening and nationalization. The history of this musical genre reveals that Afro-Brazilians creative contributions to Brazil’s national identity have not guaranteed them full access to citizenship. Overall, music has been crucial to the transformation of Brazil’s diverse population into a nation with a cohesive, collective identity able to withstand enduring inequalities.

Like every other nation in the world, Brazil is an imagined community. This community has been partially constructed through the use of cultural symbols and subversion of social norms in the carnival ritual. However, while the way in which this community was imagined may have begun with elite manipulation during the Estado Novo, the rise of blocos afro in Salvador during the military dictatorship demonstrated that those consistently at the bottom of the power structure can utilize the same mechanisms to change the way in which individuals see themselves as part of the imagined community. By unapologetically embracing negritude through their song lyrics and aesthetic symbolism, Olodum and Ilê Aiyê were able to politically subvert the myth of racial democracy disseminated by the military regime and occasionally critique the state. Even so, poor blacks in Brazil have been excluded from the elite projects of modernization and nationality and characterized as primitive, often forced to pursue alternative means of cultural survival. In this respect, blocos afro work toward giving the marginalized access to what everyone in the community is supposedly entitled. By reaffirming their identity, uplifting their communities, and critiquing the state, blocos afro solidify their place in the national narrative. Brazil was just as much invented by the Vargas regime as the Afro-Brazilians whose popular culture became the building blocks of modern Brazilian national identity.
“QUEM FOI QUE INVENTOU BRASIL”

APPENDIX A: “HISTÓRIA DO BRASIL” (1933)

Quem foi que inventou o Brasil?
Foi seu Cabral!
Foi seu Cabral!

No dia vinte e um de abril
Dois meses depois do carnaval

Depois
Ceci amou Peri
Peri beijou Ceci
Ao som...
Ao som do Guarani!

Do Guarani ao guaraná
Surgiu a feijoada
E mais tarde o Paraty

Depois
Ceci virou Iaiá
Peri virou Ioiô

De lá...

Pra cá tudo mudou!
Passou-se o tempo da vovó
Quem manda é a Severa
E o cavalo Mossoró

APPENDIX B: “SÃO COISAS NOSSAS” (1932)

Queria ser pandeiro
I would like to be a tambourine
Pra sentir o dia inteiro
To feel all day long
A tua mão na minha pele a batucar
Your hand drumming on my skin.
Saudade do violão e da palhoça
This longing for the guitar and the shack,
Coisa nossa, coisa nossa
Our things, our things
O samba, a prontidão
Samba, pennilessness
E outras bossas,
And other fashions
São nossas coisas, são coisas nossas!
They’re our things, they’re things of ours!

Malandro que não bebe,
The malandro that doesn’t drink,
Que não come
That doesn’t eat
Que não abandona o samba
That doesn’t abandon samba
Pois o samba mata a fome,
Because samba kills
hunger
Morena bem bonita lá da roça,
The beautiful morena from out there in the country
Coisa nossa, coisa nossa
Our thing, our thing
O samba, a prontidão
Samba, pennilessness
E outras bossas,
And other fashions
São nossas coisas, são coisas nossas!
They’re our things, they’re things of ours!

Baleiro, jorneleiro
The candy vendor, the paper boy
Motorneiro, condutor e passageiro,
The motorman, the driver and the passenger
Prestamista e o vigarista
Loansharks and con men
E o bonde que parece uma carroça,
And the tram that looks like
a wagon
Coisa nossa, muito nossa
Our thing, very much ours
O samba, a prontidão
Samba, pennilessness
E outras bossas,
And other fashions
São nossas coisas, são coisas nossas!
They’re our things, they’re things of ours!

Menina que namora
The girl that courts
Na esquina e no portão
On the corner and at the gate
Rapaz casado com dez filhos, sem tostão,
The married guy with ten kids and without a dime
Se o pai descobre o truque dá uma coca
If her father finds out he’s gonna give a beating
Coisa nossa, muito nossa
Our thing, very much ours
O samba, a prontidão
Samba, pennilessness
“QUEM FOI QUE INVENTOU BRASIL”

E outras bossas, And other fashions
São nossas coisas, são coisas nossas! They’re our things, they’re things of ours!


APPENDIX C: “QUE BLOCO É ESSE?” (1975)

Que bloco é esse? What group is this?
Eu quero saber, I want to know
É o mundo negro It’s the black world
Que viemos mostra prá você That we came to show you
Somos criolo doido We are crazy blacks
Somos bem legal We are pretty cool
Temos cabelo duro We have coarse hair
É só no black power Wear it only as an afro

Branco, se você soubesse White man if you knew
O valor que o negrão tem, The value of the big black man
Tu tomava um banho de piche, branco White man, you would bathe in tar
Pra ficar negrão também to be big and black too
Não te ensino minha malandragem I will not teach you my malandragem
Nem tão pouco minha filosofia, não Not even a little of my philosophy, no
Quem dá luz ao cego Whogiveslighttotheblindman
É bengala branca It’s the white walking stick
E santa luzia and St. Louisa


APPENDIX D: “PROTESTO DO OLODUM” (1988)

Força e pudor Force and modesty
Liberdade ao povo do Pelô Liberty to the people of Pelourinho
Mãe que é mãe no parto sente dor A mother who is a mother feels pain in childbirth
E lá vou eu And there I go

Declara a nação, Declare to the nation
Pelourinho contra a prostituição
Faz protesto, manifestação
E lá vou eu

Aqui se expandiu
E o terror já domina o Brasil
Faz denúncia Olodum Pelourinho
E lá vou eu

Brasil liderança
Força e elite da poluição
Em destaque o terror, Cubatão
E lá vou eu

Io io io io io
La la la la la la
Io io io io io
La la la la la la
Io io io io io
E lá vou eu

Brasil Nordestópia
Na Bahia existe Etiópia
Pro Nordeste o país vira as costas
E lá vou eu

Nós somos capazes
Pelourinho a verdade nos trás
Monumento caboclo da paz
E lá vou eu

Io io io io io
La la la la la la
Io io io io io
La la la la la la
Io io io io io
E lá vou eu

Pelourinho against prostitution
Protest and demonstrate
And there I go

It expanded here
And terror already dominates Brazil
Denounce it Olodum, Pelourinho
And there I go

Brazilian Leadership
Polluting force and elite
Highlight the horror, Cubatão [São Paulo]
And there I go

Northeastern dystopia Brazil
Ethiopia exists in Bahia
The country turns its back on the Northeast
And there I go

We are capable
Pelourinho the truth carries us
mixed race monument of peace
And there I go
Desmond Tutu

Contra o Apartheid lá na África do Sul

Vem saudando o Nelson Mandela

O Olodum

Io io io io io
La la la la la la la
Io io io io io
La la la la la la la
Io io io io io
E lá vou eu

Mozambique, Mozambique, Mozambique

Oh, Mozambique, Mozambique

Moçambique, Moçambique, Moçambique

O Moçambique, Moçambique

Moçambique eh! por minuto um homem vai morrer

sem ter pão nem água pra beber

E lá vou eu

Io io io io io
La la la la la la la
Io io io io io
La la la la la la la
Io io io io io
E lá vou eu


NOTES

1. Lamartine Babo, “História do Brasil,” 1933 by Almirante and Diabos do Céu, by RCA Victor. My translation. Full song can be found in Appendix A.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid., 236.


12. Ibid., 30-31.

13. Ibid., 139-140.


19. Ibid.


25. IBGE, *Censo demografico 2010*.


27. Ibid., 4.

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**TITLE IMAGE**

While most are familiar with the Revolutionary War label of “Tory,” few realize that its political clout extended far after the fighting ended. In particular, its usage dramatically increased around the War of 1812, as Republicans wielded it as a political weapon—loaded with insinuations of disloyalty and monarchism—against Federalists. By tracing the evolving definitions and implications of the political insult “Tory,” Zoe Rubin ’16 sheds light on early Americans’ fears of internal subversion and extreme monarchist ideas. Moreover, Rubin’s research contributes to our understanding of the fluidity of American political parties during the early republic.

By Zoe Rubin, TD ’16
Written for “Creation of the American Politician”
Professor Joanne Freeman
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A month after the United States declared war upon Great Britain on June 18, 1812, a mob descended on the Baltimore office of Alexander Contee Hanson, Jr., a provocative Federalist publisher. For years, Hanson’s *Federal Republican* had denounced the prospect of war with Great Britain as an “unjust” and “disastrous” administration project, and Congress’s unprecedented application of the War Powers Clause had not altered the paper’s editorial line. Republican newspapers, in turn, described Hanson’s controversial claims as “rash experiments on popular patience.” But patience has its limits, and at dusk on July 27, the city’s long-brewing partisan tensions erupted into civil unrest.

Recounting the Baltimore riots, Federalist and Republican presses fired allegations back and forth, each claiming the other was to blame for the violence. Alluding to the bloody upheaval in revolutionary Paris, Federalist papers described how the “Robersperi-ans [sic]” had attempted to assault the fortified house where Hanson and his “friends” had armed themselves in preparation. The *New-York Spectator* framed the Federalist stand as a defense of the First Amendment, stressing that Hanson’s supporters assembled “to support the liberty of the press, guaranteed to him by the constitution and laws of his country.”

The following morning, the city’s mayor appealed to the besieged men to seek shelter in the jail, where they would be better protected. His assurances, however, proved empty. That night, the “diabolical clan of political hyaenas” forced the iron doors of the jail open with sledgehammers, murdered one Federalist, and tarred and feathered another. In the ensuing melee, the mob brutally beat Hanson and his friends, torturing some with hot wax and condemning all as “Tories!”

Republican papers charged Hanson with bringing violence upon himself and his allies, including the now-deceased General James Lingan. The *Baltimore Whig* described the crowd as simply “a parcel of boys and a few men…” who had been provoked and threatened by the “traitors” within the house. Understandably, then, this “unarmed (and then inoffensive) populace” resolved to seek revenge on “the tory garrison.” Even as indignant Federalists claimed casualty counts in the high twenties—an exaggerated estimation later proved false—the Republican writers described only how the “Tories” had supposedly killed one member of the crowd and mortally wounded several others. The *Virginia Argus* stressed the unlawful actions of Hanson and his coeditor, Jacob Wagner, and blamed the *Federalist Republican* supporters for all wrongs committed. “The Rioters in the House at Baltimore were as much a mob as the populace,” stressed one correspondent. “There is no doubt that every man of them was subject to trial for murder on the first degree.” In the resulting trial, the jury acquitted all but one of the Republican rioters. As one jury member reasoned, “the affray originated with them tories… they all ought to have been killed.”

Even in the charged political climate of the War of the 1812, the Baltimore mob’s ferocity was extraordinary. But the language first employed by the Republican rioters, and later by Republican commentators, was not. Before and during the War of 1812, Republi-
can newspaper writers, Toasters, and letter-writers alike frequently labeled their Federalist
foes as “Tories,” a charge laden with damning historical implications. Although the political
insult originated in the 1790s, its usage increased dramatically at the outset of America’s
first declared war. Historians studying the evolution of partisanship during this period
acknowledged this trend, but few have examined it in considerable depth. Why did the
“Tory” charge deliver so much punch at this particular moment? What did it mean, and
how was it employed? And what does its popular usage suggest about the nature of parti-
sanship during this era?

By 1812, the word “Tory” had already garnered a complex history as a tool for po-
itical abuse. The Oxford English Dictionary dates the earliest usage of “Tory” to approxi-
mately 1646, tracing it to the Irish tóraidhe, -aighe, meaning “pursuer,” and the Scottish
Gaelic tòrachd, which meant, “pursuing with hostile intent.” During the early 17th cen-
tury, English settlers in Ireland first used the term to describe the dispossessed Irish outlaws,
mainly Papists and Royalists, who survived through plunder and banditry. “Tory” then
acquired political meaning as an insult for supporters of King James II, a Roman Catho-
lic, during the late-17th-century restoration of the English monarchy. As these supporters
coalesced into a political party championing the need to uphold established authority, the
term “Tory” came to define its members. Since those loyal to the British monarchy during
the war for independence held conservative views in line with those of British Tories, sup-
porters of the Revolution referred to them derogatorily as American “Tories.”

Narrowly defined, then, contemporary references to “Tories” and “Toryism” during
the War of 1812 alluded to the Revolutionary War-era meaning of the terms. But like
its earlier forms, the contemporary word “Tory” was more than a mere descriptor. In the
mid-19th century, a New York Times reviewer noted the deep fear conveyed by the term’s
usage during the struggle for independence, likening the appellation to “an imputation that
comprised within itself whatever was most terrible in proportion as it was vague and un-
defined.” To use the word “Tory” in the early republic was to conjure up emotional asso-
ciations of the terror and trauma involved in the struggle for independence. And in an age
when American politicians were still struggling to define the parameters of lawful political
dissent, branding the opposition as “Tory”—a term loaded with damning insinuations of
disloyalty and monarchism—had a powerful condemnatory effect.

Far more than petty political insults, wartime allegations of “Tory” Federalism
could connote morally treasonous behavior, factional self-interest, and ideological treach-
ery. In broad strokes, Republicans—and to a lesser extent former Federalists—defined “To-
rries” in three specific, albeit sometimes overlapping, ways. Some commentators employed
the term as a label for supposedly subversive Federalists, suggesting that the Federalists’
social organizing, and particularly the emergence of the Washington Benevolent Societies,
could undermine an already imperiled government. To many others, “Toryism” was a more
general term that spoke to the existence of an illegitimate opposition, and was often lodged against the Federalist movement as a whole. Still others interpreted the term as referring to Anglophile extremists, who treasonously harbored separatist and anti-revolutionary sentiments.

Tracing the different meanings and implications of the “Tory” charge reveals deep fears about the growing threat of internal political subversion, the rise of partisan interests, and the continued existence of extreme monarchist thought in the early republic. An understanding of the prevalence and potency of these charges can shed light on both the fluidity of American political identities during these years and the Founders’ aversion to the growth of partisan institutions. Men like Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had never envisioned organized political parties as permanent fixtures of American politics; early Republican leaders refused to accept the legitimacy of the Federalist cause, while believing their own to be a temporary necessity. Once all vestiges of monarchist sympathies had been suppressed, the Republican Party’s purpose would be fulfilled. Leveling various charges of “Toryism” against the Federalists, then, allowed leading Republicans and former Federalists to isolate their opposition, subdue its followers, and permanently degrade its leadership.

“WASHINGTONIANS IN PROFESSION AND TORIES IN PRACTICE”: DENUNCIA-TIONS OF THE WASHINGTON BENEVOLENT SOCIETIES

In the months leading up to and following the June 18th declaration of war, the Republicans frequently flung accusations of “Toryism” at the Washington Benevolent Societies, fledgling Federalist associations established in part to effect democratic change in the coming slate of elections. These charges implied that Federalist social organizing masked a subversive and shadowy intent; Republican writers painted the societies as conspiracies to enlist unassuming Federalist party members and even some Republicans under a separatist banner. Examining the language and implications of these allegations sheds light on early Americans’ intense feelings of insecurity as the conflict approached and their genuine concern about the potential of a disloyal opposition to undermine the nascent republic.

After the war broke out, Federalist leaders initially urged their party members to be cautious when voicing dissent for the Madison administration’s bellicose policies. They insisted that the impressment of American sailors did not amount to a just cause for war against Great Britain. Rather, impressment was a defensive gesture by Great Britain in response to the Napoleonic wars, a policy that the Madison administration lacked the capability to influence. Since America’s national honor was not in peril, the consequent war would be inherently offensive in nature and thus illegitimate, as honorable nations pursued war solely as a means of self-defense. Such a futile course of action would only provoke
economic losses, social chaos, and ultimately anarchy. Like the Jeffersonian Republicans before them, the Federalists trusted in peaceful revolution through electoral change. Yet, having witnessed firsthand the effectiveness of the Republicans’ political mobilization in the elections of 1800, the Federalists now tentatively began to emulate their rivals’ model of partisan organization by establishing social groups of their own, such as the Washington Benevolent Societies.

Modeled after the Democratic-Republican clubs of the 1790s, the Washington Benevolent Societies were voluntary associations, ostensibly founded to promote ideals of dignified republicanism and civic virtue among the nation’s youth. Yet the societies’ professed emphasis on character building and charitable work obscured their true purpose: to expand the Federalist Party’s grassroots appeal and improve its electoral prospects. Open to men from all classes of society, the first Washington Benevolent Society was founded in New York in 1808. By 1812, similar political groups had sprung up in eleven states, including New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Ohio. Although local traditions varied, most societies orchestrated elaborate public spectacles, such as celebrations for the Fourth of July and George Washington’s birthday, thus portraying contemporary Federalists as the direct political heirs to the first president’s legacy. In his authoritative study of Federalism, David Hackett Fischer has argued that these associations, like numerous other free associations that arose in this period, cultivated a sense of communal purpose within an American society increasingly pulled apart by the forces of individualism. Beyond providing symbolic support for the Federalist cause, the Washington Benevolent Societies directly funded Federalist county leaders and publishers, enabling them to circulate Federalist speeches and toasts more widely. And where the Federalists’ local presence was lacking, the societies acted as a direct extension of the party apparatus, nominating Federalist candidates and directly campaigning on their behalf.

Republicans, however, steadfastly portrayed the Washington Benevolent Societies as seditious schemes to indoctrinate unsuspecting youth, including honorable Federalists and Republicans, into the “Tory” fold. The Republican presses frequently stressed the “old Tory” origins of the Washington Benevolent Society. Warning that no “friends” of the Madison administration were admitted into the societies, the New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette observed, “It is a fact, that persons who were tories in the revolution, who then wished Washington hanged, are not only admitted, but take the lead in these Societies.” The New York group’s founding president, the Essex Register claimed, had been “the agent of the Jersey prison ship,” while the New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette traced the Societies’ leadership back to “the British minister” in Whitehall. Patriot writers and political elites, such as Benjamin Waterhouse, a leading Massachusetts physician, framed the groups as “Jacobinic Clubs,” employing an accusation first marshaled by the Federalists against the Jeffersonians’ own grassroots political organizations in the 1790s.
radical French demagogues, they suggested, the Societies aimed to disaffect the populace from their government, undermine the rule of law, and, ultimately, provoke disunion. If allowed to persist, these groups would “destroy that respect for the government which all ought to possess.”

By castigating the Washington Benevolent Societies as Tory schemes to siphon off honest Federalists, and perhaps even Republicans, Republican commentators suggested that oppositional social groups would serve only to foster discontent, and even disloyalty. In a February 1813 letter to Thomas Jefferson, Waterhouse warned, “In my view of our domestic affairs, I see nothing so alarming, as our innumerable Washington Benevolent Societies.” Though these social groups might purport to cultivate republican virtue in future voters, he feared that they might also mobilize disaffected youth on behalf of the British crown. Waterhouse wondered whether the white roses they wore as a “badge of distinction” might honor England and the Duke of York. While lacking evidence to ground his claims, Waterhouse speculated that the Societies’ range might extend even to Canada. If proven, this allegation would imply a treasonous intent: the Societies’ founding purpose, then, would not have been to strengthen the cause of American nationalism, but to transcend the national structure entirely. Waterhouse’s inability to ascertain the geographic limits of the societies’ reach spoke to a seemingly dangerous reality. In times of war, political organizing outside the formal confines of the democratic process could neither be monitored nor mapped, and administrators had very little ability to determine the true intent of grassroots partisan movements. Adopting the pseudonym “a Shepard,” Waterhouse appealed to the public in Boston’s Independent Chronicle to recognize the Societies’ true designs: “political division, wor[ld]ly honors, and a wor[ld]ly despotism... the dissolution of the Union and the introduction of a British influence.”

Even as Daniel Webster assured the Washington Benevolent Society in Portsmouth, New Hampshire that a united Federalist Party could affect lawful political change “by the exercise of our Constitutional right of suffrage,” Republican opponents employed accusations of Toryism to depict their efforts as tantamount to treason. Repeatedly, Waterhouse referred to the Societies’ recruitment efforts as the “enlistment” of boys who might soon become soldiers, and noted with concern the “very large sum of money” raised by the organizations. Given Republican newspapers’ frequent allegations that the Federalists failed to bear their fair share of the war’s material and human costs, Waterhouse’s observations would suggest that their allegiances lay not with the American cause but with a distinctly separate Federalist cause. Whether these Federalists’ loyalties would morph into British allegiance remained the subject of rife speculation, but given the tense wartime political culture, support for any cause other than the national war effort was grounds for suspicion. Convinced that the societies posed a very real threat to the republic, Waterhouse and his fellow Republicans employed the term “Tory” to frame the Federalists’ grassroots politick-
ing as treasonous behavior and thereby isolate the opposition’s nascent social groups.

“OLD TORIES OF 76 AND YOUNG TORIES OF 1812”: THE FEDERALISTS AS AN ILLEGITIMATE OPPOSITION

Many Republican commentators manipulated the “Tory” label to cast the Federalist Party as an illegitimate opposition. The term served to highlight Federalist leaders’ supposed self-interest. So extreme was this self-interest, the logic went, that these “Old Tories” had abandoned their ideological principles and remained in a new republic they vehemently opposed, primarily to preserve their status and property. In leveling charges of “Toryism” against the Federalists, Republicans painted them as a faction consumed by its own private interests—and, consequently, a threat to a republic founded upon the ideal of public virtue. Denunciations of “Toryism” isolated Federalist leaders and shamed their followers into abandoning a disloyal and degenerate party.

On the eve of War of 1812, Republican writers employed various rhetorical strategies to highlight similarities between dissenting Federalists and the oppositional, pro-British loyalists during the Revolutionary War. While most Republican writers feared that the Washington Benevolent Societies were merely a scheme hatched by subversive agents of the British crown, they differed in their portrayals of Federalists as a whole. Some believed that only a minority of “Tory-like” Federalists held views antithetical to republican principles; others posited that party leaders themselves might be actively working to undermine republican government. Some writers used the phrase “Tories” loosely to connote all Federalists, past and present. Others, meanwhile, avoided the “Tory” label yet stressed the two groups’ ideological and behavioral similarities. Many Republican papers described the existence of a distinct “Tory” element within the broader Federalist Party, a holdover from the revolutionary period. But even those who wrote about a “Tory” faction disagreed over what influence this constituent group had on the larger party. Were they a mere subset of the Federalists, or a critical mass steering the once-honorable party into a pernicious embrace with the British crown?

Following the war for independence, Republicans noted, the Federalist Party incorporated the “Tories” that remained in the US into its fold. Thus, according to the Weekly Aurora, Federalist attachment to Great Britain stemmed not only from ideological similarities but also from the literal presence of “[party-members] who fought against American independence, and who adhered to the British throughout the revolution.” Some Republicans feared that the influence of this Tory element had a fatal effect on the party as a whole, portraying the former loyalists as a cancer that had consumed Federalism from within. Thomas Jefferson articulated this sentiment in private correspondence, asserting that a minority of Federalist leaders sought to establish monarchial state governments,
“from whence the other states may gangrene by degree.”43 A National Aegis feature entitled “What is Federalism?” described “the old tories” as a “nest of vermin” which, like parasites, “attached themselves to federalism.” With time, the article explained, the former loyalists assumed positions of leadership, and their hold over the party tightened. The account concluded on a bleak note: “A little leaven thus leavened the whole lump. This active poison corrupted the mass of federalism.”44 The author’s resigned tone speaks to the perceived permanence of this moral decline; any opportunity to reverse the party’s ideological trajectory had long since passed.

By claiming that the “old Tories” had led the Federalist movement astray, Republican critics insinuated that the party’s opposition to the War of 1812 stemmed from factional self-interest, rather than concern for the national good. If the “old Tories” and other classes of men opposed to independence had elected to support the Federalist cause, the Daily Intelligencer explained, it was only because by strengthening the federal government they might in turn recover their war-related debts.45 Under the peace settlement of 1783, the loyalists had gained the right to sue for their forfeited property in American courts; in practice, however, the fledgling nation’s weak rule of law made navigating the claims process nearly impossible. The creation of a strong federal government would enable these individuals to both regain their former financial standings and attain positions of prominence akin to those they had held prior to the revolution.46 Implicit in this popular characterization of the Federalist Party was the suggestion that private interests, rather than republican values, underlay Federalist thought.

To attribute Federalist opposition to private interest was to render their actions inimical to the republican experiment. As Gordon Wood has eloquently argued, the American revolutionaries regarded Great Britain as decadent, in large part because its leaders had allowed private interests to triumph over the commonweal.47 By contrast, they believed themselves to be constructing a society in which the pursuit of public good would transcend personal concerns. During the heated debate over the ratification of the Constitution in 1787, James Madison stressed that his proposed form of republican governance would serve as a bulwark against the growth of factions hostile to the general welfare. He defined factions primarily in terms of self-interest, writing in the widely influential Federalist No. 10, “By faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”48 Madison’s essay, titled “The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection,” noted that historical forms of popular government had often succumbed to the forces of factionalism and private-mindedness. The future president hoped that the diffusion of leadership over a vast American electorate would protect the nascent union from “the diseases most incident to republican govern-
ment.” But more than three decades after the adoption of the Constitution, allegations of the Federalists’ self-interest continued to evoke genuine fears about the republic’s potential to fall victim to local prejudices, mutual animosities, and, consequently, perpetual instability.

Equating the Federalists to their “Tory” forefathers allowed Republican critics to contrast the opposition not merely with their own party, but with the nation itself. Writing to prominent Republican editor William Duane, former president Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for national unity in the face of imminent war with Great Britain. In such circumstances, he explained, to characterize Republicanism as a mere political party would be “false and degrading.” Rather, the Republicans represent “the nation,” opposed by “a faction, weak in numbers, but powerful and profuse in the command of money, and backed by a nation, powerful also and profuse in the use of the same means.” In drawing this far-reaching juxtaposition, Jefferson expressed his belief that the Federalist-Republican split was about far more than simply whether the US should favor Great Britain or France in her political leanings. Rather, the outbreak of war with Great Britain represented a watershed moment—a time for former Federalists to disavow party ties and support the national cause. Jefferson’s adamant stance seeped from the pages of Duane’s influential Philadelphia Aurora, which boasted one of the largest circulations in the country. As the war progressed, the Aurora stressed that “opposition of the federalists has always been base and groundless.” Again likening Federalist leaders to “Tories,” the paper urged still-loyal “democrats” and Federalist party members to look beyond the deceptive façade of the Federalist party to see their its nature. Both in power and in opposition, Duane’s paper suggested, the Federalists actively sought to destroy the nation’s republican institutions and undermine its survival. Other Republican newspapers echoed this charge, implying that any remaining Americans willing to vouch for the Federalists had been hoodwinked. The Baltimore Patriot summarized this growing consensus: “Federalism was the watch-word which operated as the charm to destroy all the vital republican principles of our constitution.”

It is important to note that Republican writers applied the appellation “Tories” liberally in the early years of the war of 1812. While some used the term literally to suggest that the Federalist Party had been reduced to a Tory faction, others merely voiced fears about the parallels between the opposition’s language and that of the loyalists in 1776. Yet regardless of whether columnists explicitly defined the Federalists as “Tories” or simply compared their actions to the notorious pro-British colonists, that the two parties could be put in conversation was incriminating enough. Hanson’s Federal Republican bemoaned leading Republican politicians’ purposeful ambiguity in their public references to contemporary “Tories.” Singling out a Maryland state senator, the paper described how one Nathaniel Williams unequivocally used the term “tories” in his toasts to mean “the federalists generally, or at least the principle men of them.” Yet, the Federal Republican suspected that
“if every federalist in the union should say to him—‘Sir, did you mean to include me?’ He would answer No, as he has done—‘No, I mean no federalist here.’” By associating “Tory-ism” with the Federalist movement while refraining from calling the Federalists “Tories” to their faces, the Republicans were playing a wily game. Insulting their opponents in the press, rather than in person, allowed the Republicans to color public perceptions and reframe popular discourse while avoiding the dishonor of character assassination. As the Baltimore American solemnly concluded, “When war is declared, there are but two parties, Citizen Soldiers and Enemies—Americans and Tories.” Persistent allegiance to a partisan opposition had no place in the new political order of 1812. According to the Salem-based Essex Register, any political opposition to the war would only further protract the conflict. Denouncing all Federalists as a self-interested “Tory” faction would shame honor-bound Federalists into abandoning their opposition and supporting the national cause: “Those who oppose their country in this hour of danger, must here after be stigmatized with the odious appellation of its enemies in the struggle for independence, Tories.” But by suggesting that the Federalist Party had no right to oppose the national administration in times of war, Republican slanderers implicitly raised thorny questions about the judiciousness of a permanent political opposition once America’s founding era elapsed.

“MODERATION CAN NEVER RECLAIM THEM”: THE FOUNDERS’ FEARS OF THE FEDERALISTS’ EXTREMISM

In their personal correspondences, elite politicians like Thomas Jefferson and John Adams liberally employed terms like “Tories,” “Tory Federalists,” and “Tory Junto,” to characterize and condemn various Federalist leaders as extremists who nursed ideologically treacherous views. Whereas Jefferson was most concerned that certain ultraconservative Federalist leaders harbored monarchist and separatist sentiments, Adams and other former Federalists worried about a more immediate and personal threat. They feared that these extremists had perverted the Federalist cause, and by extension damaged the reputations of all those who once identified with that party. Jefferson’s use of the “Tory” charge reflected his desire to stamp out unnatural monarchist thought by force if necessary. By contrast, Adams and his peers employed allegations of “Tory Federalism” in an effort to portray these extreme Federalists as anti-revolutionaries and pretenders to the patriotic Federalist name, and ensure the purity of their own political reputations in the process.

Thomas Jefferson’s frequent invocation of the term “Tories” to describe the Federalist opposition provides insight into the third president’s deep ambivalence about the existence of a permanent opposition in American politics, as well as his growing agitation about monarchical extremism within the Federalist camp. As early as the 1790s, Jefferson warned of the threat of a monarchist conspiracy organized under the guise of Federalism,
conveying his fears in the editorial pieces of Philip Freneau's *National Gazette*. His writings during this period reveal an already staunch belief in what he would later articulate as the difference between the Federalist Party and “the people who call themselves federalists.” He viewed his assumption of the presidency in 1801 as an opportunity to finally abolish the distinction of “Republican & federalist,” or if that could not be done, replace the distinction with the more unequivocal “republican & monarchist.” Stressing that the honorable Federalists represented a subset of republicanism, Jefferson emphasized that they had but temporarily veered off their ideological course, “decoyed into the net of the Monarchists by the XYZ contrivance.” In a revealing letter to leading naturalist and botanist Benjamin Smith Barton, he wrote, “The body of the nation, even that part which French excesses forced over to the Federal side, will rejoin the republicans, leaving only those who were pure monarchists, and who will be too few to form a sect.” Once politically isolated, the remaining Federalist leaders would lack the capacity to influence American governance.

Jefferson understood this distinction between monarchists and republicans to be natural, contrasting it with the artificial lines separating Republicans from Federalists. Analogous to the Whig–Tory division now well-established in Great Britain, the monarch-republican divide reflected fundamental differences of individual makeup and temperament: the one inclined toward vesting power in the people, the other in an authority purposely removed from the people, such as the British crown. Comparable dividing lines, Jefferson argued in his retirement, could be found in every society. John Adams felt that these distinctions, be they between Whigs and Tories or Federalists and Republicans, were permanent, and inherent to human nature. But by the end of the War of 1812, Jefferson appears to have disagreed. In a letter to Adams, he contended that amid revolution, “the distinctions of whig & tory will disappear like chaff on a troubled ocean.” That Jefferson could both believe such distinctions to be natural, yet simultaneously envision an America in which they no longer existed, speaks to the depth of his belief in the republic’s exceptional character. The new American nation alone had the capacity republican self-government; contemporary monarchies might learn from America’s example, but the experience of the French Revolution suggested that decades—even centuries—would pass before other polities could even begin to put these political lessons into practice.

Jefferson ceased referencing the supposed monarchist threat for the remainder of his administration, but he returned to the theme in his retirement, contrasting the “Monarchists of our country” in New England with “the solid mass of republicanism to the South & West.” On the eve of war, he began to describe the so-called Essex Junto, a group of Anglophile Federalists perceived by many politicians to be the staunchest supporters of monarchism and separatism, as a “Tory” faction. He wrote to General Henry Dearborn of his “disquietude” concerning “the spirit indeed which manifests itself among the tories of your quarter… your Essex men.” When war finally broke out in 1812, he was quick
to characterize this subset of the Federalists as monarchists, who “[bore] deadly hatred to their republican fellow citizens” and “will appear to be exactly the tories of the last war.” Subsequent writings drew attention to the treacherous opposition of not only the old Tories, but also “the new school of tories, who array themselves against us, either from their inveterate love of monarchy, or the wish to yoke us again to the British car.” But how to determine the extent of disloyalty among the Federalists and respond in wartime to the danger that they posed remained an unresolved concern.

Jefferson went to great pains to categorize the various schools of thought within the Federalist movement and characterize the nature of the monarchist threat. Drawing a distinction between the Federalist leaders and their followers, he divided the party into three groups in a letter to Scottish mapmaker John Melish: “1. the Essex junto who are Anglomen, Monarchists, & Separatists. 2. The Hamiltonians, who are Anglomen & Monarchists, but not Separatists. 3. the common mass of federalists who are Anglomen, but neither Monarchists nor Separatists.” Traces of this classification scheme appeared as early as 1801, when Jefferson wrote a letter to former Secretary of War Henry Knox, outlining his opinion that, while the majority of the Federalists were “real Republicans,” two currents of monarchist thought also existed within the Federalist movement. In that letter, Jefferson differentiated between those who supported monarchist theory but would not dare disturb the nation’s governance, and the “ardent Monarchists” headed by Alexander Hamilton—a group he would tolerate but never trust. But Jefferson’s 1813 letter to Melish indicated that a new class of zealots had now emerged, more extreme in their monarchial sympathies than even Hamilton’s “ardent Monarchists.” During peacetime, those who espoused Anglomany and separatism might be monitored and contained. Yet in times of war, their suspect loyalty could evolve into outright neutrality, or even defection to the British cause; either course of action would amount to treason and provoke disunion. Jefferson’s schematic revisions suggest a political observer struggling to understand a rapidly changing partisan landscape, fearful that domestic disloyalty might undermine the nation’s fight against the British. A new strain of subversives, Jefferson must have felt, was well-deserving of the label “Tory”—a term that had conveyed imminent threat during the struggle for independence.

Whereas a decade earlier, Jefferson had seemed willing to endure the isolated existence of the “ardent Monarchists,” his later analysis of the monarchist threat revealed a shift toward more radical action. He welcomed their temporary separation from the union, confident that they could not govern the New England states independently for long. Their populations would flee to the security and prosperity of the United States, and their states would soon return, humiliated, to the republican fold. Through a war with New England, the threat of monarchist intrigue would pass for good. According to Peter Onuf, by casting the so-called Essex Federalists as a foreign threat, rather than a domestic concern, Jefferson could reasonably justify waging war against them without violating repub-
lican tenets of conciliation and union. In the ensuing long peace, the “Tories” of this war, like “the tories of the last war,” would either commit to the American republican project or seek asylum in the British Empire, as their predecessors had done three decades prior. Past American statesmen had neutralized the old Tory threat; references to a new strain conveyed the comforting implication that their political heirs could do so once more. More than simply a rhetorical tool to pressure Federalists into rejoining the republican cause, Jefferson’s likening of the Essex Junto to a “new school of tories” reflected his sincere fear of internal subversion at the outset of the war.

If Jefferson’s references to the “Tories” revealed his trepidation about treacherous Federalist ideology, the rhetoric of former Federalists like John Adams conveyed a different aim: to demonstrate the falsity of such extremists’ claim to the Federalist political tradition and thus rehabilitate the reputations of the original Federalists, including their own. Whereas Jefferson’s heightened language evinced his desire to purge the present political landscape of “Tories,” or extreme monarchists, Adams and his counterparts were preoccupied with the more abstract task of purifying their place in posterity. Any perceived association between the Federalism they espoused in early years of the republic and the contemporary political ideology now disguised under that name could jeopardize their historical legacy. By unequivocally labeling the two schools of thought as different, they could then prevent dangerous perceptions of ideological kinship.

Unlike Jefferson, Adams felt that the ideological treachery of the contemporary Federalist Party extended far beyond the so-called “Essex Junto.” In a letter to Waterhouse, Adams stressed that he found the very moniker “Essex Junto” misleading. Rather, he felt, this mutation of the Federalist movement should be named for what it was: “old Toryism.” Moreover, its geographical limits extended far beyond Essex County, Massachusetts: “It is common to every State, City town and Village in the United States. There was not one without a Tory Junto in it, and their Heirs, Executors, Administrators, Sons, Cousins, etc. Compose at this day an Essex Junto in every one of them.” To write a “History of the Essex Junto” would mean to trace the narrative of the “history of the whole American Community for fifty years.” Characterizing the ultraconservative Federalist streak as a product of “old Toryism” conveyed a pointed political message: this brand of ideological treachery was a legacy of colonial- and Revolutionary-era loyalist thought and bore no relation to the patriotic “federal” movement of the 1790s.

Adams first explicitly conveyed this concern about how the “Tory Federalists” might warp posterity’s judgment of former Federalists like himself in a letter to Benjamin Waterhouse of Rhode Island. He implored Waterhouse, who had considered himself a Federalist until 1807, to recognize how association with the most extreme Federalists, or “the British Faction,” might taint their historical standing: “The Tories in Massachusetts, Rhod[e] Island and Connecticut have all Reputations in their Powers[ : ] Yours, mine, my
Son’s and Son in Law’s. [A]nd Washington’s too.”

By linking their treacherous ideology to the Federalist name, extremist Anglophiles like Timothy Pickering, Stephen Higginson, and George Cabot corrupted the honest, patriotic cause of those before them. Monarchist and separatist sentiments could tarnish the former Federalists’ reputation among contemporaries and future generations. During the early years of his retirement, Adams’ intense concern over his place in history prompted him to engage in a tireless paper campaign in defense of his own reputation, which included, most notably, a series of letters to the Boston Patriot. He now approached the potential reputational damage wrought by the “Tory Junto” with a similar fervor.

What made the problem of the “Tory Junto” so pressing for Adams was its intimate nature. Not one to deny himself credit for his actions, he confessed to Rush that “those who owe me most obligations are the most hostile to me.” Adams felt personally responsible for Essex Junto’s influence on the American body politic; they had taken up his views about government in the early years of the republic and benefited from his patronage. His desire to unify the American people had led him to be “the most tender, the most compassionate, the most indulgent to the Tories.” In “gratitude,” they had provided him only with “Treachery and Perfidy.” Despite Adams’ compensatory campaign—aimed at correcting the false perception that he was a “crypto-monarchist”—the very existence of such contemporary Federalist leaders could nevertheless undermine his efforts.

By employing the term “Tories” to describe Federalist extremists, former Federalists like Adams posited themselves as diametrically opposed to treasonous party contemporaries, thus shielding their historical reputations from the contamination of separatist sympathies. Adams felt that the “whole Body of Tories,” both in North America and overseas, considered themselves “[his] Political Enemies.” Situating those who were determined to destroy the Country” within that broader Tory fold implied that their unpatriotic ideology was actively hostile to Adams’s own. The “Tory” charge also cast these Federalists as reactionaries, opposed to independence—a cause for which revolutionaries like Adams, Benjamin Rush, and Elbridge Gerry had argued and fought hard to earn. Gerry proposed distinguishing between “revolutional, and antirevolutional federalists” in the hope that the two groups might be wholly separated, with the latter contained and, ultimately, dismantled. Given the former Federalists’ well-known role in some of the most critical debates over the America’s founding, they could rest assured that such a distinction would remind Americans of their own patriotic contributions, even as it emphasized the historical significance of the present opposition’s disloyalty.

At the outset of the War of 1812, colorful descriptions of “Tory” Federalists peppered the pages of Republican newspapers and the Founders’ personal correspondences. The implications of these charges varied widely. Some commentators simply noted simi-
larities in the conduct of “the federalists now and that of Tories of old.” 93 Others maintained that “Tories” were a constituent and corrosive element of the Federalist Party whose very presence corrupted the entire political movement, rendering the opposition illegitimate. Some leveled these accusations against the leaders of Federalist social groups, namely those of the Washington Benevolent Societies. Others alleged that select groups of ultraconservative Federalists, like the so-called Essex Junto, were in fact a “new school of tories.” 94 Still others disputed that charge, preferring to frame these extremists as old Tories. Considerable disagreement remained over who deserved to be characterized as foreign or disloyal subversives: Wayward Federalists? False Federalists? All Federalists?

Tracing these accusations, and their patterns of usage and intent, exposes extraordinary discrepancies, but also reveals the profound and widespread anxieties that motivated Republicans and former Federalists to employ the “Tory” charge against Federalists. With the coming of the War of 1812, the future of the nascent republic appeared more precarious than ever. To the Republicans, the Federalists’ potentially subversive social organizing or seditious monarchist sympathies might be tolerated, albeit with grave suspicion, during peacetime, even as they looked forward to an era of one-party rule. 95 But in wartime, such behaviors and beliefs posed looming threats to the nation’s stability, and, given Great Britain’s reputation for provoking insurrection, the very sanctity of the union. There was no waiting for party distinctions to fall away of their own accord. Only by characterizing the Federalists—especially their leaders—as disloyal, illegitimate, and self-interested did their counterparts feel they could ensure national unity. 96

The “Tory” label did more than embody deep-set concerns about organized partisanship and monarchist thought: it operated as a political weapon. Wielded skillfully, the allegation could serve as a tool for denouncing both the present motives of political opponents and the future existence of political opposition. Seeking to isolate and dismantle the organized opposition, Republicans consciously used the insult as an othering device. Wary of being associated with this disloyal “other,” former Federalists like John Adams leveled their own accusations of “Toryism” against their erstwhile allies.

Examining how these charges of “Toryism” functioned at the outset of the war sheds light on the tenuous state of party divisions in the early years of the republic. Americans still understood their burgeoning political institutions to be temporary and fluid in nature. References to “Toryism” reflected the Republicans’ abiding fear of the hostile intent of a partisan opposition, and that of Federalist “Anglomany” in particular. 97 They envisioned the coming war with Great Britain as a revolutionary restart: an opportunity to defeat the illegitimate Federalist Party and overcome organized partisan interests altogether. The ubiquity of “Tory” charges suggests a widespread, genuine belief that oppositional thought must have limits, even in a constitutional republic. Appreciating the underlying fears that prompted these accusations reveals a nation still struggling both to come to terms
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with its revolutionary character and to understand the reality of its political composition some three decades after its founding.

NOTES

1. In his noted study of the emergence of newspaper-based politics, Jeffrey L. Pasley characterizes the Federal Republican as “the most extreme Federalist newspaper of them all” and deems Hanson “the most aristocratic of the Federalist editors.” See Jeffrey L. Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers”: Newspaper Politics in the Early Republic (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2002), 241.


3. While my archival research has only indicated that this article appeared in the Essex Register and the New-Jersey Journal, the article's byline suggests that it was first published in the Worcester-based National Aegis. [Salem, MA] Essex Register, July 15, 1812; New-Jersey Journal, July 21, 1812.


6. Ibid.

7. “From the Baltimore Whig, of the 28th July,” Rhode-Island Republican, August 6, 1812.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. “To the People of Charlotte Prince Edward Cumberland and Buckingham,” Virginia Argus, August 6, 1812.

11. Committee of Grievances and Courts of Justice of the House of Delegates of Maryland, On the Subject of the Recent Mobs and Riots in the City of Baltimore, Together with the Depositions Taken Before the Committee (Annapolis: Jonas Green, 1813), 101.


13. Historians of early national America have found themselves at odds with one another over whether the War of 1812 would best be characterized as America’s second war of independence or the country’s first civil war, but few deny the existential nature of the conflict. For more traditional histories of the conflict alleging the former, see Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812. (Berkeley, C.A.: University of California Press, 1961); John K. Mahon, The War of 1812 (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972). J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic, 1783-1830 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) is an especially meticulous treatment of the subject. Alan Taylor’s The Civil War of 1812 provides a refreshing counter-argument, one that stresses the recent and incomplete nature of national divides on the US-Canada border and the deep-rooted anti-war sentiments that nearly brought New Englanders to the point of secession. See Alan Taylor,


15. “The Unanimous Address of All the Federalists, Who Met At the Late Session of the Legislature of Maryland, To Their Constituents,” *Alexandria Gazette*, July 22, 1812.


20. Lawrence Delbert Cress, “‘Cool and Serious Reflection’: Federalist Attitudes Toward War in 1812,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 7, no. 2 (July 1, 1987), 139.

21. Ibid., 129.


27. Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism*, 128. Fischer also argues that the Societies served to assuage concerns about the elitism of Federalist cause by uniting the middle and upper classes in a shared social project.

28. Ibid., 126.

29. Ibid., 127.

31. Essex Register, May 19, 1813; New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, May 12, 1812. By “British minister,” the newspaper was likely referring to the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Castlereagh. The author noted that, though the “head and shoulders” of the Societies were “among the British minister,” their control was delegated to the “British envoys… when in this country.” This language suggested that the Societies were a strategic object of British imperial policy, implemented by lower-level representatives of the Crown in US.


34. Ibid.

35. “Benjamin Waterhouse to Thomas Jefferson,” February 17, 1813.


42. “For the Essex Register,” [Salem, MA] Essex Register, February 12, 1812

43. “Thomas Jefferson to John Melish,” January 13, 1813, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition. In his analysis of Jefferson’s hatred of New England, noted Jefferson scholar Peter Onuf references Jefferson’s use of words like “gangrene” to describe the relationship between the Federalist leaders and the body politic. Such language, he suggests, reflected Jefferson’s belief that the Federalists posed an existential risk to the union, albeit one that could be localized and extracted through “radical surgery,” namely a civil war against Massachusetts. See Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 121-129.

44. “From the National Aegis. What is Federalism?” [Hartford, CT] American Mercury, May 26, 1813. Similar baking metaphors appeared in other papers over the course of the war. For instance, the Daily Intelligencer wrote, “At the very onset of our present government were mingled among its advocates a numerous class of the most deadly enemies of freedom… Thus Federalism, from its very origin, became corrupted with a foul leaven and unnatural mixture, and contained in its heart the poison that was afterwards to work the sad and ruinous effects of which we are now daily the witness.” See “From the New York Plebeian,” [Washington, DC] Daily National Intelligencer, May 12, 1814.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 175.


49. Ibid.

53. Ibid.
57. Baltimore American, July 16, 1812.
67. A decade later, Jefferson had backed off of this radical line of thought, believing that the division between Whig and Tory was preferable to any other, more dangerous division of society that would surely arise in its absence. See “Thomas Jefferson to William Short, Esq.,” January 8, 1825, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition.
69. For an analysis of the role of exceptionalist thought in American identity formation and Jefferson’s role in such discourse, see Peter S. Onuf, “American Exceptionalism and National Identity,” American Political Thought 1, No. 1 (Spring 2012), 77-100. On Jefferson’s views about the American people’s natural Republicanism, see Spivak, Jefferson’s English Crisis, 216.
John Adams popularized the term “Essex Junto” in reference to a select group of ultraconservative
Massachusetts Federalists that he accused of sabotaging his re-election. Fischer rejects this characterization, arguing that, with the exception of Timothy Pickering, most of the men of the so-called Essex Junto supported Adams’ presidency during the 1790s and election of 1800. Rather, he argues “the myth of the Essex Junto” was a convenient, albeit historically inaccurate, means to justify Jeffersonian fears of an “antidemocratic and antinational” conspiracy. The Jeffersonians would then use the phrase “Essex Junto” to describe the most determined strains of Federalist opposition to the 1807 Embargo Act and the War of 1812. See David Hackett Fischer, “The Myth of the Essex Junto,” The William and Mary Quarterly 21, No. 2 (Apr. 1964), pp. 191–235.


74. “Thomas Jefferson to Louis H. Girardin,” December 21, 1814, in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition. In Jefferson’s letter to Girardin, he attached his original letter to Melish analyzing the differences between the Federalists in depth and summarized his key points. Nor was Jefferson the only Republican commenter to identify three classes of Federalists. Benjamin Rush wrote of “British federalists, tory federalists and American federalists,” juxtaposed with “french democrats, Irish democrats, & American democrats.” With six mutually unintelligible currents of political thought seeking to guide the United States’ course, Rush questioned how President Madison could possibly manage the nation’s affairs. He refrained from explaining just what differentiated “British federalists” and “tory federalists” but appealed to the “laws of Epidemic diseases” to argue that the American variety had been forced to take on symptoms of the more powerful British and Tory strains. See “Benjamin Rush to John Adams,” August 21, 1812, in The Adams Family Papers, microfilm edition, 608 reels (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1955), reel 414.


78. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 124-125. Following his first inauguration in 1801, Jefferson wrote of his satisfaction that his address had been interpreted as an appeal to “conciliation and union.” See “Thomas Jefferson to Henry Knox,” March 27, 1801.

79. Ibid.

80. As of 1809, Adams did not publicly wish the “annihilation” of the Essex Junto. Rather, he hoped that it might controlled by “an opposite Interest, quite as interested, quite as uncontrollable, quite as dangerous, quite as destructive.” The two opposing interests, in turn, would be balanced by a “third Power,” presumably an independent executive authority, which he described as “[America’s] more comprehensive and universal interest.” This “third Power” would be above the competing democratic and aristocratic interest in American society, the “Senates and Counsels and popular Prejudices.” See “From John Adams to Boston Patriot,” c.a. 1809, in Founders Online, National Archives, last updated September 29, 2015, accessed online at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5491. From The Adams Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. Note that this is an Early Access document and is not authoritative. For a detailed analysis of Adams’s ideas about the role of the executive in balancing competing societal elements (not to be confused with formal political parties) in government, see Gordon Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: Penguin Press, 2006), 188-189.

81. All quotes are from “John Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse,” September 17, 1810. Cited in
82. “John Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse,” September 15, 1812, in The Adams Family Papers, reel 118.
83. Adams had singled out Higginson and Cabot, along with Theophilus Parson and Jonathan Jackson in an 1809 letter to the Boston Patriot as “the four main Pillars, the four mighty Oligarchs of that [Essex Junto] Faction in Boston.” See “From John Adams to Boston Patriot,” c.a. 1809.
86. Ibid. Although he specified only that the Essex Junto had “adopted my Sentiments of Government in 1779 and 1788,” Adams was likely referring to his role in the drafting of Massachusetts’s state constitution in 1779 and that document’s influence on the United States Constitution, which was ratified in 1788. (Adams was abroad serving as minister to Great Britain during the ratification debates over the Constitution but expressed support for its passage.)
87. Ibid.
88. “John Adams to Benjamin Waterhouse,” September 15, 1812.
89. Ellis, 128.
90. Elbridge Gerry famously declared that extremist Federalists opposed to the war were guilty of “mental treason.” Cited in Buel, America on the Brink, 146; Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, 256.
95. Onuf, Jefferson’s Empire, 122.

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TITLE IMAGE

To many contemporaries, William F. Buckley’s decision to accept his 1973 nomination to the United States’ UN delegation came as a surprise. The prominent conservative commentator had risen to fame in part for his criticism of the international organization. However, as Raleigh Cavero ’15 examines, Buckley’s acceptance of a role on the Third Committee offered him the opportunity to promote his interventionist, anti-Communist stance through a framework of human rights. Delving into the highly fraught spheres of national and international politics in the détente era, Cavero identifies how Buckley’s efforts to promote democracy on the UN floor laid the groundwork for an emergent alliance between conservatives and the branch of ex-liberals who, favoring Buckley’s unapologetic anti-Communist stance, came to be known as neoconservatives. Though Buckley himself finished his term disappointed by ineffectiveness, his powerful rhetoric throughout his UN term would come to have long-lasting implications on the domestic politics of the United States.

By Raleigh Cavero, SY ’15
Winner of the Prize
Faculty Advisor: Beverly Gage
Edited by David Shimer, Emma Fallone, Eva Landsberg, and Emily Yankowitz
INTRODUCTION: WALTER MITTY GOES TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On a summer day in 1973, walking through New York City’s streets, William F. Buckley had a “pure, undiluted moment of ‘Walter Mittyism.’”¹ He envisioned pleading for Soviet ballet dancer Valery Panov, exposing Chinese concentration camps, and hosting Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the UN for a triumphant speech to a global audience. In that moment, Buckley decided to accept the offer to become a US delegate to the United Nations.²

Just a few hours before, Buckley had resolved to reject the proposal. His first reaction when the US ambassador offered the position: “Had he read what I had written in the past about the United Nations?”³ Buckley, like many conservatives, had criticized the United Nations for being anti-Democratic and ineffectual—a “surrealistic organization whose entire role is Aesopian.”⁴ ⁵

Buckley was a prominent national figure in the conservative movement, which historian George Nash says had just achieved “symbolic success” in 1970: Buckley had earned an Emmy in 1969 for his debating show Firing Line, where he showcased his famous—or, for his opponents, infamous—debating style. Buckley’s brother James was newly elected to the New York Senate, and there had been a surge of interest in conservative journalism as well as in the Young Americans for Freedom, a conservative youth organization that William F. Buckley founded.⁶ He was also the founding editor-in-chief of the flagship conservative magazine, National Review.⁷ Conservatism, and William F. Buckley, were on the rise.

Buckley had catapulted onto the national stage as a conservative firebrand soon after graduating from Yale with the publication of his God and Man at Yale in 1951; McCarthy and his Enemies followed three years later, cementing his reputation by supporting Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-Communist investigations.⁸ In 1955, when he founded National Review, Buckley felt that conservatism was an embattled minority in the national political landscape. Historian David Farber asserts that Buckley thought he was fighting conventional wisdom and powerful intelligentsia with National Review, providing a conservative intellectual opinion magazine to combat the predominantly liberal media.⁹ Buckley would become one of the great leaders of the conservative movement, intertwining its three warring factions—traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti-Communism—and helping it rise in the postwar years.¹⁰

The last of these factions, anti-Communism, was shared across the political spectrum in the 1950s.¹¹ Liberals preferred to focus on containment, or restraining the spread of Communism.¹² Conservatives, especially intellectuals like James Burnham, advocated more aggressive policies against what the Right called “evil” states, using “victory” rhetoric to press for military intervention and “rollback” in places like Cuba and Vietnam—ideas which liberals called “wildly irresponsible.” Buckley responded that the “continuing blindness of liberals” to Communism was neither accident nor neglect, but a “deep psychological
problem producing paralysis.” Buckley’s strain of anti-Communism was especially intense, demonstrated in his vigorous defense of Senator McCarthy’s increasingly marginalized anti-Communist campaigns. With Buckley at the forefront, conservatism continued to champion the fight against Communism for decades. In fact, historian Lisa McGirr argues that anti-Communism helped “cement” myriad constituencies together under the conservative umbrella during the postwar period because so many Americans worked in the Cold War industry.

However, by the 1970s, the Vietnam War was beginning to disillusion the public with anti-Communism, leading both conservatives and liberals to alter their viewpoints. Previously conservatives had argued for pushing the Communists back from their territorial gains, while liberals had advocated containment. In the 1970s, the bloody foreign war was pushing the conservatives toward containment and liberals away from anti-Communism all together, preferring isolationism. The popular press began to describe liberalism’s philosophy as “back to isolationism via pacifism,” and conservatism began to more and more resemble older containment policies from the mid-century Left. However, a small, embattled group of Democrats remained fervently committed to anti-Communism, and they fought to regain control of their party throughout that decade. They soon came to be known as the neoconservatives. Ultimately, the group would fail in their “battle for the soul” of the Democratic Party, aligning themselves instead with the Republicans in 1980. In the United Nations in 1973, Buckley’s conservative anti-Communist rhetoric strikingly mirrored what the Democratic neoconservatives were arguing simultaneously, just on the other side of the aisle.

Both Buckley and the neoconservatives borrowed from President Truman’s mid-century rhetoric, which he used while expanding America’s presence in the postwar era. In the 1970s, Buckley and the neoconservatives co-opted his language to argue for diplomatically confronting and militarily containing Communism. Measures like the Jackson-Vanik amendment exemplified their aims: confronting the USSR on human rights and supporting American interventionism. Buckley and neoconservative leaders like Daniel Patrick Moynihan used their UN seat to urge the Nixon administration to take a stronger stance against the USSR—at times with grave consequences, because their words threatened to compromise the State Department’s overarching policy of détente, a foreign affairs mindset of the late ‘60s and ‘70s aimed at relaxing tensions with the USSR and moving “from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.” The Nixon administration worried that détente could be compromised if rhetoric from Buckley or the neoconservatives humiliated or condemned the Soviets.

In 1973, the State Department prioritized its foreign policy—which had just helped win a re-election—far over Buckley’s desires to highlight Soviet human rights abuses. The American UN delegation repeatedly vetoed and silenced his speeches. However, his frus-
trated rhetoric prefigured a growing bridge between the neoconservatives and the conservatives, based upon anti-Communism and international interventionism. Buckley’s statements at the United Nations in the fall of 1973 foreshadowed the neoconservative-conservative alliance that would come to fruition in 1980.

ROOTS ON THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT

At the 2010 Organization of American Historians, a panel discussion was devoted to the topic, “How Should Historians Study Conservatism Now That Studying the Right is Trendy?”

The last twenty years have seen a surge of interest in conservatism among historians, and much of this new body of literature argues with the traditional view of conservatism as “backlash politics.” Previous histories had traced the twentieth century’s development in terms of the civil, gay, and women’s rights movements, portraying the right as an ever-present pushback to progressive forces. These writers saw conservatism as isolated and marginalized in the national political arena. Even Ronald Reagan’s presidency, which most historians call a climax for conservatism in the 20th century, had been described as a backlash against black militancy, the gay rights and women’s rights movements, and Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society.

However, in the last two decades, a new wave of scholarship has begun to paint conservatism as a powerful parallel movement, developing alongside liberalism in constant contest and struggle. Conservative histories now describe a movement with original policy beliefs—a force that debated liberalism, rather than simply opposing it. Many historians now accept that significant parts of the American population opposed liberal reforms like the New Deal and the Great Society. Kim Philips-Fein argues that within this popular base, widespread support for conservative ideas like Reagan’s had been building for decades. She writes that 1980 represented a shift in American politics toward the right, rather than a reaction to the reforms of the left. Instead of simply dismantling the Great Society, this conservative surge enacted original policies that lasted. Buckley’s anti-Communist rhetoric in the United Nations supports the argument that conservatives had original ideals because it was born from belief in McCarthyism and vigorous opposition to the USSR, not simply from opposition to liberal post-Vietnam isolationism.

Buckley was also engaging with a longstanding debate between isolationism and interventionism on the Right. In the early 20th century, President Taft led a conservative movement dedicated to isolationism and a domestic focus in government policy that was cautious of steering others toward American beliefs. Eisenhower began to move the party away from isolationism, and then shortly afterward Buckley helped solidify and lead a new, strongly anti-Communist conservatism that championed foreign entanglements over limited government. Buckley supported expanding government to fight communism; the
foreign threat must be confronted first, he argued, even if it meant sacrificing limited government ideals in the interim.27

Postwar conservatives also espoused an American duty to actively oppose the Communist threat—if necessary, using military means to act unilaterally.28 The 1970s saw some retraction from this “victory” mindset toward containment, and Buckley’s UN rhetoric fits into this trend. His arguments still advocate for interventionism over isolationism, but in the form of diplomatic rather than military confrontation.29

Buckley’s 1973 public delegate tenure also contributes to a more nuanced vision of conservatism in power during the 1970s and 1980s. Though historians traditionally portrayed the Right as a fragmented and ineffective opposition to the Left, the new surge of conservative literature has swung the pendulum in reverse, too often portraying conservatism as a monolithic, united front fighting a fragmented postwar liberalism. This interpretation glosses over the complexity and fragmentation within the Right during the postwar period.30 Buckley had helped lead the more unilateralist, interventionist approach to conservative foreign policy after WWII, but during the Nixon years this view conflicted with official détente policy.31 Buckley’s arguments upheld the Right’s then-longstanding opposition to “evil” states, whereas Nixon and Kissinger aspired to a more cooperative relationship with the USSR that they felt would balance the global power structure in the Americans’ favor.32

Nixon tried to rally support from men like Buckley, many of whom saw détente as retrenchment and an acknowledgement of weakness after losing Vietnam; as a result, some speculated that the President was trying to court Buckley by appointing him to the United Nations.33 However, Nixon failed to build a coalition behind détente and many conservatives grew disillusioned with the policy by the mid-1970s.34 Buckley himself vocally criticized it.35 This issue, among others, convinced Buckley to suspend his support of the Nixon administration in July 1971.36 Two years later, as a delegate in the UN, Buckley continued combating Nixon’s détente foreign policy, sometimes sparking direct personal conflict. This intra-conservative fight is one example of the Right remaining complex and conflicted during the 1970s.

Finally, Buckley’s language at the UN marks an early moment where a conservative connected human rights rhetoric with an aggressive diplomatic agenda. Though human rights are often considered to be a focus for liberals, even the Left did not coalesce fully around human rights language until the 1970s, according to historian Kenneth Cmiel. It was during the détente years that voices from the Right and the Left began using this rhetoric to counter Nixon’s “realpolitik.”37 Conservatives only began fully articulating a stance in 1976, when they emphasized individual freedom, limited government, and the fight against Communism as paths toward full political, civil, and legal rights. Years before these arguments emerged, Buckley was not only an early conservative voice in human rights—he
was one of the first supporters of Amnesty International—but he also made an important philosophical step: connecting conservative anti-Communism with increasing human rights abroad. He said that the anti-Communist fight in the Cold War was the best way to support human rights internationally, a view the White House later espoused in 1980.

Buckley’s human rights rhetoric closely mirrored language from the other side of the aisle during the early 1970s, but some of those on the Left espousing human rights confrontation were growing increasingly uncomfortable in their party. These Democrats, the neoconservatives, were beginning to coalesce during Buckley’s 1973 tenure at the UN. They had their roots in the anti-totalitarian liberals of the 1920s and 1930s, when Communists and Progressives sympathetic to Communism had a substantial role on the Left and published their opinions in magazines such as New Republic and The Nation. Anti-totalitarian liberals, the ancestors of neoconservatives, rebelled against the Communists and Progressives, and the neoconservatives similarly pushed back when they thought the Left was sympathizing with Communism during the 1970s.

The neoconservatives wanted to revive a mid-century liberalism of anti-Communism and containment. Leftist thinker Reinhold Niebuhr first helped incorporate anti-Communism into liberal beliefs when, after visiting Europe during the postwar period, he changed his views to assert that Soviet expansionism increased in response to “every gesture of trust” from the West, thus threatening the European continent. In 1947, President Truman made a speech requesting aid for Turkey and Greece that painted a dichotomous worldview, describing a free world versus an enslaved one, and stating that the United States must intervene economically and politically in order to spread freedom in the face of Communist advances. Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” solidified containment as the liberal expression of anti-Communist thought, and the policy gained primacy in the US government for twenty years. The philosophy came to be known as the “vital center” after historian Arthur Schlesinger’s 1949 book of the same name arguing that democracy and totalitarianism could not live together; he asserted that the US must “defend and strengthen free society” through containment.

When the Vietnam War turned the Left away from anti-Communist containment toward demilitarized isolationism, the neoconservatives questioned the shift. New liberal approaches to foreign policy post-Vietnam ranged from statesman Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “technetronic” theory that technology would decrease ideological conflict to Stanley Hoff- man’s assertion that Communist revolutions were not to be feared and American should focus on regional balance of power. None of these theories gained significant traction, and conservative intellectual James Burnham said in 1972 that liberals disillusioned with anti-Communism were still in a “transitional state.” Revisionist historians like Murray Rothbard and William Appleman Williams contributed to liberals’ distaste for anti-Communism by portraying the Soviets in a positive light and arguing that US foreign policy
had been dominated by a desire to access foreign markets and create an informal economic empire. As the war escalated, politicians like Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright began joining these voices, calling Vietnam a misguided desire to “remake” the world in America’s image.  

This was the moment when the neoconservatives began to split from the Democratic ranks, fighting to retain the anti-Communism of the Truman era. They bought a *The New York Times* ad to announce the foundation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, which fought to bring their foreign policy ideals back to the Party, and the full page notice announced a “clear signal to the Democratic Party to return to the great tradition through which it had come…the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy…” In *The Rise of Neoconservatism*, John Ehrman entitles his chapter on the neoconservatives’ search for a leader, “Looking for Truman.”

At the same time, Buckley adopted human rights rhetoric more similar to liberal language like Truman’s than that of his own conservative party as he served in the United Nations. A rhetorical bridge centered on the American duty to spread freedom through anti-Communist interventionism was beginning to emerge between the neoconservatives and the Right, and it foreshadowed stronger, more tangible connections to come.

**CONSERVATIVES UNITED AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS**

It was a weekday afternoon in mid-June 1973 when US Ambassador to the UN John Scali called William F. Buckley and requested an urgent meeting. When Buckley suggested the next week, Scali said that it simply wasn’t “soon enough.” They agreed to breakfast the next morning in the UN ambassadorial suite in the Waldorf Astoria.

The two men had come to know each other on Nixon’s visit to China shortly before, where Scali had been a special consultant to the President and Buckley had traveled as part of the press corps. Scali had a knack for attracting “men of power.” President Kennedy had consulted with him privately during the Cuban missile crisis and he was a personal friend of President Nixon. The President had asked him to retire from his career as an ABC newsman to become the Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to the UN. Buckley described him as a man of “salty tongue and disposition,” predisposed to chain smoking and getting quickly to his point.

Now, Scali leaned back in his chair and got to his point: asking Buckley to be a public delegate to the United Nations for the 28th session of the General Assembly. The public delegate was a unique position in the US delegation designed to bring diverse perspectives from outside the establishment. Buckley had the opportunity to join a group comprised of five ambassadors, two legislators (one Democratic and one Republican), and five alternate public delegates. Specifically, Scali asked him to join as a public delegate on the Third
Committee, the body considering human rights issues. Buckley was astonished. Not only had he written scathing reviews of President Nixon in his syndicated column, but he also thought he had completely burned his bridges with the Nixon administration in 1971. Buckley had rejected a re-appointment to his USIA (United States Information Agency) advisory board post and had backed John Ashbrook's protest candidacy against Nixon. Nixon had won by a landslide, but Buckley's disillusioned opposition was gaining traction. Why the administration would want Buckley, one of its foremost critics, as a delegate to the United Nations seemed a mystery.

Initially, Buckley internally resolved to reject the offer. He later said that the only thing keeping him from simply walking out of the room was “courtesy.” Buckley, along with many conservatives, thought the United Nations was mainly united in its opposition to the United States. Buckley had called the UN a “hypocritical,” “anti-Democratic” place of “selective condemnation” where the USSR and many developing nations condemned the US while escaping criticism for their own human rights abuses—often while receiving American foreign aid. Buckley had recently demanded “a large dose of realism and candor” in American policy toward the UN, calling for a tighter, more limited budget and more centralized control in the Secretary General, the leader of the UN assembly, rather than the Security Council, a body whose decisions could be vetoed by the USSR. For example, Buckley had been frustrated when the UN Commission on Human Rights took action neither after Bengali educated elites were massacred in 1971, nor when President Idi Amin of Uganda wanted to expel Asians from his country. Yet a General Assembly resolution condemned NATO countries, including the United States, for supporting countries like Portugal who retained colonies in Africa. Buckley echoed many conservatives’ anger that the United States did little to defend itself against condemnations and criticism from countries supported by American foreign aid.

Nixon and Kissinger defended their actions by insisting their ultimate goal was to preserve détente with the USSR and avoid offending the powerful non-aligned movement, which commanded many votes in the Assembly. The non-aligned grouping began during the postwar period as a collection of Third World states across Africa and the Middle East that wanted to create a third force in the dichotomous geopolitical balance of power and avoid “alignment” with the USSR and the US. China and the Soviet Union both strove to lead this group, though neither fully succeeded. The non-aligned began to hold conferences at places like Algiers and Bandung, where they defined core values: anti-colonialism, increased foreign aid from developed nations, and fighting against racial discrimination. This movement openly criticized the United States, and commanded a high number of votes compared to the US and its allies. Meanwhile, conservatives like Buckley resented the fact that the United States had become further isolated in the UN due to the Soviet bloc and the new, non-aligned group.
For all of these reasons, Buckley left the Waldorf-Astoria determined to reject the offer to become a United Nations delegate. Then, a brief moment of inspiration hit—the tantalizing possibility of fame on the bully pulpit of the General Assembly. Buckley returned to the National Review offices to confer with his fellow editors.

Scali had said that the appointment had not been cleared with Nixon yet, but Buckley and his fellow editors speculated that this could simply be the “official explanation—Scali, after all, was close to Nixon,” and both the President and his ambassador already clearly understood Buckley’s opposition to détente. One editor suggested that the President might want to make a “gesture” toward the right wing of his party. Someone else objected that reaching out to conservatives through an appointment to the United Nations would raise more doubt than confidence, considering the conservatives’ view of the institution. Buckley listened, considered, and finally concluded that someone—Nixon, Scali, or another high-ranking official—must have “set out to redefine America’s relationship to the UN” by choosing him. He called Scali and said yes.

THE RISE OF NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT

August 19, 1973: Virgil Popescu goes on hunger strike outside the doors of the United Nations in New York City, New York. He wants to be reunited with his wife, Cristina, who is trapped in Romania.

August 27, 1973: Popescu has lost 10 pounds during his eight day fast. National newspaper coverage says that he has collected almost 2,000 signatures from passersby appealing to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Romanian government for the freedom of his 23-year-old bride. He said his father had been killed simply for being a priest and that he, his brother, and his sister had been persecuted and deprived of higher education. On July 28, 1972, he said he crossed the Danube River with his bicycle on his back.

September 18, 1973: Popescu visits US Ambassador Clyde Ferguson to ask for American help in his wife’s emigration. Three members of the local Romanian community support him because he is too weak to walk after a month of fasting. Romanian officials insist his wife does not want to emigrate because Popescu maltreated her. Popescu maintained his wife had been “deprived of work” and threatened by Secret Police for wishing to leave the country.

FORESHADOWING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE

could conceivably die few yards from where anniversary of Human Rights Declaration being celebrated.”

September 20, 1973: A Romanian priest and NYC police take Popescu to the Jewish Memorial hospital after he complains of chest pains. Reports call his condition “grave.” The hospital feeds him intravenously. Doctors conclude his heart condition almost certainly resulted from prolonged fasting.

In the margin of the September 20th brief, Buckley scrawled: “This a real story. This guy is NOT a phony. He really is fasting.” He underlined the last word twice.

While Popescu was starving outside the gates of the United Nations, there was much talk within the building about emigration from the Soviet Union. Throughout the early 1970s, dissident Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn had been drawing attention to Soviet oppression through books like One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which chronicled life in a Siberian labor camp, and in 1970 he won the Nobel Prize for Literature. In August 1973, while Popescu began his hunger strike, the Soviets imposed an emigration tax that primarily affected Jews.

Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson wrote an editorial in The New York Times during September 1973 that compared the USSR to Nazi Germany and called for a more “human détente” that respected human rights within communist states. During the week of September 18th, when Popescu was one month into his strike and the UN had just begun its fall session, Buckley said that coverage of emigration rights in the USSR in the Sunday New York Times “almost rivaled Watergate.” Buckley was hoping to ascend to the US representative position on the Third Committee, tasked with the very human rights issues that were now at the fore of the national conversation and embodied in a hunger strike at the gates of the UN.

One year earlier, on October 4, 1972, Senator Jackson of Washington State had proposed his co-sponsored Jackson-Vanik amendment. It was introduced in early 1973 and continued to be debated until it passed as an amendment to the Trade Reform Act on December 20, 1974, gaining significant support from the American public and from conservatives like Barry Goldwater and John Tower. It proposed withholding “Most Favored Nation” trade status from the Soviet Union until the country allowed more emigration rights, saying that such a measure represented the American dedication to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights more than 25 years earlier.

One of Jackson’s co-sponsors, Democratic Senator Abraham Ribicoff, joined some liberal politicians’ moral arguments for the amendment, calling the Soviets’ actions “heinous” and “barbaric.” Before long, the amendment’s supporters increasingly used such human rights language as well. The measure threatened to humiliate the Soviets and
collapse Nixon’s détente, thereby undercutting the Americans’ attempts to maintain cordial relations—and Congressional liberals who supported détente hesitated. Jackson, on the other hand, made a fiery anti-détente speech in early 1973. This was one of the first moments when a new, more confrontational foreign policy persuasion rose within the Democratic Party, headed by Senator Jackson, and began to split from the rest of the liberal movement. The Jackson-Vanik amendment was at the core of the national conversation about human rights in the fall of 1973 while Buckley was a UN delegate.

Soviet ambassadors to the UN expressed their displeasure with the amendment both publicly and privately. The USSR had just dropped its exit tax in early 1973 and raised emigration levels in response to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, though such measures apparently had not aided Virgil Popescu. On Buckley’s first day at the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik expressed the Kremlin’s “deep annoyance” with the Jackson-Vanik amendment and its “opposition to the spirit of détente.” Ambassador Scali apologetically explained that the President did not control Congress.

In the middle of the conversation, Buckley entered the room. Scali introduced them, and Buckley recounts the following exchange:

Malik: “Ah, yes, I know all about Mr. Buckley…But let me tell you something.”
He paused and looked at Buckley as the room froze in anticipation.
Malik: “I don’t agree with you about everything!” The room sighed in relief.

A week later in the General Assembly, Buckley reflected that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was “much exercised, as Malik had been the week before, about the Jackson amendment.” Gromyko’s speech cautioned against “teach[ing] others how to manage their internal affairs,” attacking the American legislature. “Were we to take the path of imposing our practice upon other countries,” he declared, “then those who are now trying to persuade us to adopt alien laws, morals, or customs would probably object, and this is understandable and justifiable.”

In response, Buckley wrote: “The impudence is mind boggling.”

The United Nations is divided into subsections: the General Assembly, including representatives from every member state; the Security Council, which hosts some rotating members and five permanent ones with veto power; the Economic and Social Council; the International Court of Justice; and the Secretariat. The General Assembly itself divides into six committees to consider proposals, and human rights-related issues go to the Third Committee. Scali had offered to make Buckley the US representative to the Third Committee on Human Rights. As such, Scali suggested, Buckley would occupy the same Third Committee public delegate seat that had been held by luminaries like Eleanor Roosevelt and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Scali never delivered on his promise to make Buckley the
primary US representative on the Third Committee, but Buckley did take advantage of his position's connection to Democratic politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Moynihan and Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson were two leaders in the budding neoconservative movement as it split slowly from liberalism throughout the 1970s. McGovern’s neo-isolationist foreign policy in the 1972 election spurred Senator Jackson and his followers to call for a return to the more muscular liberalism of Truman and Kennedy. They also opposed Nixon’s détente because they saw it as legitimizing the oppressive Soviet regime rather than trying to change it.

Senator Jackson and his foreign policy-minded staffers joined an already existing group of Jewish intellectual Democratic voices in New York City that objected to domestic issues like Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and the radical social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Irving Kristol headed this group and its members emphasized the limits of social engineering, often publishing in Kristol’s magazine The Public Interest. Senator Jackson’s group coalesced more around foreign policy than domestic issues, and they often voiced their views in fellow neoconservative Norman Podhoretz’s Commentary, though Podhoretz had been part of Kristol’s early group. There was some crossover between Kristol’s first wave and Senator Jackson’s second wave, with some early members joining the Scoop Jackson Democrats’ anti-Communism and some of the second wave adopting Kristol’s domestic views. However, neoconservatism remained remarkably diverse; its most important figure, Kristol, did not share Senator Jackson’s beliefs. Kristol and Podhoretz sometimes described neoconservatism as a “persuasion” or “tendency” rather than a movement. Neoconservatives mainly agreed on the fact that they shared no “manifesto, credo, religion, flag, anthem, or secret handshake.”

The group’s members were “extremely well placed…in government, in the academy, in journalism—in short, in all those modern institutions out of which influence can be radiated.” Daniel Patrick Moynihan would become the first successful neoconservative politician, elected as a Democratic senator in New York in 1977. By 1980, the neoconservatives aligned with the Republicans based in large part on their anti-Communist views, and some of Jackson’s prominent staffers like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and Richard Perle later rose to high positions in the Reagan administration.

However, during Buckley’s UN tenure, neoconservatives were still an embattled group of Democrats who were beginning to endure criticism from their fellow liberals and praise from conservatives. In 1970, the The Wall Street Journal called Norman Podhoretz an “improbable conservative” to his chagrin, and three years later the same newspaper coined the term “neoconservative” to describe Moynihan and others associated with Irving Kristol. Socialist Michael Harrington used the term neoconservative as an “epithet” in autumn 1973. Kristol, Podhoretz, and others were unhappy about being called conserva-
tive, though Kristol quipped that, having been named Irving, he was “relatively indifferent to baptismal caprice.” Ultimately Kristol would “unenthusiastically” cast his vote for the Republicans in 1972, and he reluctantly accepted the title “neoconservative” while maintaining that there was no such thing as neoconservatism. While Kristol et al. had friction with fellow liberals, they garnered praise from the other side of the aisle. In June 1972, William F. Buckley wrote a tribute in _The Alternative_, where he said Kristol was “writing more sense in the public interest these days than anybody I can think of.”

As they uneasily coalesced in the mid-70s, neoconservatives’ strongest common points became anti-Communism, interventionist foreign policy, and US moral leadership. Historian Justin Vaisse argues they had their rhetorical roots in conservative thinkers like James Burnham and presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, though in their moment the neoconservatives called for a return to Truman and Kennedy’s anti-Communism. Kennedy had asserted that the US would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Even as early as 1972, historians say that the neoconservatives had a solid “freedom agenda” and interventionist outlook, though they disagreed about how interventionist the US should be. These calls for mid-century ideals were solidifying at just the time that conservatism was beginning to more and more resemble mid-century liberalism, moving from “victory” to containment rhetoric. The neoconservatives further widened their schism with the Democrats by prophesying that McGovern’s “accommodationist” foreign policies would cause electoral failure on the Left; when many liberals cast votes for Nixon in 1972, they felt their prediction had come true. The neoconservatives launched a campaign to retake the party after McGovern’s defeat.

They founded the Coalition for a Democratic Majority to unite Jackson supporters and bring the party back to the days of “Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, LBJ, and Hubert H. Humphrey.” The coalition urged the Democrats to accept a global leadership role for the United States and recommit itself to the fight against Communism. They also denounced the New Politics and the New Left for creating what they called a dangerously radical, anti-establishmentarian, and anti-Semitic shift; their feelings were especially strong given the fact that many neoconservatives were Jewish. The neoconservative campaign therefore combined the domestic ideals of first-wave neoconservatism and the foreign policy of the second wave. Ultimately, their effort would fail in rallying the Democrats, and the campaign’s only true success was keeping Jackson supporters together, according to his staffer Richard Perle. However, it did foreshadow growing similarities between neoconservatism and conservatism, the year before Buckley entered the UN.

These tensions between the neoconservatives and the Democratic Party underlay the
Congressional battle over the Jackson-Vanik amendment during Buckley’s public delegate tenure in the fall of 1973. Conservatives and neoconservatives alike saw Jackson-Vanik as a welcome turn away from détente, a policy that they thought compromised American values by ignoring Soviet human rights abuses.110 Kissinger and the State Department insisted that private diplomacy succeeded where public humiliation failed, calling the Jackson-Vanik amendment “excessively moralistic” and “quixotic or dangerous,” leading to “ineffectual posturing or adventurist crusades.”111 Kissinger asserted that he had been quietly prodding the Soviets in private negotiations to improve Jewish emigration rights, and this was the official policy while Buckley was working under the State Department at the United Nations. When the Jackson-Vanik amendment passed in 1974, Kissinger’s moderate success was undone; the Soviets felt humiliated and decreased their quotas in response.112 However, during the fall of 1973, the Congressional debate was still strong, and Buckley demanded Soviet humiliation.

Sir Alec Home, the British foreign minister, visited the US to address the United Nations General Assembly during Buckley’s tenure, and Buckley invited him to appear on his television show, Firing Line. The British foreign minister, Buckley said, was known to be a strong supporter of human rights. On the show, Buckley asked Home how he would push the USSR to respect human rights. Home replied that he wanted to “begin to try to create for the Soviet Union that kind of confidence that allows free movement within the law—I must insist of course—always of the country concerned.”

Buckley: “If, let’s say, Senator Henry Jackson were sitting in your chair, and he had used the phrase, ‘We should do something to remove barriers,’ and I were to say to him, ‘What do you propose to do?’ he would reply, ‘Well, I propose to withhold certain trading privileges unless they do as Sir Alec has suggested. So here he has a concrete non-rhetorical sanction that he is prepared to deploy. Question: (a) Do you have any sanctions that you are prepared to deploy or (b) if there are, must you for diplomatic reasons keep them under wraps?’”

Home: “[I don’t think] you want to talk in terms of sanctions…I think you must use persuasion to the limit. If you can’t persuade the other side...then we simply just revert, as I said, to a state of passive confrontation, which is very unsatisfactory.”

“So much for the flame of Helsinki,” Buckley later concluded. “Helsinki” became a synonym for international human rights due to the historic Helsinki Accords—and Buckley felt that Home’s hesitance to support sanctions like the neoconservative Jackson-Vanik amendment was antithetical to human rights.113

In December of 1973, yet another group of human rights advocates burst into a
Security Council meeting in the United Nations, demanding action against human rights abuses in the USSR. Their outburst came three months after Virgil Popescu vacated the UN gates. There is no record of Popescu’s fate after he entered the hospital.114

BUCKLEY AND MOYNIHAN CONFRONT THE UNITED NATIONS

At an informal dinner on the first day of the General Assembly, Buckley asked Scali to sponsor a resolution inviting dissident Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn to address the General Assembly. Buckley knew this would effectively confront Soviet human rights abuses like labor camps—which Solzhenitsyn had exposed in his trilogy *Gulag Archipelago*—on a global stage. Scali enthusiastically called over fellow ambassador Tapley Bennett to discuss the idea. It certainly couldn’t be done directly, Bennett said, but perhaps if another country sponsored the resolution—and if Solzhenitsyn were invited with other speakers as part of a series—inviting him to speak might be achievable in five years.115

However, Bennett and Scali were unable to think of any satellite nation that could sponsor the bill, and the group dropped the topic. Buckley later remarked that the US was the only superpower without a satellite in the UN—China had Albania, and the USSR had the Soviet bloc.116 Both China and the USSR also enjoyed the support of the non-aligned nations on many resolutions. President Mobutu of Zaire said that African and Asian countries even further “consolidated” ties during Buckley’s term, the 28th session of the General Assembly.117 Buckley resented the USSR and the non-aligned nations’ power in the UN compared to what he saw as isolation and inaction on the part of the US delegation.118

“Wouldn’t we all profit from inviting Solzhenitsyn anyway, even if the invitation was shot down by the Soviet Union in some way or other?” he reflected. “Wouldn’t it embarrass the UN to vote not to invite someone so distinguished?”119 Ultimately, he concluded, “When human rights plays at the UN, human rights loses.”120 Détente, he said, was to blame for simplifying the US delegation’s mandate in the UN to one item: “Do not offend.”121 Throughout that fall, Scali vetoed many of Buckley’s speeches for being too “provocative,” until Buckley said it became an “astonishment” if one did pass inspection.122

Buckley found his inability to respond infuriating because he believed the non-aligned and the Soviet bloc were launching harsh polemics against the US. One non-aligned ambassador in particular grated his sensibility: Jamil Murad Baroody of Saudi Arabia. Buckley wrote that Baroody “had a following” at the UN because he had been delegate since the organization’s inception, carrying a “carte blanche” from the Saudi Arabian king that enabled him to “speak without fear.” Buckley called him an “oratorical bore,” and he was frustrated that though he had heard Baroody speak one hundred times, “no one dared oppose him…[and] nobody, but nobody, ever replie[d] to Baroody.”123
One of the Saudi Arabian ambassador’s speeches that especially galled Buckley criticized the American system of government during a Plenary session, calling it “democracy by subscription and contribution.” “The spoils system in Government is ripe,” Baroody said, “and the mass media of information are twisted and slanted to distort the truth at the expense of the suppressed people in Africa.” Buckley underlined each phrase on his copy of the speech, and later reflected that an anti-American “mobocracy” ruled the UN; the organization’s charter, he said, was “simply a protean umbrella that cover[ed] the particular interests of the mob.”

Buckley was not the only public delegate to have grievances with the UN. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, soon to become a prominent neoconservative, had occupied Buckley’s public delegate seat just two years before. He was a liberal Harvard sociologist who had earned important political positions under Kennedy, an assistantship to a member of President Nixon’s cabinet, and became the ambassador to India seven months before Buckley’s term at the UN. He was quickly becoming a leader in the neoconservative movement throughout the early and mid-1970s—a liberal with anti-Communist views on foreign policy.

Moynihan’s time as a public delegate had changed his thinking in a lasting way. During his time there, the Third Committee had considered a “Report on the World Social Condition,” which had evaluated countries’ well-being based on the presence of “one single denominator: the presence or absence of social protest.” Moynihan said that he was outraged: “Presence proved trouble. Absence proved peace. This all-purpose social indicator established, for example, that the people and government of Czechoslovakia lived in perfect harmony, whilst the US was rapidly approaching anarchy and long delayed, much deserved—revolution.”

Following this experience, Moynihan gave an interview to The New York Times saying that American diplomats were unable to defend against ideological attacks, and that they needed to stand against the argument that totalitarian societies “had some good points.” For years, he continued to argue that the United States needed to stop “apologizing for an imperfect democracy.” He wrote in 1973: “What drove me to despair was the complacency—I look down the list of those who go along and those who go along by abstaining. In half of them the present regimes would collapse without American support or American acquiesce. To hell with it.” Moynihan advocated that the US suspend support for countries that criticized it, branching out from the Democrats on foreign policy.

After Buckley’s first meeting with Scali about going to the UN, he heard that Moynihan would soon visit New York City for a few days. Buckley recalled the former delegate’s “superb speech” about the UN from two years before and called to ask his advice about taking the appointment. Buckley said that Moynihan urged him to take the position,
assuring him that delegates had some latitude in giving extemporaneous speeches since these could not be reasonably submitted for clearance. 135 This advice likely resounded with Buckley, a vocal opponent of the State Department’s détente policy.

As Buckley’s speeches continued to be silenced, he bitterly reflected that Moynihan’s appointment had been “pre-détente,” which could have allowed Moynihan to make more extemporaneous statements than he was currently allowed. He also imagined that Moynihan, “a UN-loving liberal Democrat,” might have been given more freedom than a “curmudgeonly Republican conservative” like himself. 136 After his first few challenging weeks at the UN, Buckley typed out a memo to Kissinger and Scali declaring his intentions to “feel free to discuss human rights even if the inference can be drawn from what I say that I also believe in human rights within the Soviet Union.” He felt that the United States could pursue cordial relations with the Soviet delegates while still “maintain[ing] a dogged position” on public debates about human rights and the Declaration of Human Rights, of which the Soviets were a signatory.137

He assured them that he would do this “most tactfully,” but that the “genius” of the public delegate format was that he should be able to cast himself as a “detached” agent from the delegation. Scali took him aside and insisted that détente was the overarching policy, but he assured Buckley that he would be able to speak on human rights in language applicable to China and the Soviet Union once the delegation developed a “strategy.” Finally, Scali asked him to never send copies of memorandums to Kissinger.138

Meanwhile, Moynihan was making his opinions known about the US delegation’s actions in 1973. In August, he took the highly unusual step of sending a congratulatory cable to John Scali after Scali denounced Cuban “meddling” over the status of Puerto Rico. He wrote that “something specifically bad” should happen to countries that make unfounded accusations against the US. “When it has happened,” he wrote, “they should be told that Americans take the honor of their democracy most seriously.”139

During Buckley’s first session in the Third Committee of the United Nations, he seemed to have similar goals in mind. Baroody spoke at great length about eliminating an item from the agenda, but Buckley thought that the committee was supposed to be discussing the agenda order rather than the merits of each item. He rose and asked Baroody to confine his statements to the order of the agenda items. The president of the committee seemed astonished at the new US delegate’s impudence—or perhaps ignorance.140 Scali chided him after the session for opposing Baroody when the US sorely needed his vote. Buckley was not the only delegate to extemporaneously face off with Baroody; another public delegate once spoke out that he could not “take responsibility for the Crusades, the Fall of Rome, and everything else Mr. Baroody accuses us of— I have listened to that speech of Mr. Baroody’s five times since I came to the General Assembly.”141
After some time, Kissinger tried to distance the State Department from Buckley. Buckley had known Kissinger professionally long before he joined the United Nations because Kissinger had previously courted Buckley’s conservative support for Nelson Rockefeller’s presidential campaign. When the Secretary of State arrived to give the opening address at the GA, Buckley greeted Kissinger: “How is it going, Doc?” A months into the fall session, Buckley mocked President Mobutu of Zaire in his syndicated column: “Such menial tasks as placing one’s own speech on a podium are inconsistent with the pride of the President of Zaire.” Kissinger and Scali told Mobutu that Buckley’s views did not represent those of the American government. Scali said that Mobutu’s support was necessary because Saudi Arabia was sponsoring a resolution to pull UN forces out of Korea, which the US thought would be disastrous for peace; in his view, the non-aligned votes were important because it would be hard to coalesce American public support, considering the country’s desire to demilitarize post-Vietnam. “The stock reply,” Buckley thought, “should be that the erosion of American influence during the past few years suggests that we have been doing something wrong…by sitting still, numbly, for rhetorical assaults from anyone, on any subject.”

By early November, Buckley began to occasionally keep such thoughts to himself. Once, Buckley uncovered a display of photos from the Angola Liberation Front showing dead Portuguese soldiers and burning vehicles. “This struck me as odd,” he wrote. “The Portuguese and French are both members of the UN, the Liberation Front of Angola is not, yet the Front can attack the two members right in the halls of the UN…The sign says in accordance with a decision taken by the 4th Committee on the 27th of September, by the UN Office of Information. Nutty?” He confined his comments to his personal reflections.

By December 10, Buckley’s concerns about the non-aligned seemed to be at least partially founded: members of the US delegation feared that the United Nations Secretary General was going to be “emasculate[d]” by the non-aligned. There was a Security Council meeting scheduled for that afternoon, which the non-aligned nations had convened to authorize the Secretary General to attend Middle East peace negotiations in Geneva.

“ISSUE: The issue is more important than it appears to be. Aside from the theatrics, the non-aligned are making a subtle but determined effort to bring the Security Council to heel. They do not want to have Waldheim freewheeling with the generic support of the advice from the US and the USSR. Everytime [UN Secretary General] Waldheim moves they would like to have him report to the Security Council to explain what he has done, what he will do, and how. Not only is this impossibly inefficient and impractical but it will thoroughly emasculate the Security-general if successful, and eventually will make the Sec Council and appendage of the General Assembly. [misspellings and grammatical errors original]”
Meanwhile, Scali never appointed Buckley as the US representative to the Third Committee. Buckley finally wrote a pointed note to Scali: “At what point does your excellence appoint me to Human Rights?” Scali hedged by assigning Buckley numerous resolutions amongst varied committees, including the General Assembly, the Third Committee, the Second Committee, and the Special Political committee.¹⁴⁹

Though Buckley’s tenure would ultimately end in frustration, Moynihan would take up the banner of confrontational UN diplomacy two years later. Kissinger read Moynihan’s article in Commentary, a neoconservative magazine, deploring a “thirty year pattern of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal” and a “massive failure of American diplomacy” to defend liberal policies.¹⁵⁰ The Secretary of State promptly called Moynihan about becoming the UN ambassador.¹⁵¹ However, Kissinger would soon need to politically isolate himself from Moynihan just as he had from Buckley.

During Moynihan’s term, the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin made “wild accusations” against the US and called for the extinction of Israel as a state. Moynihan responded with a speech in San Francisco calling Amin a “racist murderer.” The State Department tried to distance itself. Moynihan responded simply, “I have said what had to be said.”¹⁵² He made a similarly outspoken stand against a UN resolution declaring Zionism a form of racism, declaring flatly, “This is a lie.”¹⁵³ After these bold statements, The New York Times Magazine published a flattering profile, the Chicago Tribune praised his “relentless harpooning of Third World idiocies,” and National Review called him the “Man of the Year.” A Time cover story about Moynihan in January 1976 cited an opinion poll showing 70% of respondents wanting him to keep speaking out, even if it was undiplomatic.¹⁵⁴

Moynihan continued attacking the Soviets, saying that they would “exploit our every weakness” and that US foreign policy had been outmatched. When the Soviets supported Communist liberation movements in non-aligned countries like Ethiopia and Angola, he said that these revolutions were a “progressive brutalization of politics which is being carried on by the Soviets in the name of national liberation.” It was the Americans’ duty, he said, to make sure the world understood this.¹⁵⁵ However, a story soon appeared reporting that Kissinger had privately rebuked Moynihan for his conduct, which Moynihan said was false. He thought Kissinger had circulated the rumor. Quotes from Kissinger then appeared in The New York Times saying that he and Nixon privately deplored Moynihan while publicly supporting him. Rather than be undercut, Moynihan resigned.¹⁵⁶

From opposite sides of the political spectrum, Buckley and Moynihan made similar arguments in the United Nations about confronting the Soviets on human rights abuses, defending American values against accusations from the non-aligned, and decreasing the United States’ isolation in the UN. Both felt that the US was losing its role as a global leader and failing in the worldwide struggle between Communism and democracy.¹⁵⁷ Their
push for anti-Communist, diplomatically interventionist foreign policy foreshadowed the impending alliance in 1980 between the conservatives and neoconservatives.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn echoed Buckley and Moynihan’s arguments. At nearly the same time that Buckley was pushing to invite him to the UN in September 1973, Solzhenitsyn discovered that the KGB had interrogated his typist, who hung himself afterwards. The KGB then unearthed a copy of Solzhenitsyn’s book The Gulag Archipelago that exposed Soviet oppression in labor camps. The author and his family received death threats, and in February he was arrested, deprived of his citizenship, and deported. In 1975, when he visited Washington, President Ford declined to meet with him on the advice of Henry Kissinger. On June 8, 1978, at a Harvard University address, Solzhenitsyn deplored the “decline in courage” in the West, “in each country, each government, each political party, and, of course, in the United Nations.” At the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration Human Rights that December, Buckley wrote, “…the shadow of Solzhenitsyn was over that Assembly, but nobody spoke his name.”

AN UNLIKELY RHETORICAL ALLIANCE

Late in the fall of 1973, William F. Buckley finally spoke on human rights at the United Nations. He had not expected the speech to pass through the delegation but, to his surprise, he arrived to the UN that morning and discovered it had been approved. The Third Committee had been considering appointing a High Commissioner on Human Rights for eight years. Each session, it was put off to the next year for further discussion. Some countries objected that the commissioner could interfere in internal affairs for sovereign nations.

“Human rights is an ideal to which we all pay lip service,” he proclaimed. “Among those who spoke yesterday in opposition to a High Commissioner for Human Rights were states who would have you believe that such is the congestion of human rights within their frontiers that it is necessary to surround themselves with great walls and oceans to prevent these human rights from emigrating.” It is unlikely that Buckley’s reference to the Jackson-Vanik amendment went unnoticed by the USSR.

Buckley’s confrontational human rights rhetoric had strong parallels with the mid-century Truman Doctrine. In Truman’s 1947 speech to Congress, the President tried to convince his listeners that Greece and Turkey required massive economic support to remain independent from the growing Soviet bloc. He argued that American intervention would help ensure the spread of freedom in a world at risk of spiraling toward oppression under Communist leadership. “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms,” he said. “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of
the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.” His words described a world locked in struggle between liberty and tyranny, and he insisted that the United States had a duty to fight against what he portrayed as a Communist menace. This rhetoric helped solidify the “Vital Center” around anti-Communism in the Democratic Party during the postwar period.

Buckley ascribed to Truman’s anti-Communist dichotomous worldview, believing that America was a force for good against oppressive Soviet domination. His fond discussion of the Jackson-Vanik amendment also mirrored Truman’s advocacy for an international, vocally public program spreading “freedom” and directly contesting the Soviets’ authority. However, Buckley’s uniqueness came from his use of human rights rhetoric to support these aims; though Truman supported freeing other countries from Communist domination, he did not reference improving individual human rights within Communist nations. Buckley took American interventionism one step further, in a vein more similar to Kennedy’s “support any friend, oppose any foe” speech, purporting that the US had a moral duty to uphold freedom for people living within Communist nations. Buckley endorsed confrontational diplomacy as an ideal tool to pressure the Soviets into giving their citizens rights—a goal that he said upheld the ideals of the United Nations. His ideas echoed Truman’s speech defending aggressive diplomacy as a means to greater freedom for Greece and Turkey.

As neoconservatives drew closer to the Republican Party, conservative historian George Nash says their foreign policy rhetoric also became much closer to “Mr. Acheson and Truman’s internationalism” than to the left wing isolationism of Eugene McCarthy and his supporters. Buckley himself compared Moynihan’s rhetoric to the “tradition of Dean Acheson [and] Harry Truman” in June 1979. Moynihan, like Truman, believed in a global struggle between Communism and the “free” world and affirmed that it was the United States’ duty to promote liberal democracy abroad. In fact, Moynihan’s “United States in Opposition” article espoused the theory that the British Empire had spread socialist opinion throughout the world, and he argued that the US had faltered in effectively combating that ideology.

Moynihan's desire to promote democracy abroad even hearkened back to Wilsonian principles. In his February 1975 speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Was Woodrow Wilson Right?” he argued that America had a duty to spread “freedom.” Moynihan said that “democracy in one country was not enough simply because it would not last,” and therefore the United States had the responsibility to “defend and, where possible, to advance democratic principles in the world at large.” Soon, Moynihan began to echo Buckley’s compelling combination of human rights rhetoric and anti-Communism. In the late 1970s, he opposed Carter’s approach to human rights, saying
that Carter was pursuing “international social work” whereas human rights policy should actually be a “political weapon” to be used in the “battle against totalitarianism.”

Senator Jackson was another leader committed to the anti-Communist ideals rooted in Truman’s speech. The Jackson-Vanik amendment had direct parallels with Truman’s plan for aid to Europe: both measures won widespread support as less severe, but still anti-Communist policy alternatives to military intervention. In 1947, containment-supporting liberals rallied behind broad based economic aid for Europe that required no military commitments. The Jackson-Vanik amendment had a similar pitch in the 1970s: improving emigration rights for Soviet Jews through economic means. Isolationist liberals opposed continued overseas commitments that could lead to another Vietnam, but they could easily support an amendment furthering human rights without military involvement. Senator Jackson’s Truman-like anti-Communism also made him the neoconservatives’ first choice for the presidency in 1972.

Buckley, Jackson, and Moynihan employed Truman’s mid-century liberal language toward what had become conservative foreign policy aims during the early 1970s. Where 1970s liberalism wanted to retreat from the world, they pushed for intervention. While revisionists argued the United States had caused the Cold War, neoconservatives and conservatives pushed for defending and spreading American actions and values abroad. Truman’s language—championing anti-Communism, confrontation, and the spread of democracy—helped these three figures create a unique mélange of liberal rhetorical means and conservative ends.

This rhetoric prefigured the 1980 alliance between neoconservatives and conservatives. Both Buckley and the neoconservatives departed from their respective parties’ traditional language to create a rhetorical bridge that stretched back to the days of President Truman. The neoconservatives adopted classic liberal language, but that rhetoric and its goals differed from some of their fellow Democrats in the post-Vietnam foreign policy era. Buckley’s connection between conservative anti-Communism and human rights allied him with contemporary neoconservatives but differentiated him from the Right’s silence on human rights during the post-war period. His argument spread across the party toward the end of the decade. When it did, near 1980, the neoconservatives and conservatives fully entered an alliance, though not purely based on this early 70s bridge coming to fruition. Rather, conservatism’s logical tie between its foreign policy and greater human rights abroad coincided with the neoconservatives’ migration to the Right based on foreign policy as well as other domestic issues. Buckley’s human rights advocacy in the UN in the early 1970s foreshadowed these changes in the conservative movement later in the decade.

Buckley used his unique rhetoric most boldly in a speech he never gave. It was to be delivered on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.
in early October 1973. A cable from the Washington diplomatic headquarters demanded, “There should be no repeat no mention of specific countries or specific cases involving human rights violations.” (grammatical errors original) Buckley wrote a speech defining the world in terms of countries that “grant human beings human rights” and those who do not. He requested in the draft that all countries who “systematically deny the human rights associated with the UN Declaration should gracefully absent themselves from this chamber.” His aide thought the speech would go over well. After all, Buckley had softened his demand with a cautionary line: “I do not wish to be censorious…but those countries whose own policies are not congruent should leave.”

That night, when Buckley returned home, he found that Scali had left him a message to call him “instantly” in Washington, “no matter how late.” Buckley guessed what it was about, and went promptly to sleep. The next morning, the US ambassador explained that the speech simply could not be delivered as it was, because the State Department was in the midst of delicate negotiations concerning the Yom Kippur War, and anything “smack[ing] as a defense of Jews could be devastating” to relations with the Arabs and the Russians. Scali assured Buckley that the “top leadership” of the delegation was personally in “whole-heart[ed]” agreement with his speech, and that he would get a chance to “vigorously” express his views on human rights after the Middle East war had concluded. However, Buckley declined the chance to deliver an edited, less confrontational version of the speech; instead he concocted an excuse to leave town that day. An alternate delivered the edited statement.

**A SUCCESSFUL SILENCE**

Buckley had a growing sense that “Walter Mitty was dead.” It had been building since Scali had not posted him as the delegate on the Third Committee, continued to grow when his memo was firmly rejected, and solidified as Scali assigned him to a range of resolutions on committees that would take him away from the Human Rights Committee. Luckily, his brother Jim had just been elected Senator of New York in 1971. Buckley called for advice.

After some research, Buckley’s brother read aloud from Public Law 357, the 79th Congress UN Participation Act of 1945, Section 2C: “The representatives provided for in Section 2 hereof, when representing the US in the respective organs and agencies of the UN, shall, at all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President transmitted by the Secretary of State…”

“In a nutshell, Bill, you are not a free agent,” Jim said. Buckley considered resigning. There had been very little public attention to his appointment, and he felt that the State
Department would continue to frustrate the work he believed he should be doing for the US. Suddenly, Buckley had an idea. He would write a book—a journal—documenting his experiences in the United Nations as a delegate, revealing useful insights from someone outside the bureaucracy. “I would not, after all, emerge the screwy,” he crowed.185

Later that winter in Switzerland, where he went to write his book, he reflected back on his months at the United Nations: “Even now I do not understand the purpose of the layman-delegate.”186 His attempts to make speeches and contribute to policy had been repeatedly frustrated, and the public delegates had been “entirely left out” of negotiations for the Yom Kippur War that had broken out during their General Assembly session, he wrote discontentedly.187 Even after he published these reflections in his book, United Nations Journal, there was relatively little notice paid to his efforts.188

What Buckley’s persistence in the United Nations did achieve was a rhetorical foreshadowing of the neoconservative-conservative alliance in 1980. Both groups’ rhetoric reached back into Truman’s speeches. There, Buckley, Moynihan, and Jackson would find the necessary structures to articulate their conservative foreign policies in the 1970s. Both Buckley and the neoconservatives branched away from their respective parties, moving closer together toward a common language and, eventually a common party.

In December 1973, Buckley was simply looking forward to ending his experience in the United Nations. On the last day of his term, the closing statements ran late. It was 8:30PM, and US Ambassador Tapley Bennett had yet to give his address. Buckley felt sorry for him, but he had promised his harpsichord teacher he would attend her recital. He knew she would miss him, and that Bennett would forgive him for leaving. He did not read the final remarks the next morning.189

NOTES


3. Ibid.


9. Farber, *Conservatism*, 59-67. Farber says Buckley called the early years of his career “crying in the wilderness: liberals ruled the citadels of culture and politics and the masses had fallen prey to their machinations.” Farber also writes that there was no intellectually credible magazine of opinion for conservatism at the time.
11. Ibid.
12. Farber, *Modern Conservatism*, 50-52
15. Qtd. in Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism.”
17. Ben Wattenberg, a commentator and author who was part of the neoconservative group, quoted in Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 47-50, 59-61.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
the Republicans away from isolationism, see Farber, *Modern Conservatism*, 316. Refer once again to Nash v-viii also for a summary of Buckley’s critical coalescing leadership in the first postwar conservative resurgence.


29. Outside the United Nations, Buckley was concurrently advocating for American military intervention in Latin America. He supported American involvement in General Pinochet’s overthrow of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected socialist leader in Chile who established diplomatic relations with Cuba. See Judis, *Buckley*, 370-372 for the fascinating story about Buckley’s involvement founding a Chilean lobbying organization, the American Chilean Council, and supporting pro-Pinochet coverage in the *National Review*. For more information about American attitudes toward Allende and perceptions about Chile’s relationship to Cuba, see “The Nixon Administration’s Response to Salvador Allende and Chilean Expropriation,” “Nixonontapes.org,” last updated 2007, http://nixonontapes.org/chile.html. Within the United Nations, there was a particularly exciting episode where Soviet ambassador Malik announced to the UN that the Chilean government was going to execute a Communist senator at 4PM that day. Ambassador Bazan from Pinochet’s government said the allegations were untrue, but not before many members of the Soviet bloc denounced the execution. *United Nations Journal*, 108-113, Box 425, Folder 294, Buckley Papers.

30. Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide.”


32. Farber, *Modern Conservatism*, 262.


36. Nash, *Conservative Intellectual*, 334. Judis argues with this date, saying that over six months Buckley took confused and uncertain actions—“so much so that Buckley himself could claim in retrospect that he called for Nixon’s resignation, while Nixon loyalists like Pat Buchanan could recall Buckley as one of the few conservatives who didn’t ‘hit us when we were down.’” Judis says that it was not until June 1974 that Buckley finally adopted the same stand he had privately advised his brother to take: calling for Nixon to quit. Judis, *Buckley*, 352-357.


43. On public opinion turning against interventionist foreign policy, see Nash, *Conservative Intellectual*, 316 and Williams, “Déjate and Domestic Politics.” A Department of State Bulletin described Americans’ widespread disillusionment: “This has been the longest, the most difficult war in American history. Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all 9 years ago; and there has been disagreement on the conduct of the war.” No author, Department of State Bulletin, Box 45, Folder 2, United Nations. On neconservatives’ discontent with the Democratic Party in the early 70s, see Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 2-10, 28-32, 47-50, 59-61.


46. Ibid, 316-320. John Gaddis argues that the idea originally surfaced with Charles Beard, but that the idea came into its “most influential characterization” with Williams. These revisionist views were vulnerable to conservative accusations of “anti-Americanism,” and Buckley wrote an editorial early in the 70s saying that “to dismiss even contemporary America as one vast plot against the survival of our eternal souls is Manichean and boring.”


49. United Nations Journal, 1, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.


53. Ambassador Tapley Bennett, one of the subordinate ambassadors, stressed the importance of the public delegates in contributing alternative points of view to the delegation during their initial Washington briefing. The five delegates in the fall of 1973 included: Margaret Young, the widow of civil rights leader Whitney Young; Mark Evans, a personal friend of the President who was Mormon; Richard Scammon, Scali’s friend and Director of Elections Research Center. Margaret Young withdrew halfway through for health reasons, but she made several statements on minority rights. Scammon’s duties in Washington also kept him away from New York City most of the time. Two ambassadors on the delegation besides Bennett were William Schaufele, a lifetime foreign ambassador, and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, previous ambassador to Uganda and General Counsel to the US Commission on Civil Rights. There were also two congressional representatives, one from each party: Democrat Robert C. Nix and Republican John Buchanan. Ibid, 3-6, 10-13.
55. United Nations Journal, 2, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. See also Judis, Buckley, 351, and Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 334.
58. For a contemporary writer calling Buckley a critic of Nixon’s administration, see Redman, “Buckley Reports.”
59. United Nations Journal, 5, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. He wrote sarcastically that if Scali had asked him to be a dictator of the Gulag Archipelago, he would have reacted similarly: he would have asked a few questions and said he would think about it.
60. Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 265 and Buckley, Journal, 130, 253, 257. Buckley quoted a limited circulation cable from Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Ambassador John Scali in August 1973. Buckley also describes a situation where the UN enacted sanctions against Rhodesia. The US then had to purchase chrome from the USSR instead at a higher price, sponsoring a nation whose human rights abuses — according to Buckley — were far more egregious. The American Congress then enacted the Byrd amendment requiring the US to purchase chrome at the lowest price; the US, to the UN’s chagrin, returned to purchasing from Rhodesia. The delegates were told that the Byrd amendment had gotten the US into “the most fearful problems with the UN.” Buckley shows this as an example of the USSR escaping criticism for its human rights violations. United Nations Journal, 18-19, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. Scali also notes criticism of the US within the UN about the Byrd amendment. Memo from John Scali, October 1, 1973, Box 332 Folder 336, Buckley Papers. In his reflections on his UN tenure, Buckley wrote that most countries in the United
Nations were “effectively protected” against “criticism of their neglect of, or suppression of, human rights, with the traditional exceptions: South Africa and Portugal, of course; and any states which, from time to time, persecute Communist parties, or overthrow left-minded governments.” Buckley, *Journal*, 221.


63. Ibid.


66. Political Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers, September 5-9, 1973, Page 33, Item 6: “Further condemns the continued economic, financial, and military assistance given to S. Africa by certain NATO powers, in particular the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, thereby enabling the Government in Pretoria to maintain and reinforce its policy of repression and apartheid.” Box 332, Folder 335, Buckley Papers.

67. Buckley, *Journal*, 190, 232, Appendix B. This appendix shows the United States’ numerical isolation in General Assembly voting, showing the numbers of votes cast with and against the US, and assigning a numerical rating for each. The rating was determined by assigning +1 for voting with the US, -1 voting against, and 0 for abstentions. The appendix was based on 14 resolutions chosen as a cross-section, touching on issues like terrorism, colonialism, the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, and the recognition of revolutionaries and governments-in-exile. There were only two countries with a rating over 10: Portugal and South Africa. In Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s cable re-published in the *Journal*, Moynihan says that there were some instances when the United States had the support of smaller nations, but that these were the exception rather than the norm. Buckley, *Journal*, 257.

68. *United Nations Journal*, 3-6, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.


71. Telegram Ambassador Scali to US Embassy in Bucharest, September 19, 1973, Box 261, Folder 2255, Buckley Papers.


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Telegram from Ambassador Scali to US Embassy in Bucharest, September 20, 1973, Box 261, Folder 2255, Buckley Papers. It should be noted that the records do not indicate whether Popescu was Jewish, though he suffered under the Soviet bloc’s emigration restrictions. His strike earned national coverage in *The Daily Herald* in Chicago, the *St. Petersburg Times*, and other papers.


77. Zelizer, “Detente and Domestic Politics.”


85. Ibid.


87. Ibid, 78-9. This likely is a reference to the Soviets’ “Iron Curtain” over Eastern Europe.

88. There is one further subsection that currently only meets when required. The Trusteeship Council supervises eleven “trust territories,” or territories preparing to gain independence. The last territory to gain its independence was the American Pacific Islands. “United Nations in Brief,” United Nations website.


90. Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 1-2; Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics.” The Scoop Jackson Democrat neoconservatives were the true ancestors of the modern neoconservative group, who are known for their moralistic, muscular foreign policy views that encourage the US to advance into the world to shape it according to American values. Vaisse, “Neoconservatism,” 1-3.


92. Ibid.


109. The neoconservatives were averse to what they perceived as anti-Semitism and militancy in the New Left, especially given that many of the neoconservatives were Jewish. Increasing student radicalism, including events like the Columbia protests in 1967-68, alienated the neoconservatives. There was also a rising pro-Palestine sentiment in the left among figures like Noam Chomsky and IF Stone. Ehrman writes this was a key turning point for Jewish neoconservatives. They felt both of these movements were taking over the Left, and this sentiment helped ignite their push to take back the party. Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 38-41, 58-61.


112. Ibid.


114. Telegram summarizing Security Council meeting, from Secretary of State in Washington to USUN in NYC, December 10, 1973, Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers. During the Guinean Representative Madame Cisse’s speech there was a “brief outburst” in the gallery.


116. Ibid.

118. Ibid, Appendix B. Unsigned typewritten note, January 1, 1974, ND, Buckley Papers. Typewritten note attached to clipping discussing previous day’s election of 15-man board of UN Industrial Development Organization for three-year terms. The note says US was a candidate but didn’t make it. Rather, the Soviet bloc elected two members, Africans four, Arabs five, and Latin America one. Latin America’s delegate was from Argentina, who the author says voted with the non-aligned. The author further wrote that Switzerland and Austria were the only friendly countries on the board. “One more step toward the day when the non aligned will decide how to spend our money—and one day closer to the effective end of the UN. Our people didn’t think this was very important and didn’t care whether we were elected to the Board or not. Maybe they know something I don’t know.” Style suggests Buckley. Also, box does contain signed notes from other authors.

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid, 221.
122. Buckley, Journal, 228 and Judis, Buckley, 352.

124. Transcript of Plenary 2162, November 1, 1973, Pg. 81, Box 332, Folder 334, Buckley Papers. Also, Memo from John Scali, October 1, 1973, entitled “Tanzanian Fonmin (Foreign Minister) Openly Attacks US,” Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers. Also unsigned typewritten note, ND, attached to a New York Times article, “The Genocide Convention Time” by William Korey, Folder 336, Box 332, Buckley Papers. On November 8th, 1973, the Secretary of State wrote a telegram to the USUN about a Recovery and Rehabilitation program to improve a famine in the Sahel. Buckley scrawled in the margin, “While the Africans tee off on us resolutely in the UN, we are the few who have really helped [the famine] in Sahel. Telegram from the Secretary of State in Washington to the USUN in NYC, November 8, 1973, Box 332, Folder 335, Buckley Papers.

126. Moynihan had only gone to the United Nations as a public delegate three days a week because he “insisted that he would need to continue to meet his two seminars in Cambridge two days a week.” United Nations Journal, 1-15, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.

129. Ibid.

132. Ibid, 82.
133. Ibid, 83-86.


139. Ibid, 83. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 253-60.


141. Buckley was not the only public delegate who would extemporaneously face off with Baroody. On November 7, 1973, the Saudi Arabian ambassador (whom Buckley privately called the “Prophet of the Plenary”) proposed in the Special Political Committee that the US fund the entire Palestinian refugee budget because American aid to Israel was the only reason there were Palestinian refugees in the first place. The US, he said, had already demonstrated its ability to provide $2 billion “in one day” to Israel. Mark Evans, another public delegate, spoke out extemporaneously against the proposal. Evans said that this would be the first time at the UN that a country would be singled out in this way; further, the US already contributed $23 million annually to the UN Relief and Works Agency — 64% of the total contributions since 1950. The exchange was “blistering,” as Buckley noted in the file. Unsigned typewritten note preceding transcript of Special Political Committee session 879, November 7, 1973, Box 332, Folder 334. On the corresponding transcript, the following exchange occurs: Evans: “I can’t take the responsibility for the Crusades, the Fall of Rome, and everything else Mr. Baroody accuses us of—I have listened to that speech of Mr. Baroody’s five times since I came to the General Assembly in six weeks [ago]…I was told to ignore the delegate from Saudi Arabia, that there was only one way to handle him and that is to ignore him and let him talk, because nobody listens to him…[after speaking for a time] I have never seen the Saudi Arabian delegate sit and listen so long—I am grateful for that.” Baroody later said in the speech that President Truman originally designed the Israel-Palestine partition for “selfish reasons” and violated the Palestinians’ right to self-determination under Wilson’s original declarations. Transcript of Special Political Committee session 879, November 7, 1973, Box 332, Folder 334. A memo from Scali follows saying that he was working to block this “mischief-making” from Baroody. Buckley later wrote that Baroody often criticized the US for being under the control of Zionist Jews. *United Nations Journal*, 63-70, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.

142. *United Nations Journal*, 42-49, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 42-49, 57-60. During the confirmation process for the General Assembly, the FBI called Buckley’s co-editor to discuss his connections to members of the Nixon administration and attitudes towards it. “Has Mr. Buckley done anything since 1969 that might embarrass the Nixon administration?” “No,” Rusher reportedly responded, “but since 1969 the Nixon administration has done a great deal that has embarrassed Mr. Buckley.” Judis, *Buckley*, 352. Also see Buckley, *Journal*, xxvi.


147. Typewritten Note, November 12, 1973, Box 332 Folder 335, Buckley Papers.

148. Unsigned typewritten note, ND, attached to telegram summarizing Security Council meeting
of December 10, 1973, Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers.


150. Ibid, 96-97.

151. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 83. Moynihan was outspoken even on transcription practices in the Security Council. He requested a change in UN procedure that ignited a chain of letters involving the Secretary-General. Letter Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Kurt Waldheim, ND, Unsigned “Note for the Secretary-General,” March 3, 1976, Note Kurt Herndl Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General to M. Glaissner, Director of Security Council, Letter Elaine Sloan Director of the General Legal Division to Ambassador Tapley Bennett March 24, 1976, Box 44, Folder 5, United Nations.

152. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 83. John Scali resigned close to the time Moynihan began his term as an ambassador. Letter from John Scali to Kurt Waldheim, June 30, 1975, Box 45, Folder 6, United Nations.


154. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 92.


156. Ibid.


159. Buckley, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy.”


161. Buckley, Journal, 244. Selvi Siplik, Assistant Secretary-General for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, delivered a statement implying that the Third Committee had failed to fulfill its humanitarian duties. “Statement at the Third Committee on Tuesday, 16th October 1973,” Third Committee of the General Assembly 28th Session, No Box, No Folder, United Nations Archives. Buckley writes that a British diplomat also quipped at the end of the 28th session that Third Committee resolutions were ineffectual, compared to the Sixth Committee and the Security Council. See also Buckley, Journal, 246.

162. Buckley, Journal, 221-230. Buckley delivered another minor statement on the Freedom of Information Act in the General Assembly on December 14th, 1973. It fills only four paragraphs. “My Government wishes to record very briefly its special disappointment that the General Assembly has once again passed over an opportunity to affirm a declaration on freedom of information.” He argued that declining to share the discussions in the United Nations “profane[d] the very purpose of the body…” Baroody, the Saudi Arabian ambassador, responded, “I think it is marvelous that for once I should be in agreement with the representative of the United States…” Transcript of Plenary 2201, pp. 30-31, December 14, 1973, Box 332, Folder 334, Buckley Papers. See also Buckley, Journal, 151.

164. Ibid, 228-229.
166. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 13.
170. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 134.
171. Ibid, 83, 95.
172. Ibid, 76-80.
173. Ibid.
175. Williams, “Détente and Domestic Politics.”
177. Ibid., 18-25.
179. Henry Kissinger was in the midst of shuttle diplomacy, a term applied to his peace negotiations between the Israelis and Egypt beginning in in late 1973. The Soviets had tried to jointly enforce a cease-fire, but Kissinger had refused the request, ordering a short nuclear alert to back up his rejection. See Gaddis, The Cold War, 204-5. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim wrote a confidential letter to Kissinger that shows the US Secretary of State was continuing the process largely outside of the United Nations. Waldheim writes, “I have received constant and pressing calls from Ambassador Malik for the activation of the Soviet observers in the Middle East… I have told Ambassador Malik that the agreement that the Soviet Union and the Americans would provide 36 observers each was reached in Washington…I would much appreciate it if the problem could be discussed urgently with Ambassador Dobrynin and the necessary agreement reached.” Letter Kurt Waldheim to Henry Kissinger, CC Mr. Roberto Guyer, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, and Mr. Anton Prohaska, Box 45, Folder 2, United Nations. Roberto Guyer identified using the following resource: “Interview with: Roberto Guyer,” United Nations Oral History, http://www.unmultimedia.org/oralhistory/2013/01/guyer-roberto/. Anton Prohaska identified using this resource: “Secretary-General Visits China,” United Nations News Media and Photo, http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=673/67330&key=12&query=coverage:%22China%22&so=0&sf=date.
181. Ibid, 52.
183. Buckley, Journal, 94-95. The bill continued to say that the representatives of the UN should abide by the Secretary of State’s directions “unless other means of transmission is directed by the President.”
185. Ibid, 98
187. Buckley compared his nomination to the UN to Nixon “appoint[ing] his Irish setter as delegate”—it would not have been noticed, “unless it was suspected that he was being put beyond the reach of the Watergate grand jury.” Buckley, Journal, 96-100
188. Ibid, 135-140. Eric Redman wrote in a review of United Nations Journal in The New York Times. He praised Buckley’s writing style but critiqued his stances on human rights. The article argued that human rights were “relativist”: the US should not argue against decreasing democratic freedoms in other countries if doing so achieves social goals. Redman, “Buckley Reports.”
189. Ibid, 252.
190. Philips-Fein, “Conservatism”
191. Judis, Buckley, 357
193. Eckel and Moyn, The Human Rights Breakthrough, 163-165. Reagan said that the US had a mission for “all men and women to share in our tradition of individual human rights and freedom, with government the servant and not the master.”
197. Farber tends to portray conservatism as alarmist and dated. For example: “Taft, cheerful as any mortician, had a hard time saying something positive about most anything. William Buckley did his best to break the conservative mold by smiling a lot and demonstrating that he knew how to have fun. But his essential message was that as long as Americans continued to allow liberals to rule they all were surely going to hell in a hand basket, and deservedly so.” Farber, Modern Conservatism, 160.
198. Buckley admits that the journal was focused very “subjectively.” Buckley, Journal, 253.
199. Ibid, 96-97.

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