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Yale European Studies Council
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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

As the 2016 election cycle slowly starts to play out in earnest, the question of immigration reform will no doubt take ever greater prominence in our public discourse. Yet the Americas have seen many centuries of migration, movements of individuals, families, and entire nations. It is to this long and continuing story that this edition of The Yale Historical Review is dedicated.

The Spanish Civil War is often regarded as the forerunner to the Second World War, the first chapter in a dark period of European bloodshed. Two of our essays, however, examine the important role of the Americas in this “European” conflict. Omegar Chavolla-Zacarias ’16 considers the decision of the Mexican government to accept Spanish Republican refugees, highlighting how this humanitarian decision furthered myriad political, institutional, and ideological goals. Moving further south, Tomas Piedrahita, University of Pennsylvania ’16, studies a wide variety of Argentinian discourses surrounding the Spanish Civil War, inviting us to understand their rhetorical significance within the Argentinian political realm.

The relationship of peoples and places is perhaps never more fraught than in the often violent history of European encounters with the native populations of the Americas. Jonah Bader ’16 examines one of the earliest and bloodiest such conflicts, King Philip’s War (1675–1678). His essay analyzes the colonists’ perceptions of Christianized “praying Indians,” following the political and cultural power of this easily manipulated image. And while the memory of battles between indigenous peoples and European settlers remains fresh in our minds, John Paul Paniagua, Whittier College ’14, brings our attention to a less obvious - but nonetheless formative - narrative, that in which Europeans forced over 2,000 Apache peoples away from the American Southwest and exiled them to a life of labor in Mexico City and Havana.

Place may mean islands, nations, or whole continents; it may also manifest on the smaller scale of a single city. In his essay on the creation of the Major League Baseball stadium in Atlanta, Daniel Judt ’17 focuses on race, class, and urban renewal in an examination of how various inhabitants of the same city view the development of place and space from deeply divergent perspectives, creating or enforcing schisms within their communities.

Once again, the Review is proud to present a longer essay through our website. Irma Mariana Ramirez Villa, Buena Vista University ’15, outlines the many registers of the American response to the displaced Jews of post-1945 Europe, unified by a measured altruism she characterizes as “calculated kindness.”

The past two years have been an exciting period for the study of history at Yale: booming enrollments, transformative changes to the undergraduate major, and the arrival of numerous new faculty members. One of our associate editors, David Shimer ’18, sat down with Professor Anne Eller, a scholar of Caribbean and Latin American history who joined the department in 2013, to discuss her research, the state of the field, and history at Yale.

The end of the spring semester is traditionally a time of transition, as a class of seniors prepares to depart and a new class of freshman prepares to take its place. We at the Review extend a warm welcome to the class of 2019, and salute our graduating editors, past and present: Tiraana Bains, Stewart McDonald, Noah Remnick, Maude Tisch, and Spencer J. Weinreich. We would also like to thank the record number of students who were generous enough to share their projects of historical analysis with us, as without such enthusiasm we would not be able to present such a diverse and engaging collection of essays. We hope you will enjoy reading them as much as we have.

Sincerely,

Spencer J. Weinreich, Editor in Chief
Samuel Becker, Managing Editor
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Conducted by David Shimer
As the Spanish Civil War was drawing to a close, the beleaguered Republican government arranged for Mexico to accept refugees fleeing Francisco Franco’s victorious Nationalists. Omegar Chavolla-Zacarias ’16 follows this story on multiple scales, examining the political aims and policy changes of the Mexican government alongside the stories of individual refugees. The essay identifies the ideological side of Mexico’s decision – inverting the power-dynamic of colony and colonizer—while never losing sight of the practical problems of transporting and settling thousands of refugees. Chavolla-Zacarias integrates this policy into the broader history of early twentieth century Mexico, its emergence and self-perception as a modern (and modernizing) nation-state.

By Omegar Chavolla-Zacarias, BR ’16
Written for “Law and History”
Professor Rohit De
Faculty Advisor: Genevieve Carpio
Edited by Jacob Wasserman and Anthony Kayruz
INTRODUCTION

Night fell as 24-year-old Josefina García left her family’s home in the Spanish province of Leon with only the clothes on her back. Afraid of leaving footprints in the freshly fallen snow, she carefully avoided walking on the worn paths of her mountain village. Spain’s Civil War had just begun, but the right-wing Nationalists had already killed her brother, a supporter of the Spanish Republic, and Josefina suspected they would come for her next. As the war continued to unfold, it became clear that the Republicans would not win, and Josefina became a refugee in her own country. She traveled from Leon to Asturias and then to Catalonia to avoid capture. Before the war ended, she crossed the Pyrenees into France. Witnessing the fall of the Spanish Republic and Europe on the brink of war, she sent a letter to Mexico’s ambassador in Paris requesting asylum, in the hope that the former Spanish colony would offer her a new life, as it had so many of her persecuted compatriots.¹

García was only one of about 20,000 Spaniards who were granted political asylum in Mexico following the Nationalists’ victory in the Spanish Civil War. But how did Mexico accommodate so many foreigners, and what were the nation’s intentions in offering Spaniards the opportunity to start new lives in a country that most of them had never visited? The Mexican Constitution, the Inter-American Treaties of Havana and Montevideo, and legislation passed by the country’s Congress outlined eligibility and the process for receiving asylum—all developments which established a legal method for Mexico to absorb Spanish Republicans. Meanwhile, President Lázaro Cárdenas, a sympathizer of the Spanish Republic, welcomed the political refugees because he saw them as potential colonizers of Mexico’s vast and sparsely populated territory who would help spur economic growth.

This essay will examine Mexico’s approach to political asylum, the position of the Spanish Republican government regarding evacuation to Mexico, President Cárdenas’ reasons for granting asylum to Spanish refugees, and the refugees’ reception by Mexicans and their incorporation into Mexican society. In so doing, I argue that the legal, political and economic climates of Spain and Mexico in the 1930s allowed President Cárdenas to spur development by redefining Spain within his country’s national narrative through a process of mass immigration.

THE DOOMED SPANISH REPUBLIC AND PRESIDENT CÁRDENAS’ VISION

President Cárdenas, a leftist and longtime friend of the Spanish Republic, did not establish Mexico’s program of evacuation and political asylum for Republican refugees on his own. In fact, the idea of Spanish immigration to Mexico originated within the Iberian Peninsula. When Juan Negrín of the left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) became president in 1937, he set out to find a way to save his fellow Republicans, who were

losing the war against General Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces. Across the Atlantic, Mexico’s Revolution had produced intellectuals and politicians whose beliefs closely aligned with those of Spanish Republicans. These ideological leaders contrasted Republican Spain, a government with leftist ideals similar to their own, with Monarchical Spain, the brute, colonizing power from which Mexico had gained its independence.

The leaders of the Spanish Republic hoped to capitalize on the fraternal sentiment that existed between their government and that of President Cárdenas in order to ensure the safety of their people. In 1937, his inaugural year as president, Negrín sent Juan Simeón Vidarte, Spanish Undersecretary of the Interior, to Mexico under the pretext of negotiating outstanding debts. In reality, Vidarte called on Cárdenas to discuss the relocation of displaced Republicans, whom a Nationalists victory would deprive of a country. Upon hearing Vidarte’s bleak description of the impending future, Cárdenas agreed to receive exiled Spaniards in Mexico.

It was not difficult for the Mexican President to reach a decision. In 1917, facing the end of its revolution, Mexico had ratified a new constitution that outlined the country’s future handling of refugees. Despite not officially recognizing the legal institution of political asylum, the Constitution of 1917 featured three elements that could be used to justify the legality of asylum and of the reception of refugees. The first and most explicit element is Article 15, which prohibits the country from entering into treaties that would necessitate the extradition of people accused of political crimes in a foreign country—that is, left-wing Spaniards living in Mexico could not be forcibly repatriated to stand trial for political actions in right-wing Nationalist Spain. Mexico, and Latin America more generally, regarded the grant of asylum as an essential component of human rights—a means of protecting the life, liberty, and safety of those persecuted for their political beliefs. The fact that the Constitution echoes the universality of political rights indicates that Mexican law viewed the protection of refugees as a campaign that transcended Mexican nationality.

The second element refers to the Constitution’s use of the term “people” instead of “citizens.” Article 1 of the Constitution states that “[i]n the United Mexican States all people will enjoy the human rights recognized in this Constitution and in the international treaties

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1 Ibíd., 108.
1 Ibíd., 108-109.
1 Ibíd.
1 Ibíd.
1 Ibíd.
1 Joan Friedland and Jesús Rodríguez, Seeking safe ground: the legal situation of Central American refugees in Mexico. (San Diego, Calif.: Mexico-U.S. Law Institute, University of San Diego Law School, 1987), 8.
9 Friedland and Rodríguez, Seeking safe ground, 8.
10 Ibíd., 4.
to which the Mexican State belongs.”12 Rather than referring only to the nation’s citizens, this document seeks more generally to protect “all people.” Tellingly, the term “all people” does not merely apply to those within Mexican borders; it also includes foreigners, a category under which asylum-seekers necessarily fall. Article 33 of the Mexican Constitution renders this claim explicit by stating, “foreigners…will enjoy the human rights and guarantees that this Constitution recognizes.”13

Finally, Article 133 specifies that all international treaties into which Mexico enters form part of “the Supreme Law of all the Union.”14 As a result, when the administrations of Plutarco Elías Calles and Abelardo L. Rodríguez signed the Havana Convention of 1928 and the Montevideo Convention of 1933, two Inter-American Treaties outlining the criteria for, and commitment to, the institution of asylum, Mexico formally integrated the granting of political asylum into its federal legal code.15 The two accords were signed only about a decade before the arrival of the first Spanish refugees and at the outset of the Cárdenas presidency.

The Constitution of 1917 provided a framework upon which the Cárdenas administration could build a program of political asylum for Spanish Republicans that would incorporate the refugees into Mexican society through employment opportunities. President Cárdenas outlined a proposal for inviting foreigners to colonize and develop the more sparsely populated parts of his country in his Plan of the Six-Year Presidential Term (Plan Sexenal).16 Influenced by global race theories and the eugenics movement, the law reflected ideas of Mexican racial affinity to Spaniards and assumptions concerning Spaniards’ ability to adapt to Mexico.17 Spaniards had colonized Mexico once before, and if the ideology of Spanish Republicans was similar to that of Mexican Republicans, these Spaniards would, per the proposal, easily assimilate into Mexican society.

Occupation would become a key factor in determining which Spaniards best fit into Cárdenas’ plan to develop Mexico by granting refuge to Republicans. As described by historian Abdon Mateos, Cárdenas viewed policies concerning Spanish political exiles as not only a question of asylum, but also a strategy for Mexican colonization.18 The Mexican President imagined that most Spaniards would become fieldworkers, fishermen, laborers and young technicians who would colonize Baja California and the tropical lands of Mexico’s Pacific Coast.19 This assumption of the refugees’ identities and professions, however, did not reflect reality. Therefore, Cárdenas’ plan would have to be modified to give preference to

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12 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, art. 1.
13 Ibid., art. 33.
14 Friedland and Rodríguez, Seeking safe ground, 12.
15 Ibid.
16 Friedland and Rodríguez, Seeking safe ground, 2.
17 Ibid., 114; Reflecting a similar logic, in 1936 Cárdenas’ government established immigration quotas for all regions of the world, except in the cases of Spaniards or Iberoamericans. Mateos, “Los republicanos españoles en el México cardenista,” 117.
18 Ibid., 116.
19 Ibid., 114.
those who, through their professions, could prove they would be most useful to Mexico’s development.²⁹

LETTERS FROM EXILE: “I DIDN’T EVEN KNOW WHERE MEXICO WAS”²⁰

Josefina García’s story, described in the introduction of this paper, was not unlike those of the other Republicans who came to Mexico. Many of the Republicans who managed to escape from Spain crossed the Pyrenees into southern France. However, once there, they were excluded from French society and made to live in internment camps.³¹ Inside these camps, the unwelcome Spaniards wrote letters to the Mexican ambassador in Paris asking for political asylum. This begs an important question: how did the refugees learn of the option of emigrating to Mexico and what did their letters include?

News of Mexico’s decision to admit Spanish Republicans as political refugees circulated widely throughout France and among leftist circles. In the case of Josefina, a family friend of hers, Félix Gordón Ordás, happened to be Spain’s then-Ambassador to Mexico. Privy to Cardenas’ plan, Gordón Ordás advised her to write to Mexico’s ambassador, Narciso Bassols, asking for political asylum and passage across the Atlantic.³² Other refugees learned of these opportunities through the French press, which published news of Mexico’s policy alongside messages inviting Spaniards to leave the country. Periodicals such as Marseille’s Le Petit Journal, which announced, “Bon Voyage, gentlemen, go hang yourselves elsewhere,” made even clearer the sentiment that France, a nation that itself stood on the edge of war, would not accommodate Spanish refugees.

Once the press had publicized Mexico’s refugee policy, thousands of Spanish Republicans began writing letters to Ambassador Bassols seeking political asylum. In his letter to the ambassador, Manuel Gayo Canalda expressed hope in qualifying for the asylum, citing an “unbreakable will to never return to Nationalist Spain.”³³ The majority of these letters were handwritten in pencil. As one refugee explained, “we only have enough ink for the envelope, as we have no Francs and no one will accept Spanish money.”³⁴ Sudden poverty was only one of the issues mentioned in the letters. Many more Republicans wrote about the hardship of being without a state. In March of 1939, one refugee at the camp in Bourg-Madame explained “[t]he war has made us a people without a homeland. We have no

³⁹ Ibid., 114.
³² Junquera, "Maestros Leoneses, Carne De Cañón."
³⁴ “Señor Embajador,” El País.
MEXICO AND THE REFUGEE QUESTION

homeland because we have directly renounced fascist Spain.” A month later, the refugees’ worst fears were confirmed: Francisco Franco assumed the position of Head of the Spanish State.

In the letters to the Mexican ambassador, refugees shared personal descriptions of age, marital status and professional skills—skills that are often presented as teachable or beneficial for Mexico. Gayo Canalda was a 22-year-old, unmarried Republican from Catalonia who had spent six months in the Argelès-sur-Mer camp in the South of France. Before fleeing his home, Gayo Canalda worked on a farm in the Spanish municipality of Lleida, and his letter explains his willingness to share his agricultural training with farmers in Mexico. Another letter, signed by eight married men from Valencia between the ages of 25 and 34, describes the group of supplicants as “specialists in orange cultivation” who, on account of their expertise, “offer themselves” to Mexico.

Regardless of profession, letter authors made clear their ties to the political left. Antonio Casas, a refugee originally from Aragon, had been a mechanic before the war, working in a war factory in Barcelona throughout 1938. In his letter, he explained that he fought at the front and was a member of the left-wing Popular Front. Luís López Dóriga, another ex-politician, described his time in the Spanish Parliament as a representative aligned with the Radical Republican Socialist Party. López Dóriga was a former professor of Sociology at the University of Granada and the ex-dean of the Cathedral of Granada, but he had to abandon his profession for his antifascist ideas. Despite being barred from working, López Dóriga always affirmed that he “maintain[ed] his conscience inspired by Christian principles, which are the root of real Democracy, of which the Mexican Nation is today a high example in the order of Civilization.” In his letter, he offers unconditional adherence to the laws of the Mexican Republic, especially those that permit the exercise of the religious profession.

Like the Mexican intellectuals and politicians of the Revolution, Spanish Republicans emphasized the link between their Republican government and that of post-revolutionary Mexico. For instance, in the letters, the phrase “Mexican Republic” appears more often than “Mexico” or “the United Mexican States.” Likewise, many supplicants described themselves as “leftists” or “communists,” adjectives with which Cárdenas’ political allies—Ambassador

36 Ibid.
37 Manuel Gayo Canalda to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, March 11, 1939.
38 Orange farmers to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, March 5, 1939.
39 Antonio Casas to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, March 2, 1939.
40 Ibid.
41 Luís López Dóriga to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, July 12, 1939.
42 Ibid.
43 Luís López Dóriga to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, July 12, 1939.
44 Ibid.
Bassols, himself a communist—could identify. Letters arriving in the ambassador’s mailbox introduced the Mexican government to a group of people whose experiences could help rewrite the narrative of Mexican-Spanish relations and convince the greater Mexican population of the natural link between revolutionary Mexico and Republican Spain.

By emphasizing the qualities most important to the Mexican government, such as occupation, alignment with the political left, and admiration for the Mexican Republic, the applicants appealed to the narrative of suitable “colonizers” outlined in Cárdenas’ Six-Year Plan—a plan that intended to develop Mexico’s economy by absorbing a people whose political views and national history tied them to the historical narrative of the Mexican Republic. In the eyes of the president, Cárdenas’ Mexico and Republican Spain had a natural affinity for each other.

TRANSPORT, ARRIVAL AND INTEGRATION

On July 13, 1939, Josefina García joined about 2,000 other Spaniards at the French port of Pauillac, just north of Bordeaux. Without any luggage, she boarded the Senaia, the ship that would at last carry her away from Europe. As the vessel pulled away from the harbor, García might have stared back at the shrinking coastline, reflecting on her murdered brother—just another casualty of Spain’s Civil War. But perhaps she looked instead toward the Atlantic, toward the continent she knew so little about and toward the country that had promised her a new life. García had lost everything in Europe, but she was finally en route to a country that had offered her asylum and the possibility of establishing herself in its society, regardless of her political beliefs.

Spanish refugees were eager to arrive in Mexico and integrate themselves into the country’s society. During the sea voyage, the refugees had been taught Mexico’s national anthem, which they began to sing upon arrival at the port of Veracruz. Thousands of Mexicans sympathetic to the Spanish Republic had gathered to greet the ship. Hearing the Spaniards sing verses of their adoptive country’s anthem engendered feelings of fraternity between the refugees and the Mexicans, who welcomed the Spaniards by waving Republican flags and shouting: “¡Viva la República!”—long live the Republic. Those Mexicans present on the day of the ship’s arrival were primarily leftist supporters of Cárdenas’ policy. Questions remained, however, as to how the general population would perceive the newcomers and how the newly-arrived Spaniards would fare in the country.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, not all Mexicans welcomed the leftist and largely atheist Republican refugees. In deciding who could come to Mexico, Ambassador Bassols gave

36 Junquera, ”Maestros Leoneses, Carne De Cañón.”
37 Chouza, de Llano and Seco, ”Un País Maravilloso Para Manuel.” El País.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
preference to political refugees who expressed communist sentiments and whose professions fit Mexico’s economic needs, as determined by Cárdenas’ leftist government. The country’s political right, however, expressed indignation at the arrival of thousands of “reds.” During a Sunday mass in the town of Morelia, one priest even described the refugees as “dangerous and murderous.” Certain nationalist sectors of laborers and fieldworkers also expressed concern that the Spaniards would oversaturate the job market and pressured the Department of the Interior to limit the number of refugees given asylum. Initially, Cárdenas had not established a limit for the number of Spanish refugees and the estimate of those seeking asylum stood at 150,000 people.

By the end of the program’s first year, Mexico faced a tremendous set of challenges as it attempted to house and employ the 3,000 refugees who had already arrived. The Committee of Aid to Spaniards (CAE) provided money, clothes and job search assistance to newly-arrived refugees, but job demand outpaced supply. Those who found employment typically entered lateral occupations: once a schoolteacher in Leon, Josefina was sent to train rural schoolteachers in a town called Roque; a former university professor, López Dóriga became a high school teacher; and, as he had promised in his letter to the ambassador, Gayo Canalda taught agricultural science in Michoacan. But the number of jobless refugees exceeded the number of those employed. In response, Mexico’s Department of the Interior considered halting the arrival of more ships until the nation’s economy could provide more jobs.

The problem of employment had its roots not in job supply, but in legislation relevant to labor. Mexico’s Work Law defined a quota for the percentage of foreign labor that the country’s companies could employ. Therefore, the sooner the Spaniards became citizens of Mexico, the easier it would be for them to find work. Undersecretary of the Interior Ignacio García Téllez argued that, in order to make the incoming Spaniards eligible for more positions, the country should grant them immigrant status rather than refugee status. Under Mexican law, immigrants have a faster pathway to citizenship than refugees, and therefore have a shorter waiting time before becoming eligible for more jobs.

40 Mateos, “Los republicanos españoles en el México cardenista,” 114.
45 Junquera, "Maestros Leoneses, Carne De Cañón."
46 Ibid.
47 Luis López Dóriga to Ambassador Narciso Bassols, July 12, 1939.
49 Mateos, “Los republicanos españoles en el México cardenista,” 118.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
distinction may originate in the idea that refugees will not necessarily need protection indefinitely, whereas immigrants have chosen to assimilate into a new country’s society. The Mexican government’s intention, however, was for the Spaniards to assimilate, and a majority of them did become citizens of their adopted country.

The lack of employment opportunities was not the only obstacle facing refugees, however, as the deteriorating political situation in Europe rendered the feasibility of Mexico’s refugee program even more precarious. Once France fell to Nazi Germany in May of 1940, the refugees faced new difficulties from the puppet Vichy regime. Led by General Phillippe Pétain, the wartime French government was unsympathetic to the cause of the Spanish Republicans and had little interest in helping them reach Mexico. At the order of President Cárdenas, Luís I. Rodriguez, Bassol’s successor as Ambassador to France, met with Pétain to ask that France place all Spanish refugees residing in country in the custody of Mexico. Rodriguez, adamant to go to whatever measures necessary, convinced a reluctant Pétain by assuring him that Mexico would assume the entirety of the burden of transporting the Spaniards, and, on August 22, 1940, the Vichy leader signed an agreement allowing for the resumption of the evacuation of Republicans to Mexico. Plans were made to transport the remaining Spaniards, but Pétain was left with one question: “Why such a noble intention…intended to favor undesirable people?”

Pétain did not understand that, in granting refuge to the Republicans, Cárdenas was welcoming Spain into the Mexican national narrative to spur his nation’s development. Mexico easily incorporated Republican Spain into its political culture using the language of the Revolution. According to Cárdenas and to his party, whereas monarchical Spain represented a former colonizing power and the brutal conquistadores, Republican Spain drew from such revolutionary ideals as secular education, expropriation of property, and land reform. The Mexican government’s distinction between the two Spains allowed for a new popular perception of the refugees. In the early days of the refugee program, Mexican children who learned they would be attending school with Spaniards believed their new classmates would exude stereotypes of arrogance and ruthlessness associated with the sixteenth-century conquistadores. As more and more Spaniards arrived, however, Hispanophobia lessened, and Mexican rhetoric regarding the Conquest and the country’s time as a Spanish viceroyalty changed.

In all, about 20,000 refugees were offered asylum after the fall of the Spanish Republic. Mexicans soon realized that the incoming Spaniards were not stealing the nation’s wealth as the conquistadores had; the refugees took up jobs such as teaching and farming,

9 Prados, "Los Schindler Mexicanos." El País.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
which spread education, especially in rural areas, and increased production of agricultural goods, thereby advancing economic development and social mobility.\(^9\) The Spaniards were becoming an integral part of Mexican society, just as Cárdenas had planned.\(^60\)

CONCLUSION

Josefina García did not remain a schoolteacher in Roque forever. After a while, she moved to Mexico City, where she engaged with other Spanish Republicans living in exile. Mexico had offered her a chance at a new life, but she never lost touch with her Spanish roots. While many of the Spaniards who had taken refuge in Mexico lived out the rest of their life there, García’s stay would only be temporary. In 1986, a decade after Franco’s rule came to an end, she returned to Spain for good.\(^61\) The Mexico that García first moved to in 1939, however, was not the same Mexico she left half a century later.

Mexico’s Revolution gave rise to a period of legal innovation that produced the liberal Constitution of 1917, ratification of the Inter-American treaties of Havana and Montevideo, and congressional legislation that established a transnational understanding of human rights and founded a process for granting asylum. Such legal innovations provided the framework for President Cárdenas’ program of asylum for Spanish Republicans after the Spanish Civil War. The President did not act solely out of compassion; he envisioned the political refugees as a new wave of “colonizers” whose professional expertise could spur Mexican industry and economic growth.

The government incorporated the Spaniards by way of a new national narrative, one which presented two Spains: monarchical Spain, the nationalist, former colonizing power; and Republican Spain, a country that shared Mexico’s revolutionary ideals. Cárdenas used the Spanish Republic to reinterpret the relationship between Mexico and Spain, projecting its fall and the absorption of its citizens by Mexico as a tool to advance Mexico’s impending rise and development. Josefinia García and her Republican compatriots came to be seen as siblings of the post-revolutionary Mexicans. Their integration into Mexican society through political asylum and introduction into the workforce marked the beginning of a new phase of national development—one that the narrative of the Revolution and the period’s legal innovations intended to create.

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\(^9\) Ibid., 109
\(^60\) Ibid., 109.
\(^61\) Junquera, "Maestros Leoneses, Carne De Cañón."

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**TITLE IMAGE**

While the cultural and historical ties between Argentina and Spain have long been a topic of heavy analysis and discussion, few have directly researched the rhetorical role the Spanish Civil War played specifically within Argentine writings, from the perspectives of Argentines themselves. Tomas Piedrahita, University of Pennsylvania ’16, provides us with such analysis, drawing on a wide range of writings—from poets to politicians—in an attempt to elucidate the motivations behind Argentine dialogue surrounding the Spanish Civil War. Piedrahita argues that Argentine writers often discussed events in Spain due to their own country’s parallel challenges, and that many of their reactions to their former colonizer’s conflict were in fact reflections and projections of their ideas about Argentina.

By Tomas Piedrahita, University of Pennsylvania ’16
Professor Antonio Feros
Edited by Emily Yankowitz and Lauren Wackerle
INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the twentieth century, few countries expressed the kind of devotion toward their former colonizer as Argentina did towards Spain. The reasons behind this affinity are undoubtedly layered and unique to the country.

There are few countries that, over the span of the twentieth century, displayed such a strong affinity for their former colonizer as Argentina. The reasons behind this affinity are, to be sure, layered and complex. The substantial Spanish émigré population residing in Argentina surely played a role in increasing contacts and deepening connections; in fact, by 1936, immigrated Spaniards comprised up to fifteen percent of Argentina’s population. But this alone does not account for the pervasive Spanish influences in Argentina’s cultural, literary, and artistic traditions, nor does it wholly explain the unending claims and references to Spain during the Spanish Civil War, a time of crisis and reshaping for both countries.

This paper aims to dissect Argentine writing on the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). More specifically, it will examine the writings of poets, clergy, politicians, and intellectuals, among others, with an eye toward determining the motives behind comparisons to Spain. The paper aims to strike a balance between perspectives and capture a broad a range of positions in order to reflect the complex relationship between the two countries. More importantly, this essay seeks to demonstrate that international events under brief dip into the politics of Argentina during the 1930s details the climate in which writing was occurring and is followed by an evaluation of Argentine claims to a shared cultural heritage. Finally, the paper analyzes the framing of the Spanish Civil War to identify continuities and departures across accounts. The objective of this analysis is to demonstrate the manner in which the realities of events can be lost in favor of desired collective understandings, which can take the form of distortions, exaggerations, or misrepresentations that readapt perceptions to suit specific narratives.

While a number of historians have written on Argentina during the 1930s, there is little coverage of the Spanish Civil War as it was observed and understood through the eyes of Argentines. Most scholarship centers either on the ideological parallels between the two countries or the mobilization of political and cultural forces in Argentina in response to the war. Argentine scholar Ernesto Goldar, for example, explores the galvanizing effect the war had on cultural life in Buenos Aires, tracing in particular the proliferation of poetry. Argentine responses to the 1936 death of famed Spanish poet Federico García Lorca are also featured in Goldar’s work. Yet, both subjects consume only ten pages in the 240-page book, entitled Los Argentinos y La Guerra Civil Española.

Historian Niall Binns also examines Argentina’s response to the Spanish Civil War, but his research outlines the mobilization of the left and right, consigning his work to realm

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of political history. Though some space is devoted to the responses of major Argentine newspapers, it is only in service to broader explorations. Likewise, scholar Mark Falcoff delves briefly into the cultural links between Spain and Argentina, laying emphasis on the ideological and political evolution of Argentina during the 1930s. While most scholars agree the Hispano-Argentine connection ran peculiarly deep, little has been done to assess the particularities of this connection through the lens of Argentine writing. In fact, what domestic framing of the Spanish Civil War reveals about Argentines and their understanding of cultural conditions within and without their borders is one that has been seldom addressed by scholarship.

The question of what domestic framing of the Spanish Civil War reveals about Argentines and their understanding of related events is one that has been seldom addressed.

My argument rests on two assertions: first, I argue Argentines saw the Spanish Civil War as a direct reflection of their own struggles and so put pen to paper to make sense of these connections; second, I assert that the framing of the war spoke more to social tensions within Argentina than to the actualities of the civil war in Spain. A brief detour into the political climate of Argentina during the time will help contextualize my argument and give shape to Argentina’s sociopolitical zeitgeist.

THE POLITICAL CLIMATE IN ARGENTINA DURING THE 1930s

At the start of the Spanish Civil War, Argentina had experienced a number of important changes. From September 6, 1930, to February 20, 1932, the country had been governed by Jose Felix Benito Urriburu, a heavy-handed Argentine army General who spearheaded the 1930 military coup resulting in the ousting of President Hipólito Yrigoyen, a noted progressive and co-founder of the Radical Civic Union (RCU). In November of 1931, under the aegis of Urriburu’s administration and as a result of voting corruption, Augusto P. Justo was elected president. Serving until 1938, Justo ushered in a wave of conservative policies and positions that marked a sharp departure from the political ethos of preceding years. Thus began the Década Infame, a period between 1930 and 1943 that saw political tumult, widespread corruption, financial instability, and a cultural reshaping that permanently recast Argentina’s identity.

The years before General Urriburu’s coup were marked by remarkable progressivism in Argentina. Prior to the presidency of Yrigoyen, Argentina had seen tremendous economic growth under the tenure of presidents whose administrations took a decidedly conservative stance in later years. President Yrigoyen, branding himself a “man of people,” captured the presidency in 1916 and implemented policies that strengthened the immigrant middle class, secured universal male suffrage, increased employment, and generally projected a sense of

“integrity and democracy” that captured the hearts and minds of working Argentines. His party, the Radical Civic Union, also gained power and influence, sparking a consolidation of previously fragmented conservative forces that viewed the rise of a “reformist democracy” with a wary eye. Despite Yrigoyen’s broad appeal and popular initiatives, enthusiasm for his administration waned in the midst of the 1929 global economic crisis. Argentina’s most prominent newspapers grew highly critical of Yrigoyen, and there was a pervasive sense the aged President was losing control of his administration. This, coupled with the coalescing and renewed vigor among rightwing groups, gave rise to exchanges with the army that resulted in the 1930 coup.

Yet the reemergence of conservatism in Argentina was neither swift nor smooth. Conservative groups exerted considerable influence during the early twentieth century, and opposition to progressivism had taken root preceding the 1930 coup. However, much of the right wing still found itself fragmented and amorphous at the start of the 1930s. After taking office, President Augustin Justo distanced himself from Uriburn on account of the latter’s strong nationalist and corporatist tendencies. A new right and an old right also concretized during this time, temporarily combining to advance their shared agenda. The old right, embodied in the Partido Demócrata Nacional, represented the most prominent landed Argentine families, protecting them with policies and directives that fostered a perverse oligarchical liberalism. These policies characterized early twentieth century Argentina and resulted in the country’s economic ascendancy. The budding Nacionalistas, by contrast, appealed to urban centers and middle class workers, many of whom were drawn to the party’s calls for renewed patriotism and corporatism. However, these two camps encompassed even smaller and more specialized political subgroups, creating a fissiparous effect on the right during the thirties.

President Justo implemented laws and policies that marked a sharp retreat from the legislation of Yrigoyen’s administration. There was, indeed, a pervasive belief that class divisions were growing more pronounced in Argentina, with conservatives again representing the landed elite and the RCU incarnating the interests of the burgeoning middle and working classes—a view vindicated by congressional voting records of the 1930s.

Ibid., 48.
Ibid., 37.
6 Ibid.
7 Deutsch, “Radicalism,” 50.
8 Mario Rapoport, Historia económica, política y social de la Argentina (Buenos Aires: Primera Clase Impresores, 2006), 198.
10 Ibid.
which indicate consistent conservative opposition to programs impacting the lower classes.\textsuperscript{11} It was as if the “farmers, small merchants, [and] factory workers” had been pit against a regime intent on promoting oligarchies, catering to the rich, and chipping at the influence of the working classes.\textsuperscript{12} Class tensions were amplified in the thirties, with rigged elections, unpopular domestic policies, and a lagging economy fueling discontent in various quarters.

Apart from a changing and increasingly tense political climate, the economic landscape dramatically shifted during this time. For much of the 1930s, Argentina was plagued by the scourge of economic contractions, a condition exacerbated by the chill relations with Great Britain, its principal trading partner. In 1933, President Justo signed the first of what would be two lopsided accords with the British, both of which embittered Argentines, who resented what they perceived as being “degrading” arrangements.\textsuperscript{13} Apart from generating discontent, these pacts also led to an increased emphasis on import-substitution industrialization, which expanded domestic industries and diversified product lines.\textsuperscript{14} Though Argentina rebounded comparatively quickly from the 1929 crisis, Justo’s accords with British reshaped what had historically been an export-led economy and deepened Argentina’s self-image crisis.

The push-and-pull between conservatives and leftists engulfed the entire country, stimulating a particularly fruitful period of writing. Publications of all kinds sprouted across provinces, with the Argentine intelligentsia writing even more prolifically after the start of the Spanish Civil War. Public disaffection with the Justo, and later President Ortiz, grew markedly during the decade, and the sharp political reversals triggered by General Uriburu’s coup jolted both liberals and conservatives into action. The following accounts lend insight into the nature of this mobilization and the decidedly cultural form it assumed.

\section*{A SHARED CULTURAL HERITAGE}

Though the perspectives of the educational elite may not accurately capture the grievances and sentiments of all societal rungs in Argentina, they still give shape and substance to the era’s zeitgeist. This is especially true because much of their writing was published in venues with sizeable readerships. More important for the purposes of this examination, however, is the recognition that dire political situation in Argentina aligned with the turmoil in Spain, sparking an intensely vicarious investment in the outcome of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Tulio Hl. Donghi, \textit{La Argentina y La Tormenta del Mundo: Ideas e ideologías entre 1930 y 1945} (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina, 2003), 53.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Sandra McGee Deutsch, \textit{The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890 – 1939} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) 205.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Rapoport, \textit{Historia económica}, 215.
\end{itemize}
Spanish Civil War—a crisis which would, in the eyes of many, carry profound implications for Argentina’s identity.

One open letter to the Spanish ambassador, signed by a number of prominent Argentine writers on August 1, 1936, lamented the bloody civil war of a country intimately bound to Argentina. “Their conflicts,” they wrote, “reverberate in Argentina with greater intensity than those of any other country in the world.” Describing the Spanish as “brothers,” the authors—which included Jorge L. Borges, Alberto Gerchunoff, and other luminaries—affirmed their support for the Republican cause, “that today defends the government of their homeland.” Exhorting the ambassador to side with those fighting for democracy, the authors also stressed the civil war had extended into “homes” of Argentina; that is, it stirred and perturbed the population as if the battles were taking place within its own borders. From the beginning of the war, then, the Argentine intelligentsia was seen couching their message in a language that subtly emphasized the cultural stakes for the country.

A mere thirteen days later, another open letter, published in the same newspaper but signed by twice as many Argentines, articulated more specific grievances. While not explicitly affirming their support for Franco, this letter constituted a direct anti-republican challenge to Argentine intellectuals who had written the August 1st letter in the same publication. In it, the authors decried the destruction of art and churches and denounced “[the] cruelties...being perpetrated by the parties of the communist republic.” The authors also lamented the death threats towards the Argentine ambassador to Spain and made no pretenses of paternalism. Instead, they called for civility in the face of conflict and placed their sympathy with those who “restore the nationality, the religion and the glorious tradition of their homeland.” Their emphasis on “glorious” traditions hints at the perceived cultural implications for Argentina, which, if not an equal, at least viewed itself an heir to Spanish culture.

This last written notion evokes explicit and implicit ideas in a various accounts. Take, for instance, Leonilda Barrancos de Bermann, a spirited political activist in Argentina and wife of famed doctor-turned-intellectual, Gregorio Bermann. In an interview for Crítica, a widely circulated Argentine newspaper, Barrancos highlighted the Argentine affinity for Spain: “Those of us who, over the course of several Argentine generations, feel our native

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16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
blood…know instinctively who actually defends the traditions, history, and culture of Spain. We side with those intellectuals who…have made the proletarian cause their own.”21 We see, then, not only an invocation of proletarian solidarity, but an explicit appeal to the understanding that Argentina remains an inheritor of the trappings and traditions of Spain. In like manner, Samuel Eichelbaum, a leading Argentine playwright and writer, warned in 1936 that “the fate of the Hispanic culture” was in the hands of those fighting in Spain. 22 “If they don’t triumph,” he cautioned, “Spain and the Hispanic countries will sink in a retrogradation that will destroy all that which is vital to our culture.”23

Not all appeals to a shared cultural heritage were as explicit. In a 1936 article, Argentine Senator Mario Bravo, a noted orator and progressive within the senate, spoke of a changed hispanoamericanism, that is, of a warmed relationship between Spain and former colonies—not just Argentina. According to Bravo, this relationship had called forth “that which is most sacred to the liberty and dignity of man.”24 Archaic notions of Hispanic exceptionalism and of an exalted language had been superseded by an “hispanoamericanism” stressing “the solidarity of class [economic] interests…[and] the liberty of those who are oppressed.”25 Similarly, Rosa Bazán de Cámara, a prominent Argentine professor and feminist, wrote romantically of Spanish Civil War without drawing a direct comparison to Argentina. She described the essence of Spain as having a “purity,” or being impregnable to the coming and passing tides of change26 – the implication being that perhaps Argentina was subjecting itself to unwanted transformations. Her message was expressed in terms of a conscious and enduring Spanish volition: “If other countries have accepted changes that have altered the basis of their essence, Spain has not accepted them…[i]t is Spain, with its history, its tradition, its culture, that is to say, Spain in body and soul, that in these moments is battling between life and death….”27

Catholic intellectuals also invoked Spain’s grandeur in their formulations. Apart from fostering close ties to Justo’s administration, most clergy openly supported Franco’s regime through a host of publications, penning articles with sharp nationalist and antiliberal

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23 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
overtones. Shortly after the start of the civil war, for example, a number of prominent Catholic intellectuals authored a manifesto in which they condemned Spanish Republicans and saluted those fighting “heroically...for their fatherland’s nationality, religion, and glorious traditions.” Particularly interesting to note here is that both camps stressed their ties to madre patria, meaning that appeals to Spain’s history and grandeur were able to accommodate disparate messages—that is, to fit the rhetoric of conservative and liberal Argentines alike without posing any direct contradictions.

Francisco Luis Bernádez and Alfonso Durán stand as two conservative Franco sympathizers who illustrate this last point. Bernádez, a noted Argentine poet and reporter, published a review for a book in Crisol, a small newspaper notorious for its biting prose, in December of 1936. One passage of the review contained references to “an Argentina founded on the Crucifix and the sword,” terms prominently figured in the rhetoric of Franquistas. The reference to the cross expressed a nod to the Catholic tradition in Spain. Furthermore, the sword reference conjures Spain’s storied medieval incarnation. In response to those claiming the Spanish Civil War was running too long, Durán, a conservative priest and writer, compared the conflict to the American Civil War and then asked in 1938: “Why must one say that this Spanish war has run long, when it attempts to save not two million men, but twenty-five million Spanish men and their glory, their tradition, their religion, their catechism, their art, and their soul and flag?” Indeed, the symbolic importance the war carried for Argentines cannot be understated.

The centrality of the Spanish Civil War in Argentina, particularly among the country’s intelligentsia, bespeaks the narrative-forming capacity the outcome of the war was considered to hold. In other words, Spain’s emergence, either as democracy or fascist state, would have a profound impact on Argentina’s self-conception, a country facing its own crises in the 1930s but also long thought to have been the torchbearer of prosperity, modernization, and Spanish culture in South America. Indeed, claims to madre patria abounded, with intellectuals of all persuasions jostling to declare allegiance to Spain. Little, however, was established in these discussions, with the engagements serving more as a sort of exercise for Argentina, one in which intellectuals and politicians could, implicitly, outline the way in which culture was informed by the politics of their own soil.

30 Niall Binns, Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 145.
31 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 145.
32 Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 255.
As previously explored, Argentina’s political scene was undergoing its own transformations during the Década Infame. The ascendancy of conservatism and relegation of progressivism gave way to latent class tensions. In addition, both liberals and conservatives had begun casting Argentina in their own light, evincing profound differences in the values held across parties but also similarities in what each thought would appeal to the public. Spain had experienced comparable political turmoil during the 1920s and early ’30s, and so there existed a natural inclination on the part of Argentines to draw parallels – parallels that took on distinct cultural, political, and ideological forms. In the process, Argentines sought to determine the significance of the war in the context of their own country. For much of Argentina, the triumph of one party would not merely signal an ideological victory; it would mark a paradigmatic shift in the world’s conception of living and civilization.

Take, for instance, the year 1936, when the Argentine congress passed a number of reactionary bills, among them a bill suppressing communist activities. Proposed by the Justo administration, the bill broadly aimed to curb free speech and impose harsh sanctions for those suspected of being affiliated with communism. It sparked heated exchanges between congressional members, some of whom referenced the turmoil in Spain as an example of what would happen in Argentina. One such member, conservative Senator Matías Sánchez Sorondo, who was also the bill’s principal spokesperson, pointed to the effect communism had on Spain: “Moscow’s will, never flagging and even reinforced by a global revolution, has carried out in the Spanish example. Those who prefer not to listen or witness should not lament the consequences.”

Sorondo claimed Spain was combating the presence of “barbarians,” and “saving with the heritage of civilization with blood and pain.” His references to “heritage” and “civilization” implied the war concerned more than just ideology; it was about the preservation of a cherished heritage, one that Argentina also bore on its shoulders. Sorondo used the “Spanish example” to draw a direct parallel to Argentina, suggesting present conditions in the latter were not only comparable to those in Spain, but that they would yield similar fate if the country did not eradicate communists with the passage of the proposed bill.

The notion that the Spanish Civil War carried ideological implications beyond its own borders is also seen in the accounts of Colonel Carlos Gómez, who at the time was a retired professor of La Escuela Superior de Guerra, a military academy in Argentina. Of his many articles, most of which focused on evaluating the military strategy of the Spanish Civil War, one in particular, titled “The Spanish War and the State of International Affairs,” discusses the significance of the conflict in the context of global affairs. He writes:

\[33\] Congreso de la Nación Argentina, Represión de Actividades Comunistas, December 4, 1936, 134.

\[34\] Ibid.
It had been a while since the world had last seen a crisis in international relations so acute as the one we are presently witnessing...But the actual Spanish war is about the clashing of two ideologies, fundamentally opposed and irreconcilable, that divide, not just Spain, but the people of many countries, threatening to extend to the entire inhabited world; and we don’t say “civilized” because the ideological battle has been carried, from one place, to even those peoples with the most rudimentary cultures.\footnote{Carlos A. Gómez, La Guerra de España: Comentarios Publicados en “La Nación” (Buenos Aires: Tomo Primero, 1939), 93.}

Gómez’s perspective is telling inasmuch as he thought the Spanish Civil War was of “\textit{global} interest.”\footnote{Ibid.} Implicit in his account is the assumption that the clashing of two ideologies in Spain would be encompassing or, at the very least, emblematic of the ideological dichotomies elsewhere—Argentina included. To some, then, the universality of the war was clear.

Enrique Dickmann, a Jewish doctor, author, and congressional legislator in Argentina, shared this view. At the height of Spanish Civil War, he proposed a congressional declaration expressing Argentine support for the establishment of a democracy in Spain.\footnote{Binns, La \textit{voz de los intelectuales}, 250.} After conservatives emptied from the chamber upon hearing his proposal, he decried neutrality and noted the hypocrisy of those who were “a democrat in his own country and a fascist internationally.”\footnote{Quoted in Argentina y la guerra civil española. \textit{La voz de los intelectuales}, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 250.} A similar but more expansive view is seen in an article Dickmann wrote for \textit{Revista Socialista} in September of 1937. The article discusses the battle between fascism and democracy, with references to “the free men of the world” and the “universal and eternal transcendence” of the war.\footnote{“El caso de España. Democracia y dictadura,” \textit{Revista Social}, September, 1937, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. \textit{La voz de los intelectuales}, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 251.} Dickmann suggests the war’s “consequences are projected in time and space; because in [Spain’s] civil war, two utterly clear conceptions of man in society, of government, of human material and mental progress, of social justice, have been polarized.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Argentine newspapers cast the war in even broader terms, that is, as having implications for civilization and humanity. \textit{Crítica}, for example, affirmed its support for the Republican cause in a 1936 editorial entitled “Why We Are With Spain.” “All that which stands for spiritual, social, and political progress,” the article reads, “has been incorporated into the world’s culture, over these past two centuries, is at jeopardy in Spain.”\footnote{“Por qué estamos con España,” \textit{Crítica}, September 2, 1936, in Argentina y la guerra civil española. \textit{La voz de los intelectuales}, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 232.} The piece ends by noting socialists were shoudering “the cause of civilization and of justice,” an
utterance which echoes Dickmann’s pronouncements.42 Relatedly, Guillermo Delgado, a medical student and Argentine activist, wrote in Córdoba, a provincial Argentine newspaper: “The potential of youth, the potential of humanity which is now being put into action, today uplift an invincible Spain that presages a new era in the history of civilization.”43

La Fronda, a conservative Argentine newspaper founded and run by a cousin of General Uriburu, took part in the same brand of sensationalism. In an article entitled “Civilization or Barbarism,” the paper discussed the two perspectives taking root in periodicals across the country. On one end, sensationalism characterized the prose of some publications, and on the other, venues were declaring disingenuous neutrality toward the war. To the latter, the paper responded: “But that is a great hypocrisy...[because] [t]he battles of Spain transcend its frontiers and affect the future of political civilization in Europe and the Americas.”44

**A SOCIAL WAR**

By way of contrast, El Mundo, a left-leaning Buenos Aires newspaper, framed the civil war not as concerning civilization per se, but as relating to the social order. One article in particular, detailing the arrival of Republican troops in Madrid, discussed the rising tensions coursing through “coffee shops” and “stores” in Argentina.45 “Spain has been—is currently—the site of the first social war in history. The ideas and sociological theories most contemporary and ancient—communism and fascism—the conception of a better world, brandish at this hour the arguments of canons, grenades, tanks, planes....”46 Though the battle between ideologies is still reduced to fascism and democracy, the more expansive references to a social war invoke the notion of class divisions, particularly divisions as emanating from ideological differences. While surely the Spanish Civil War concerned class to a great extent, it was not its principal concern. The newspaper’s characterization, then, reflects more directly on the way in which conditions in Argentina colored perceptions of the war.

This last point rests on the assumption that the framing of a subject can say more of the framers than of the content encompassed within—a phenomenon that can be observed firsthand in the previous article. The article notes, for instance, that the debates “about the moving tragedy of Spain” occurring in the streets of Buenos Aires contained no shortage of

42 Ibid.
44 “Civilización o barbarie,” La Fronda, August 9, 1936, Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 431.
46 Ibid.
individuals “who boasted historical erudition and true comprehension of social theories.”47 There was, then, a perception that Argentines not only understood the war in Spain, but could also make sense of the competing social visions at stake, an observation indicating that natives widely discussed this topic. In consequence, *El Mundo’s* framing of the Spanish Civil War as a *social* war says more of Buenos Aires than Madrid.

Carlos Ibarguren, an eminent Argentine intellectual and politician, believed mainstream discussions misplaced the Spanish Civil War. Refraining from lofty references to civilization and humanity, Ibarguren instead commented on the war’s potential to alter the “systems” of countries.48 In particular, he posited the “politico-social” organization would be changed such that collectivism would reign supreme, suffocating individualism and democracy in the process. This perspective stems in part from the author’s thinking that “nationalism” would take the place of “internationalism, [largely] because Spain is a deeply traditional and profoundly religious nation.” He finishes, “a social war is the threat from which Europe now suffers.”49 Ibarguren is thus more specific in his articulation of the stakes and transformations attendant on the war, stressing, as with *El Mundo*, the social dimensions.

Nicolás Repetto, a medical student and affiliate of the Socialist party, took to writing about the significance of the Spanish Civil War in *La Vanguardia*, a Socialist Argentine newspaper.50 His elegant articulation of Argentina’s affinity for Spain gives substance to the complexity of the relationship, and contrasting from previous accounts because it outlines Argentina’s own troubles:

> If one analyzes superficially and extracts hasty conclusions from certain events taking place in our country and the rest of the world, one necessarily arrives at discouraging findings. Within our country we see strength, injustice and fraud ingrained; Outside of our country shocking governmental mechanisms affirm and extend themselves in such way that they stand as the absolute negation of all that which had heretofore considered essential and irreplaceable in the political life of nations.51

The war, according to Repetto, had resulted in an especially troubling realization for Argentina. It meant, in particular, that virtually all that the country held dear in “political

47 Ibid., 269.
49 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 681.
life” was being put to test abroad, prompting the recognition that whatever happened in Spain would likely presage Argentina’s own fate.

DISTANCING, DETACHMENT & REDUCTIONISM

Not all periodicals subscribed to such reductionism, however. *La Nación*, one of Argentina’s most prominent newspapers, lamented passive participation in discussions of ideology. In a biting 1937 editorial, the paper sardonically noted the country’s unending obsession with politics, proceeding then to lambast the ideological reductionism: “the people whom we have considered intelligent as a result our great naiveté—and what is most disconcerting of all, is that they often are intelligent—can’t possibly comprehend that a person chooses not to belong to the left or right, as if there were no alternatives, as if sensibility and intellect were incapable of situating themselves among other latitudes.”

The act of independent thinking, they wrote, was lost in favor of adopting popular ideological positions, especially and most paradoxically among intellectuals.

*La Prensa*, another prominent Argentine newspaper, took a similar but different position on the war. Reflecting on the second anniversary of the civil war, the newspaper published an editorial in which it described the conflict as one “difficult to define or classify, because interventions of other countries have complicated and bestowed it with the character of a global war….” It was difficult, therefore, to see the distinctly Spanish character of the war; it concerned, according to the paper, the grandchildren “of those who, over the course of several centuries, gave glory to Spain and made it master of half the world.” Spaniards could not absolve itself from the intervention and recommendations of other countries. “Such circumstances,” they wrote “prevent one from clearly seeing the genuinely Spanish character of this war.”

Some in Argentina more explicitly distanced themselves from the Spanish Civil War, including Manuel Ugarte, a noted author and Socialist Party adherent. In October of 1936, he founded Vida de Hoy, a magazine that sought to foster an “hispanoamericanism” independent of Spain and other European countries. On the subject of the Spanish Civil War, he urged detachment:

It is not possible to comprehend, nor to justify within the bounds of logic, those feelings stirred up within us, alongside tinges of colonialism, every time the interests of others are at stake. Unfortunately, such was the case in the war of 1914 and such

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53 Ibid.


55 Binns, *La voz de los intelectuales*, 775.
threatens to be the case now...Let’s think of ourselves now, without having news cables dictate hatred or sympathy; let us discard intellectual bellicosities and the mobilizations of masses that participate instinctively. The real Argentinean, the authentic Argentinean, has no motive to fuel the fire...and has even less motive to carry over to this continent the agitations of a civilization which kills itself.\textsuperscript{26}

This call for detachment demonstrates the degree to which Argentines followed developments in Spain, but also speaks to the emotional investment Argentines placed in the outcome of the war.

The Argentine newspaper \textit{Córdoba} also called for detachment, though less explicitly than Ugarte. The Spanish Civil War was, according to an editorial published in 1936, “in the end, the European war.” It concerned the vitality of capitalism in Germany, Italy, England, and France, and was launched by those seeking to “Europeanize nations.” The editorial thus deemphasized the implications the war would carry for Argentina, which was mostly insulated from the dynamics of European politics. The article finishes with a touch of fatalism: “Let us not delude ourselves. The conflagration is now a given.”\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

The cultural bridge between Spain and Argentina stood inexplicably strong. So much so, in fact, that the pains and passions of the civil war were said to have been felt with special force in the former colony. In spite of these professed ties to \textit{madre patria}, however, Argentine claims to a shared cultural heritage may have been rooted more in romanticism than reality. Additionally, the desire to affirm Argentina’s exceptionalism and Hispanic otherness, especially in the wake of the 1930 coup, may have driven such claims. There was, moreover, something to be gained from associations with Spain: in drawing links to its former colonizer, organizations could broaden their appeal and legitimize their functions. If we stand as the continuation of something Spanish—the thinking might have gone—we can claim to be participating in a historical and identity-shaping movement.

This last point hinges on the assumption that Argentina was experiencing an identity crisis, a lofty but otherwise defensible assertion in light of the foregoing exploration. The variety of references to Spain, coupled with the remarkable diversity of perspectives on the war, indicates that Argentines were trying to make sense of their Spanish ties. Many of the previous accounts emphasized notions of culture, history, and tradition—all elements of national identity—suggesting they were truly at the fore of national consciousness in Argentina during the thirties.

\textsuperscript{26} Quoted in \textit{Argentina y la guerra civil española. La voz de los intelectuales}, comp. Niall Binns (Madrid: Calambur Editorial, Sl., 2012), 776.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
Identity crisis aside, one cannot also understate the degree to which Argentines expressed disaffection with President Justo and later Ortiz, both for their fraudulent political victories but also for their undoing of Yrigoyen’s initiatives. Spaniards had experienced a similar disaffection in previous years, and so Argentines pointed to the turmoil in Spain to suggest a comparability of conditions. In other words, Argentines articulating the stakes, contingencies, and circumstances of the war in Spain were, implicitly, doing the same for Argentina—almost as if in anticipation of upheaval. There was, in the view of some individuals, no reason why the Spanish Civil War could not spell Argentina’s own future.

This discussion also extends to the disparate framing of the Spanish Civil War, which is unique for two reasons. First, it means reporting on Spain communicated vastly different conceptions of the war. Second, it suggests the war was being refashioned to suit specific narratives, a task necessitating some degree of distortion and exaggeration. It is precisely for this reason that one observes Argentines framing the war as one for humanity, culture, and civilization. As a result, the realities of the war may have been lost in the process, reflecting instead the societal tensions of Argentina and the ways in which those tensions were shaping collective understandings of war in madre patria. Spain stood, to be sure, as a puppet in the hands of some.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


TITLE IMAGE

“ALL INDIANS ARE RECKONED TO BE FALSE AND PERFIDIOUS”

COLONISTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF PRAYING INDIANS DURING KING PHILIP’S WAR

King Philip’s War (1675–1678) saw a coalition of Native American tribes, led by Metacomet (also known as “King Philip”) of the Wampanoag, clash with the colonists of New England and their native allies. In proportion to the populations involved, the war may have been the bloodiest in North American history. Jonah Bader ’16 unpicks the complex cultural framework for this conflict, focusing on the fraught category of “praying Indians” – native societies that had embraced Christianity and European technologies and yet, in the colonists’ eyes, remained fundamentally “Indians.” Bader traces how the image of the “praying Indian” was manipulated to make sense of the chaotic world of late seventeenth century New England.

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With King Philip’s War raging, there rose a cry among furious Massachusetts colonists: “Oh, come, let us go down to Deer Island, and kill all the praying Indians.” It was February 1676, and those Indians were already dying in droves on Deer Island from exposure, illness, and hunger. They had been interned there since October, an escalation of the previous policy to confine them to their towns upon pain of death. Rumors that they planned to escape the island and exact revenge led a group of colonists to request that they be transported to “some place farther more from us.” The Massachusetts General Court did not acquiesce, yet they also did not allow the praying Indians to return until May, and by that time more than half had died.\textsuperscript{3}

King Philip’s War (1675-1676) was primarily a contest between New England colonists and hostile Indians led by Philip (also known as Metacomet), but ‘praying Indians’—Indians who had been ‘civilized’ and Christianized—were also devastated by the war. The war signaled the demise of the ‘praying towns’ set up for them, the most prominent attempt to incorporate Indians into early British North America. How did the gains of this decades-old program of civilization and Christianization evaporate in a couple years? Why did Massachusetts turn on the praying Indians? To be sure, some praying Indians did turn on them. However, the pervasive fear and distrust among colonists of praying Indians can only be explained by the colonists’ perception that the praying Indians were not actually acculturated; rather, they remained ‘Indian’ under their façade of ‘civilization’ and were therefore part of the untrustworthy, dangerous ‘other’ that aimed to extirpate the English from the land.

JOHN ELIOT’S INDIANS

The charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony declared that its primary purpose was to convert Indians to Christianity. Although most colonists ended up not fulfilling this task, some missionaries, especially John Eliot, took up the cause.\textsuperscript{4} He won converts through his preaching, and he also sought to impose “civility” on the Indians through a law code that would conform the Indians to English mores. Seeking to turn men into agriculturalists (previously the sphere of women), he enjoined men to build dwellings and till their fields. He also punished fornication, public nudity, and bad hygiene, and he required English-style haircuts. Beginning with Natick, about 20 miles outside Boston, in 1650-1651, Eliot set up

\textsuperscript{3} Lepore, 140-141.
praying towns where Indians were supposed to live according to such rules.³ By 1674, there were, largely through his efforts, 1,100 praying Indians spread throughout 14 praying towns in Massachusetts. Other missionaries in New England also spread Christianity, most notably in Plymouth, where in 1674 there were 19 praying towns with a total of 500 inhabitants.⁶

Importantly, though, the praying Indians were never fully acculturated. Most lived in wigwams rather than European-style houses. They continued to practice customary funeral rites. Men still did some hunting and fishing instead of solely farming.⁷ Literacy lagged far behind that of colonists, with low levels of literacy in the Massachusetts language and even lower levels in English.⁸ The praying Indians were not fully incorporated into New England society either, gathered in the praying towns rather than living scattered among the colonists. It is tempting to consider how they would have been treated during King Philip’s War if they had been fully acculturated and incorporated, but it is important to remember that this was never Eliot’s goal. He only wanted to teach them enough “civility” and “religion” so they could become full Christians. Still, in 1673 he tried to admit some praying Indians to English churches because only two of the praying towns had official churches, requiring praying Indians in the other towns to make a trip to one of those two towns to receive sacraments. Church elders refused, questioning the language skills of the praying Indians.⁹ If this attempt had succeeded, it could have been a crucial step towards fostering close ties between praying Indians and colonists, as the church was the center of New England towns. The fact that praying Indians and colonists had separate religious communities indicates the gulf that already existed between the two groups before the war.

Nevertheless, the Massachusetts colonists trusted the praying Indians early in the war, but their animosity grew as they regretted their initially trustful inclinations. When a group of praying Indians promised “that they would be quiet, and do no Harm to the English…. the Inhabitants of Brookfield thought they would be Faithful, in regard they were Praying Indians, took their Words and dismist them” until their next meeting. At that time, the “Inhabitants of Brookfield, who thought them to be very Honest, therefore took no Arms with them” but were then ambushed by the praying Indians.¹⁰ The colonists specifically trusted them because they were not just any Indians, but praying Indians. They were

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³ Ibid., 52-54, 66, 71.
⁴ Cogley, 20, 53-58, 172-206, and Lepore, 37-38. Some Indians were genuinely attracted to Christianity, but there were also pragmatic reasons to accept his program. They believed it would lead colonists to respect their lands, give them the powerful tool of literacy, and offer them access to manufactured goods. Until the war, their goals were achieved to some degree (cf. Cogley, 121-123, 166-168, 233-239, and Lepore, 36-38).
⁶ Lepore, 36-38. Data only exists for the Plymouth praying towns, but Lepore surmises that literacy rates among Massachusetts praying Indians were probably only slightly higher.
⁷ Cogley, 4, 168-169.
shocked at this betrayal, and that it was preceded by such brazen dissembling. Another group of praying Indians who burned Springfield “were confined to their [praying] Town and about a Mile about it; but for their usual Civility Sake, were permitted daily to have Converse with the Town [of Springfield] about what Business they had, and at Mid-night they did their Exploit.” 11 The destruction had been possible because they allowed the praying Indians intercourse with Springfield, so the colonists felt they had been naïve. Their magnanimity had been for civility’s sake, so the treachery led the colonists to the conclusion that the praying Indians could not be treated as ‘civilized’ people. Traumatic betrayals like these provoked deep anxiety in Massachusetts colonists and made them “willing to give credit to any report against the praying Indians.” 12 If some praying Indians betrayed them, might not all praying Indians be treacherous?

There were several reasons why the praying Indians switched allegiance. Early defections were by Indians from the more recently established praying towns, who were less Anglicized and therefore may have been more sympathetic to Philip’s cause. 13 Some praying Indians were simply pressed into service by Philip, 14 while others joined because of feuds with tribes who entered on the side of the English. 15 As the Massachusetts government began to confine praying Indians to Deer Island, few colonists realized that the threat of being sent “to some Island as the Natick Indians are...in danger to be starved with cold and hunger, and...sent out of the country for slaves” was driving more praying Indians away from them. 16 The effects of this vicious cycle of mutual distrust only reinforced colonists’ convictions that Deer Island was a sound policy.

There were some detractors of this policy, namely Eliot and Daniel Gookin, an associate of Eliot’s who served as Superintendent of Indians for Massachusetts. 17 They were staunch defenders of the praying Indians, and while people continued to respect Eliot, they loathed Gookin. 18 Gookin, who feared for his life, was himself no friend to the people, condemning “the vulgar” who worked against the praying Indians and blaming them for government policies that were made simply "to satisfy the clamors of the people." 19 One such colonist, who vented his fury on Gookin, said he was “an Irish Dog, that was not faithfull to his country, the Sonne of a whoare, a Bitch, a Rogue, God confound him & God rott his

11 Saltonstall, 47-48. At the time of the attack, praying Indians had been confined to their towns for almost two months, and soon after the attack Massachusetts moved to transfer praying Indians to Deer Island (cf. Lepore, xxvi).
12 Gookin, 471.
13 Gookin, 436.
14 Ibid., 455. He also says others defected “with heavy hearts and weeping eyes” (477).
15 Drake, 100.
16 Gookin, 476.
17 Cogley, 226-227.
18 Saltonstall, 40.
19 E.g., cf. Gookin 449 (note), 491, 494, 470, 481, 453.
Soul… if I could roast him alive, I would.”\(^{21}\) During England’s recent colonial venture in Ireland, the English deemed the Irish ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’ like the Indians, if not worse.\(^{22}\) Thus, this colorful insult charged Gookin with being uncivilized, inhuman, unfaithful, and ungodly—in other words, a stereotypical Indian. If he elicited such invective by defending praying Indians, then it is reasonable to assume his enemies held a similar view of the Indians themselves, helping to explain their fear and distrust.

**A MANICHEAN MENTALITY**

The minister Increase Mather reproached the colonists for “condemn[ing] all Praying Indians, crying out, they are all nought, there is not one good amongst them.”\(^{23}\) Gookin also lamented that most colonists made no distinction because “all Indians are reckoned to be false and perfidious.”\(^{24}\) These comments reveal the colonists’ proclivity to indiscriminately condemn the ‘other,’ vilifying all Indians, whether praying or not. Now the colonists decided to “forbear that epithet of praying.”\(^{25}\) The ‘praying Indians’ reverted, in colonists’ minds, to the status of ‘Indians,’ one and the same with the treacherous enemy. The unfaithfulness of a turncoat minority had forfeited the confidence of the colonists in all praying Indians. Some colonists took the alternative approach of altering the moniker to “Preying Indians” because “they have made Preys of much English Blood.”\(^{26}\) To colonists, the praying Indians had given up their peaceful Christian ways and assumed the vicious warfare of the pagan enemy, and the colonists emphasized this betrayal by converting their best quality (“praying”) into their new worst quality (“preying”). Enemy Indians taunted the colonists that their Christian God had forsaken them,\(^{27}\) but to colonists it was rather their Christian Indians who had forsaken them.

In fact, colonists perceived that some praying Indians had forsaken Christianity or were not true Christians at all. The colonists did not feel “secure enough, because they cannot know a Heathen from a Christian by his Visage, nor Apparel.”\(^{28}\) The only thing they could be sure of was that the person was Indian, and prudence called for colonists to assume anyone of Indian race was a potential enemy, for there was no permanent mark to identify

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\(^{21}\) Quoted in Lepore, 140.


\(^{24}\) Gookin, 450.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 449.

\(^{26}\) Saltonstall, 49.

\(^{27}\) Lepore, 104-105.

\(^{28}\) Saltonstall, 32.
loyal praying Indians. Only race was permanent, as even long-time praying Indians were liable to abandon Christianity. During her captivity among enemy Indians, the English woman Mary Rowlandson learned that “those seven that were killed at Lancaster the summer before upon a Sabbath day, and the one that was afterward killed upon a week day, were slain and mangled in a barbarous manner, by One-eyed John, and Marlborough’s praying Indians.” A Puritan would not need any information beyond “Sabbath day” to conclude that these praying Indians were in fact “barbarous.” That these praying Indians would attack on Sabbath must have been especially shocking because they were from one of the oldest praying towns, Okommakamesit. What is more, a praying Indian might prove to be a “Heathen” even if he still pretended to be a Christian. Rowlandson met one “Praying Indian, who... had a brother, that would not eat horse,” so “he read that scripture to him,” and thereby “showed him that it was lawful to eat that in a famine which is not at another time. And now, says he, he will eat horse with any Indian of them all.” This enigmatic passage can be explained by the English aversion to eating horse meat, which they considered a pagan practice. To colonists, such practices exposed praying Indians to be pagan Indians under the veneer of religion; it only made it worse that they would twist Scripture to justify a pagan practice. Rowlandson was likewise horrified by “another Praying Indian, so wicked and cruel, as to wear a string about his neck, strung with Christians’ fingers.” Nathaniel Saltonstall, a Boston merchant, made a similar accusation of “inhume Barbarities” perpetrated by “the Heathen” of “wearing Men’s Fingers as Bracelets about their Necks.” Apparently colonists had heard that Philip’s men practiced such ‘savagery’ and that praying Indians who joined him were no exception. Rowlandson specified that they were “Christians’ fingers” to communicate that these praying Indians were not Christians at all. The racial prejudice is clear in the colonists’ moral relativism, as they found no fault in their brutal treatment of Philip’s corpse, dragging it through the mud, mutilating it, and placing the severed head on a pike in Plymouth.


30 Cogley, 143-144. There had been tensions between Okommakamesit and the nearby Marlborough settlement.

31 Rowlandson, 352-353. The passage was 2 Kings, 6:25, which suggests the Jews were eating donkey during a famine in Samaria.


33 Rowlandson, 353.

34 Saltonstall, 98.

35 Lepore, 173-174. Philip’s corpse was decapitated and quartered, and then the quarters were hung from trees and the head was brought back to Plymouth to be placed on a pike. The allied Indian who killed Philip was given his severed hand as a prize.
PROVING THEIR LOYALTY

Even when praying Indians fought on behalf of Massachusetts, they were often the object of resentment. Some soldiers complained that “they were cowards and skulked behind trees in fight.”

The English detested their enemies for fighting this way. They moaned that they “could see no enemy to shoot at, but yet felt their bullets out of the thick bushes where they lay in ambushments,” and they decried the “manner of the heathen that are now in hostility with us, contrary to the practice of civil nations, to execute their bloody insolences by stealth, and skulking in small parties.”

Hence, when praying Indians fought this way, the colonists must have associated them with the enemy Indians and their ‘uncivilized’ fighting style. At the very least, it was a reminder that the praying Indians were only partially acculturated. “Skulking” is a word that particularly connotes treachery, so this tactic may have also caused the colonists to fear that these praying Indians would one day betray them. Their distrust was augmented by the suspicion that the praying Indians “shot over the enemies’ heads” or “g[a]ve the Indians noatis how to escape the English.”

This may have been true in some cases, but it was certainly not universally true, as there were multiple accounts of their dutiful service. Whatever the case, they were an easy scapegoat for English losses, and “the people generally distrusted those praying Indians, and were not willing to have any of them employed to serve the country.”

Serving in battle with strangers can produce camaraderie, but in King Philip’s War it tended to produce distrust among the colonists instead.

If praying Indians struggled to prove their fidelity through service, was there another way to do so? This challenge is captured by Rowlandson’s disparaging account of one “Praying Indian, who when he had done all the mischief that he could, betrayed his own father into the English hands, thereby to purchase his own life.”

The lesson was that Indians were inherently disloyal, and if one would betray his own father, then surely they could not be relied upon to remain loyal to the colonists. Rowlandson apparently did not recognize this praying Indian’s quandary: delivering his father was a display of loyalty to the colonists that was nonetheless perceived as a perfidious act, but protecting his father would have demonstrated his disloyalty to the colonists. Either way, he was bound to be labeled a traitor. If this was the colonists’ mindset, it seems almost nothing would have made them trust praying Indians during the war.

36 Gookin, 444.
37 Ibid., 441, 450–451.
38 Gookin, 444, and quoted in Lepore, 139.
39 Cf. Gookin, 446-448, 478-480, 505-506, 512; Saltonstall, 34, 38; William Hubbard, The History of the Indians Wars in New England, ed. Samuel G. Drake, 2 vols. (New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 225, 270. For example, Hubbard, another friend of Eliot’s, wrote, “Many of them have given notable Proof of their sincerity, by fighting against their, and our Enemies, and have been very successful in their Endeavours” (270).
40 Gookin, 507.
41 Rowlandson, 353.
Only when the colonists faced annihilation did they begin to change their minds. In the first few months of 1676, the colonists were losing the war. If they failed to turn the tide they would not be able to plant or harvest crops. They would starve. In desperation, some colonists called on the government to raise a company of praying Indians from Deer Island, which they did. A few months earlier, two praying Indians had been taken from Deer Island to serve as spies for the colonists, but when they returned from their assignment, they were accused of treachery and sent back to Deer Island. Thus, it is not surprising that the praying Indians who now enlisted still had to “leave their parents, wives, and children under the English power, which would be rational security to the English for their fidelity.” In other words, these men had to leave their loved ones as hostages in order to assuage the fears of colonists. The company was in fact raised over the objections of many colonists, but they soon warmed to the praying Indians when they helped reverse Philip’s gains and secured the English victory.

**THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR**

Even if the praying Indians regained the trust of colonists, they did not regain the reputation of being ‘civilized.’ The Massachusetts Council rewarded faithful praying Indian soldiers with a medal that depicted an Indian lacking any accoutrements of ‘civilization’ or Christianity (Appendix A). The image was a near-copy of the original seal of Massachusetts adopted in 1629 (Appendix B). In the seal, a mostly naked Indian, holding a bow and arrow (arranged to indicate peace), says, “Come over and help us,” quoting a request for proselytizing in Acts:16-9. One explanation for replicating this image of an Indian on the medal is that it was a stock image that would convey the message of Anglo-Indian harmony to all those familiar with the seal. Yet if the harmony was between colonists and praying Indians, then it seems odd to use a half-naked figure holding a bow and arrow, both inaccuracies for the praying Indians, who wore clothes and fought with guns. This image characterized praying Indians first and foremost as Indians; only if they lost that part of their identity would they be considered assimilated and ‘civilized.’ Alternatively, replicating this image on the medal suggests that colonial leaders felt their pre-war gains in ‘civilizing’ and Christianizing Indians had been erased. After all, the colony continued to use the original seal until the creation of the Dominion of New England in 1686. The new seal (Appendix C)

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42 Gookin, 486-491, 506-509.
43 Ibid., 507, 512-513.
44 Lepore, 157-158.
46 Lepore, 80, and Gookin, 509, 512.
included an Indian paying homage to King James II, but this Indian is barely different. Again there is no indication that the Indian is ‘civilized’ or Christian, appearing naked save for a covering around the waist and now wearing a headdress. When the Dominion was abolished in 1689, Massachusetts reverted to its original seal until 1692, when the seal was replaced by the royal coat of arms. In short, the official seals of Massachusetts suggest that the Indians there remained uncivilized for most of the 17th century until they suddenly disappeared altogether.

However, the surviving praying Indians did not simply disappear. During the war, most praying Indians died on Deer Island, fell in battle for either side, fled the English, or were sold into slavery. The surviving minority returned to a few of the praying towns, where they retained their native practices, like living in wigwams. Gradually they lost their land to encroachment or sold it to pay debts, and they eventually abandoned their syncretism, embracing European-style houses, joining the New England economy, and intermarrying.

These changes were driven by economic difficulties; encroachment of settlers; loss of autonomy; and a declining population ravaged by illness, low birth rates, and among males warfare, alcoholism, and flight from debts. The resulting gender imbalance led many women to marry free or enslaved blacks, who were predominantly male and were also part of the underclass, though some surreptitiously married whites. Assimilation and intermarriage caused the praying Indians to lose their ‘Indian-ness,’ such that the government usually categorized their descendants as “colored,” “negro,” or “mulatto.” To whites, they had disappeared, a prime example of the myth of the vanishing Indian.

CONCLUSION

In 1812, long after King Philip’s War, John Adams noted, “We scarcely see an Indian in a year.” The fact that he did not see them does not mean they were not there. As historian Jill Lepore points out, whites “simply may not have recognized them.” In a sense,
their perceptions of praying Indians caused them to disappear. However, that phenomenon had begun in a more tangible way during King Philip’s War. Massachusetts colonists trusted the praying Indians at first, believing them to be ‘civilized’ Christian allies. Then the treachery of a small number of praying Indians caused the colonists to panic. With the colony’s survival in no way guaranteed, they began to assume that the praying Indians were part of an Indian coalition bent on their destruction. The colonists could no longer see past their race, leading them to impute all the worst qualities of their enemies, such as savagery and duplicity, to the praying Indians. Consequently, the colonists’ narrow-mindedness stoked their fear and spurred them to commit atrocities on innocent praying Indians. After the war was over, few praying Indians remained, but the survivors adapted and gradually incorporated themselves into English society, over time relinquishing or marrying out of their ‘Indian-ness.’ No intermediate state was possible: to whites, the praying Indians were still Indians at their core, and they only stopped being Indians when they became fully acculturated and ensconced in colonial society.

Richard H. Pratt, leader of the Indian boarding schools movement in the late 19th century, whose importance in Indian ‘civilization’ efforts rivals that of John Eliot, once lamented, “We have never made any attempt to civilize them with the idea of taking them into the nation.” Although Eliot had not intended to assimilate the praying Indians, during several periods in American history, whites like Pratt actively sought this outcome. Pratt felt that stripping the Indians of their ‘Indian-ness’ would turn them into good American citizens. He believed that “the only good Indian is a dead one,” but only insofar as the government should “kill the Indian in him, and save the man.” To be Indian, in Pratt’s view, was to be fundamentally ‘savage.’ Thus, it was not just provincial colonists living in fledgling settlements who held this view—it endured more than two centuries after the ferment of King Philip’s War.

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APPENDIX A

Detail from medal given to praying Indians who served in King Philip’s War on behalf of the English (1676)

Source: Peace Medal, 1676, National Museum of the American Indian, Smithsonian Institution,
http://nmai.si.edu/exhibitions/infinityofnations/woodlands/239269.html.

APPENDIX B

Detail from Seal of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (1629), used 1629-1686 and 1689-1692

Source: Seal of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1629, Smithsonian Institution,
“ALL INDIANS ARE RECKONED TO BE FALSE AND PERFIDIOUS”

APPENDIX C

Detail from Seal of the Dominion of New England (1686), used 1686-1689

BIBLIOGRAPHY


“ALL INDIANS ARE RECKONED TO BE FALSE AND PERFIDIOUS”

York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913.

TITLE IMAGE

Between 1739 and 1816, over 2,000 Apache peoples were deported from the American Southwest and exiled to a life of labor in Mexico City or Havana. Using reports, regulations, and receipts, John Paul Paniagua, Whittier College ’14, illustrates the shifting landscape of Spain’s presidio system, the disorganized contours of Spanish-Apache policy on the northern frontier, the Apache experience on their journey south, and their variegated means of escape. Paniagua’s analysis fits into a larger collection of “Red Atlantic” histories in which European settlers thrust approximately 600,000 indigenous people into the Atlantic as captives, slaves, and laborers.
APACHES IN THE RED ATLANTIC

ABSTRACT

Between 1739 and 1816, over 2,000 Apache peoples were deported from the American Southwest and exiled to a life of labor in Mexico City or Havana. This excerpt is taken from my larger Mellon Mays Undergraduate thesis, which seeks to more deeply understand the geopolitical contingencies that made this exile possible. Using reports, regulations, and receipts, this paper illustrates the shifting landscape of Spain's presidio system, the disorganized contours of Spanish-Apache policy on the northern frontier, the Apache experience on their journey south, and their variegated means of escape. This research aims to contribute more broadly to colonial borderlands history, as well as our understanding of the Atlantic and Latin American past.

In March of 1792, Sergeant Valentin Moreno set off from the presidio, a fortified military settlement, in the Villa de Chihuahua to begin a journey that would take him and his company sixty-five days to complete. Moreno and twenty-four soldiers were to guard a group of eighty-one Apache prisoners of war as they journeyed south, from the northern reaches of Spain's North American empire. Their orders allowed them to use “any physical restraints necessary” to prevent escape. If the soldiers found themselves surrounded, they were to “kill [the prisoners] beginning with the big ones, sparing if possible all the medium and little ones.” As the soldiers led the convoy of forty-eight women, sixteen men, and seventeen children south, those orders would prove prescient.

After almost a month of travel, several prisoners attempted an escape. While camping in a remote region, several frenzied Apache men and women began hurling stones at their captors, leaving at least one soldier wounded “by a thrown stone that struck him in the head.” But the Spaniards had surrounded the convoy with their horses and gear for security; the Apaches were never truly able to break their cordon. When Sergeant Moreno gave the order to kill, “in less than a quarter of an hour” twelve of the Apache men were killed.

1 A presidio is a fortified military settlement, see p. 60.
1 Pedro de Nava, “Estado que manifiesta los Prisioneros que ha de recibir en el Quartel del Pilar de Conchos, el Sargento de la Compania de san Carlos Valentin Moreno para conducirlos hasta la Cuidad de Mexico,” March 12, 1792, Reel 175, Legajo 142, Expediente 13, Documents from the Archivo General de La Naciòn de México and other related archives, Center for Southwest Research, UNM Albuquerque; Mark Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands: Spanish Deportation of Apache Prisoners of War, 1770-1810 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2011), 152–154. A detailed description of this collera based upon the most legible documents available can be found in Mark Santiago’s work.
3 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 153.
4 Nava, “Estado de prisioneros.”
6 Ibid., 161.
INTRODUCTION

Because the prisoners’ deaths had to be verified upon their arrival in Mexico City, Moreno “ordered the ears [be] cut from the twelve dead Indians.” They were strung together on a leather cord and unceremoniously stuffed into a saddlebag. Seven weeks later, as the convoy approached the outskirts of Mexico City, the soldiers pining for rest and relief from the arduous journey, the Apache experience in exile was just beginning. The surviving women and children would most likely be distributed to families across the city as domestic laborers; the two surviving men would be imprisoned until the next chain gang could transport them to the port of Veracruz, where they would be shipped to Havana and “removed from land where they can be dangerous.”

A policy and practice of exiling Apache peoples developed over the course of the eighteenth century that ultimately led to the displacement of over 2,000 Apaches from the American Southwest to Mexico City or Havana, to a life of exile and hard labor. Their stories, like that of the Moreno convoy, raises many questions: Why were Apache prisoners to be removed, and why Cuba? What were their experiences in transit and in diaspora? Were they prisoners of war or closer to slaves? More broadly, how do these stories fit into the larger historiography of captivity and slavery in the colonial Americas? This essay seeks to trace the creation and practice of this removal policy, while mapping the subsequent diaspora of Apache peoples throughout the Atlantic world.

Despite claims by historians like Jace Weaver—who notes that Natives were “enslaved and shipped abroad in numbers that are startling”—and David J. Weber, who argues that Apaches “suffered banishment to distant islands more than any other group of

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1 Ibid., 162.
2 Ibid., 150–151.
3 Paul T. Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” n.d., 8–9; Richard John Perry, Western Apache Heritage: People of the Mountain Corridor, 1st ed (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991), 1–10. Apaches, as Southern-Athapaskan peoples, were loosely bound by linguistic and cultural traits, but they were hardly a cohesive entity, preferring familial and regional clusters rather than overarching agglomeration. However, the “Apaches” extant in Spanish documents “warrant collective analysis precisely because their mobility, dispersal, and divisions helped make them such frequent targets for capture and enslavement.”
4 Jace Weaver, The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000-1927 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 15; Paul Gilroy, The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic delineated the Atlantic world as a “structure of thought” as well as “geopolitical and geocultural nexus” for the making of contemporary black identities. In this light, Weaver attempts to illustrate the contours of a “Red Atlantic” in similar terms. He does so in order to illustrate how the global experiences of Amerindians “challenge the coherence of all narrow nationalist perspectives.” These historiographic perspectives have traditionally limited the geographic significance of Amerindians to select regions when they experienced many of the same hemispheric and global processes that were shaping other early modern peoples.
unyielding Indians,” the Apache exile policy remains underexplored. If Weber is correct in claiming that the Apache exile experience constitutes the largest banishment of Natives from the Southwest during the colonial period, the contours of this historical moment deserve further study considering that 2,000 or more Apaches were banished when their population likely never exceeded more than 10,000 in total. Building upon Paul Conrad’s important study of the broader practice of exiling Natives from the Rio Grande basin, I argue that Spanish-Indian policies targeted Apaches in the latter half of the eighteenth century despite evidence that proved raiding was a multi-ethnic endeavor. Further, I aim to extend the “Middle Passage” framework employed by historians Emma Christopher, Cassandra Pybus, and Marcus Rediker to include the forced migration of up to a quarter of the Apache population. By charting how and why Apaches were thrust into the Atlantic, I seek to


12 Max L. Moorhead, “Spanish Deportation of Hostile Apaches: The Policy and the Practice,” 1975, 218, 205; Christon I. Archer, “The Deportation of Barbarian Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain, 1780–1810,” The Americas 29, no. 3 (January 1, 1973): 376–377, doi:10.2307/298009; Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 196–197; Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500–1800,” 15. Max L. Moorhead illustrates that exile policy had two purposes: First, “to rid the northern frontier of a dangerous element.” And second, to foster “more humane treatment and, hopefully, more effective conversion “of the most ferocious, vindictive, and irreconcilable” Native nation the Spaniards had encountered in the borderlands. In this light, Christon I. Archer argues that such a practice was logical and that by 1789, “deportation of Apache and other Indian prisoners of war to Havana was a generally accepted policy.” However, to Mark Santiago, the policy was a result of trial, error, accommodation, and pragmatism, which linked global contingencies to local contexts. Thus, deportation constituted the “cheapest, easiest, and quickest” mode of destroying the Apaches and clearing the northern reaches of the empire. Ultimately, Paul Conrad argues it was only after royal officials inspecting the frontier blamed Apache groups for being the sole creators a livestock rustling economy that war was created and exile recommended.

13 Matthew Babcock, “Blurred Borders: North America’s Forgotten Apache Reservations,” in Contested Spaces of Early America, ed. Juliana Barr and Edward Countryman (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 171–172; Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500–1800,” 212, 256–261; Gary Clayton Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580–1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 96; Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 201–203. There is a great deal of variability regarding the number of Apaches exiled in the relevant literature. Both Conrad and Santiago present similar totals over 2,000, while Babcock more conservatively argues that at least 979 Apaches were exiled. The scope of these numbers justifies additional work, but an even more salient impetus is found in Conrad’s work which highlights that over 3,000–5,000 Natives from a variety of Native groups were exiled from the region during the same period. Considering that over half of the exiled Natives he found records for were Apache, it is not unlikely that the number of Apaches exiled could be well beyond the current high of 2,266.

connect the often-ignored “interior world” of the North American Southwest to the larger Atlantic world and the processes that shaped it.\textsuperscript{16}

Ultimately, even though Weaver argues that Natives “experienced nothing in transoceanic shipment as horrific as the Middle Passage,” the movement of indigenous peoples across the Atlantic was neither limited nor unimportant. Rather, the fact that some 600,000 indigenous peoples were thrust into the Atlantic trade systems and transportation routes as captives, slaves, and laborers points to the existence of a “Red Atlantic” that deserves further study. Indeed, Weaver argues that “Indians, far from being marginal to the Atlantic experience, were, in fact, as central as Africans. Native resources, ideas, and peoples themselves traveled the Atlantic with regularity and became among the most basic defining components of Atlantic cultural exchange.”\textsuperscript{17}

PEOPLES IN FLUX: FROM ATHAPASKAN TO APACHE

Apache peoples are part of the Athapaskan linguistic and cultural family that spread across the North American continent from Alaska to the Southwest.\textsuperscript{18} Because “biological

\textsuperscript{15} Natale A. Zappia, \textit{Traders and Raiders: The Indigenous World of the Colorado Basin, 1540-1859} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 1–20. Zappia illustrates how the Native Southwest was an expansive network of Indian trails, trading centers, and territories that linked California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Sonora, and Baja California. So dynamic and interconnected that European settlements appear diminutive and peripheral in comparison, the Native Southwest was just one portion of an Indigenous continent characterized by Native cores and empires, polities, and linguistic geographies.

\textsuperscript{16} Allan J. Kuethe and Kenneth J. Andrien, \textit{The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century: War and the Bourbon Reforms, 1713-1796}, 2014, 23–24. As Kuethe and Andrien note, employing an Atlantic approach allows historians to examine particular “places, regions, empires, or even institutions within a wider Atlantic context.” Doing so “places renewed emphasis on movement, particularly the migration of humans, ideas, and commerce back and forth across oceans.”

\textsuperscript{17} Weaver, \textit{The Red Atlantic}, 15–18. Though the number of indigenous peoples thrust into the Atlantic pales in comparison to the 12 to 20 million Africans that were enslaved as part the notorious Triangle Trade, Weaver notes that the number of Natives is comparable to the 688,000 immigrants drawn to Spain’s Atlantic colonies; the 700,000 persons drawn to New England from England, Scotland, and Ireland; and the 345,000 French migrants drawn to New France and the Caribbean. In this light, Weaver notes that “the movement of indigenes around the Red Atlantic seems more consistent with the movement of other groups in the Atlantic world.”

\textsuperscript{18} Perry, \textit{Western Apache Heritage}, 3–4,9; Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 8–9. There are many hypotheses regarding the origins of the term Apache. It might be derived from the Zuni word for enemy, Apachu. Or it might be a Nahuatl term for raccoon. Or, perhaps, a Yavapai word meaning persons. A note on terminology is in order. I use the term “Apache” knowing full well that it is a name people were called, never a name peoples used for themselves. Instead, they used the word Dené, meaning “the people” to refer to themselves. The Dené, as Southern-Athapaskan peoples, were loosely bound by linguistic and cultural traits, but they were hardly a cohesive entity, preferring familial and regional clusters rather than overarching agglomeration. However, as Conrad has argued, even if “Apache” was a synonym for enemy Indians in the interior provinces rather than a reference to southern Athapaskan-speaking nations specifically, the Apaches extant in Spanish documents “warrant

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data support the idea that Athapaskan-speaking peoples share a common past," it is likely that the Apache story begins thousands of years ago with their proto-Apache ancestors and their decision to migrate south.\textsuperscript{10} Beginning around the year 200 C.E., successive waves of Athapaskan family bands began journeying south from the subarctic. In fits and starts, over space and through time, a gradual movement that may have lasted anywhere from two hundred to one thousand years brought the Athapaskan proto-Apache to the Southwest.\textsuperscript{21}

There is no documentary evidence indicating that Apaches lived in the southwestern region of what is now the United States until the late sixteenth century. Had they been there earlier, Richard Perry notes that they likely would have been mentioned by early Spanish expeditions in the 1540s.\textsuperscript{22} Other accounts, however, have proposed multiple dates and interpretations for their arrival. Historians Jack Forbes and Colin Calloway place proto-Apache-Athapaskans in the Southwest as early as 1200 and 700 C.E. respectively.\textsuperscript{3} While Jay Palmer, using glottochronology, claims that Athapaskan peoples could have been in the Southwest as early as A.D. 575.\textsuperscript{24} Ultimately, these alternative interpretations are legitimate, given that Spaniards did meet Athapaskans during their earliest forays into the Southwest, even if they had not yet been named Apaches by their foes.

Dating their arrival precisely is difficult due to the nature of their migration and ethnogenesis.\textsuperscript{25} It is likely that the quest for food was a primary factor motivating the

\textsuperscript{10} Perry, Western Apache Heritage, 10; J. W Helmer et al., Problems in the Prehistory of the North American Subarctic: The Athapaskan Question (Calgary: Archaeological Association, Dept. of Archaeology, University of Calgary, 1977), 117. A specific blood antigen designated "Albumin Naskapi" is common among Athapaskan populations of the Subarctic, but it only occurs with frequency in the Southwest among Athapaskan-speaking peoples. Further, “on the basis of twenty-four blood group gene frequencies, the geneticist Emeke Szathmary concludes that there is ‘little or no significant genetic differentiation among Athapaskans.’”

\textsuperscript{21} Colin G Calloway, One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West before Lewis and Clark (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 57.

\textsuperscript{22} Perry, Western Apache Heritage, 6–7.

\textsuperscript{23} Jack D. Forbes, Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard, 2nd ed, The Civilization of the American Indian Series, v. 115 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), vii–xiii. Though Forbes acknowledges that his theory is still tentative, his claim is not unsubstantiated. Indeed, citing a father who in 1634 wrote that “the huge Apache nation” had been the proper “native inhabitant” of northern New Mexico rather than the Puebloans who had recently migrated “to escape the intolerable cold.”


\textsuperscript{25} Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830, 4, 267. Ethnogenesis is the process by which new identities and ethnicities are formed due to internal and external pressures. Alteration often includes, but is not limited to, the forging of new languages, social orders, political alliances, and economic systems. Though by no means a tidy process, Anderson notes that over time a single ethnicity gradually emerges with symbols and cultural characteristics from several different groups.
Athapaskan diaspora. Had other pressures been acute, it is likely that Athapaskans would have deviated from their normal patterns more substantively. With its many ecological zones, topographies, and food sources, the Subarctic fosters the formation of small autonomous clusters of people who are more capable of exploiting the resources available.\(^{26}\) Moreover, because the biological diversity of the region is found in the mountain ranges, Athapaskans were primarily mountain peoples. Thus, along the American Cordillera (a string of continuous mountain ranges that spans both North and South America), “nothing more than the pursuit of their traditional patterns would have been necessary to lead [Athapaskan] people south” through subtly different food frontiers until they reached the region that would come to be known as Apachería.\(^{37}\)

The North American Southwest, a region of “mountains, mesas, canyons, and plains punctuated by low basins...characterized by an arid or semiarid climate and low and unpredictable rainfall,”\(^{28}\) had a far different climate, population, and ecology than the Subarctic. Over the course of hundreds of years, the region’s human economy had shifted from farming and gathering to perennial bison hunting.\(^{29}\) This process continued as the proto-Apache moved south, and by 1400 proto-Apache bands had dispersed throughout the region to adopt a diversity of lifestyles, from semi-sedentary farming to nomadic bison hunting. By the middle of the sixteenth century when Apaches began rapidly expanding, they encountered the Spanish.

Between 1540 and 1600, Spaniards began to move north from the center of Mexico at different speeds and in different waves mirroring the Athapaskans’ southward journey. During their exploratory journeys in search of the fabled Seven Cities of Cibola that Cabeza de Vaca had described upon his return to Mexico City in 1536, Spaniards met Athapaskans or peoples who had adopted their way of life on multiple occasions.\(^{30}\) For example, in 1541, a

\(^{26}\) Perry, *Western Apache Heritage*, 15.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 15–16; Joseph G Jorgensen, *Western Indians: Comparative Environments, Languages, and Cultures of 172 Western American Indian Tribes* (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980), 61; James W VanStone, *Athapaskan Adaptations: Hunters and Fishermen of the Subarctic Forests* (Arlington Heights, Ill.: AHM Pub. Corp., 1974), 125; William C Sturtevant, *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. x (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1983), 380. Ethnographic sources have provided merit to this interpretation. Indeed, James Vanstone has suggested that Northern Athapaskan populations share “deep cultural similarities” despite a variety of outside influences while Morris Opler has suggested that there is a “basic Apachean culture pattern” present in southern Athapaskan populations. Connecting these two ideas, Joseph Jorgensen has argued that the Athapaskans who migrated south maintained a great deal of similarities with their northern ancestors despite the vastness of the space they traversed. Thus it is likely that the Apache “use of mountain ranges, the independent movements of small groups, buffalo hunting, farming, and the raiding complex in the Southwest” can all be linked either to the cultures of their northern ancestors or skills learned on their migrations southward over time.

\(^{28}\) Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 73b

\(^{29}\) Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 56.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 132–33; Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830*, 105–106. Anderson notes that the Athapaskans were so well rooted in the Southwest that weaker native societies would adopt the Athapaskan way of life.
year after his convoy of over a thousand departed in search of “great wonders,” Francisco de Coronado stood at the edge of an unforgiving sea, the *Llano Estacado*. The staked plains are almost 50,000 square miles of sprawling grasslands spread across five degrees of latitude and 3,500 feet of elevation. They were so large that Coronado though he would never reach their end because the plains were “bare of landmarks” as if they were “surrounded by the sea.” Around a fortnight after entering the plains, Coronado and his convoy encountered a ranchería of natives they called Querechos who constructed “tents...in the shape of pavilions” and moved “from place to place...by means of dogs” loaded “with their tents, poles, and other things.”

These Querechos were among the myriad of Athapaskan buffalo hunting bands that lived in and across the plains. Twenty days later, Coronado also encountered other Athapaskans like the Teyes, enemies of the Querechos. But to Coronado, they were “all people of the same type.” In fact, it is likely that the Querechos and Teyes were part of a larger Athapaskan community dispersed among the plains. Indeed, these Teyes were likely part of a longstanding regional community, as they remembered having seen Cabeza de Vaca’s convoy twenty years prior—suggesting that they were not mere visitors in the region. Later expeditions, such as Espejo’s in 1582, found Querechos in the mountains far west of where Coronado had seen them. Calloway notes that these Querecho-like people were probably Navajos who lived a plentiful hunter-gathering lifestyle in the regions around Mt. Taylor, New Mexico. Espejo also encountered Teyes, whom he claimed carried on extensive trade with the Pueblos, “taking them salt, game, such as deer, rabbits, and hares, [and] tanned deerskins...to trade for cotton mantas.”

Athapaskas were know to the Spanish by many different names, yet they were all exiled as Apaches. The word “Apache” seems not to have entered the Spanish lexicon until the late sixteenth century. In 1598, Juan de Oñate and his convoy of 560 soldiers, colonists, priests, and families marched north towards Pueblo country in hopes of establishing a more permanent colony in New Mexico. In the process, not only did Oñate impose encomienda labor regimes on Pueblo communities, he also introduced the word “Apache” into the Spanish vocabulary.

31 Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 140.
32 Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, “Letter of Coronado to the King, October 20, 1541,” in *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition 1540-1542*, ed. George Hammond and Agapito Rey (The University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 186.
34 Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, “Letter of Coronado to the King, October 20, 1541,” 188.
35 Juan Jaramillo, “Jaramillo’s Narrative,” in *Narratives of the Coronado Expedition 1540-1542*, ed. George Hammond and Agapito Rey (University of New Mexico Press, 1940), 301–02. Jaramillo’s narrative of the expedition notes that “Among [the Teya] there was an old blind and bearded Indian who gave to us to understand by signs that, many days before, he had seen four others of our people... closer to New Spain.”
36 Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count*, 159.
Oñate characterized the Querechos and Apaches as similar people who either lived in rancherías teeming with tents or in pueblos with as many as fifteen communal plazas per settlement. While it is clear that Spaniards knew very little about the Native peoples with whom they came in contact, it seems Oñate had stumbled upon different groups of Apaches: some who lived a semi-sedentary lifestyle and adopted a mixed economy of agriculture, trade, and hunting; and nomadic hunters who made their livelihood off the plentiful buffalo herds that spanned the plains. Oñate observed that their languages were different from those spoken nearby, indicating that the people he encountered were likely to have been Athapaskan. He noted that the Apaches were in reasonably close proximity with other Natives and therefore likely to have existed somewhat peacefully. Yet Oñate claimed the Apaches were a “people that has not yet publicly rendered obedience to his majesty.”

Apache expansion into the Southwest was a far more complicated process than Spanish records made it out to be. At the time of Oñate’s journey, Jumano and Pueblo peoples who had dominated Southwestern trade systems from Louisiana to New Mexico were being displaced by what Gary Clayton Anderson has termed a process of “Apacheanization” in the Southwest. Apaches had not “rendered obedience” because they prospered in native as well as Spanish lands. Apaches “adapted to the changing economies of the Southwest” via pastoralism, agriculture, and trade in both goods and captives even prior to the 1580-1766 period that Anderson cites. By 1600, this process accelerated dramatically with the encroachment of large amounts of Spanish settlers and the introduction of their labor demands, diseases, goods, and horses.

Spanish encroachment weakened Jumano and Pueblo peoples, and both were gradually subsumed by the growing sphere of Apache influence. Some acculturated willingly; others were forcefully incorporated as Apaches violently acquired goods from Pueblo communities who would no longer trade due to stresses of Spanish demands. Horses were introduced into Apache culture by Pueblo Indians, who had fled New Mexico missions in the beginning of this period. By the 1650s, the allure of equestrian life was clear: horses provided exponential increases in mobility that would allow peoples to exploit human and natural resources across previously unfathomable distances. While dogs ate grass indirectly, by consuming the meat of other animals, horses drew their energy directly from the plains’ greatest resource. Thus, by utilizing the plains’ grasses more effectively, “a vast

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38 George Hammond and Agapito Rey, eds., “Don Juan de Oñate to the Viceroy of New Spain, March 2, 1599,” in Don Juan de Oñate Colonizer of New Mexico, vol. 1 (The University of New Mexico Press, 1953), 483–86.
39 Calloway, One Vast Winter Count, 276.
41 Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 1580-1830, 108.
42 Pekka Hämäläinen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains Indian Horse Cultures,” in American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850 (Routledge, 2007), 836.
expansion of power [was] made possible by tapping energy that had always been locked beyond reach.”\textsuperscript{44} However, as Pekka Hämäläinen has cautioned, horses “also disrupted subsistence economies, wrecked grassland and bison ecologies, created new social inequalities, unhinged gender relations, undermined traditional political hierarchies, and intensified resource competition and warfare.”\textsuperscript{45} Patterns of success and failure characterize the spread and adoption of equestrianism across the plains. Hämäläinen ultimately notes that different climates across the south–north axis of the plains fostered different adoptions and adaptations to the sudden appearance of the Spanish and their horses.\textsuperscript{46}

Because the grasslands are far denser in the southern plains, the Jumano, Pueblo, and emerging Apache peoples were in a well-positioned ecological niche. Spanish Barbs, descendants of heat-resilient and durable North African horses, thrived in the Southern Plains and created large feral herds very quickly that could be bought, sold, or stolen. Mounted Apaches transformed themselves and the Southwest very quickly after this period. As Colin Calloway illustrates, mounted Apaches “developed a pattern of seasonal mobility that integrated village farming in the river valleys with buffalo hunting on the plains.”\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, as Anderson notes, Apaches carved out a niche for themselves as skilled traders who would exchange captives for horses with the Spanish and then drive their herds across vast distances to exchange them for other goods in markets as far as Kansas.\textsuperscript{49}

Apache prosperity was alluring and their diplomacy shrewd. Thus, many non-Athapaskan peoples chose to incorporate themselves into Southern Athapaskan communities, or were forcefully integrated through captivity-alliance systems. Thus Calloway concludes that Apache influence was extended via effective trade and astute diplomacy in addition to violent conquest. Horses allowed people to reimagine and “redeem their existence,” and the Southwest was redrawn as “invaders swept in, seized the possibility, and revised the country and themselves.”\textsuperscript{50} Indeed, Apache expansion was just one facet of a centuries-long saga that spanned from mounted Jumano traders in the sixteenth century and concluded with the dominance of the mounted Comanche empire afterwards.

Soon after Oñate’s mention, the Apaches emerged in Spanish records as a formidable force in New Mexico that warranted a great deal of correspondence. Indeed, Viceroy Velasco lamented to the Spanish king that New Mexico was an unforgiving region full of “natives [with] so little desire for the gospel and…friars [with] so little inclination to learn [their]
many languages. According to Fray Lázaro Ximénez, “Spaniards and the Christian and peaceful natives in New Mexico are frequently harassed by attacks of the Apache Indians, who destroy and burn their pueblos, waylay and kill their people by treachery, steal their horses and cause other damages.” Because of these depredations, by 1608 Viceroy Velasco claimed that the Apaches had pushed the colonial “machine [of New Mexico to] the verge of falling to pieces.”

As historian Ned Blackhawk claims, “the origins of such violence and trauma are found in the economies of violence engendered by Spanish intrusion.” Even though Apaches were robust traders who acquired goods through violence, their increasing raids during the seventeenth century must also be viewed in light of a parallel increase in slaving raids of Spanish poachers. Apaches initially served as valuable poaching intermediaries who supplied Spanish and Native slave markets surrounding New Mexico, Texas, and the plains with captive Utes from the north. However, the growth of southern mining cities like Parral and Chihuahua dramatically intensified Spanish slave raids into Apache country in the seventeenth century. Apaches were not merely movers of goods, but often goods themselves. Apache captives would often be “ransomed” to the highest bidder in any number of communities distributed throughout the frontier.

A clearer understanding of the migration and integration into the Southwest of the Apache raises new questions: Why were Apaches exiled so systematically when they proved to be astute trading intermediaries and a valuable supply of Indian labor? Why did their attacks on Spanish settlements continue to increase into the eighteenth century? Was

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6 Barr, Juliana, “A Spectrum of Indian Bondage in Spanish Texas,” in Indian Slavery in Colonial America (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 283. Of this process Barr notes that, “Spaniards viewed slave hunting and coerced labor as central to regional development as their imperial reach extended northward in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Across the northern provinces of New Spain, military efforts designed to “pacify” enemy Indian peoples also fed Spanish coffers through either the sale or the labor of prisoners of war and captives of raids. As they moved northward, Spaniards first exported captive and enslaved Indians to other provinces for profit, then used them instead for their own farms, ranches, mines, and households.”
Spanish slave raiding the only cause, or were there other contingencies? The answers to these questions lie both deeper in the record and deeper into the plains.

PRESIDIOS, POLICIES, AND PRISONERS

While the search for sustenance may have brought Athapaskans south, it was the search for silver that brought Spaniards north. In 1546, the Spanish found silver in Zacatecas on the northern plateau of Mexico, sparking a “frenzied ‘rush’ of miners, merchants, and ranchers” northward in search of wealth.59 Moorhead notes that “as the Spaniards pressed onward...each new Indian nation they encountered was more nomadic and hence less easily controlled.”60 In order to secure their populations and products from the hit-and-run tactics employed by Natives, the Spanish incorporated a garrisoned fortification system.

Presidios, first instituted by Viceroy Martin Enríques in the 1570s as holdings on Atlantic coastline, were originally small forts of six soldiers, dispersed along the main roads every nine to twenty-six miles.61 By the Pueblo Revolt of 1680, garrisons had increased to house fifty or more men, at times stationed over a thousand miles from the capital. Thus garrisons grew larger as the dangers of expansion grew. With the exception of the Tarahumara Revolt, Native resistance after the Chichimeco Wars had been limited to occasional, localized uprisings. By 1680, however, the landscape of resistance in the northern reaches of the Spanish empire was such that an “uprising of eighty-five nations” from the Gulf of California to the Big Bend in Texas became a more real, frightful possibility.62

Presidio construction pressed northward despite an uncomfortable truth: the forts had never functioned properly for their intended purpose. Even in their earliest task—to protect the arteries of trade from the capital to Zacatecas—presidio forts had failed to prevent raids of even small groups of Natives. Presidios lacked systematic coordination until the end of the seventeenth century, when José Francisco Marín toured the garrisons and found them in various states of disrepair and inefficacy. Marín found that even though the forts cost the empire an exorbitant 170,000 pesos a year, most were manned by criollos—Native conscripts who were “part-time soldiers and part-time settlers.”63 Further, most presidio captains had

60 Ibid., 6–7. Indeed, Spanish incursions into The Gran Chichimeca—a vast territory home to at least ten separate nations; including, Pames, Guamares, Zacatecos, and Guachichiles—set off a half century of war known as the Chichimeco War between 1550-1600.
61 Ibid., 7–10.
previously been merchants, mine owners, or ranchers; many abused their power to create commercial monopolies.\textsuperscript{64} Yet the Spanish persisted in building inefficient structures that would ultimately leave them vulnerable to attack and financially crippled. As part of the Bourbon Reforms of the eighteenth century, a series of comprehensive Spanish legislations sought to rectify flaws in the presidio system. Significantly, this included initiating a policy of a widespread practice of exile that increasingly targeted Apaches.

Exile policy developed over the course of three regulations that were instituted by the Spanish crown during the eighteenth century: the Regulations of 1729 and 1772, and the Instructions of 1786. The Regulations of 1729 were designed to reorganize the “costly, inefficient, undermanned, and unwieldy” line of presidios that had protected Spanish settlers from Natives and served as a geopolitical buffer to the encroachment from other imperial powers. Written by Brig. Gen. Pedro de Rivera, the regulations resulted from a four-year journey spanning 7,000 miles during which de Rivera realized that, despite spending over 444,000 pesos a year on the forts, the presidio system showed serious flaws. Thus, the document’s 196 articles painstakingly delineated a streamlined system that would supposedly save the crown over 250,000 pesos per annum.\textsuperscript{65}

Most importantly, though, de Rivera’s document officially put on paper a policy of exiling natives from the northern frontier to Mexico City. Citing the effectiveness of a royal order from 1722—which mandated the deportation of hundreds of Toboso prisoners from

\textsuperscript{64} Pedro de Rivera, Pedro de Rivera and the Military Regulations for Northern New Spain, 1724-1729: A Documentary History of His Frontier Inspection and the Reglamento de 1729, ed. Thomas H. Naylor and Charles W. Polzer (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1988), 237–254; Joseph de Berrotarán, “Captain Berrotarán’s Report on the Condition of Nueva Vizcaya,” 171. Indeed, one captain who was arrested for lackluster service later in the eighteenth century possessed two large haciendas and a smaller ranch at the time of his arrest. The inventory of his possessions indicates that he was living well beyond his pay-grade considering that he operated a water-powered flour mill employing at least thirty workers on government salary. Further, some eight leagues from all of this, the captain possessed some five thousand head of branded cattle, hundreds of horses and mules, and a complex of stockyards and corrals to house them. Ultimately, considering that his practically new eighteen room home possessed moving windows, “French-style” chairs, soap processing facilities and a team of sixty-five peons to tend to the captain’s needs, it is clear that this captain lived beyond his yearly 600 peso salary.

\textsuperscript{65} Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 185–186; Moorhead, The Presidio, 45; Rivera, Pedro de Rivera and the Military Regulations for Northern New Spain, 1724-1729, 10–17, 235–287. To accomplish this, the presidial line of the northern reaches was cut from twenty-three to nineteen and the number of soldiers was cut from 1,006 to 734. Ultimately, though, the focus on economy blinded Rivera in many respects. Moorhead notes that “the Reglamento of 1729 did little or nothing to strengthen the defenses of the northern frontier either quantitatively or qualitatively.” In fact it may have actually been harmful in how much it cut from the budget. As Conrad notes, Rivera thought that raids could be easily quelled and security attained if only “soldiers were not so occupied in tending their captains’ livestock and fields.” By assuming that raids could be halted simply by seeking more thorough retribution on a curtailed budget, the regulations completely ignored the complexity of the Native rustling economy which leached resources from the empire.
the regions surrounding the province of Nueva Vizcaya to Mexico City—Rivera’s regulations explicitly put a similar practice into a widespread effect in 1729. De Rivera thought that exile had completely splintered Toboso resistance; to him, the threat of raids was nothing more than “imaginary fears of future dangers.” Consequently, de Rivera’s regulations simply ordered “officers who happen, by plunder, to capture Indians” to “send them under guard to the outskirts of Mexico.”

In 1772, a new set of regulations drawn up by the marqués de Rubí superseded those of 1729 and delineated even more specific requirements for operation of the forts. Precipitated by other global contingencies—including the Peace of París in 1763, ending the Seven Years’ War and redrawing New Spain’s northeastern boundary to include Louisiana—the regulations suggest that this seemingly remote, American segment of the colonies was actually, geographically and influentially, quite central. Again, these regulations were the result of a major inspection spanning two years and 7,600 miles.

By the 1770s, over fifty years of Comanche-Apache warfare had displaced thousands of Apaches permanently. Between 1700 and 1730, Comanches and their Ute allies migrated into the Arkansas River basin and sparked what would become a drawn-out, deadly conflict. The collision between these two expanding dominions was centered on the fertile river valleys, essential for sustained life in the region. The mixed hunting and agricultural economy of the Apaches required waterways for the complex irrigation systems for crops, horses, and cattle. However, the Comanche, who were rapidly shifting to a purely equestrian culture, required the abundant grasses and drinkable water for the cultivation of their horse herds. Moreover, as a hunting society with a bison-based diet—high in protein but lacking in other nutrients—chronic nutritional imbalances had to be addressed. Rather than adopt small-plot agriculture like the Apaches, the Comanche chose to “intensify their hunting economy, eliminate Apaches from New Mexican markets, and then exchange their surplus meat, fat, and hides for maize and other carbohydrate products at the Pueblo fairs.”

Their conquest of the upper Arkansas basin in the 1720s satisfied their immediate territorial and nutritional needs. However, by the late 1730s, their populations and herds had grown so large that further expansion was needed. By the 1750s, their conquest of the Llano Estacado was underway, and by 1770, Apaches from northern New Mexico to western Texas

66 Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 162–165. Even this cédula is predated by rhetoric pushing for removal and convoys of Tobosos sent south between 1710 and 1723.


68 Moorhead, The Presidio, 47.


70 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 29–32.
had been displaced entirely; Comanche colonization forced them to join “other Apache groups in raiding Spanish villages, haciendas, and ranches.” Apaches now occupied a vast swath of land to the south dubbed the Gran Apachería; spanning 750 miles in breadth and 550 miles in depth, the territory blanketed a variety of Spanish settlements. Indeed, Weber notes that “Rubí found numerous communities, mines, haciendas, ranches, and farms destroyed by Apaches or abandoned out of fear.” Lafora claimed that Apaches had gained a reputation for speed, order, and endurance, but most of all, “extreme cruelty.”

The raiding bands that wreaked havoc on frontier settlements were diverse groups. Because the many facets of colonial violence shattered Native communities across the southwest, William Merrill notes that raiding bands likely “drew their membership from all the various ethnic groups on the northern frontier: Apaches and other nomadic Indians; sedentary Indians affiliated with Catholic missions; individuals of mixed Indian, European, and African descent known as castas or gente de raza; and in a few cases, Europeans or creoles.” Thus it is likely that there was a great variety of band composition. Some might be entirely composed of a close-knit group of Apaches or Comanches, whereas others might be completely ad-hoc resembling the cimarron communities of fugitives found throughout the colonial hinterlands of the Americas.

Regardless of these complexities, Rubí and Lafora blamed almost all Indian depredations exclusively on Apache bands. Influenced by the Comanche threat to the north, Rubí cited that “the northern nations: the Comanches, Iscanis, Taguacanas, Taguayas…[are] irritated by our unfortunate alliance with the [Apaches].” Stating that Spaniards shall one day have the Comanches “as neighbors,” Rubí thought it expedient to

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72 Ibid., 64.
77 Ibid., 133–135. Indeed, Merrill cites the make-up of one particularly unique band led by an Apache named Calaxrin. This band of 600 to 1,700 people of all ages and sexes included only a handful of Apaches, some of which were known as criados indicating that they had been captured as children and raised in Spanish households as a result of earlier exile policies. The other Indians in the band were predominantly Tarahumaras and Cholomes, and the non-Indian population contained peoples of African and European descent.
remove Apaches so that Comanches “shall live tranquilly in their true dominions.”²⁹

Ultimately, Rubí wrote, “these advantages...make me consider as necessary the total extermination of the [Apaches].”³⁰ In this light, it is not surprising that a reiteration of exile was written into the official regulations of 1772. The regulations ordered that “the first attention of all should be directed to waging active and incessant war against the Indians who are declared enemies, where possible attacking them in their own villages and land; but with the prisoners that are taken in war, I prohibit all bad treatment...they shall be sent to the vicinity of Mexico City where my viceroy may dispose of them as seems convenient.”³¹

These new regulations did not “solve” the problems of frontier defense either. Between 1771 and 1776 in Nueva Vizcaya alone, raiders killed 1963 colonists, captured 155 others, and made off with 68,873 cattle. Spain’s inability to protect its interests on the frontier was due not only to Native powers in the region, but also to Spain’s precarious power position on the global stage in the eighteenth century. From 1713 to 1763, a thinly-stretched, vulnerable Spanish empire was primarily a reactionary power. Poorly regulated from the beginning and starved of resources during the “spontaneous, and interrelated revolutions” that swept the globe between 1750 and 1850, the Spanish could not win an offensive war against the Natives that raided their northern provinces.³² Because deportation proved most expedient, recorded instances of Apaches being sent south grew tremendously after this regulation.³³

In 1786, Viceroy Bernardo de Galvez issued a new set of instructions for the northern frontier. A hybrid of the English and French colonial policies with which Galvez was familiar, the modified instructions were, on paper, the most progressive, well-reasoned instructions

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³⁰ Ibid.
³² Paul W. Mapp, The Elusive West and the Contest for Empire, 1713-1763 (Chapel Hill: Williamsburg, Va: University of North Carolina Press ; Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 2011), 20–22; Kuethe and Andrien, The Spanish Atlantic World in the Eighteenth Century, 66; Weber, Bárbaros, 161; Franklin Knight, “The Haitian Revolution,” The American Historical Review, AHR Forum, 105, no. 1 (2000): 103–15. As Kuethe and Andrien note, “After disastrous defeats in the War of the Quadruple Alliance, Spain was shackled with severe restriction in shaping its commercial policy, which left the door wide open to massive foreign penetration.” Weber notes that between 1762 and 1763 Spain fought with France against the British during the Seven Years’ War. Moreover, from 1779 to 1783, Spain fought England during the American Revolution. From 1792 to and 1795, Spain fought France again and lost. Most dramatically, from 1796 to 1808, England contested Spain on a new level and successfully blockaded Spain from its overseas colonies. Global wars aside, in Peru the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1780-81 and the comunero revolt also drew resources away from New Spain to the Andes. Accordingly, “the cost of defense [in Spain’s American colonies] rose between 1700 and 1790 by at least a factor of seven.”
ever written for the frontier. The new set of instructions blended multiple Indian policies to bring about a “deceitful peace.” Indeed, by plying Apaches with trade goods such as alcohol, Galvez hoped that “a new necessity” would “oblige them to recognize their dependence upon us more directly.” Galvez hoped that “the supplying of the drink to the Indians will be a means of gaining their goodwill, discovering their secrets, [and] calming them so that they will think less often of conceiving and executing their hostilities.” These Instructions, along with the Regulations of 1772, would come to dictate Spanish-Native policy on the northern frontier for the rest of the colonial period. Though the Instructions did not stipulate exile, per se, they did order extermination. Indeed, Galvez claimed that he was “very much in favor of the special ruination of the Apaches” and that “war must be waged without intermission in all of the provinces and at all times against the Apaches who have declared it.” As part of this effort, the deportation of Apaches continued, and accelerated, during the peak years of Apache-Spanish warfare. Indeed, between 1773 and 1810, over two thousand Apache captives were sent south to Mexico City, and after 1788, to Havana.

The explicit targeting of Apaches by Galvez reflects not only the xenophobia of certain Spanish bureaucrats, but also the pressures of Comanche expansion and the multi-ethnic raiding of Spanish settlements. Indeed, between the 1729 and 1786, several pivotal sets of negotiations between Spaniards, Comanches, Navahos, and Utes increasingly shut Apaches out of the “tightening circle of commerce, conciliation, and kinship” that characterized the new order of the southwest. Ultimately, though the Apaches were skilled raiders, they were targeted because Spaniards were stretched very thin and found it more expedient to deal diplomatically with the Comanche rather than the Apache. As Hämäläinen notes, Comanches also raided settlements in New Mexico and Texas with great frequency and efficiency, yet they could not be deported because they were simply too powerful. Thus, Rivera, Rubí, and Galvez increasingly recommended the destruction or deportation of Apache captives in light of the much larger threat of the Comanches to the north. As Brett

86 Weber, Bárbaros, 184.
87 Ibid.; Peter Mancall, “‘The Bewitching Tyranny of Custom’: The Social Costs of Indian Drinking in Colonial America,” in American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850 (New York: Routledge, 2007), 246–68. As Peter Mancall illustrates, such tactics were not unique, but rather quite common, and in certain cases very effective. Though “alcohol proved less threatening in Mexico and the Southwest than it did in British America,” this trade may still have legacies today as “alcohol abuse has been the most significant ongoing health problem American Indians have experienced since the mid-seventeenth century.” Other deceitful trade schemes designed to make Apaches sedentary and subservient involved trading broken or worn firearms that would “delight the sight of ignorant persons” and force the Apaches to seek spares.
88 Galvez, Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain, 1786, 34, 79, 95.
89 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 40–124; Weber, Bárbaros, 207.
90 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 64.
Rushforth notes of this dynamic, Europeans forged alliances with Natives—partnerships often cemented by reciprocal bonds of slavery and captivity. To gain Comanche allies, Spanish bureaucrats captured and exiled Apaches to distant islands.

**APACHES IN THE RED ATLANTIC**

The official records regarding the fates of exiled Apaches chart a march of over one thousand miles across unforgiving terrain. Convoy sizes varied greatly, from less than twenty to more than one hundred. The primary Native groups affected include: “Coahuiltecan groups from the Northeast; Chiricahua, Lipan, Mescalero, and Gila Apaches from the central frontier; and Seris from the far west.” The majority of those sent south were women; men and boys over fourteen years of age totaled just 16.9 percent, and children—of both sexes—just 22.6 percent. That men were more likely to resist capture or the Spaniards less willing to kill indigenous women and children may explain the gender skew.

Prisoners were sent south in convoys called *colleras* or *cuerdos*, named for the halters tied around their necks or the chains linking the prisoners together. Bound prisoners were forced to march south on foot with additional shackles around their legs. The prisoners were accompanied by contingents of various size, consisting of “soldiers, sometimes of armed civilians, and sometimes of a combination of both.” The journey to Mexico City took at least seventy days, as the *colleras* and their escorts journeyed from presidio to presidio, deeper and deeper into the Spanish realm. Spaniards viewed Apache men as “adept tricksters,” who they kept handcuffed at all times. Prisoners were fed basic meals that, given the stress of the journey and disease, proved inadequate to keep many prisoners alive. Indeed, one soldier noted that the starved prisoners would approach strangers for food and water as they passed through settlements.

When the convoys arrived in the capital, Apaches were imprisoned once more to await the departure of the next chain gang to Veracruz. Men were sent to the royal jail and women to the cramped, unsanitary poor house. Because the royal treasury only allocated one or two *reales* per day to the maintenance of incarcerated Apache captives, they were often left hungry and naked. After waiting for weeks to months, the captives would begin the 250-mile

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97 Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 221.
journey to the port of Veracruz on foot. Their shackles were tightened to prohibit escape as they traveled eight to twelve miles a day across the rugged and increasingly tropical environs of the gulf coast. Conditions were so appalling, captives were said to have a “die first, walk tomorrow” demeanor; they would often throw themselves on the ground in exhaustion, enduring repeated beatings, because they could not or would not move. Given the climate, rough terrain, and hard labor, the journey to Veracruz was a likely factor in elevating the high death toll to a shocking fifty percent. Yet, when they arrived on the coast, the captives were again imprisoned until they could be “removed from land where they can be dangerous.”

The provision for exile was carried out at least as early as 1739 when a ranchería of Lipan Apaches led by Cabellos Colorados and his family were sent south. After a year of incarceration at the presidio of San Antonio, officials explained that “thirteen Indian men and women prisoners in the said presidio, [shall be taken] tied to each other, from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, to the prison of the capital in Mexico City…the two year-year-old daughter of chief Cabellos Colorados…shall be treated in the same manner.” Shackled in leg irons, the collera journeyed south for 102 days before reaching the capital. They were distributed throughout the city as servant laborers and within six months all but five had perished. As Conrad argues, “such banishment, imprisonment, and forced labor in Mexico City echoes past practices even as it presaged future forced migrations of Apaches out of the Greater Rio Grande.”

A thirty-year gap in the records, between 1739-1773, begs the question of whether the practice was abrogated. Perhaps, as Sara Ortelli has argued, the Apache threat had been overblown, used as a rhetorical tool by Spanish settlers to resist reform, secure income, and cover illicit commerce with Natives. However, considering how frequently Apaches were exiled in the years when documentation does exist, it is possible the records did not survive, or have yet to be catalogued. In the years for which documentation exists, thirty-two known colleras are recorded as having transported at least 2,266 Apaches. Considering that the number of other captives present in the records pushes the total over 3,000, Conrad claims that it is likely that the total number could be as high as 5,000 over the course of the

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98 Ibid., 222.
99 Ibid., 223.
100 Ibid., 222–224; Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 150–151.
102 Ibid., 183.
104 Sara Ortelli, Trama de una guerra conveniente (El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007).
105 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 201.
eighteenth century. Thus, he has termed the exile of Apache captives to Mexico City and Havana “The Apache Middle Passage.”

Those sent south suffered various fates. In total, the death rate was 11.4 percent, but on a case by case basis, the numbers could much higher. Death stemmed most often from long periods of confinement or disease rather than from direct confrontation between guards and prisoners. Before even beginning the march south, Natives could be held for weeks, months, or even a year. Apaches caught during Spanish campaigns between May of 1786 and October of 1787 were not shipped south until the summer of 1787. After waiting anywhere from eight to thirteen months, the prisoners were shipped south in intervals of six weeks.

In reality, captives probably did not wait that long; disease likely killed many far sooner. Conrad illustrates how confinement contributed to the severity of smallpox epidemics and the spread of “putrid fevers” linked to cholera. Doctors at the royal jail meticulously recorded the suffering of those under their care. In 1798, they ordered that two Apache “be kept behind and not sent on to Veracruz” because one had “a fever” and the other “was coughing up blood.” Further north in 1789, one of the largest colleras ever recorded, lost a third of its population before it even embarked. Commandant General Ugarte explained that “this collera was to have had more than two hundred fifty piezas; but many died in prison despite the care with which they were attended.” As he phrased it, “this accident arose in great part due to the inevitable corruption of a place where many people live confined for some time, and from the melancholy that overpowered their spirits with the loss of their liberty, as well as the variation of their diet.” Thus, not only did close confinement foster the spread of disease, but changes in diet also elevated death tolls. Scurvy and diarrhea were common; nomadic and semi-nomadic diets were rich in variety and nutrition compared to the pithy portions of chili and tortillas served to prisoners.

Those that survived their long layover in the frontier’s putrid jails fared very poorly on the journey itself. Indeed, the ill-fated convoy of 250 that had languished in frontier jail cells and had been reduced to 180 before departure encountered a great deal of hardship on the actual journey. Under the charge of first ensign Francisco Enderica, the convoy of eighty-seven women, eighty-five children, and eight men departed to Conchos from Chihuahua on December 11, 1789. Almost immediately Enderica noted that “as the mules were being

107 Ibid., 69.
108 Ibid., 69.
109 Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500–1800,” 224. “Meco” and “Meca” are homogenizing terms for male and female Native captives.
110 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 89.
111 Ibid.
113 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 90–93.
packed for the march, the Sergeant brought me word… that an old Indian woman had cut her own throat… I had her ears cut off and sent them with the news to the Señor Commandant General.  

The removal of ears, hands, and noses was common practice on the journey south. Jars and satchels of severed appendages were used as “corporeal coins” to verify death tolls reported by soldiers so financial accounts could be cleared.  

In this way, these ears, hands, and noses reveal the “financializing, decorporealizing logic of equivalence” that undergirded colonial violence.  

Apaches were also repeatedly forced to watch Spaniards sever the rotting heads, ears and hands of their kin so that bureaucrats in the capital could later tally murdered captives.  

This in particular must have been extremely traumatizing, in light of the fact that Apaches customarily evacuated encampments where kin had died.  

Violence, in its many manifestations, also reduced individuals to “a type of person, or terribly, not even that, a type of nonperson, a type of property, a type of commodity, a type of money.”

By the time Endérica and his convoy reached the capital, 70 of the original 180 had perished, including all eight men, twenty-nine women, and thirty-three children. Including those left behind, the total losses were over 50 percent.  

Yet such substantial losses were hardly uncommon. A collera of Apaches sent south in October of 1787 and commanded by Sergeant Terminel lost over a third of its seventy-nine prisoners to disease in just a few weeks.  

Another collera of 108 Apaches sent south in 1788 lost thirty-five prisoners over the course of its journey. Seven died in jails before the journey had set off; three more were left behind, presumably to suffer the same fate. Other losses meant only seventy-three reached

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114 Ibid., 93.
116 Ibid., 82; Blackhawk, Violence over the Land, 17–18.
118 Ibid., 7.11; Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 82. Baecom makes clear that the “accounting procedures and the econometric logic” that undergirded imperial projects sought to “convert history… into a calculable matter of credits and debts, to reduce the vast business of empire [into] a list of accounts... a schedule of wounds received, body parts lost, lives surrendered... an undifferentiated array of numbers.” In practice, as Santiago illustrates, Spaniards would verify the results of their military campaigns with appendages: “The proof of this success... is my receiving the heads of the twelve gandules... three officers also certified that they saw another three gandules killed in a place where they could not reach to cut off their heads, which documents I enclose for Your Excellency in proof of the claim.” Gandule is a Spanish word for pigeon pea, and a derogatory referring to Amerindians. Moreover, the documents the soldier refers to are appendages.
119 José Maria Cortés y de Olarte, Views from the Apache Frontier: Report on the Northern Provinces of New Spain, trans. Elizabeth Ann Harper John (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), 78–79. Cordero noted that after an elaborate cremation ceremony, the remains were hidden in mountains, and “at that very instant they moved to a new location from which they could not see the previous one... the dead are never mentioned” again.
120 Ibid., 11.
121 Ibid., 93–96.
122 Ibid., 70.
the capital two months later.126 Another collera sent south in the same year was reduced to only three upon arrival in Mexico City; even then, the prisoners had to be immediately hospitalized.127 Another convoy dispatched in January of 1789 lost more than a quarter of its original prisoners.128 In 1794, ninety-five Apaches were sent south, yet fourteen died of epidemic illness almost immediately. Only sixty-one survived to see the prisons of Mexico City after their several-month march. Three years later, it was reported from Veracruz that only twenty-eight of those sixty-one had survived to board ships to Havana. The fate of those who embarked is not known.

Another collera, dispatched from the presidio of Pílar de Conchos in November of 1797 under the charge of Sergeant Jose Antonio Uribe and twenty-four men, encountered a similar situation. With fifty-eight women and twelve men, the convoy arrived in Mexico City just as the city was experiencing “one of its worst epidemics of small pox.” Seventeen days after the convoy arrived, nine women had died, two more were dying, and another three had been transferred to another location. A month later only nineteen of the original fifty-eight were healthy enough to march to Veracruz and embark towards Havana.129 These deaths occurred despite the supposedly detailed instructions, specified in the Regulations of 1772, for feeding and clothing the prisoners.

Apaches often attempted to escape during the journey.130 While only 5.6 percent did so successfully, the “specter of Indian escapes” weighed heavily on the minds of Spanish officials and conductors of the convoys all the same.131 They were repeatedly told of past escapes and the consequences that would unfold if Natives who had been exiled were allowed to return to their lands to the north and seek revenge. In fact, it was the Apache’s propensity for escape tactics that spurred their exile to more distant locations such as Havana. Indeed, in 1787, Viceroy Flores cited that he was dispatching “Apaches…to destinations overseas.”132 This decision came after a captive on a recent convoy claimed that Apache women that had been distributed throughout the capital and northern plateau would

127 Ibid., 215.
128 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 80.
132 Santiago, The Jar of Severed Hands, 71.
“guide him in his return” through some sort of system that made it “very easy to be freed.”

Records of the more than 250 escapes that occurred during the eighteenth century illustrate harrowing and cunning flights that were well-organized and often successful. Indeed, a collera dispatched in 1797 was tasked with transporting two very important prisoners: first, a chief of “much credit” named Gaslen, whose “significant acts of war and spirit” deserved punishment; second, a man named Polito who had previously escaped another convoy bound for Veracruz and had returned home. For these depredations, much care was to be taken during the journey, and they were to be sent “overseas to ensure they could never return to their land.”

Escapes most often occurred in the early morning or at dinnertime when hands were freed for consumption. This often occurred farther south, in the forested mountains leading down towards the coast. Not only would the foliage obstruct lines of sight, but the captives being more desperate, and the escorts more tired or inexperienced, made this stretch of the journey most likely to witness an escape. Indeed, late in 1796, a soldier named Francisco Gonzalez approached the town of Jalapa nearing the eastern coast of Mexico. The mayor of that town reported that Gonzalez had been injured during a violent escape at a nearby roadside inn. Gonzalez relayed that nearing midnight, captive men had signaled to each other and trampled the guard at the door of their room and taken his firearm. In the main hall of the inn, they used jagged stones they had torn from the walls to lash out against their enemies and conduct their escape.

Those that survived the violence, disease, and incarceration, but were unable to escape lived a life of labor dictated by age and gender. Apache prisoners were in a unique position, constantly redefined by Spanish officials. By law they were not slaves, but prisoners of war entitled to certain promises of good treatment; however, in practice, the myriad fates of Apache captives reveal that many were thrust into a slave existence. Matthew Babcock claims that “Spanish officers sometimes referred to captured Apaches as piezas,” a term meaning slave. Babcock also reaffirms that at least some Apache women worked as slaves in Spanish households, textile workshops, and plantations while the men that made it to Cuba worked as slaves on the fortification of Havana.

Male captives that survived were assigned a life of labor alongside convicts and African slaves in Veracruz or Havana; they were to work on port and castle fortifications for their rest of their life and they were never to return home. Far more female captives survived,

133 Ibid.
135 Nava, “Commandant General Pedro de Nava to Branciforte, Chihuahua.”
137 Ibid., 227.
138 Ibid., 232.
and James F. Brooks has suggested that captive women were dispersed across the Americas within larger systems of captivity and exchange, knitting diverse communities into “vital and violent webs of interdependence” that spanned time and space. As captive Apache women were distributed across Mexico and the Caribbean as sexual and agricultural laborers, Brooks illustrates that sexual relations and exploitation may have bridged cultural barriers through matriliney as their children might stand a chance of mixing into the colonial milieu. Young children sent south might also have moved through various towns on the journey south, or resided in the capital itself, in hopes that a Catholic upbringing would enable them to assimilate and adopt a new cultural identity.¹⁴⁰

Even though “Cuba was a dumping ground for all sorts of outcasts from New Spain,”¹⁴¹ it is clear that at least some rumors of the “fierce and indomitable” character of Apache “unbelievers” preceded their arrival, as one of the first convoys to reach Cuba’s shores in 1784 was immediately questioned by the governor of the island about the reputation of its prisoners.¹⁴² Not even the Captain General of Cuba, the marqués de Someruelos, was comfortable with the traffic of Apache captives into his jurisdiction, since he thought they “added a destructive and unnecessary element to the Cuban population.”¹⁴³ Apache exiles are difficult to trace in the Cuban archives. However, in fall of 1802, the city council of Havana received multiple reports that a group of runaway slaves were breaking into homes, stealing livestock, and burning fields in the countryside. In response, because “the slightest sign of slave revolt was enough to throw Havana into a state of absolute panic,” Spanish authorities dispatched a group of twenty-one soldiers to pursue and capture them.¹⁴⁴

All of this was not unusual for the teeming slave society that was nineteenth century Cuba, yet there were anomalies in the case. Not only did the palenque (fugitive community) in question prove very adept at evasion, it was led by two Apache men who appear in the records as El Chico and El Grande. The other five members consisted of two men who also are reported to have “looked like Indians,” and three other men described as “black and mulatto slaves.” For their actions, a bounty was placed on the heads of the two leaders, and by October El Grande’s head had been severed, preserved in a jar of brandy, and sent to the governor’s desk.¹⁴⁵ In response to the actions of these seven men, the council of Havana

¹⁴⁰ James Brooks, “‘This Evil Extends Especially... to the Feminine Sex’: Negotiating Captivity in the New Mexico Borderlands,” in American Encounters: Natives and Newcomers from European Contact to Indian Removal, 1500-1850 (New York: Routledge, 2007).
¹⁴¹ Archer, “The Deportation of Barbarian Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain, 1789-1810,” 381. Archer notes that “besides Indians, Mexico sent numerous vagabonds, army deserters, gamblers, and other elements considered corrupt or viceridden” to Cuba.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid.
¹⁴⁵ Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500-1800,” 1-2; Archer, “The Deportation of Barbarian Indians from the Internal Provinces of New Spain,
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requested the Spanish crown to halt all shipments of “Indios féroces” from Mexico. Even though shipments did slow dramatically after 1803, they continued until 1816.140

In another one of several events that occurred during the first decade of the nineteenth century, four Apaches escaped custody in Havana and proceeded to rustle the livestock owned by residents. In the process, they killed an African slave and found themselves cornered by authorities. Despite this, they continued to fight until two had been mortally wounded.147 In the ensuing court trial against the two surviving Apaches, they were sentenced to ten years in overseas presidios. One, Rafael, was sent back to Veracruz. It is here where the contours of the Apache exile experience are made most clear: the Viceroy of New Spain personally saw to it that the man be sent back to Havana, stating that “prisoners of this class were never to be returned to New Spain regardless of the pretexts.”148 Rafael was shipped back and forth between Havana and Veracruz, languishing in their prisons. He later died in jail awaiting shipment to Columbia.149

Rafael’s death speaks to the many facets of captivity and enslavement that characterized histories of colonialism in the Americas. Apaches were permanently thrust into the Atlantic world upon their departure from Veracruz. At least 400 Apache captives arrived in Havana between 1772 and 1816. Some perished quickly due to disease while some survived longer living lives as house servants or physical laborers. They were among the myriad of indigenous peoples sent to the Caribbean from New England, New France, Southeastern North America, Central America, and South America. Indeed, as Alan Gallay cites, from 1670 to 1715 as many as 51,000 Indian slaves passed through markets in South Carolina en route to various destinations including the Caribbean. Furthermore, Brett Rushforth claims that these numbers are likely to be much higher considering that Gallay’s numbers do not include Indians sent to Carolina from New France and its Indian slave markets that grew exponentially over this same period.150

1789-1810,” 383. The records of this Apache-led palenque reveal that Archer misrepresented how Apaches integrated themselves into Cuban society. He notes that “Indians refused alliance with the African slaves” when this was clearly not the case.


148 Ibid., 384.


The Amerindians who made these voyages were “acted upon as objects of violence and discipline, but they were also actors in their own right; they were subjects of rebellion, [and] agents of history-making.”\textsuperscript{55} Indeed, the Apache experience reflects the negotiations inherent in empire building in the Americas. Once valuable slavers, then sold or “ransomed” into slavery by other Native groups and Spanish poachers, by the end of the colonial period specific royal policies delineated a regular practice of exiling Apaches to Cuba.\textsuperscript{52} Apaches, other Amerindians, and various peoples of African descent all experienced violent and protracted periods of forced migration during the colonial period. Imperial and commercial networks drew diverse peoples from far-off places to the Caribbean, where they lived and died in similar and differing ways. Their fates speak to the “spectrum of bondage” that characterized histories of colonialism in the Americas.\textsuperscript{53} Ultimately, to find Apaches from the North American Southwest in the heart of Spain’s American empire reveals that the social and transactional peripheries of empire were perhaps more constricted than geographical distance would suggest.

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\textsuperscript{52} Conrad, “Captive Fates: Displaced American Indians in the Southwest Borderlands, Mexico, and Cuba, 1500–1800,” 244.


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APACHES IN THE RED ATLANTIC


TITLE IMAGE

In 1963, Atlanta Mayor Ivan Allen decided it was time to bring America’s favorite pastime to his city in the form of Major League Baseball, and notably, a state-of-the-art baseball stadium. Allen hoped to bolster the image of a progressive city racing into the future with a booming economy, and in bringing the major leagues to the South, Atlanta found itself not only becoming a regional capital, but in fact a national presence. However, as Daniel Judt ’17 explains, the construction of the Atlanta Stadium was at once a national triumph of civic engineering and also a manifestation of the government’s willful ignorance of the challenges for those living in low-income neighborhoods. In this paper, Judt explores various histories and narratives surrounding the creation of the stadium, focusing on elements of race, class, the democratic process, and the nature of urban renewal.
He knew it as soon as he saw it: the greatest site for a sports stadium in America. Ivan Allen, the mayor of Atlanta, Georgia (1962-1970), had pitched parts of his city to many potential investors. But, in 1963, he faced his biggest opportunity yet. Allen wanted Major League Baseball to come to Atlanta. To do so, he needed to convince a Major League team that his city could handle the ‘Bigs’—and that meant having a stadium. Allen looked around. At first glance, the land that he had settled on did not seem in good shape.

Mayor Allen was standing in an empty lot. In front of him, a few struggling trees. Otherwise, the landscape was barren and glum. Remnants of old houses, reduced to foundations, peppered the immediately surrounding blocks. To Allen’s right, blocks of homes, none more than two stories high, scrunched together, showing signs of wear. To his left, though, a more impressive skyline: Georgia’s State Capitol building, her dome surrounded by towering, glistening skyscrapers scattered helter-skelter around Atlanta’s Central Business District. The mayor was separated from the spectacular sight by three highways—Interstates 20, 75, and 85—whose intersection was in the midst of construction; unfinished exit ramps and entry lanes delicately wound their way up to the elevated roadways. Allen imagined a stream of cars weaving through the intersection, off the ramps, and up to a brilliantly lit stadium. The mayor took in the scene, gathered his confidence, and prepared to sell.

The purchaser of the land would be the Milwaukee Braves. The Braves’ owner, the young Chicago businessman Bill Bartholomay, was in 1964 eager to hear the mayor out: he wanted a change in scenery from Wisconsin, where his team was boxed in by other ballclubs in adjacent states. Mayor Allen spoke about the merits of bringing a baseball team to his plot of land with the fluency of a man who had been rehearsing the moment since his election two years prior. But Bartholomay could not have known that the deserted lot, home of the Washington-Rawson urban renewal project, was not the mayor’s initial choice for a stadium location. Designated for renewal years before, the area had been left vacant due to a lack of interested developers. But in spite of its gnarly, unfinished appearance, Allen thought it was ideal: it sat near the capitol in downtown Atlanta, just a mile from Five Points (the heart of the city) and a soon-to-be major highway intersection. And, critically, it would serve as a ready barrier between downtown Atlanta and the city’s southern slum neighborhoods.

2 Daniel Judt interview with Richard Cecil (former Braves’ Vice-President), November 25, 2014, Atlanta, GA, in the author’s possession.
Bartholomay and the Braves saw the site the same way. Allen was overjoyed; the South had been stuck in the minor leagues for too long, and here were the Braves, offering Atlanta the key to professional sports. Just two years later, in 1966, Washington-Rawson became the site of Atlanta Stadium and the home of the Braves. Allen envisioned a glorious arrival. The Braves’ star, the black slugger Hank Aaron, would hit hundreds of home runs, and people would forget the color of his skin. More sports teams would follow. Atlanta would receive national attention for its glistening new stadium with its flashy baby-blue seats and forward-thinking fully integrated facilities.

Had Allen and the Braves looked a bit closer at their barren tract of revitalized land, they might have found a very different story. They might have heard voices, drowned out by Atlanta’s relentless push for business and economic progress, voices of people who felt differently about putting a stadium in their neighborhood. They might have heard the people of Washington-Rawson describe the collapse of their region after urban renewal; they might have heard black voices talk about their once-integrated streets that had slipped further and further toward outright slums. They might have seen issues waiting to pop up, sores a stadium would make fester: the cars streaming off those highways would need to park—where? Fans would have to navigate three interstates to travel from the stadium to downtown. The remaining neighborhood that ringed the plot had good reason to be angry at the city, and the stadium might only make things worse.

These problems may well have run through Allen’s mind. But in the end, the mayor’s pitch won out: boosterism would make Atlanta better. When over 60,000 fans showed up to celebrate the Braves’ arrival to Atlanta and another 50,000 cheered Aaron’s first at bat, the mayor and his city earned national praise. Atlanta Stadium was an icon of civic engineering. Hank Aaron would go on to shatter Babe Ruth’s career home run total in Atlanta, and the city would come to embrace its star with only occasional reluctance. Atlanta was a beacon of steady integration and of booming Southern industry; when it became the home of the South’s only major league team, it shone a bit brighter. Forget regional capital—Atlanta had become a national presence.

This narrative, which emerged with the stadium, has elements of truth. But those elements are coated in a triumphal glaze that conceals the difficult aspects of Major League Baseball’s start in Atlanta. Poor urban planning, business interests’ power over moral and

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political decisions, the city government’s willful ignorance of the blight in slums and low-income neighborhoods, and, above all, a hubristic determination to create an image of a “national” city are themes that run through all aspects of Atlanta’s 1960s. But nowhere, perhaps, did the city’s meticulously crafted image of the future and its most troubling truths of the past collide more than at the site of Atlanta Stadium. At first, the future won. But Atlanta’s selective self-portrait was effective only so long as it suppressed problems in the neighborhoods around the stadium, problems that loomed even higher than the structure itself. These problems eventually undermined the image of Atlanta that Allen and others sought to create.

Some people did see that this image was sustainable only if the city addressed, rather than hid, its flaws. The Braves, upon arriving, made a sincere effort to counter the city’s deliberate negligence and create a healthy relationship with the neighbors. Their work, though, was never a primary focus and ultimately lacked the scope necessary to combat endemic issues. It would eventually fall short, thanks to an absence of support from the city. Nevertheless, the Braves’ attempts to integrate their ballpark into the community, and the city’s lack of interest in those same attempts, reveal a complex role-reversal: the city played ruthless businessman while the Braves tried, albeit inadequately, to play community organizer. A blindly positive—or determinedly negative—history does not take this complicated relationship into account.⁹

In the end, neither side succeeded. The stadium, then, was at once Atlanta’s proudest moment, its graduation to a truly ‘big time’ city, and the best example of how a fixation with image made the city’s golden reputation impossible to maintain.

To understand why Allen felt so strongly about bringing a Major League team to Atlanta, a brief tour of the history of Atlanta baseball is necessary. Before the Braves, Atlanta had the Crackers, a minor league team that was part of the class-AA Southern League and was, until 1962, all white. The Crackers tried to do justice to the city’s image as the ideal progressive Southern city. The team remained popular by keeping up with Atlanta politics; as the city distanced itself from the rigidly segregated South, so too did its baseball club.

Throughout the 1950s, the Crackers were hugely successful on the field against teams from other leading Southern cities, which supported Atlanta’s claim to leader of the South. With seventeen league championships, the Crackers were known as the “Yankees of the minor leagues.” In the 1950s, the team was the minor league affiliate of, coincidentally, the

⁹ For a note on how the historiography of the Braves and of urban planning in Atlanta have dealt with the stadium, see bibliography. For now, it must be said that the voice of blacks living around the stadium and of black elites is noticeably absent from this narrative. Delving into the history of black presence in Washington-Rawson and the sentiments of the community as it tried to interact with black elites would be necessary for the story to be complete. Nevertheless, using newspaper clippings, interviews, letters and secondary literature, this essay attempts to weave Atlanta Stadium into the troubled urban political history which accompanied it, and which it further aggravated.
Milwaukee Braves. The Southern League was packed with cities that were among the most implacably segregationist in the Southeast: Birmingham, Little Rock, Memphis, and Mobile, among others. The Crackers upheld the image of Atlanta as the best of these Southern metropolises, which allowed them to remain fairly popular in their hometown. But as some southern minor league systems were starting to consider integration, the Southern League was not among them.  

When the Crackers tried to push that boundary, the Southern League fought back. In 1954, Crackers owner Earl Mann tried to bring Nat Peeples, a black outfielder who had been on the Braves’ Class A team and who deserved a promotion, to Atlanta for spring training. Peeples, somewhat stunned at the move, earned his spot as the Cracker’s starting left fielder by the end of spring training. He made the team and pinch-hit for his first appearance in Mobile, Alabama. Though he only played an inning, he inspired a wave of optimism in black Southern baseball fans. The Atlanta Daily World, the city’s black newspaper and the South’s only black daily, proclaimed Peeples “a wedge in the doorway,” but cautioned its readers not to lose faith if the outfielder failed.

The warning was prescient. Just two weeks into the season, Peeples was demoted to Class A Jacksonville. Mann claimed publicly Peeples needed more consistent playing time, but privately told Peeples that, “They’re just not ready yet. I couldn’t get nobody to go with me. We’ll have to wait awhile.” The Crackers had tried to push the nation’s most staunchly segregated league to accept an integrated team and had been met with overpowering resistance. But even as baseball declared itself unready to integrate, Atlanta showed signs that it, as a city, was.

Atlanta’s fixation with its image was born in part in response to its reputation as just another racist southern town. Even by 1945, the national press looked down on Atlanta; the city had not, as its own slogan went, “risen” up from its Civil War ashes. Atlanta was inevitably associated with Georgia’s fiercely racist governor, Eugene Talmadge. But in 1946, the Supreme Court struck down Georgia’s poll tax and white primary, opening the floodgates for black voters and giving Atlanta, with its rapidly growing black population, incentive to change. This, coupled with Mayor William Hartsfield’s (mayor from 1937-1941 and again from 1942-1962) commitment to promote Atlanta’s reputation (if doing so meant working with blacks and slowly desegregating, so be it), led to a moderate coalition that

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11 Adelson, Brushing Back Jim Crow, 143.
12 Ibid, 143-44, 147.
13 Ibid, 150.
14 Loc. Cit.
paired white and black businessmen with city politicians. Atlanta’s leaders adopted a policy of gradual integration because it was pragmatic; they were primarily interested, as historian Kevin Kruse writes, in “presenting a positive public image for themselves.” Mayor Hartsfield and his coalition saw an opportunity to move from the Old South to a new, business-friendly South and took it. “Our aim in life,” the mayor said, “is to make no business, no industry, no educational or social organization ashamed of the dateline ‘Atlanta.’”

With this, Mayor Hartsfield began trumpeting “the city too busy to hate” as Atlanta’s informal slogan, and the city was indeed beginning to emerge as a leader of gradual integration in the South. As early as 1948, the police force was desegregated, and by the mid-1950s, Mayor Hartsfield had formed a biracial coalition that supported a “moderate pace of racial change.” In 1961, Atlanta would take the daring step of desegregating public schools, seven years after the Brown decision. To be sure, integration in Atlanta was slow and riddled with setbacks: rampant white flight and white businessmen ignoring token integration laws, to name only two. But Atlanta was leaps and bounds ahead of the other major Southern cities, and Hartsfield and Allen wanted that to be the thrust of the city’s reputation. A baseball team being held back by the rest of the South was a bad fit.

In 1962, the Crackers tried to integrate again. This time, though, they did not want to deal with the Southern League. The ownership petitioned the integrated Class-AAA International League for entry in 1961, and the Crackers became a member in 1962. They proceeded to integrate immediately: John Glenn and Johnny Joe Lewis became the first black baseball players in Atlanta. Glenn’s arrival was greeted with fairly minimal news coverage and did not help boost crowds, even when the Crackers won the league championship that same year. As with most Atlanta integration, there were spurts of protest by angry whites. Despite this, Glenn and Lewis enjoyed a relatively successful season. The Daily World wrote, “Atlantans showed that the cosmopolitan atmosphere which had greeted desegregation in downtown lunch counters and public schools—could be extended with the same cordiality to baseball.” The Crackers had fallen back into step with Atlanta’s reputation.

Even with this success, though, the Crackers plunged into a downward spiral. Attendance in Ponce de Leon Park, the Cracker’s home stadium, plummeted during the late ’50s and early ’60s, even before integration. This was in part because the Crackers’ glory years had come and gone. But important too was the fact that the Crackers, integrated or

16 Ibid, 35.
17 Mayor William Hartsfield, quoted in Kruse, 40.
18 Loc. Cit
19 Kruse, 35.
21 Adelson, Brushing Back Jim Crow, 239.
23 Earl Mann, Letter to Crackers Baseball Fans, 1959, Folders 5, 7, 16, 20, Box 12, Robert Woodruff papers, 1819–1996, Emory MARBL Library, Atlanta, GA.
not, were minor league. This status clashed awkwardly with another side of Atlanta’s image: Hartsfield, Allen, and the Atlanta press constantly emphasized Atlanta’s growth. The city was leading the nation in retail sales by the early 1960s, and businesses tried to grab their share of Atlanta’s growing presence as the major Southeast powerhouse.\textsuperscript{24} The major leagues—and major cities—were in the North and the West; Atlanta baseball was stuck with Birmingham and Little Rock. The decision to leave the Southern League in 1962 must have seemed a political statement as much as a pragmatic one to some fans.

Atlanta was moving up the ladder toward becoming a progressive, major city. Yet this was not enough. “Try to instill in everyone in your territory that ‘baseball is more than a game, it is democracy in action,’” a letter from the Milwaukee front office advised the Crackers in the late 1950s.\textsuperscript{25} Baseball as baseball was no longer interesting to Atlanta. A baseball town was associated with the league its team was in, and The Crackers could not live up to an Atlanta that was pulling well ahead of the South with which the team competed.

For Allen and, eventually, for those who backed the stadium project, professional sports were integral to fostering a powerful and admired Atlanta. Upon taking office in 1962, however, the mayor did not find many who agreed with his priorities. Starting with Mayor Hartsfield, Atlanta’s huge business growth had been closely accompanied by urban renewal. Business elites were simply not interested in entertainment development. No one, it seemed to Allen, had time to care about building a stadium.\textsuperscript{26}

Instead of upgrading its sports, Atlanta turned its attention to its Central Business District (CBD), the heart of downtown. In 1956, the Hartsfield administration decided to designate for urban renewal three areas near the CBD. The areas were those neighborhoods around Butler Street, Washington-Rawson streets, and University center. These, the administration reasoned, were home to some of Atlanta’s worst slums. Designating an area for urban renewal meant that the land would be bought by the city; the city would then “clear the land”—razing its buildings and infrastructure to the ground—and would relocate any displaced citizens into public housing, to be constructed elsewhere. Finally, the city would resell the cleared land back to a private interest for new development projects. The net cost of the renewal would be funded in part by the Federal Urban Renewal Administration.\textsuperscript{27}

Ivan Allen and his business cohort agreed with Hartsfield’s reasoning. Allen believed urban renewal would kill two birds with one stone: it would contribute to Atlanta’s already

\textsuperscript{24} Robert Byrd and Associates, \textit{Super Stadium, Super Market}, 1964, Box OP6, Clyde Partin papers, 1940-2009, Emory MARBL Library, Atlanta, GA.

\textsuperscript{25} Harold E. Goodnough, letter to Crackers’ Management, “Selling Baseball in Your Territory”, date unknown (c. 1958), Folders 5, 7, 16, 20, Box 12, Robert Woodruff papers, 1819-1996, Emory MARBL Library, Atlanta, GA.

\textsuperscript{26} Bisher, \textit{Miracle in Atlanta}, 10; Allen Jr., \textit{Mayor}, 154.

rapid economic growth while simultaneously eliminating the slums that formed ugly blotches around Atlanta’s new gleaming skyline. Urban renewal, especially in the downtown area, would lead to higher property taxes, which would in turn allow the city to spend on public infrastructure projects. By this logic, renewal would benefit the poor just as much as it did the rich.\textsuperscript{28}

This vision of urban renewal, however, was stymied by the quick-fix fashion in which the Allen administration implemented it. Business leaders who had Allen’s ear had significant control over renewal; the Aldermanic Board made it difficult to manage the inevitable aftereffects of displacing thousands of people. Allen’s administration cared about the image the first stage of urban renewal created: Atlanta’s slums were “disappearing,” and in their place, wealthy business districts rose.\textsuperscript{29} The image was clearly flawed - where were the slums’ inhabitants moving? - but it was comfortable and appealing, easy to buy into. The press bought it, and, despite minor complaints, the federal government continued to fund the project. Seeing no voice of dissent, Allen and his business compatriots never felt the need to look for one.\textsuperscript{30}

Urban renewal threatened to gloss over the inevitable displacement of poor blacks from the slums it cleared. Despite this, black leadership in Atlanta largely supported the first round of urban renewal. The idea of eliminating “blight” (the term the Chamber and many government reports used to describe conditions in Atlanta slums) appealed to black elites who were eager to work with, not against, the Allen administration just as much as it did with white businessmen. Black endorsement of the projects, though, were contingent on the subsequent construction by the city of black public housing to accommodate those who had lost their homes and their neighborhood.\textsuperscript{31}

But Allen believed that urban renewal could also lead to civic projects. This desire, combined with Allen’s conviction that a professional baseball team would bolster Atlanta’s image, led him in 1963 to turn his attention to one of the three original urban renewal plots: Washington-Rawson.\textsuperscript{32}

While the press and the Hartsfield administration maintained that clearing Washington-Rawson would get rid of one of the city’s worst slums, some saw the area as merely lower-middle class. Washington-Rawson was not a single neighborhood, but an intersection of two streets within the parameters of the urban renewal project. (Renewal projects were often named after streets.) The project pulled from parts of three

\textsuperscript{28} Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 371.
\textsuperscript{29} Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 373; Clarence Stone, Economic Growth and Neighborhood Discontent: System Bias in the Urban Renewal Program (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1976), 58.
\textsuperscript{30} Loc. Cit.
\textsuperscript{31} Public housing in Atlanta was still segregated when Allen took office in 1962 even though it received Federal funding.
\textsuperscript{32} Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 371.
neighborhoods: Summerhill, Mechanicsville, and Peoplestown. These neighborhoods were the home of comfortable, middle-class white Victorian-style housing in their heydays in the early 1900s. Since then, they had slowly transitioned into integrated neighborhoods: by 1960, Peoplestown was 49.8% black and 50.2% white. There was a small shopping area—controlled primarily by the white portion of the community, which was heavily Jewish—and residents described their neighborhoods as poor but by no means intolerably so.33

But to the city, eager to increase the CBD’s area of influence, Washington-Rawson screamed redevelopment and renewal. Allen thought there would certainly be interest in developing an upper-middle class residential community that could link to a modernized downtown. By 1959, much of the Washington-Rawson site had been leveled. Approximately 600 acres of land were now empty.34 These 600 acres were not even the full scope of the project—in 1960, the Aldermanic Board’s Urban Renewal Committee reported that only 289 of the 649 land parcels allotted for the project had been purchased and cleared—but it was significant enough that it unseated large swathes of the site’s homeowners.35 Residents of Mechanicsville and Peoplestown, the two neighborhoods directly affected by the program, saw 3,261 living units dismantled; over 3,000 individuals and families were removed.

The aldermanic board and business elite thought little of rehousing options for displaced blacks. In 1961, Mayor Hartsfield’s aldermanic board successfully pushed for an informal agreement with the Mayor’s administration: no construction of public housing on urban renewal land. In October 1963, the Federal Urban Renewal Administration picked up on Mayor Allen’s reluctance to focus on relocating displaced citizens and issued a warning, requesting Allen pay closer attention to the relocation standards the city had promised. Allen had anticipated warning since the summer of that same year. To appease the feds, he had urged his Board of Aldermen to reverse their 1961 ruling and allow the construction of public housing on urban renewal land. As a start, he proposed that the westernmost portion of the Washington-Rawson project be used for white public accommodation. The Board of Aldermen budged only slightly, though, authorizing the construction of 1,000 housing units in the area, provided that the city government would not be forced to build them.

Allen proposed public housing for the Washington-Rawson neighborhood because his plan for an area flush with businesses had, by 1963, ground to a halt. Vast amounts of land had been cleared, but the city could not find private developers interested in buying up the area.36 The project had lost space due to the construction of the messy intersection of Interstates 20, 75, and 85. The intersection was supposed to give the greater Atlanta region easy access to the CBD, but instead awkwardly cut off the remaining urban renewal land

34 Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 374.
36 Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 373-74.
from the shopping district. Citizens in their cars would likely head straight home rather than traipse into downtown.\textsuperscript{37}

Allen saw white public housing as a compromise: renewal land would be used for public housing for Atlanta’s poor, but it would also provide the white business elite in the CBD with their buffer between downtown and the poor black communities of south Atlanta. Atlanta’s black leadership immediately cried foul: providing more white public housing was no more than a cosmetic adjustment—another way to insufficiently patch up the holes the city had left in its urban renewal program. They claimed, rightly, that Allen was evicting black residents from their land and was now replacing their former homes with white housing. Indeed, the Urban League - a nationwide civil rights organization whose biracial Atlanta branch was seen as the black voice in early urban renewal debates - needed only point to the vast discrepancies between white and black public housing to make its point: whites had an excess of available units, while blacks found themselves on long waitlists for units that had not even been constructed. The Urban League’s outcry and the increasing pressure from the Federal Urban Renewal Administration led Allen to abandon his proposal for white public housing and look for a civic project for Washington-Rawson that would benefit both the surrounding neighborhood and, more importantly, the Central Business District and the Downtown Connector. The stadium was, in Allen’s mind, an ideal fit.\textsuperscript{38}

Allen’s idea that Washington-Rawson could host Atlanta’s greatest civic undertaking merged the history of the Crackers and the history of urban renewal. As Allen began his push for a stadium in earnest, Atlanta was ready to graduate from its minor league status, which was dragging the city down. Putting a stadium and a major league team on an urban renewal plot would show that urban renewal was beneficial for the whole city. But Allen did not realize that a stadium in Summerhill also would also bring a sport representing Atlanta’s future into an awkward encounter with Atlanta’s suppressed past.

Ivan Allen, Jr. grew up around business. His father, Allen Sr., headed one of the largest office supply companies in the South. This position, coupled with a significant investment in Coca-Cola stock, established the Allens in the upper echelons of Atlanta’s white business elite. Allen rose quickly in politics and found himself involved in mediating the infamous sit-in staged by Atlanta’s black leaders at Rich’s department store in 1960. The heated negotiations over the Rich’s sit-in gave him pause, for to rise in politics in Atlanta in the 1960s, Allen realized, a pragmatic stance on race was a must.\textsuperscript{39}

Allen’s \textit{modus operandi} became slow but steady progress on integration, never at the

\textsuperscript{37} Keating, \textit{Atlanta}, 1652 (Kindle Location).

\textsuperscript{38} Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 375.

expense of business and never any more aggressive than was necessary to give the impression of a movement towards equality. Urban renewal is a perfect example: when prodded by the federal government, Allen made an effort to increase black public housing, but only went as far as was necessary to appease his public critics.

In this light, a stadium had significant power: it could release Atlanta from the South’s troubled past. The stadium’s potential as the business and cultural icon of Atlanta left business elites and politicians willing to shove aside democratic process, if not in law most certainly in spirit. Allen and his cohort were so enthralled with their gleaming new city that they never stopped to consider those who viewed a stadium as part of a larger system that had destroyed their neighborhoods.

The negotiations that led to the stadium were kept confidential until the last possible moment, and Allen never sought public approval for the project. Instead, he quietly prepared plans for the stadium with a small group of supporters. Allen’s main brain trust for the operation was the City of Atlanta and Fulton County Recreation Authority, a body that would become known simply as the Stadium Authority once it took on its primary task. The Authority was first created and charged with improving Atlanta sports back in April of 1960 by the Georgia Legislature, but failed due to lack of interest (Its members never actually met.). Allen knew of the failed Authority when he took office in 1962, but did not want to reconvene it unless he felt it had a real chance of producing a stadium.

On April 25 of 1963, Allen had his first shot at a team. Charles Finley, the owner of the Kansas City Athletics, was in town scouting out Atlanta for a potential move. Allen jumped at the opportunity, spending the day with Finley and giving him a full tour of the city, culminating in an impressive speech as they stood on the barren land of Washington-Rawson. “Just like I told you, Mr. Finley. The greatest site for a sports stadium in America,” Allen finished. Finley immediately grasped the business appeal: Allen was proposing a massive, modern stadium in the heart of the capital of the South, the largest untapped market for professional sports in all of North America. An informal agreement was reached, and Allen set about reviving the old Recreation Authority.

On June 3, Allen reopened the failed Authority unilaterally, without consulting the Chamber of Commerce or the Board of Aldermen. He kept only two members from the first iteration of the group. One, Arthur Montgomery, would serve as chairman. Montgomery was the owner of Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (not to be confused with Coca-Cola Co.) and had always backed Allen’s push for a stadium. Allen then appointed six new members, including

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40 Kruse, White Flight, 41.
42 Bisher, 16; Allen Jr., 156-57.
an eccentric banker named Mills Lane.  

It was Allen, Montgomery, and Lane who almost singlehandedly made a stadium possible. Allen handled the politics and public image; Montgomery, the behind the scenes agreements; and Lane, the money. Lane owned C&S Bank, and was noted for his enthusiasm about a stadium project; he supposedly wore sneakers to work every day to quietly voice his desire for a professional sports team in Atlanta. Allen’s request to Lane was one at which most investors would have laughed. Allen needed money for a stadium, as he famously put it, “on land we didn’t own, for a team we didn’t have.” But Lane did not laugh, and reportedly assured Allen that he would take care of the finances to get the Stadium project off the ground if Allen dealt with the politics. All of these dealings—Allen’s funding from Lane, the reopening of the Stadium Authority, courting Finley’s Athletics—took place without public knowledge. Allen was sure of the image of Atlanta he wanted to create, and took public approval as a given.

On June 6, Allen convened the first meeting of the newly revived Stadium Authority. The Authority resolved to meet every week, and settled quickly on Washington–Rawson as the desired location for the stadium. In a series of twists and turns, Finley’s Athletics were replaced with the Milwaukee Braves. The Athletics could not get approval from the American League to move to Atlanta, and the Braves were disenchanted with Milwaukee’s limited market. They were quietly looking for a way out and saw Atlanta as a worthwhile target. By September 4th, the Braves and the Stadium Authority agreed on the “basic points” of plans for the new stadium.

In late July of 1963, Allen made a trip to Washington, D.C. and became the first southern government official to testify in favor of a national civil rights bill in Congress. Like all of Allen’s progressive policies and statements, the trip was not insincere: Allen truly believed that a civil rights bill would help Atlanta grow, which would be good for its poor black community. But it was also an intensely calculated appearance. The mayor knew full well that the projects he was undertaking—the stadium among them—would put the national spotlight on Atlanta. And he also knew that the disregard for public housing pointed out by the Urban Renewal Authority would be brought to the fore if tensions rose between neighborhoods. Allen’s trip to Washington would calm any rising tensions over insufficient desegregation or disregard for slums. The mayor would later remark, “What we were doing was selling our city like a product.” As newspaper reports about the arrival of baseball in Atlanta from the next two years reveal, Allen’s image-crafting was, at first glance, a

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44 Cecil, November 25, 2014.  
46 Allen, Atlanta, 2558–2570 (Kindle Locations).  
48 Bisher, Miracle, 177. 

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Allen, Atlanta, 2536 (Kindle Location); Kruse, White Flight, 206; Allen Jr., Mayor, 149.
resounding success.

Only once the Braves had committed to moving and stadium construction was ready to begin did Allen let the issue go public. When he did, the approval he sought was limited in scope and merely a matter of courtesy. By March of 1964, the Braves and the Stadium Authority were nearing an official deal. On March 5th, Allen announced an unofficial contract with an unnamed team.49 From there, the Stadium Authority acted swiftly to capture public approval. The very next day, John White, the chairman of the finance committee of the Board of Aldermen, called for a public hearing to “assess the strength of opposition to the building of a stadium.” The event was highly publicized, with the Atlanta Constitution urging its readers to attend and support the initiative.50

The hearing was held on March 6th. Allen and Montgomery both spoke to rousing applause. The Aldermanic Chamber in City Hall, where the meeting was held, overflowed with over 400 citizens. White, who chaired the meeting, asked for an informal poll: all in favor of the stadium in its proposed location should raise their hands. When everyone did, a cry of “play ball” came from an enthused participant in the back of the room. Montgomery and Allen were thrilled. The Aldermanic Board voted and approved the Stadium almost unanimously. “I feel that this proves the mandate of the people,” Montgomery said proudly. “I see no obstacles now.” On April 15th, ground was broken at Washington-Rawson, and a rushed fifty-one weeks of construction began.51

To claim “the mandate of the people” because the stadium had received unanimous consent from 400 citizens eager to attend an aldermanic meeting might seem absurd. At the time, though, many thought the Stadium Authority’s chairman was right. Newspapers painted the board meeting as official city approval: “Allen Says It’s Great...Citizens Agree,” The Constitution wrote. Allen called it the “most gratifying” experience of his career. The neighborhoods around the stadium were never mentioned. Montgomery “saw no obstacles” precisely because the obstacles - houses, citizens, families, stores, and neighborhoods - had been cleared out five years prior.

The press around the Stadium’s completion and the Braves’ arrival in 1965 and early 1966 was just as Allen had wanted it: Atlanta’s papers and magazines championed the project as a “miracle” that would bring Atlanta onto the national stage. An obsession developed not with the Braves, but with the stadium. “It is a symbol of the new city...a status symbol...[that will] carry Atlanta’s name over the nation,” sportswriter reporter Jack Spalding wrote in a 1966 Atlanta Constitution Magazine issue dedicated to the Braves. “This

is the kind of advertising no salesman can offer,” he concluded. Offered a page to express his own thoughts, Allen echoed Spalding, proudly writing, “Atlanta had an obligation both for its own future and for the good of the Southeast, to build a major league stadium.” The endeavor was not just great for the city; it was great for the South. This theme came, in part, from an emphasis on the proximity to the Downtown Connector: “The Braves could easily pull from a seven-state area,” another Constitution article bragged. A report titled “Super Stadium, Super Market,” described how Atlanta stadium would become a weekend getaway: each year, hundreds of thousands of fans would flock to Atlanta to spend the weekend seeing a few games, staying in a nearby hotel, buying gifts and eating out downtown, and admiring Atlanta’s CBD. The Stadium would mix business with pleasure. It would prove that busy did not equal boring. “Atlanta plays as hard as it works,” concluded the “Super Stadium” report.

The stadium also garnered support from some black elites. The 100% Wrong Club, an extension of the Daily World that promoted black athletes, titled their annual All-Sports Jamboree “1964: the Year that Was Sports.” Images of the stadium dominated the event’s program, and Allen was the keynote speaker. In what would turn out to be ominous foreshadowing of a debilitating divide between poor blacks and their elite leadership, very few black leaders spoke about the problems with building the stadium in an area already reeling from poorly executed urban renewal.

The Braves arrived to an all but completed stadium for their first exhibition game in Atlanta in April of 1965. Upon hearing that the Braves intended to move to Atlanta at the start of the ’65 season, the city of Milwaukee sued the team and secured a restraining order. The Braves, it was agreed, would play exhibition games in Atlanta at the beginning of ’65 and would return for good in 1966. A tremendous parade, from the airport to their future home, greeted the team. Phil Niekro was a young Braves pitcher at the time, having just made the team in 1964. Niekro recalls that parade as “the biggest parade I’d ever seen.” The huge crowds made you think, Niekro maintained, that “the whole South was big in baseball.” The stadium now had a name: Atlanta Stadium. Montgomery described the choice as “short [and] non-controversial”. It was also a reflection of the goal of the project: the focus of the stadium was not so much who it would hold as what it would do for

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5 Jack Spalding, “Status Symbol.”
54 Byrd and Associates, Super Stadium, Super Market, Box OP6, Partin Papers.
5 Program for “Thirtieth Annual All-Sports Jamboree: 1964, The Year That Was Sports,” The 100 Per Cent Wrong Club and the Atlanta Daily World, January 29, 1965, Box OP6, Clyde Partin papers, 1940-2009, Emory MARBL Library, Atlanta, GA.
Atlanta’s reputation.57

The opening of regular season baseball at the stadium in 1966 was treated as a moment when Atlanta could cleanse itself of its past and current problems. “Now we have dropped all the limitations of the past,” Allen proclaimed to a Constitution reporter on the opening day. The scoreboard was even clearer: “April 12, 1861: First Shots Fired on Fort Sumter...April 12, 1966: The South Rises Again,” it flashed at the beginning of the game. The message got the loudest, longest cheer of the night from the sellout crowd, longer and louder than any of the Braves players, the mayor, or catcher Joe Torre’s homerun.58 The papers had either sold their message well or had properly gauged their audience. Perhaps both. Atlanta saw the hypermodern stadium in their city center as proof that they, the South, were back. The mystical idea of Atlanta Stadium as the pinnacle of the city’s achievements drowned out any voices of dissent floating up from just outside the stadium walls. Those voices were a threat to the Stadium’s aura. If Atlanta Stadium signaled the end of the “limitations of the past,” poor black slums and squalid public housing must not exist.

But the glowing image pushed by Allen and Atlanta’s press did not eliminate problems with Washington-Rawson. Indeed, when the Braves front office started to move down to Atlanta during 1964 and ’65, they recognized the blight in the neighborhoods around the stadium that the city, basking in its own image, had refused to acknowledge.

Dick Cecil had arrived in Atlanta in early 1964. Cecil was part of Bartholomay’s business team and had been sent to Atlanta to oversee the construction of the stadium and settle the Braves into their new neighborhood. He was the Braves’ assistant farm director, responsible for running spring training for the Braves’ Class A and AA teams, but by 1964 he had transitioned to business manager. Because negotiations were still under wraps at the time of his arrival, the Braves took extra precautions and had Cecil enter Atlanta under a pseudonym. As the stadium rose out of the ground, though, the news was leaked, and Cecil became more openly involved in planning the Braves’ transition.59

Even those who witnessed firsthand the problems of the neighborhood into which the Braves were moving found Allen’s narrative convincing. “It [the stadium] was like a spaceship,” remembers Bob Hope, at the time a college-aged intern in the Braves’ Public Relations department. (Hope would go on to become the PR manager only a few years later.) “It just doesn’t get any more spectacular than this.”60 Cecil agrees: “That stadium

59 Cecil, November 25, 2014.
60 Daniel Judt interview with Bob Hope (former Atlanta Braves Public Relations Director), November 24, 2014, Atlanta, GA.
really made Atlanta a big league city…it [Atlanta] became the focal point of the South.” Cecil and Hope echo the seemingly endless reports and newspaper articles that made the same claim, almost verbatim. “Atlanta Believes It’s the Greatest,” wrote Constitution Editor-in-Chief Eugene Patterson the day after the public hearing. Patterson perfectly captured the mood the press was trying to create.

But Cecil was also quick to identify problems surrounding stadium planning that the city had forgotten and ignored. In an ironic role reversal, he and the Braves management tried to take on the city’s responsibility to the neighborhood. In some respects, they were able to mitigate the harm done by the city and help the communities of Summerhill, Mechanicsville, and Peoplesville. In most ways, though, they were unable to fill the city’s shoes, and Atlanta’s detrimental commitment to its ultimately superficial image continued.

Cecil discovered that the way Allen pushed through the stadium was far from democratic. By the time he arrived, it was “basically almost too late to do much,” Cecil recalled. “With Arthur [Montgomery], Mills [Lane], and Ivan [Allen], it [the stadium] was going to happen no matter what…the public was probably told when it was already cut and dry.” Cecil also sensed that the location would be controversial and feared the Braves and the city might have problems if they did not work with those affected by the construction of a giant circle of concrete in the middle of their neighborhood. “The stadium was built controversially,” he noted, adding, “we knocked down a lot of homes and we just displaced people.” This is more than Allen’s administration and Atlanta’s press would admit to.

When Cecil realized the neighborhood surrounding the stadium was hurting from the urban renewal project and subsequent lack of rehousing, he knew he needed someone else who would know how to work the area. So, Cecil called an old friend: Bill Lucas, a black former player for the Braves’ minor league affiliate whose spring training Cecil ran in Waycross, Georgia. The two had become friends. Lucas was calm and easygoing and had handled racism and harsh segregation in Waycross. Cecil knew he would be excellent as a bridge between the Braves’ Northern, white front office and the predominantly black community it was entering. It did not hurt that Lucas’ older sister, Barbara, was Hank Aaron’s wife.

Cecil and Lucas began to canvas the neighborhoods immediately surrounding the stadium. At the same time, they tried to hire a staff that was “integrated [on] every phase.” Cecil does not remember quite how it started, but he and Lucas found themselves working with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and The 100% Wrong Club, two well-established institutions of black leadership in Atlanta. Lucas especially was good at going door-to-door, trying to convince the disenchanted, increasingly impoverished residents living near Washington-Rawson that the Braves did in fact care about their wellbeing. “We tried to become part of the community as much as we could,” said Cecil. “I

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61 Cecil, November 25, 2014.
63 Cecil, November 25, 2014.
remember he [Lucas] and I used to spend a lot of time walking around...we were going door-to-door talking with residents.”

Even as Cecil worked to bring the community around to the intruding stadium, he was aware that the problems he was trying to handle were created well before his arrival. “It was before us...and it’s true of any city, when you have an urban renewal area, or a blighted area, they come and knock it down...you really needed to work to understand the problems of the community.” Which is something Cecil believes he and Lucas did a good job of. Not just good: Cecil confidently says he felt he and Lucas had done the best job at integrating into Washington-Rawson anyone could have hoped for, given the long-brewing discontent in Summerhill, Mechanicsville and Peoplestown. Like Allen’s image, Cecil’s story steers clear of nuance.

By late 1966, Cecil and Lucas had repeatedly gone door-to-door hearing residents’ concerns: about the stadium, about parking for the games, about the lack of public housing for their displaced former-neighbors. Cecil pushed the Braves to build a small ballpark for a school two blocks from the Stadium site. He and Lucas also ran three-week summer programs for minorities designed to train them in the business of a front office. Here, Cecil wishes he had done more. “We were light” in the front office, he recalls, describing the overall skin color of Braves management in the ‘60s. But the program did help attract black employees for more menial jobs, and by 1967 the Braves’ staff (aside from the front office) was over half black, something virtually unheard of at the time in the South for a major business.

That Cecil would immediately hire a black man and set out into a poor black community to try to give its citizens a voice did not go unnoticed by white segregationists and white supremacists. Cecil remembers his kids were mocked in school: their father was a “nigger-lover.” Some people in the business community told him to “ease up a bit, not do so much [with the neighborhood].” Cecil refused, though, and insists he and Lucas made the neighborhood comfortable with the Braves. “[It was] still a tough area, and it was always going to be a little difficult, but we did a good job,” he maintains. “The neighborhood stuff eventually took care of itself, to some degree.”

Given the problems that continued to build in the neighborhood, a glowing account of the Braves as conscientious Robin Hoods is ill founded. Cecil and the Braves believed they had a greater positive influence on the community than was actually the case, and as a result, sometimes misunderstood neighborhood discontent—how could their neighbors be mad at them if they were helping more than anyone else was? If anything, though, these

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid; Aaron with Wheeler, I Had a Hammer, 253.
66 Loc. Cit.
67 Loc. Cit.
68 Cecil, November 25, 2014.
shortcomings are not indicative of a lack of effort—Cecil and Lucas dug deeper into the problematic issues of Washington-Rawson than city officials had—but of the overwhelming scope of the deterioration the region had already undergone.

And yet, Cecil, Lucas, and the Braves organization must be given credit for recognizing and trying to act on issues that the city ought to have dealt with long before the Braves or the stadium arrived in the Washington-Rawson area. Cecil and Lucas assumed positions of part conscientious businessmen, part local government officials. The two acted out of a sense of responsibility to their new neighbors, a sense that Atlanta’s government and business leadership, white and black, had long since lost.

In the rush to praise everything about plans for the stadium, the Stadium Authority and press had turned a blind eye to obvious problems not only with their treatment of the surrounding neighborhood, but with the stadium itself. For one, the stadium’s 51,000-person capacity posed a major transportation dilemma. Atlanta lacked any form of mass public transport and was proud of its highways; stadium officials would have to account for an enormous amount of vehicle traffic before each game. This reality also meant enormous amounts of parking.69

The city had ordered a feasibility study for the stadium in 1964 that ignored a clear problem with parking capacity around the stadium. Other reports tacitly acknowledged the issue, but city officials answered by handing off the responsibility for parking to citizens living on neighboring blocks, a practice which destroyed more of what little community was left around the stadium. The city’s feasibility study looked at the already cleared acreage around the proposed stadium site and estimated 4,100 parking spaces could be accommodated without clearing new land. The study estimated that an average of four people would arrive in each car, which would allow 16,400 fans to park in preexisting space. The city was also in the midst of planning a shuttle bus that would run from downtown Atlanta to the stadium before and after each game. This, coupled with the regular bus system, led the authors of the feasibility study to estimate that 3,250 people would use public transit to get to the ballpark.70

This accounted for 19,650 fans, approximately 31,000 less than would fit in the stadium on a sellout night. Cecil joked that the Braves’ lackluster attendance record after the initial excitement meant that spots for 20,000 fans were more than enough. In the ‘60s, though, the numbers tell a different story: attendance regularly rose 10,000 over the allotted number of parking spaces.71 Concluding that the city expected only 20,000 fans to come to each game makes little sense, given their confidence that the stadium would draw crowds

69 Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City” 375; Keating, Atlanta, 1607 (Kindle Location).
71 Cecil, November 25, 2014; Keating, Atlanta, 1618 (Kindle Location).
from all over the Southeast on a regular basis and would be the talk of the town for years to come. More likely, the city either chose to be willfully ignorant when confronted with an obvious parking dilemma or thought that more spaces would come as the Braves began playing.

The truth probably lies somewhere in between these two options. The city did seem to remain woefully unaware of the massive traffic and parking problems the new stadium would cause, but also knew that it would get parking from a community desperate to adjust to an intrusive structure. A report drafted by E.J. Forio, vice-president of Coca-Cola Co., stated that the city anticipated 10,000 parking spaces at the stadium site, and another 4,000 within six blocks of the stadium. Forio clarified: as the initial 1964 feasibility study estimated, 4,000 spots would be accounted for in the construction of the stadium. The other 10,000 (6,000 right next to the stadium, another 4,000 less than six blocks away) would “be provided on a self-amortizing basis.”

If the Braves ever saw Forio’s report, they did not buy it. Instead, upon arriving in Atlanta in 1966, the team demanded that the city create an extra 2,500 parking spaces before 1976. Here, again, the Braves took the initiative to try to at least mitigate a problem the city had overlooked. The total available spaces eventually rose to 6,600, but only after the city cleared more land to make more lots. Even then, not nearly enough spaces were available to accommodate even a reasonably full crowd. Predictably, barely three people, not four, arrived in each car that needed a parking spot. A generous estimate, with busses factored in, left slightly over 6,000 cars searching for parking on a sellout night.

To the owners of housing in the neighborhoods surrounding the stadium, the need for parking was an unfortunate opportunity. Desperate to get something back from the stadium that had replaced their neighborhood, they opened up their yards to parking during the baseball season, charging a couple of dollars per car. Turning front lawns into parking lots without a permit was a clear violation of city zoning laws, but Atlanta looked the other way. Some owners, such as landlords who lived elsewhere but had almost or completely vacant property in the area, took a more dramatic approach and simply demolished or burned down entire houses. The illegal lots created around the stadium ran two to three blocks deep within the first few years of Braves baseball in Atlanta.

Cecil insisted that the citizens who opened up their lawns to parking “liked that aspect” of having the stadium nearby. But frequent parking lot raids and a growing number of newspaper articles and reports from community advocacy groups suggested otherwise. Cecil recalled problems with cars being broken into as unregulated, chaotic parking ran

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72 E.J. Forio to Robert Woodruff, “Information on the new professional Baseball and Football Stadium for Atlanta”, undated, Folders 5, 7, 16, 20, Box 12, Robert Woodruff papers, 1819-1996, Emory MARBL Library, Atlanta, GA.
73 Keating, Atlanta, 1618 (Kindle Location).
74 Keating, Atlanta, 1618; Cecil, November 25, 2014.
rampant. Cecil and Lucas also began to hear more and more complaints about the issue of children and traffic—if streets were clogged with cars in the summertime, children could not play safely outside. In response, Cecil pushed for the construction of small playgrounds in the center of parking lots (where, presumably, traffic would not be nearly as dangerous). However, residents were still understandably dissatisfied when told they had to settle for playgrounds surrounded by a swarm of cars.75

Despite government officials’ and the press’ insistence that the stadium was nothing but the pinnacle of good news for Atlanta, reports of the problems with urban renewal began to surface in 1965. From July 25 to 31, the Atlanta Constitution published a series titled “Housing: People, Problems, Profit.” The series ran one article per day and covered various issues that plagued Atlanta’s slums, ranging from lack of recreational facilities to crooked landlords to the debate over the merits of urban renewal. The articles did not focus on the neighborhoods around Atlanta Stadium (they chose instead some of the most severe slums that had yet to be touched by urban renewal, such as Blue Heaven).76 The stadium came up in other articles that accompanied the series, however. One had Allen driving past Atlanta Stadium—which, the article noted, was on land that was once “one of the city’s worst slums”—and saying, “The great tragedy of rehabilitation and cleanup is that we never realized how bad it was [before urban renewal].” Two days later, a Constitution editorial cited the “former slum land” that was now the stadium as evidence to support its claim that “it would be hard to argue that urban renewal has not been good for the city.”77

These articles certainly exposed faults in slum clearance and urban renewal. But, crucially, even the articles exposing mistreatment of slums were careful not to tread on the pristine image of the stadium. When the stadium area was referenced, it was as a success story. There was no mention of the current problems that the neighborhoods faced; the stadium had been the answer to, not the cause of, neighborhood deterioration. When it came to slums at large, the Constitution resisted placing blame on the city, preferring to point to landlords.78 In the case of Atlanta Stadium, they sided with the narrative of the day.

Damage done to Washington-Rawson did not go unnoticed by everyone. Indeed, the Community Council of the Atlanta Area (CCAA) picked the neighborhood as the focus of a report, “Social Blight and Its Causes,” released in February of 1966. The CCAA was a research center dedicated to building Atlanta’s neighborhood communities. Its report did not

75 Cecil, November 25, 2014; Aaron with Wheeler, I Had A Hammer, 253. Cecil tried to mitigate the high rate of carjacking with a crafty strategy: he hired a “bunch of young kids” from the neighborhood, teenagers and twenty-somethings, who he suspected might have been part of the carjacking in the first place, to prevent crime around the parking lots, and claims the carjacking dramatically decreased not long afterwards.
76 Atlanta Constitution, “Atlanta’s Not Too Busy to Care, but Slum Ills Too Big for Old Remedies,” July 26, 1965.
hold back as it detailed the slum-like physical and social blight that plagued Summerhill and Mechanicsville. Peoplestown was not part of the study, but had itself suffered clear deterioration post-renewal: by 1970, the neighborhood had lost 1,672 people—a 24% decrease in population from 1960—and had gone from being 49.8% black to 89% black, indicating severe white flight away from a dying region. The report identified persistent problems as the 1966 season fast approached. Among them: no recreation, substandard housing, debilitating low income, illiteracy, poor healthcare, and alcoholism. The CCAA determined housing around the stadium to be “slum housing” and declared much of it “beyond repair.” It was not that Mechanicsville and Summerhill had been the city’s worst slums, as Allen and the Constitution would have it; rather, they were quickly becoming them.79

The CCAA put the burden of responsibility for the deterioration directly on poorly planned, poorly executed urban renewal: “Clearance and relocation, without careful consideration of the effect on neighborhoods, has a snowballing effect in the destruction of the surrounding area,” they wrote. The reports’ recommendations, though, remained weak and insubstantial. The reports urged the city to engage in “a program of public information on future plans [and]… a program of open dialogue” and to keep the neighborhoods up to date on urban renewal projects.80 For the most part, the report did little to shake the narrative of the stadium as a resounding success story. More than a single study was needed to turn the spotlight away from the stadium and towards its surroundings.

Atlanta Stadium did not even make it through its first full season before the tensions it had created in one of the surrounding neighborhoods, Summerhill, transformed into four days of riots. The immediate instigation was the shooting of Harold Prather, a young black man, by a white police officer on September 6, 1966. Prather had been twice convicted for stealing cars, and the police suspected he had committed a third offense. When confronted, Prather ran; Lamar Harris, a patrolman, pulled his gun and fired multiple shots, hitting Prather in the hip and on his side.

As Prather went down, citizens of Summerhill rose up. Furious that they were witnessing yet another black shot by white cops, the neighborhood protested, violently. Later that night, Mayor Ivan Allen, Jr., head of the “city too busy to hate,” mere blocks from the stadium that had erased the past and moved Atlanta into its era as a progressive national city, found himself standing on top of a cop car dodging rocks as he failed to quell a furious black crowd chanting, “Black Power! White Devil!” Allen was rocked off the car; canisters of tear

80 “Social Blight and Its Causes,” February 1966, Folder 1, Box 30, Paschall papers.
gas, not the mayor’s conciliatory words, dispersed the crowd.\textsuperscript{81}

Ostensibly, the crowd was there for Prather. But the real cause of the rage that made its way through the crowd had begun years before. Summerhill had been in steady decline since the onset of urban renewal. It had gone from integrated to almost entirely black, from working class to impoverished. It had become the home of heavy traffic, loud fireworks at night, and a massive public venue, none of which it had ever requested or approved. Summerhill’s residents had in late 1965 debated using rent strikes to protest their deteriorated housing. The neighborhood had sent representatives to the Citizens Advisory Committee on Urban Renewal in October of that year with a pile of ignored requests. When the Committee sympathized but was unable to act, Summerhill’s citizens staged minor demonstrations in the summer of 1966.\textsuperscript{82} The riots were a long time coming.

The Constitution and national magazines like Time tried to blame the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) for the violence. Stokely Carmichael, a young firebrand in the organization, was painted as a violent rogue who had taken control of a bewildered neighborhood.\textsuperscript{83} Once again, many black elites sided with white businessmen against the neighborhood. Black leadership wanted to remain influential in Allen’s politics; they therefore distanced themselves from young black radicals who were stirring up trouble. The national press echoed the smear campaign. One assistant to the mayor captured the response perfectly: the mayor and the black leadership “had the guts to call a spade a space, not blame the trouble on economic or any sociological business,” he huffed.\textsuperscript{84}

Allen reacted to the riots by taking steps to improve public housing - an indication that he, too, knew the real cause behind Summerhill’s anger - but the faults of urban renewal were so ingrained in Atlanta politics that the mayor’s change of tone did little to undo the damage. A “Housing Resources Committee” was established to oversee construction of 16,800 new low-cost standard housing units before 1971. Allen also targeted the area around the stadium as a potential “model cities” site (a federal program that provided funding for urban revitalization). And yet, Atlanta’s white businessmen pushed back, arguing—just as they had in 1956—that the only way to ensure continuous growth for everyone was to not let public housing close off areas to development. Allen’s new programs were slowed and sometimes stopped completely; his goal of 16,800 new housing units was not reached.\textsuperscript{85}

The image of Atlanta Stadium as a beacon of the future and end of the past became tarnished. The rioters “Defied Allen,” as the Constitution put it in their front-page headline

\textsuperscript{81} Time Magazine, “Atlanta: Stokely’s Spark,” September 16, 1966; Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 369; Harmon, Beneath the Image, 205; Stone, Economic Growth, 126.

\textsuperscript{82} Harmon, Beneath the Image, 205; Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 379-80.

\textsuperscript{83} Atlanta Constitution, “Snick March Quenched, 10 Seized at Riot Scene,” September 8, 1966; Eugene Patterson, “A Day to Forget,” Atlanta Constitution, September 7, 1966; Time Magazine, “Atlanta: Stokely’s Spark.”

\textsuperscript{84} Harmon, Beneath the Image, 204-05.

\textsuperscript{85} Holliman, “From Crackertown to Model City,” 381.
on September 7th.\textsuperscript{86} After 1966, the Braves began a rapid decline in popularity that would not cease until 1991. The Braves drew 1.5 million fans in 1966, on par with the National League average that year, but their attendance declined every year thereafter until 1975, save 1969 (when the team won the pennant) and 1974 (when Aaron broke Ruth’s home run record). The team averaged 13,000 fans per game in 1968, just 9,946 by 1973, and a humiliating 6,642 in 1975. Annual league attendance averaged around 1.3 million fans per team during that period, but by 1972, the Braves were drawing a little over half that number.\textsuperscript{87} Parking was less of an issue, but the idea of Atlanta Stadium as an economic boon for the city began to falter.

Some historians have suggested this steady decline in attendance was due to racism towards players, since by the ‘70s, the Braves were around half black. Incidents around the stadium suggest problems. Aaron’s wife, who was black, had an ugly encounter with a white policeman who would not let her into the stadium with her car. Aaron himself was subjected to vicious taunts from the right field bleachers for countless games.\textsuperscript{88}

The issues that plagued the stadium area from the early ‘60s played a role in turning the city away from its ballpark. Urban renewal had made the area near downtown Atlanta a declining black slum at odds with the stadium project from the very beginning. Without a municipal effort to address residents’ complaints, resentment simmered. With the Summerhill riots, the area around Atlanta Stadium became known as dangerous. The integrated poor neighborhood on which it was built became virtually all African American. It must have been hard to buy the 1965 story of the stadium as an emblem of the future when it was now so deeply caught up in racial tension that Atlantans liked to think of as remnants of the past.

In 2017, the Atlanta Braves will no longer play in the City of Atlanta. The team is vacating Turner Field, its home since 1996 (it lies adjacent to the old Atlanta Stadium, destroyed that same year and now, fittingly, a parking lot), and moving to Cobb County. There, just outside of Atlanta proper, it will reside in Sun Trust Park, smack in the middle of a massive development complex. Construction on both the stadium and the surrounding complex—which will include shops, restaurants, a hotel, an office tower, and an indoor concert venue—has begun; the predicted cost is a staggering $622 million.\textsuperscript{89}

\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Atlanta Constitution}, “15 Injured as Hundreds of Negroes Riot, Toss Rocks at Police, Smash Cars Here: Defy Allen, Repulsed by Tear Gas,” September 7, 1966.
The Braves ownership has defended the move by claiming they are moving closer to their fan base and creating new economic opportunities. Thanks to their insistence that the move is beneficial and exciting for the people of Cobb County, the ownership and the local government of Cobb have glossed over troubling racial, economic, and democratic aspects of the move. These aspects should sound familiar. Once again, issues such as lack of public approval, inadequate parking, and the destruction of a neighborhood are clearly visible; once again, local government is ignoring those issues. This time, though, the Braves ownership is equally to blame.

As Allen and Bartholomay did in 1964-66, the Braves ownership and the Cobb County commissioners met and dealt behind closed doors until the last possible moment. Cobb commissioners rotated in and out of meetings, making sure that quorum never technically existed. This allowed them to avoid Georgia’s Open Meetings Act which, had all five commissioners been in the room at the same time, would have required the talks be public. Braves ownership did not want the issue to go public because it knew that residents of downtown Atlanta and Cobb alike would protest the move. Even after the Braves announced the relocation in November of 2013, they continued to skirt the Open Meetings law to avoid Cobb citizens protesting the $397 million their county is pouring into the stadium complex.

When the Cobb commissioners finally held a vote on the stadium in an open meeting, they stacked the speakers. Twelve private citizens brought in by pro-ballpark business interests lined up five hours before the meeting to secure the twelve speaking spots. When critics of the project tried to protest the speaking order, police forced them to leave the room. One of those trying to speak was the Cobb representative of SCLC.

Parking and traffic also threaten to be issues. The Braves released a parking layout for Sun Trust that accounts for over 10,000 spots (the stadium will seat 42,000). But the plan is contingent on a pedestrian walking bridge being built across Interstate 285 to give stadium-goers access to parking on the other side of the highway. Plans for that bridge have fluctuated wildly, and as of February 2015 construction was tentatively set for a dual-level pedestrian and shuttle bus overpass that Cobb County predicted will cost $9 million. Regardless of whether sufficient parking will exist, traffic will plague the new stadium. Dick Cecil, who is highly critical of the move, says Cobb will now face the worst traffic jams in}


Atlanta history. MARTA, Atlanta’s subway system, does not run to Cobb, since Cobb’s citizens rejected it, implicitly in part to keep blacks from moving into the county.

Finally, the Braves’ move is fraught with many of the same racial tensions that drove the problems behind Atlanta Stadium fifty years ago. Many have accused the Braves of leaving because their overwhelmingly white, suburban fan-base avoids downtown Atlanta, which they see as black and crime-infested. Bob Hope put it clearly: “When they [Braves ownership] say they’re moving closer to their fan base, that’s white flight, no other way to describe that.”

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the Braves’ relocation is not even the terrifying similarities to the mistakes of the 1960s, but the one major difference. In the 1960s, the Braves front office, the Cecils and the Lucases, fought to integrate the Braves into a collapsing neighborhood. Now, Braves ownership has decided that this fight has been lost, or is simply not worth fighting. As the Braves move from the site of Atlanta Stadium to the mall that will be Sun Trust Park, the one positive lesson that can be taken from 1963-66 has been forgotten: the idea that racial, social, and civic progress go hand in hand.

The move to Cobb underscores the rickety and discriminatory structure that underpinned Allen’s hard-fought image of Atlanta. A glance at the 1960s would have been helpful for today’s Braves and Cobb County commissioners. Instead, like Atlanta businessmen and politicians of 50 years ago, they have chosen to disregard “the limitations of the past.”

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**A NOTE ON HISTORIOGRAPHY**

There is an extensive historiography of Atlanta’s urban planning in the mid-20th century, and an equally extensive one on the Braves (in particular, on Hank Aaron). Rarely, though, are the two histories tied together. Clarence Stone provides two excellent accounts of the development of Atlanta’s neighborhoods under Mayor Allen and reveals how Atlanta’s failure to address major racial problems plagued its rapid economic growth, but uses the stadium as only a brief example. Historians Larry Keating and David Harmon, as well as journalist Frederick Allen, follow Stone’s vein: each briefly addresses the issue of the stadium and the Braves, but none linger, instead using the stadium as a morsel of evidence for a larger argument about Atlanta’s impressive but troubled development. None buy the glowing image of Atlanta’s expansion; Keating in particular uses the construction of the stadium to accuse the mayor of excessive use of his office’s power.

Histories of the Braves and of Aaron afford a greater look at the team that arrived in Atlanta in 1966, but also only glance at the stadium and barely stop to contextualize the team’s move in Atlanta politics. Sportswriter Howard Bryant, sports historian Tom Stanton, and Aaron himself (in his autobiography) all focus on the former home run king and provide only a fleeting account of the Braves’ arrival in Atlanta. Furman Bisher, the *Atlanta Constitution*’s sportswriter in the late 1960s, wrote a contemporaneous account of the Braves’ arrival that is problematically glowing in its description of the city, failing to touch on any negative aspect of the move. Mayor Allen’s 1971 memoir falls prey to the same trap. And none of these accounts adequately address steps the Braves themselves took to work with their new neighborhood. These histories—of urban renewal troubled by race and class and of the Braves themselves—ought to inform each other.

**TITLE IMAGE**

By Irma Mariana Ramirez Villa, Buena Vista University ’15
Written for “The Historian’s Craft (U.S.)”
Professor William Feis
Edited by Andrew Tran and Scott Remer
ASYLUM IN SIGHT—First refugees trickled into country in 1933.

Courtesy of the American Jewish Historical Society.¹

¹ “The USNA Story: A Summing Up, 1933-1953 of 20 Years of Service to Jewish Refugees By the American-Jewish Community,” March 1954, I-93, Box 23, American Jewish Historical Society, Center for Jewish History, New York, NY [hereinafter AJHS Archives].
Fifteen years ago this summer, a re-converted US troopship, the SS Marine Flasher, docked at New York Harbor . . . Aboard were over a thousand rather shabby-looking men and women in their twenties or early thirties, most of them Jews. Their meager belongings were contained in battered card-board suitcases, some held together with strings. Their clothes were ill-fitting . . . Their faces still showed the haunted look of those whose daily companions had been persecution, fear and death in Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, and Buchenwald.2

These “shabby-looking men and women” with their cardboard suitcases, ill-fitting clothes, and haunted expressions were displaced persons (DPs). To them, a life in United States was an opportunity to embark on a new beginning away from Hitler and the hells of Europe. Beginning with an executive order in 1946 and culminating with the 1948 Displaced Persons Act (DPA), President Harry Truman and his administration temporarily broadened American immigration policies to allow a total of 140,000 Jewish refugees to enter by 1951. Tasked with overseeing their resettlement, American Jewish organizations—many of which had advocated for the admission of these immigrants—labored to extend their relocation efforts across the country. Addressing the immediate needs of these individuals and striving to convert them into proactive citizens, these agencies were in many cases the only lifeline refugees had in their new homeland. Upon this array of organizations and its representatives, directors and caseworkers, rested the hopes of these DPs for a new life.

Delving into the experiences of this group of immigrants generates several questions. Who exactly were these refugees and what compelled them to come to the United States? How were they received? What was the nature of the agency aid provided and was it enough? What considerations make their immigrant experience unique? Is “success” the right word to attribute to their resettlement? An investigation of these and other related questions ultimately leads to the conclusion that the American response to the plight of Jewish displaced persons (DPs) was an imperfect industry of “calculated kindness,”1 an endeavor where the bureaucratic goals of self-sufficiency and practicality took predominance over the intangible needs and expectations of these survivors.

PART I: THE ROAD TO THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948

REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES BEFORE WWII

Before the outbreak of World War II and the Nazi implementation of its systematic program of forced labor and murder, approximately nine million Jews resided in the nations

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2 The phrase “calculated kindness” derives from Loescher and Scanlan’s Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-present (1986), where they examine American immigration policy since the end of WWII.
that would comprise the Third Reich. The rise of the Nazi party, heralded by Hitler’s appointment to the German chancellery, set in motion a series of discriminatory laws that converted its Jews and other designated “enemies of the state” into potential victims. Those who recognized the danger and who had the means to escape endeavored to do so. Until 1941, the German government encouraged the departure of Jews, though not without first depriving them of their property through a heavy emigration tax and by limiting the amount of money they could transfer abroad. The first wave of emigration carried many to neighboring countries like France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, and Switzerland. Still others sought refuge overseas in places like Britain, Palestine (Israel), the United States, South America, and China.

Trudy S. was twenty years old when she entered the United States in 1935. Unlike the rest of her family—all of whom migrated to Palestine in 1937—she opted to leave their native Germany for the U.S. through the sponsorship of a family member who lived in New York City. Despite the fact that she was fluent in English, she had difficulty maintaining employment in the city and was eventually relocated elsewhere by the Council of Jewish Women:

My father had a cousin in New York, and he gave an affidavit for me. He had a good job, enough to give more than one [an affidavit] a year. So he gave one for me, and the following year, he gave one for his wife’s nephew . . . I stayed with my father’s cousin for one week, and then I looked in the Times every morning for a job. This was in New York. Then I started housework, and I got fired. And then I went somewhere else and did housework and then got fired. It was the Council of Jewish Women who sent us to Pittsburgh because there were no jobs in New York, but there were no jobs in Pittsburgh either . . .

It is important to note that the role of American Jewish organizations was not limited to the postwar period, as many of them provided assistance to newly-arrived refugees. Despite the struggles Trudy encountered during her first years in the country, she managed to send money to her family back in Germany. She eventually married a fellow German refugee and resettled in Denver, Colorado in 1949.

Like Trudy, Werner “Red” S. and his parents escaped Germany before the outbreak of the war. Assessing the worsening situation for Jews in their hometown of Bünde, Red’s father, who ran a tobacco factory, determined that the best solution was to leave. While Red,

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6 Personal interview of Trudy S. by author, February 6, 2014.
who was only eight years old at the time, could hardly leave his parents, his seventeen-year-old brother managed to escape to Italy where worked as a bartender. Arriving in Berlin in 1935, his family’s stay was cut short by the rising anti-Semitism around them which eventually forced them to migrate to Amsterdam, where they waited a month before being granted passage to Britain. Upon disembarking in Britain, his father was placed in an internment camp while his mother was given employment as a housekeeper. Red, meanwhile, was sent to the English countryside where he lived with a foster family for a year. In the fall of 1939, the three managed to secure a pass to the United States through a connection in Chicago.

Once there, Red’s family lived modestly in a one bedroom apartment provided by their sponsors in exchange for his father’s work at a hotel. To supplement their income, his father sold Fuller Brush products during the day while his mother fixed hair and gave massages in their home. The working conditions and way of life in Chicago, however, took their toll on Red’s father:

[H]is father didn’t speak a word of English, so [he] had to become a janitor and shovel coal into the furnace of this hotel, the Southerland Hotel in Chicago . . . He became very bitter, very angry, very tired . . . Red did not remember his father being angry in Germany, but in Chicago, shoveling coal all night into this hotel and having to sell Fuller Brush door-to-door during the day . . . we can imagine what his father went through during those years.\(^7\)

In contrast to the struggles his family encountered, Red thrived and was enrolled in school where he befriended other kids his age, including his future wife, Elaine, who provided this interview. He returned to Bünde for the first time in 1999 on a trip that evolved into an exchange program and collaborative project to record the histories of his community’s former Jewish population.\(^8\)

While the United States did not facilitate, legislatively, the entrance of refugees during the pre-WWII period, American Jews were able to sponsor their European relatives, an ability that was expanded upon by the DPA of 1948. Even with this allowance, a restrictive immigration system was in place due to the 1924 Immigration Act which informally discriminated against individuals of Eastern and Southern European descent. It did so by establishing country-specific quotas based on the 1890 census; a stagnant standard that did not take into account waves of immigration from these “less-than-desirable” nations that would follow in the subsequent decades. Additionally, visas could be denied to those who were deemed likely to become public charges. Though President Roosevelt enacted a more lenient “likelihood clause” in 1935, its potential to foster the entrance of refugees was not

\(^7\) Personal interview of Elaine S. by author, February 6, 2014.

quite realized, an outcome that may have been the product of prejudiced, and perhaps even anti-Semitic, inclinations on the part of American immigration officials in Europe.² Entering through a narrow gap within an otherwise discriminatory system, individuals like Trudy, Red (and his family), were able to escape persecution and possible death in Hitler’s Europe.

THE “DP CRISIS” AND ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE UNITED STATES

In its total, World War II displaced somewhere between 7 and 9 million Europeans. Despite the enormity of this number, by the end of 1945 more than 6 million had been repatriated, leaving behind those who were either incapable or unwilling to return to their prewar homes. Jewish refugees were amongst this latter group which, on VE Day, numbered about 200,000.³ By the end of 1946, the exodus of Eastern European Jews from Poland, the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania had expanded the number of Jewish DPs to an estimated 250,000.⁴ Many made their way to the DPs camps within the British- and American-occupied zones in Germany and Austria where they waited for the opportunity to emigrate. For some, this wait took nearly ten years as Foehrenwald in Bavaria remained in operation until 1957.⁵

Progress towards the resettlement of DPs in the U.S. began with the Harrison Report. Dispatched by Truman in July 1945, Earl G. Harrison’s mission was to examine the DP camps in Germany. His study noted the camps’ conditions, their organization, and their leadership, all of which he deemed inadequate. He also suggested that Jewish refugees in Austria and Germany be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. In this last regard, he particularly focused on Britain, calling upon it to modify its White Paper⁶ and to issue 100,000 visas to

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As Hagit Lavsky points out, this inablility, and in other cases, unwillingness to return to their home cities and towns can be attributed to their fears of “retribution, economic deprivation, or annihilation.” See Lavsky, Hagit and Leonard Dinnerstein, “Displaced Persons, Jewish,” *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (New York & London: Yad Vashem and Macmillan Publishing Co.: 1990), 377 [hereinafter *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*], “Displaced Persons, Jewish”). This fear was not unsubstantiated. Poland, in the spring and summer of 1946, witnessed an outbreak of anti-Semitic mob violence against Jews who had attempted to return to their former towns of residence. One of the worst incidents was seen in Kielce were forty-one Jews were murdered and another seventy-five badly injured. See Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America’s Half-Open Door, 1945-Present* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986), 8.

⁴ Of which 185,000 were in Germany, 45,000 in Austria, and 20,000 in Italy. See *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, “Displaced Persons, Jewish,” 377.

⁵ Heberer, *Children During the Holocaust*, 375-376, 395-397.


⁷ Britain’s White Paper of 1939 came about after the Arab Revolt seen in Palestine from 1937 to 1939, forcing Britain to reassess its policy in this country, ultimately restricting Jewish immigration. See “British White Paper
displaced Jews. Harrison also proposed that the United States should facilitate the admission of refugees with familial connections in the country. Though Truman urged Clement Attlee, head of the new Labour government in Great Britain, to act upon Harrison’s suggestions, Attlee did not take heed, claiming that the suffering of Jewish DP’s could not be proven to be greater than that of non-Jews. Instead, he suggested that survivors should be taken to camps in North Africa. Nonetheless, the findings of an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, dispatched in January 1946, echoed Harrison’s recommendation for admitting 100,000 Jews into Palestine, which Truman publically endorsed. In response, British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin claimed that “they did not want too many of them in New York,” and the committee’s report was rejected by London.

Bevin’s insinuations rang true to an extent, as anti-Semitism was present in the United States, infecting the nation well before WWII. Reaching its historical peak between the Great Depression and 1947, intolerance towards Jews began to be circulated by American media as early as the 1920s. *The Dearborn Independent*, published by automaker Henry Ford, was amongst the first of these outlets to do so. FDR’s inauguration in 1933, meanwhile, was followed by the emergence of pro-Nazi groups, with the president’s opponents referring to his New Deal as the “Jew Deal,” claiming that it was part of a Jewish

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4 Harrison’s task involved surveying “(1) the conditions under which displaced persons, and particularly those who may be stateless or non-repatriable, are at present living, especially in Germany and Austria, (2) the needs of such persons, (3) how those needs are being met by the military authorities, the Governments of residence and international and private relief bodies, and (4) the views of the possibly non-repatriable persons as to their future destinations.” He was also instructed to pay particular attention to the needs and views of Jewish refugees in Germany and Austria. In his report, he noted that DPs were crowded behind barbed wires under armed guard, where they experienced shortages in food, clothing, fuel, and adequate shelter. In some cases, the shelters were former concentration camps. While the high death rate among concentration camp survivors was not entirely unexpected given the physical state they were in upon liberation, the looming winter made their survival prospects even bleaker. Adding to the deplorable conditions of the camps was the realization that organized efforts to rehabilitate refugees and to reunite separated families were, with a few exceptions, largely non-existent. With regard to the specific needs of Jewish refugees, Harrison noted a pervasive low morale amongst them. Further exacerbating their state was the inability of the SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, and later the Combined Displaced Persons Executive) to provide them with special recognition as “Jews.” This was due to the fact that “Jews” were not part of a specific nationality, disqualifying them from any special recognition and aid, which would have otherwise been considered a form of special treatment. See Earl Grant Harrison, “The Plight of the Displaced Jews in Europe: A Report to President Truman” (New York: Reprinted by the United Jewish Appeal for Refugees, Overseas Needs and Palestine on behalf of the Joint Distribution Committee, United Palestine Appeal, National Refugee Service, 1945), 3-7, 9-11, 13 [hereinafter “Harrison Report”].

5 Epstein, *Children of the Holocaust*, 95.

6 Quoted in Epstein, 95.

7 Epstein, 95.

conspiracy. That same year, the Silver Legion, a fascist, white supremacist anti-Semitic group was founded, and organizations like the Ku Klux Klan and the Knights of the White Camelia saw an outpour in their support. Three years later, the German-American Bund began to organize the growing numbers of American National Socialists into Gaue, or regional districts. Individuals with influence also took part in voicing anti-Semitic rhetoric. Aside from Ford, who endorsed the publication of this prejudice, was Father Charles Coughlin whose widely-popular radio program reached millions of Americans. Though an early supporter of FDR, Coughlin—after realizing that he would not play a key role in the presidential cabinet—began articulating anti-Semitic attacks during his broadcasts in 1935. Up until the forced cancellation of his show in 1939, he derided “international bankers,” a phrase that most of his listeners understood to mean Jewish bankers, and even voiced his support of some of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s policies.20

Alongside the growing tide of anti-Semitism were marked tensions amongst other ethnic and social groups which escalated after the December 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. The American Jewish community was not exempt from this as swastikas and slogans defiled Jewish cemeteries and synagogues and anti-Semitic literature was made largely available. Jewish children were reportedly attacked by other youths, while anti-Semitic incidents in the army and Congress were publicized. Gauging the American mentality, polls taken by the Opinion Research Corporation between 1938 and 1941 revealed that one-third of its respondents believed that Jews held too much power in the U.S. During the war, these numbers rose to 56 percent and by 1945, they stood at 67 percent.21

Two independent studies, “Antisemitism among American Labor” (1945) led by the Institute of Social Research (ISR) and Wartime Shipyard: A Study in Social Disunity” (1947) conducted by Katherine Archibald demonstrate the continuance of anti-Semitic predispositions after WWII.22 Both studies were unique in that they took into account the

9 Ziege, “Patterns Within Prejudice,” 97-98.
21 Japanese internment camps were erected, while outbreaks of violence and intolerance shook the nation. In the Sleepy Lagoon affair of 1942, a group of Mexican-American teens were wrongly convicted of murder, while during the 1943 Zoot Suit Riots in Los Angeles Hispanic youths were violently targeted by American marines. Similar attacks also took place in cities like New York and Chicago. That same year, the “Christian Front hoodlums” caused a serious police scandal in Boston, which alongside the “hate strikes” launched in dockyards throughout the nation, only attested to the existing antagonism. See Ziege, 97.
22 Ziege, 97.
23 The first, “Antisemitism among American Labor,” was a large-scale project led by the Frankfurt Institut for Sozialforchung (IfS) in exile, also known as the Institute of Social Research (ISR), while the latter, Wartime Shipyard, was an independent two-year study conducted by Katherine Archibald from the University of California, Berkeley. Both sought to go beyond opinion polls to uncover American attitudes towards Jews and other traditionally disenfranchised groups. The ISR’s study took place between May and November of 1944 and involved 30 researchers and 270 volunteers who focused in industrial centers in the West, Midwest, and East—including NYC, Philadelphia, Camden, Newark, New Jersey, Pittsburg, LA, Detroit, and San Francisco,
views and prejudices of all groups and minorities they encountered. Both also recognized that anti-Semitic attitudes would have to be viewed within the context of the social change generated by the wartime economy—the mass emigration of countryside workers to urban centers, the securing of working-class jobs by the lower classes, the entrance of women into the workforce, and the movement of African Americans from the south to the east and west. Ultimately, the ISR study found that anti-Semitism increased despite the reported persecution of Jews in Europe. Archibald’s findings reaffirmed this conclusion, noting that Jews challenged the hierarchical structure in society “for although, in the shipyard view, the Jew was racially inferior to the Gentile, his cleverness, arrogance, deceit, and greed had made him the undeserving master of power and wealth. In contradiction to righteous principle, the magnitude of his sins was matched, not by failure, but by the magnitude of his success.”

In due course, the United States would address the “DP crisis” within the context of its own prevailing anti-Semitism. While this intolerance did not degenerate into the same degree of mass persecution and genocide witnessed in Europe, the U.S. was no stranger to its effects having exhibited symptoms of its entrenchment decades before the outbreak of WWII. As demonstrated by the polls and studies conducted during and after the war, the publicizing of the plight of European Jews did not lessen this discrimination but was in fact shown to have increased in spite of it. For Jewish refugees awaiting an opportunity to leave the European DP camps and to start anew elsewhere, the continuance of these attitudes shaped the environment upon which the DPA was passed, defining the expectations for their resettlement and affecting how they were received by cities and communities throughout the nation.

and smaller towns and cities in Massachusetts, Maryland, and Wisconsin— that were involved in the war effort, like ship making and motor and aircraft manufacturers. Volunteers performed their task as hidden participant interviewers during seemingly spontaneous conversations. Questions included: “1. Do Jewish people act and feel different from others? 2. Can you tell a Jew from a non-Jew? How? 3. Do you mind working with Jews on the job? Why? Have you ever worked with any? (a) How about working with Negroes (of course, this question cannot be asked a Negro worker) 4. Did you know any Jews before you started in your first job? At school or in your hometown? What were they like? 5. How do feel about what the Nazis did to the Jews in Germany? 6. Are there people in this country who would like to see feelings against the Jews grow? What groups? Why do they want it? 7. Do people think the Jews are doing their share in the war effort? What do you think?” Interviewers were additionally given a questionnaire to record the demographic information of their interviewees, such as gender, marital status, age, education, place of birth, original nationality, and religious affiliation. Similar in its goal but operating at a smaller scale, Archibald conducted her study between 1942 and 1944 as a “worker-observer” at the Moore Dry Dock, one of the largest dockyards in the San Francisco Bay Area. See Ziege, 102-108.

Ziege, 113-114.
Ziege, 115.
**ZIONISM, PALESTINE, AND THE TRUMAN DIRECTIVE OF 1946**

To Great Britain, the opening of Palestine was an unpalatable solution to the “DP crisis” due to its unwillingness to compromise its interests in the Middle East (namely in the form of oil, strategic ports, and waterways) and the Arabs’ opposition to the arrival of more Jews. Despite this opposition, Zionism, a movement that sought to establish a Jewish state, gained momentum within, as well as outside, the camps. One of its outcomes was the launching of a great, illegal immigration effort to Palestine as Zionists viewed the predicament of Jewish DPs as an opportunity to further their political agenda. Groups of Jewish refugees were consequently taken out of camps within the American zone in Germany and sent overseas from the coasts of Italy and France. Between 1945 and the formation of Israel in 1948, all but five of sixty-three ships carrying illegal immigrants were intercepted by the British, resulting in the internment of 26,000 Jews in Cyprus.

The need for a solution and Britain’s rigidity on the Palestine issue led the President to take action by issuing the Truman Directive of 1946. An estimated 40,000 visas were issued under this act, 28,000 of which were given to Jewish refugees. Perhaps desiring to buttress Roosevelt’s effort to convince the American public that their entrance into WWII was, as Peter Novick points out, “a matter of self-defense and not an endeavor to fight for the Jewish interests,” Truman was careful not to specify that these visas would go to victims of persecution. Instead, he claimed that such actions were aimed to “reduce human suffering.” His directive, however, was imperfect namely because of the obstructive immigration policies established by the static and wholly irrelevant 1924 Immigration Act. As a result, Polish Jews, who made up a considerable majority of the DPs, had to deal with Poland’s curtailed yearly quota of 6,524. Individuals from the Baltic regions fared similarly as allowances were pitifully small: 236 for Latvia, 116 for Estonia, and 386 for Lithuania. Furthermore, the act failed to reach its full potential as the approximate 40,000 visas awarded made up only 50 to 60 percent of the total number that were available.

The Truman Directive did, however, change one important aspect of American immigration policy with regard to sponsorship. Previously, only U.S. citizens could sponsor the admission of family members. The directive liberalized this ability by allowing American agencies to sponsor DPs through assurances known as “corporate affidavits.” Truman’s action thus established a precedent in the agency-refugee relationship by reassuring the

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27 Epstein, 95-96.
29 Quoted in Loescher and Scanlan, *Calculated Kindness*, 6.
American communities that would come to house these new arrivals, and the nation as a whole, that agencies would assume responsibility for the welfare of these refugees.\(^{31}\)

**THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948**

The movement that would bring about the passage of the DPA of 1948 was heralded by the American Council on Judaism (ACJ) and the American Jewish Committee (AJC) in 1946. Their mission was to launch a major campaign to secure 100,000 visas for Jewish DPs to enter the United States. Aware of the anti-Semitism that had poisoned both Congress and the American public, their strategy had to be carefully structured. First, it was determined that Congressional support would be sought by addressing the plight of Jewish refugees under the overall effort to aid the DP population. Second, the legislation advocated for, it was decided, should be expansive enough to allow for the entrance of a considerable number of endangered Jews even after a substantial number of non-Jews were admitted. And third, to assuage any possible qualms about the employability of these immigrants and the impact their admission would have on the national economy, a lobbying effort would also be launched to highlight the DPs’ skills and overall ability to assimilate. By 1947, their effort was more concretely conceptualized by the well-financed Citizens’ Committee on Displaced Persons (CCDP).\(^{32}\) Following the strategy hitherto outlined, a typical press release would identify “displaced persons” in this way:

> More than 75 percent of them are victims of one or another of European dictators, no matter what cause or name the dictatorship flourished—communist or fascist. They are, those 80 percent, of the Christian faith, a good many of them Polish and Baltic Catholics. Another portion of them, by far the smallest number, only one out of five is of the Jewish faith. Some of them are political exiles, and since fascism is nominally dead in Europe today, this means that some of them are exiles from countries now controlled by the communists.”\(^{33}\)

In other words, the best approach given the prejudiced attitudes towards Jews was to cast them in a light that would make them more appealing to the American mindset.

This campaign to incidentally bring in Jewish refugees was advanced by the Stratton Bill. Drafted by the Citizens’ Committee and sponsored by House Representative William Stratton (R-IL) in 1947, the measure called for the admission of 400,000 refugees over a four-year period. Though hearings were held over the summer of 1947, the Stratton resolution did not make it to the House floor. Truman himself did not publically support it.


\(^{32}\) Loescher and Scanlan, 9-10.

\(^{33}\) Quote in Loescher and Scanlan, 10.
In fact, he did not involve himself in the legislative process to address the “DP crisis” until the following year when the issue was once again brought to Congress’s attention.\textsuperscript{34}

In the midst of the congressional debates on the Stratton measure, the CCDP initiated a lobbying and publicity campaign to target Congress and those Americans who might support the act but feared the economic costs it could bring. This campaign sought endorsements and support from groups at the national and local level. It also worked to educate the public on the displaced persons situation and the ways in which their admission would positively impact the American economy. The CCDP would furthermore serve as a liaison between Congress and the Truman administration. In the end, the support of over 250 national organizations—labor unions, ethnic associations, religious groups, and an array of charitable, educational, and fraternal organizations—was obtained, generating significant public support to incite Congress to take action.\textsuperscript{35}

The deteriorating relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the disbandment of the UNRRA,\textsuperscript{36} and the U.S.’ entrance into the International Refugee Organization (IRO) helped solidify its commitment to alleviate the “DP crisis.” Despite this new determination, however, The Fellows Act, introduced in 1948, cut the number of prospective refugees to be admitted to 200,000. More restrictive than the Stratton Bill, the Fellows Act also placed particular provisions on who could enter. For example, it specifically called for the admission of 2,000 Czechoslovakian political refugees. In addition, a method known as “quota mortgaging,” or the subtracting of the admissions made under the DP act from the admission quotas of each immigrant’s respective country of origin, was to be employed. Furthermore, prospective immigrants had to:

\textsuperscript{34} Loescher and Scanlan, 14.

Truman, however, continually called upon Congress to take action, stating: “We are dealing with a human problem, a world tragedy. Let us remember that these are fellow human beings now living under conditions which frustrate home; which make it impossible for them to take any steps, unaider, to build for themselves or their children the foundations of a new life . . . Their fate is on our and must now be decided. Let us join in giving them a chance at decent and self-supporting lives.” See Harry Truman, “Special Message to the Congress on Admission of Displaced Persons,” 7 July, 1947, Public Papers of the Presidents, web (accessed September 19, 2013).

\textsuperscript{35} Loescher and Scanlan, 11-13.

\textsuperscript{36} As articulated by Loescher and Scanlan, the recognition that the refugees in Europe had become part of the political landscape and the nation’s developing anti-Communist policy overseas, helped convert the DP issue into an aspect of Cold War politics and ultimately built a basis of conservative support in the United States for action. The disbanding of UNRRA in 1946 by the United Nations was brought upon by the charge that it had provided rehabilitation assistance to individuals in the Soviet sphere. The Soviets also had complaints of their own. Believing that the UNRRA had a role in encouraging the resistance of Soviet nationals to be repatriated, it refused to continue providing financial assistance to this organization. The International Refugee Organization (IRO), created in 1947, called for active action to be taken to resettle the DPs and other refugees. Unsurprisingly, the USSR refused to join the organization. For the United States, however, a commitment to this organization—in the light of its perceived capacity over all other countries to take in DPs— alluded to an imminent change in its immigration policy. See Calculated Kindness, 15-18.
CALCULATED KINDNESS

(1) Prove that they entered one of the Allied zones of occupation in either Germany or Austria before April 21, 1947
(2) Be registered with the IRO as a “DP” or “refugee”
(3) Must lack proof of previous affiliation with any hostile movements against the U.S. or its form of government

Refugees were also required to have proof (or “assurance”) of employment and housing. Finally, preference was to be given to qualified farm laborers and trained professionals (doctors, dentists, nurses), individuals with experience in construction and garment-making, and those who possessed educational, scientific, or technological qualifications.37

Meanwhile in the Senate, a new measure was introduced, the Revercomb Bill, which was far more restrictive than the Fellows Act. To begin, it proposed the acceptance of 100,000 refugees over a two-year period. Additionally, admission was limited to those who had entered the DP camps on or before December 22, 1945. It also reserved 50 percent of all assurances for agricultural workers and suggested that 50 percent of those admitted should come from countries that had been annexed by the Soviet Union after WWII. This proposed act proved to be problematic on several fronts. First, many of the Jews present in the DP camps in 1945 had already left for Palestine, the U.S. (under the Truman Directive), or other countries. Moreover, Jews who had entered the camps after the 1946 exodus from Eastern Europe were disqualified by the December 22, 1945 deadline and very few Jews came from the annexed Baltic States of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia. Finally, the preference for agricultural workers further discriminated against Jews as many lacked such skills and background.38 Brought before the Senate floor on May 1948, two significant amendments were made. First, the number of DPs to be admitted over a two-year period was raised from 100,000 to 200,000. Secondly, preference was to be given to Volksdeutsche, or ethnic Germans, who had been expelled from Eastern Europe by the war.

Because the Fellows and Revercomb acts passed in their corresponding Houses, a conference committee was called forth to reconcile them. The end result was the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 which ultimately maintained the worst parts of both bills. While the act allowed for the entrance of 205,000 DPs from July 1, 1948 to June 20, 1950, the cut-off date for entrance into the Allied zone remained fixed at December 22, 1945. Moreover, the act reserved 30 percent of all visas for agricultural workers and 40 percent for citizens of the Baltic States. In a speech given in 1973—25 years after the passage of the DPA—Ugo Carusi, first Chairman of the Displaced Persons Commission (DPC), reflected on the situation and his frustration with the Senate’s prejudice:

Well, the net result was that, in the House of Representatives, a rather reasonable bill emanated and, in the Senate, one which anyone can say is

37 Loescher and Scanlan, 18.
unreasonable, so unreasonable that some of us wondered whether or not there wasn’t a concerted effort to make it so unworkable that it would be little better than no bill at all.39

It would not be until 1950 that the DPA was amended, dropping the preferences for agricultural workers and Baltic citizens, increasing the number of visas to 341,000, and extending the entry period into the Allied camps to January 1, 1951.40

EXPECTATION V. REALITY: WHAT DID DP’s WANT?

A disconnect exists between what Jewish refugees wanted to make of themselves after the war and what the U.S. determined it could do to address their predicament. In the end, the refugees’ perspective was largely ignored in the quest to outline rightful and convenient policy and action. Just a month before the passage of the DPA, the state of Israel was created, allowing for unrestricted DP immigration into that country. Conventional wisdom at the time determined that the majority of Jewish refugees would want to migrate there and that unrestricted immigration access would only add to their incentive. The actions of the refugees after the passage of the DPA, however, contradicted this expectation as many still endeavored to come to the U.S.41 A St. Louis agency worker puts this issue into perspective in the following way:

Many collateral clients have always wanted to know . . . whether the immigrant really wanted to come to the United States or if he was coming here out of desperation due to a lack of ability to go anywhere else . . . [M]any Americans who have worked for the Zionist cause or who have participated in the UJA Drive have felt that they were creating a new homeland for these helpless and homeless people. Now that Israel has been born they are sometimes resentful that the immigrant still wants to come to the United States.42

Historian Beth Cohen proposes a nuanced examination of this issue. By 1950, approximately 350,000 survivors had immigrated to Israel, 140,000 to the United States, and

41 Cohen, 15.
CALCULATED KINDNESS

several thousands to places like Canada, South America, Australia, and South Africa. Others remained in Europe.\textsuperscript{43} Difficulties in determining an exact number of migrating survivors comes from the fact that for some, their \textit{first} destination was not their \textit{desired} place to remain permanently. Cohen’s examination of post-war surveys taken to define survivors’ intent led her to determine that: “[M]ost of the refugees who immigrated to Sweden wanted to remain in Sweden, the majority of those in Austria wanted to go to America, and 50 percent [of those] in Belgium wanted to go somewhere besides Palestine.”\textsuperscript{44} Her findings thus call for a more measured approach when examining the post-WWII inclinations of Jewish DPs.

The issue of where DPs wanted to resettle is much more complicated than contradictory statistics on intent suggest. For many, the question of \textit{where} was less important than that of \textit{when}. Getting out of Europe was, for many, all that mattered. In some cases, destination was determined by familial connections, usually within the United States. Furthermore, when deciding between the U.S. and Palestine (or later Israel), some refugees registered to go to both places. Thus, if the U.S. consul was first to grant them permission to immigrate, the ideological, Zionist-driven question of Israel waned in contrast to the opportunity to get out. Other refugees were dissuaded from going to Israel out of concerns for the stability of a life there. A twenty-six year old survivor articulated his qualms in a July 15, 1948 letter:

“I am honest enough to say that I above all others would like to go there [Israel] . . . I am as much afraid as anybody of getting my throat cut or killed now that I have barely escaped past killings. However, this would certainly not prevent me from going there if it would not mean having all that I have built up again and all that I try to build up come toppling down like a house of cards.”\textsuperscript{45}

Concerns for family also added new dimensions to this issue. For the above survivor, the fact that his fiancée was physically unable to withstand the Israeli climate and his concerns for his mother’s ability to support herself independently further shaped his conviction to go to the United States.

Given the narrative of the refugees’ resettlement in the U.S., it is impossible to deny the presence of “calculated kindness” in determining the country’s response to the “DP crisis.” One way to consider this is to imagine a conference room full of people. Sitting around the table, deliberating over the board that is laid out before them, are leaders and representatives of the American government. Though not everyone agrees with one another at this table, all are united by their belief that whatever move the United States makes on this board, it must

\textsuperscript{43} Cohen, 15.
\textsuperscript{44} Cohen, 15.
\textsuperscript{45} Quoted in Cohen, 17.
fit the limits of convenience and ability. After all, they have constituents to appease and positions they’d like to maintain. Huddled in a corner of the same room are the representatives of numerous American Jewish relief agencies. They, too, are engaged in discussion and have an issue to address: the opening of the U.S. to Jewish refugees. But they have to be careful: How can they convince the American public to do something about the issue at hand? How can they come up with an amenable solution? Precision, strategy, and an awareness of the American sensibilities dictate their call for action. Finally, tucked away in a forgotten corner are the very people their actions are meant to address. All with voices of their own, but all unable to fully determine the course of their post-WWII lives. Like pawns, the hopes of these refugees for a new start were determined by the moves made on that board.

PART II: THE AMERICAN RELIEF AGENCY RESPONSE AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF DPS

ORGANIZATION, THE UNSA, AND THE NYANA

The resettlement of Jewish refugees in the United States fell solely on American relief agencies, mostly those of Jewish origin. Addressing this purpose, the Displaced Persons Commission (DPC), created by the DPA, concerned itself with the selection and transport of qualifying refugees from Europe and their resettlement in the United States. The immigrants that entered the country under the Truman Directive were amongst the first to test the eventual resettlement system employed after 1948. Private Jewish relief agencies like the National Refugee Service (NRS), the Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), and the National Council of Jewish Women’s (NCJW) Service to the Foreign Born took part in this endeavor, coordinating the transportation of Jewish refugees to the United States and providing new arrivals with shelter, food, clothing, and medical care.

On August 1946, the NRS and the NCJW’s Service to the Foreign Born merged to create the United Service for New Americans (USNA). Working exclusively with Jewish

47 Cohen, 17.
48 Established in 1939, the National Refugee Service provided a comprehensive immigration program. Between 1939 and 1940, the peak period of refugees fleeing Nazi Germany, the NRS employed 400 workers and utilized a budget of $3.5 million. Once WWII began, however, the low immigration levels reduced the organization to a skeleton staff. In 1946, the Truman Directive led to its revitalization and expansion. Nonetheless, the influx of immigrants led to complications in terms of reception, relief and vocational services. In 1939, it merged with the Service to Foreign Born of the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW), which had been in operation since 1904, to form the United Service for New Americans (USNA). See Haim Genizi, America’s Fair Share: The Admission and Resettlement of Displaced Persons, 1945-1952 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1993), 187-188.
agencies in Europe and the United States to facilitate the entrance and resettlement of refugees, USNA would become the backbone of the resettlement effort launched by the DPA. Within the United States, USNA was divided at the national and local level, the latter of which worked exclusively with Jewish refugees in New York City. These two levels were further subdivided into need-specific departments and organizations. The agencies, however, were challenged by the task at hand. Just a year after the passage of the act, the New York Association for New Americans, or NYANA, was created due to the growing number of refugees in NYC and USNA’s increasing budgetary needs. Thus, the NYANA would come to focus solely on the resettlement of refugees in the city, while USNA was restructured to work at the national level.

Overall, mobilization efforts within the United States to carry out an effective resettlement program challenged Jewish agencies. It was a mission that demanded flexibility, and at times reinvention, of policy and structure to best fit the demands at hand. The formation of the NYANA and the designation of the USNA to operate at the national scale is just one example. The effective fulfillment of the DPA through the work of the agencies, however, required more than internal reexamination, modification, and structuring. It required the cooperation of the American nation and its people. The degree of their responsiveness, however, varied from region to region, ultimately defining the American experience of Jewish refugees.

WHO WERE THESE REFUGEES?

Before advancing to a more detailed discourse of the specific ways in which aid was provided to Jewish survivors and how it manifested itself in “calculated kindness,” it is important to get a sense of who these survivors were. A NYANA study, Demographic Characteristics of the Recent Jewish Immigrant, published in 1950, and the later Memo to America: The DP Story, The Final Report of the United States Displaced Persons Commission published in 1952, are instructive on this matter. The former, a study of 17,938

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49 Found at the national level were organizations like Migration Services, Location Services, the Corporate Affidavit Reporting Unit, the Naturalization and Americanization Service, the Port and Dock Department, the National Reception Center, National Settlement Services, and European Jewish Children’s Aid (EJCA). Conversely, at the local level were Family Services, the Religious Functionary Division (RFD), the Vocational Adjustment Department (VSD), and the Business and Loan Services Division. See Cohen, 17-19.
50 The capacity of the USNA to advance national and local divisions would eventually come under question in the light of the growing migration to New York and the organization’s increasing budgetary needs. This questioning was formalized in a survey conducted in 1947 by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF) to evaluate the organization’s effectiveness in carrying out policy to meet the needs of the survivors. The results of the survey confirmed that the work of the USNA was worthwhile, but asserted that it should no longer oversee the resettlement of Jewish refugees in New York. Instead, it suggested, that the USNA separate along its national and local branches, which it did in 1949. See Cohen, 23.
NYANA clients provides a more specific picture than the latter, which considers the entire 395,000 displaced refugees admitted to the United States between 1948 and 1952. Nonetheless, the NYANA study and the 1952 publication parallel one another and help paint a demographic picture of the refugee community. The study conducted by the NYANA, for example, reveals that the majority of the Jewish DPs were Polish. This fact is supported by the 1952 report which details that over 70 percent of the immigrants admitted by May 1952 came from Eastern Europe, the largest group, 34.5 percent, from Poland. The second largest group, at 15 percent, was from Germany, followed by those from Latvia, at 9.3 percent.

These refugees were young. According to the NYANA study, 44.6 percent of its clients were between the ages of 24 and 40 years old. The average age was 29, contrasting the U.S. median age of 50. The 1952 study goes on to illustrate the overall immigrating DP population as “exhibit[ing] some of the characteristics of a young and growing population” as 29.5 percent were under the age of 20 and 87.6 percent were under the age of 50. Meanwhile, it also noted the disproportionately large number of children under 5 years of age. These statistics were also reflected in the NYANA caseload. According to the study, 4,500, or 27 percent, of its clients were under the age of 16, though only 1,156 were between the ages of seven and sixteen. The 1952 report goes on to infer that the youth of these immigrants is a reflection of the Nazi death machine:

(1) The largest group of those admitted were displaced persons who were victims of the Nazi labor program. The young and strong were selected, and were 20 to 40 years at the time they became slave-laborers for totalitarianism.
(2) Opportunity for bearing children and for marriage in this DP group was lacking during the period of persecution and forced labor. This accounts for the gap in the 5 through 24 year groups.
(3) Increased postwar births account for the large proportion of young children under 5 years of age.

With regards to gender, the Jewish refugee caseload examined in the NYANA study reveals that there were more male than female clients. The 1952 report echoes this conclusion.

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95 Cohen, 25.
96 The last DP ship to arrive in the United States disembarked on July 21, 1952. One should also note that Jewish refugees accounted for an estimated 140,000 of this total. See Memo to America, 242.
93 Cohen, 25.
Memo to America, 243.
94 Memo to America, 244.
95 Cohen, 26.
Memo to America, 245.
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For every 100 females there were 119.3 males admitted, a ratio of 45.6 to 54.4. Several reasons may account for this disproportionality:

After the start of the war, Jews perceived that men were at greater risk, and families sometimes encouraged husbands and sons to escape to the Soviet Union, where they spent the war years under brutal, but not genocidal, conditions. Another consideration is that men and women were separated upon arrival in concentration camps. Women and young children were kept together and, after selection, usually murdered together.

As far as family composition, almost 30 percent of the NYANA caseload belonged to a three-member family. This statistic is a bit misleading as 11 percent of these three-member families were not of the two-parents-and-a-child structure. Meanwhile, nearly 25 percent of two-member families, or 21 percent of the total caseload, were of different generations. Additionally, 10 percent of these two-member family groups were not couples but rather combinations of two adult males, two adult females, or one of each, perhaps brothers and sisters. The largest proportion of family units was the one-person family, constituting 35 percent of the total caseload. In keeping with the gender-ratio imbalance, men outnumbered women six to four. The 1952 report reaffirms these statistics, detailing that three of every four immigrants were part of a family group, more than half, or 52.2 percent, of which were single-family adult units. According to the report, the large percentage of single-family units is partly the result of the DPA definition of a “family” which excluded unmarried children over the age of 21.

In the midst of the statistics provided by these reports, it is important not to forget that these individuals were people, not numbers. They were survivors of an unnamed catastrophe, the extent of which had yet to be uncovered and reckoned with by the American consciousness. These individuals were unique, and in many ways, much unlike those who had previously entered the nation. And yet, it is possible to draw some conclusions and see distinct similarities in their American immigrant experience. This is partly the case because the agencies enacted policies and provided services based on the survivor. Age—and to a smaller extent, gender—for example, served as a discriminant, as the needs of adults and of minors differed and had to be addressed accordingly. Work experience also influenced their situation, as those with specialized jobs, like religious functionaries, or those with professional training, like doctors, faced difficulties of their own. Marital status and even the

57 Cohen, 26;
Memo to America, 245.
58 Cohen, 27.
59 Cohen, 26.
60 Memo to America, 246.
health of the survivor also shaped their experiences. The ways that agencies implemented policy into action allow one to draw parallels between each unique story.

POLICIES OF RESETTLEMENT

New York City was the place where refugees first disembarked and where approximately 60 percent stayed. USNA, in collaboration with other agencies, was nevertheless successful at encouraging refugees to settle elsewhere in the United States. Cities and smaller communities and towns across the nation were encouraged to do the “right thing” by taking in refugees. It is misleading, however, to think that Jewish refugees had much of a choice over their resettlement as their destination was often pre-determined before they even set sail for America. To obtain a visa to enter the United States, every DP needed a sponsor to provide an affidavit. This affidavit served as a way to reduce the likelihood that these immigrants would become public charges, as it committed an individual, agency, or (less often) an employer, to provide for the sponsored refugee. Sponsors were bound, on paper, to provide the following to each DP:

1. Assurance of suitable employment at not less than the prevailing rate of wages for like activity in the community where employed without displacing some other person from employment.
2. Assurance of safe and sanitary housing for the persons and members of his family who will accompany him and who propose to live with him without displacing some other person of such housing.
3. Assurance that the displaced person and members of his family who accompany him and propose to live with him shall not become public charges.
4. Assurance that the displaced person and members of his family will properly received at the port of entry in the United States and transportation and en route expenses from such port to the place of destination shall be provided.

In reading these stipulations, it is clear that an effort was made to reassure American citizens that these displaced persons would not take jobs or become public charges within their new communities.

61 Cohen, 31-32.
62 One should recall that Truman, in his directive of 1946, gave agencies the ability to provide corporate affidavits to immigrating refugees; a power that was previously reserved for family sponsorships.
63 Cohen, 32.
American Jews often became sponsors after learning of their relatives’ situation in Europe, perhaps via a personal letter from the surviving kin. Guilt may have had a role in motivating many of these sponsors to take action. Rae Berman and Callman Rawley from the Jewish Family and Children’s Service of Minneapolis explain, in their 1948 article, the process involved in getting American relatives to sponsor. The end goal of this course was to “help the person who is motivated and driven by conscience . . . to become related to the reality and the situation as well as the responsibilities that will follow his [the DP’s] migration to this country.”

For the agencies, the allocation of these individual affidavits was beneficial for both humanitarian and practical reasons: A DP sponsored by a family member became that family’s responsibility, freeing both agency resources and an affidavit for someone without familial connections in the country.

Such sponsorship, however, became problematic as many of those who provided these individual affidavits failed to abide by the requirements and financial responsibilities. Part of this neglect was perhaps the result of miscommunication on the part of the agency. In a 1950 article written for the Jewish Social Service Quarterly, Frida Romalis voiced her concern over the failure to properly inform U.S. relatives that, in sponsoring family, they were to assume complete financial responsibility over them. An example she presents is the “M” family whose American relatives, upon discovering that they had survived the war, endeavored to bring them to the country. The M’s arrived in December 1948. However, less than a week after reaching St. Louis, where their sponsors lived, the M’s showed up at the local Jewish Family Service Agency asking for employment, housing and money for dental care and to purchase clothing. Romalis explains that “[i]t was only after pressure from us that the relatives . . . were willing to undertake to give room and board,” leaving all other costs to the St. Louis agency.

While miscommunication between agencies and sponsors appears to be a valid explanation for this issue, its extent is hard gauge. Did the prospect of becoming responsible for refugees deter any from sponsoring their relatives? Would more individuals have provided an affidavit if agency assistance would have been more readily available?

New York alone accounted for 77 percent of all individual affidavits provided. Of these, almost 90 percent turned to the NYANA for assistance. But why did so many choose to stay in New York? “New York was the center of American Jewish life,” Cohen notes, for:

In 1948 the Jewish population of the United States was 5,000,000 of which 2,000,000 lived in New York City out of a general population of 7,455,000 . . . New York had Jewish neighborhoods with the infrastructure necessary to those who wanted it. There was a substantial Yiddish culture, both secular and religious: press, schools, theater, and radio

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67 Cohen, 33.
programs. New York was also home to the majority of the country’s *landsmanschaft* (hometown social groups), which provided an important social network for survivors.\(^68\)

This desire to remain in New York, however, ran contrary to the DPA, which called on agencies to work to disperse refugees across the nation to prevent their concentration in urban centers. USNA and other cooperating Jewish agencies attempted to meet this regulation by working with American communities to establish quotas for the number of refugees they could accommodate. A selection of undated occupation lists from Linz, Munich, Stuttgart, and Vienna provide a brief glimpse of this endeavor, as DPs were to resettle in cities and towns across the country based on these regions’ specific labor needs. A refugee from Linz, for example, was needed in Indianapolis, Indiana to serve as a “Jewelry Engraver.” Another, a refugee from Stuttgart, was needed as a farmer in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.\(^69\)

Refugees, however, often foiled such plans by refusing to leave or by returning to NYC after being placed elsewhere.\(^70\) So, how did agencies respond to these unauthorized movements? The universal response of all agencies was that unless such an individual could take the place of another in that locale’s quota, all agency support was to be denied them. While vocational services would still be available, it was often not enough to help these self-starters. The 1950 amended version of the DPA included a “Good Faith Oath” requiring all refugees to go and remain in their assigned communities.\(^71\) The securing of community assurances from regions outside New York was hence an intentional move by the USNA to send refugees away from the city to prevent the economic costs of their concentration. Corporate affidavits were instrumental in this endeavor.

Resettlement outside NYC, however, posed other problems. Convincing these locales to not only accept but also retain Jewish DPs was difficult. Efforts to educate these communities on the plight of Jewish DPs awaiting entrance into the nation were of variable effectiveness. Pleas on their behalf would be made to American communities to open their arms to these new immigrants. One of these came from William Rosenwald, honorary president of USNA, in November 1949. Addressing 150 Jewish leaders at the Midwest Conference of the USNA, Rosenwald called upon Congress to liberalize the current 1948 legislation to allow more refugees to enter the country beyond the June 1950 cut-off date. He

\(^{68}\) Cohen, 34.


\(^{70}\) Cohen, 35.

\(^{71}\) Cohen, 45.
also reprimanded U.S. communities for their inaction, encouraging them to provide more housing and work assurances, believing that

“... unless American communities act with the greatest haste and determination tens of thousands of homeless men, women and children now in displaced persons’ camps in Europe and eligible for admission in the United States next year would miss the opportunity to enter this country.”

Some places heeded the call by providing a quota of immigrants they were willing and able to accommodate. Once a community did commit to a specific quota, a USNA field representative would follow up to ensure they understood their responsibilities and followed through with their agreement. Nonetheless, many communities that agreed to accommodate new arrivals often expressed certain discriminatory stipulations on the “type” of refugees they would welcome. Examples of these preferences can be seen in the field reports taken by USNA workers during the first year of the DPA’s passage.

**COMMUNITY RESPONSES**

The reports taken by USNA field workers illustrate the response that American communities typically gave when asked to take in Jewish refugees. One striking feature about them is the abbreviations used to describe refugees. These include: S (Singles), C (Couples), NSO (No Sabbath Observers), NMM (No Mixed Marriages), NA (No Aged), NK (Non-Kosher), C/C (Case by Case), SK (People with Skills), SFU (Small Family Unit), ES (English-Speaking). For example, the August 1948 report on Louisville, Kentucky listed the city’s restrictions as: “NSO, no artists, musicians, waiters, Chronic, aged dep [dependents].” It was also noted that a refugee had been rejected that month on the basis that “[the] client had been in NY 2 years—agency only willing to accept recent arrivals.” That same month, an agency in Sioux City, Iowa specified its desire for “no complicated cases—pref. [prefer] Eng. speaking,” while Grand Rapids, Michigan voiced similar concerns as: “NSO, N.M.M. No health, dep. [dependents] or emot. [emotional] probs. [problems].”

Additionally, these reports demonstrate the unwillingness of certain locales to welcome DPs through the alleged inability to accommodate them, either because the agency itself faced challenges, or because the community was regarded as inadequately equipped to

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73 Cohen, 36.
cater to the needs of these refugees. Though it was surely beyond the means of some communities to open their doors to refugees, the argument begins to lose credibility when applied to larger, more developed cities. In August 1948, for example, Rochester, New York rejected a refugee “due to limited emp. [employment] opp [opportunities] for client.” Dallas, Texas, also rejected a case in March 1949, claiming there were “inadequate sources in community to meet clients need for econ. adjustment.” Meanwhile, some locations like Jacksonville, Florida and Charleston, South Carolina expressed no desire at all to participate in the resettlement program.

Anti-Semitic prejudice was present in the usage of acronyms like No Mixed Marriage (NMM) and No Sabbath Observers (NSO) and the alleged inability of certain locations to take in refugees. In voicing a preference for NSO, a community turned away religious refugees, like rabbis and yeshiva students. Denying entrance to mixed-marriage couples was also discriminatory as it upheld intolerant views on what constituted a socially acceptable union. Meanwhile, communities that did not want minors, the aged, or the sickly also shut their doors to some of the most vulnerable of refugees. These forms of discrimination exemplify the “calculated kindness” that shaped the resettlement experiences of displaced refugees. In this case, American communities were the ones to do the calculating by defining who was (and was not) welcome and in what capacity. Though “kindness” was implied in their willingness to accept refugees, its extent is lessened by its upholding of restrictive immigration precedents. Such precedents largely cast the unemployable and dependent immigrant as an undesirable cost to assume.

THE PUSH FOR SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND PRACTICALITY

The primary goal of agencies was to make refugees self-sufficient as soon as possible. The NYANA is a case-in-point. Initially, the agency was set to provide aid to refugees for up to five years. After the arrival of over 20,500 individuals in 1949, the NYANA had to reexamine its policies. The result was the “8-4” plan, which limited the aid given to refugees to exactly one year. This act meant that refugees were expected to be self-sufficient—housed and employed—within a year of their arrival. Displaced persons who had been in the country for more than a year and who were not at risk of deportation, were in danger of having their cases closed by the NYANA. Partially a financial move, the enactment of the “8-4” plan is estimated to have saved the United Jewish Appeal $2.5 million. From these savings, $1

79 Cohen, 53.
million was to be allocated to help enforce this policy.\textsuperscript{80} Demographic characteristics also played a role in NYANA policy. As illustrated earlier, the arriving DP population tended to be youthful and in the prime of their working years. The NYANA used this fact to its advantage by enacting the “20-40” policy, requiring all able-bodied men and women between the ages of 20 and 40 to find useful employment. This policy would become standard across American Jewish relief agencies after 1950.\textsuperscript{81}

The NYANA employed the Vocational Service Department (VSD) in their quest to help refugees find employment. Refugees’ first interaction with the VSD came in the form of a group orientation session—often in Yiddish—where they were introduced to the “American way of work, from wages and working conditions, to the types of jobs available, to unions and licensing requirements.”\textsuperscript{82} These individuals were then assigned a counselor with whom they would lay out a plan of action to secure employment as soon as possible. Additional programs for those with specialized training and skills were also available. Nonetheless, the fact that many of these newcomers were “unskilled, spoke little English, had trades that were not transferable to America, and did not always look the part of a proper job applicant,”\textsuperscript{83} generated several obstacles. To overcome them, the NYANA turned to businessmen in the Jewish community to help secure jobs. A December 1950 issue of Inside NYANA demonstrates the efforts, proclaiming that 20 refugees were employed through cooperation with the Amalgamated Joint Board and several employers in the men’s clothing industry.\textsuperscript{84} Potentially employable immigrants were also featured as part of the United Job Funding Campaign financed by the VSD. Radio shows, the Rabbinical Council of Greater New York, and the Yiddish press were also used, particularly with cases that were deemed difficult to place. Amongst those who fit in this category were “middle-aged women who had never worked, . . . young people with seminary backgrounds, . . . intellectuals, [and] other white-collar workers in their fifties.”\textsuperscript{85}

The adoption of the “8-4” rule led to a marked insistence that refugees take the first available job. The “P” family, who arrived in New York in April 1951, is just one of the many families and individuals who faced these demands. Mr. and Mrs. P were a young couple, 24 and 23 years old, respectively, and parents to a baby girl who’d been born in Germany in 1949. Though Mr. P aspired to obtain a job as a watchmaker, the caseworker assigned to him didn’t believe that his training through the ORT (World Organization for Rehabilitation) was enough to qualify for the job. After refusing to explore other opportunities, Mr. P was referred to a VSD counselor. Eventually, during the family’s sixth week in the United States, Mr. P and his counselor struck a deal: Mr. P had ten days to secure a watchmaker’s post. If

\textsuperscript{80} Cohen, 53.  
\textsuperscript{81} Cohen, 54.  
\textsuperscript{82} Cohen, 61.  
\textsuperscript{83} Cohen, 59.  
\textsuperscript{84} Cohen, 59.  
\textsuperscript{85} Cohen, 59-60.
he failed, he would let the VSD place him in any job. In the end, Mr. P failed, not because he didn’t try, but because Mrs. P had fallen ill, leaving him to take care of their daughter. His counselor, however, was unsympathetic and refused to give him additional time to look for a job. She also threatened to withhold the family’s relief check until he followed through with their arrangement and made himself available for employment. Thus, the agency’s inflexibility along with the unpredictability of life marked the P’s first year in the U.S. with difficulty. In the end, Mr. P abandoned his hopes to be a watchmaker and found work on his own as a shipping clerk.

Mr. and Mrs. “G” provide another example of how the NYANA pursued its goal of making refugees self-sufficient as soon as possible. Arriving in February 1950, their caseworker proved to be particularly aggressive in expediting their independence from agency aid. In their third meeting with the caseworker, the couple expressed their desire to delay their job search until after they had secured an apartment from an acquaintance. Their case worker, however, wondered if their refusal to look for jobs could be attributed to a “fear of moving out and beginning to live on their own” and threatened to close their case if they did not find jobs within two weeks. While their case was not closed then, as Mr. G was able to show that he was actively looking for work, both were still unemployed by June of that year. Because his wife had become sick, Mr. G accepted an unpaid on-the-job-training post at a friend’s factory out of desperation. For the agency, this meant extending their support of this family. By the end of July, Mr. G had worked himself up to earning 75 cents an hour. Less than a month later, however, he too, fell ill. After making a full recovery, he learned that he had been laid off in his previous post. Though the NYANA caseworker encouraged him to turn himself over to the VSD and take any opening, the G’s case was closed on December 31.

The urging of DPs to take up the first available job was not unique to NYANA. Other agencies adopted similar measures. This was the case for Mr. “L,” a 38-year-old refugee who had been resettled in Cincinnati, Ohio. An agency worker from the local Jewish Family Service Bureau noted that Mr. L was determined to secure a job as a welder, but because Mr. L’s experience amounted to a few months of vocational training in the DP camps, his abilities were rather limited. The Cincinnati agency instead suggested that he take another job while he worked on his English, so that he could take advantage of free training at a public school in the future. Mr. L, however, refused. It was only after the agency threatened to withhold any financial aid that he relented.

The American government’s quest for self-sufficiency and practicality determined the means by which Jewish relief agencies exhibited “calculated kindness.” The endeavor to

86 Cohen, 54-55.
87 Quoted in Cohen, 55.
88 Cohen, 55-56.
make refugees independent of their aid as soon as possible was an ideal that did not always translate into reality. Given the experiences of families like the P’s and G’s, one can see that these standards were inflexible, and that they failed to consider the unique circumstances of each case. Illness, for example, was an issue faced by both of these families and a concern that may have had deeper psychological roots in the persecution and murder of Jews under Hitler’s reign of terror. Age, experience, gender, and the ability to speak English were discriminants and obstacles to those who were unfortunate enough not to fit within the ideal of youthfulness and employability. The ways in which caseworkers dealt with these difficulties were in keeping with this calculation through their rigidity, and at times, lack of sympathy for the plight of these newcomers.

SPECIAL CASES: RELIGIOUS FUNCTIONARIES (RFs)

Religious functionaries (RFs) presented the USNA and its collaborating agencies with a special case. After the war, orthodox organizations, including rabbincic seminaries and the Vaad Hatzala (the wartime orthodox rescue committee) collaborated to bring these religious refugees into the United States. The Religious Functionaries Department (RFD) was created in 1947 for this purpose. The USNA, and later the NYANA, and their respective agencies also came to contribute to their effort. Unlike other Jewish DPs who considered themselves “religious,” RFs required assistance in securing appropriate jobs based on their specialized training. Additionally, financial responsibility for RFs was shared amongst the USNA, the NYANA, their affiliates, and orthodox organizations. Adding to the difficulties already present in the resettlement process of Jewish DPs was “the fact that for strictly orthodox refugees their religious values defined who they were and how they wanted to live. This was often at cross-purposes with the agencies that emphasized employment and self-sufficiency above all.”

Like other refugees, religious functionaries possessed qualities that made them unique. A heterogeneous mix of individuals, their composition “spanned a spectrum that ranged from Hasidic rebbes and their followers to yeshiva (men’s seminary) students to working-class Sabbath observers.” They didn’t all look the same either, as some donned the traditional Hasidic dress, with beards and side curls, and others opted for a more Western dress. Additionally, how RFs experienced WWII differed:

One seminary, the Mirrer Yeshiva, had survived in Shanghai, China. One of two institutions that fled to China and remained intact, the Mirrer Yeshiva immigrated, en masse, to America after the war. A few illustrious rabbis had escaped Europe before and even during the war and had transplanted their

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90 Cohen, 74.
91 Cohen, 74.
institutions in the United States and founded the Beit Midrash Gehova (a replica of the yeshiva he headed in Kletsk) in Lakewood, New Jersey. Yeshivath Chachmey Lublin, for example, was wiped out during the first years of the Holocaust but reestablished in 1941 in Detroit . . . Other remnants of celebrated Eastern European yeshivas survived the ghettos and camps, eluded the enemy by hiding, and even operated as partisans . . . The majority were not elite scholars but, nevertheless, had lived religious lives in their prewar communities. And they assumed they would do the same in America.92

To them, coming to the United States meant having an opportunity to “recreate, through new orthodox institutions and communities, a life similar to the one that was destroyed. For some, this was a way of honoring the vanished world.”93

Like other agencies, the RFD’s goal was to get RFs to be self-sufficient in the shortest time possible by stressing the need for employment. In New York, appeals made to Jewish religious leaders inspired the presidents of Yeshiva University and the Jewish Theological Seminary to offer a series of courses in their institutions. One such course sought to acculturate European rabbis in the American-style of sermonizing; another course intended to retrain men for employment as Hebrew schoolteachers. Still, this was not enough, as there were RFs who did not qualify for retraining as American teachers. In response, agencies suggested that RFs be trained in religious skills that would make them more employable. Suggestions like these did not sit well with some students and rabbis. Just as agencies operated toward the goal of getting refugees off their aid as soon as possible, many rabbis and students stood by the traditional expectation that their communities—in this case, the agencies—would financially support them during their studies.94 Such a contradiction further illustrates the clashing of interests between agencies and refugees. Because refugees were their dependents, the agency cause often prevailed. That is not to say that RFs did not meet success; some did. In these cases, their command of the English language, their prewar recognition, and, at times, even their age, played a role in aiding scholars to secure relevant posts around the country.

The experience of many yeshiva students was colored by their temporary visas and the treatment by their sponsoring institutions. On June 1947, the executive committee of USNA called together a special meeting to address a number of concerns involving immigrant relief services. The following policies were decided upon regarding yeshiva groups and students:

92 Cohen, 74-75.
93 Cohen, 75.
94 Cohen, 76-77.
(1) For the entire Yeshiva Group reduce the relief grants in accordance with steps taken under “Maintenance Grants” for other clients.

(2) Notify all the established Yeshivas which have signed affidavits for persons that a time limit will be set for continued support during which they are to plan to secure their own financing.

(3) Notify all the Yeshivas that we will assume no responsibility for future groups coming to this country. Those without a place to go on arrival will be sent to the New York Jewish Transient Shelter operated by HIAS. 95

The Theological Seminary Yesivath Chachmey Lublin in Detroit was one of several rabbinical academies around the nation that provided yeshiva students with these types of visas. In the course of five years, the institution had successfully sponsored a total of 30 seminary students who had found refuge in Shanghai. Though it had agreed to assume financial responsibility for these students for the next five years, within a few months of their arrival, the seminary turned to the Detroit Resettlement Service for a grant to help them provide for their new students. Its director, Harold Silver, turned to USNA and voiced his concerns over the work of this seminary, which, by that point, had applied for an additional 30 visas for a group of boys, aged 13 to 17. More specifically, Mr. Silver was concerned that providing assistance to the seminary would put undue pressure on the Detroit office. 96

In the end, it was clear that the “yeshivas’ leaders believed that bringing the European remnant back to their yeshivas was a holy mission. This took precedence over everything, including the secular communities’ way of operating.” 97 After January 1, 1949, all students entering the U.S. were required to secure employment; failure to do so within a month of their arrival would result in the termination of agency relief. Such was the case of Mr. and Mrs. F, a 22 and 23-year-old couple from Romania who entered the U.S. on student visas and failed to secure employment within the allotted month. Incredulous of the fact that they were ineligible for aid, their caseworker was unmoved by their pleas and denied them any sort of extension based on the policy. 98

The desires of religious functionaries often contradicted the vision under which agencies wished to operate. Because of the dependency of these refugees on agency aid, as mentioned earlier, the agency cause often prevailed over the desires of the refugee. Rabbi E. experienced this in his aspiration to continue his rabbinical education. His consulting caseworker, however, felt that he had inadequate experience despite the fact that he had been ordained shortly before the start of WWII. His caseworker appears to have failed to recognize that the reason for his perceived lack of experience had been beyond his control.

95 Cohen, 81.
96 Cohen, 78-79.
97 Cohen, 79-80.
98 Cohen, 80-81.
Following the “8-4” rule, Rabbi “E” eventually found a job as a presser in a neckwear factory. Mr. “R,” a 25-year old religious functionary from Prague, had had his rabbinical studies interrupted by the start of the war. After the war, he wanted to finish his training as it would allow him to follow in the footsteps of his father, who had been a well-known rabbi in Czechoslovakia. Upon arriving in the U.S., the NYANA refused to finance the remaining two-to-six months of training he had left and encouraged him to find other employment. Mr. R was shocked by the agency’s decision. His caseworker noted how the news was “very difficult for Mr. R to accept . . . It was quite evident that he could make no brake [sic] with his past experiences in relation to his social status, and feeling that it would continue in this country.”

By the same token, there were former religious functionaries who did not wish to continue on their career path once they arrived in the U.S. Individuals like these were referred to the VSD. Recalling the problems faced in attempting to secure employment for the general adult “20-40” populace, there was always the possibility that the refugee would reject the prearranged job assigned to him or her. Additionally, orthodox refugees who “looked” orthodox could be subjected to discrimination based on their appearance and beliefs. Communities throughout the country, as noted earlier, could exclude “Sabbath Observers” from their refugee quota allowances. Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, for example, rejected one religious functionary in December 1948 on the basis that “no housing, emp. [employment] opptrys [opportunities]” were available. In that month alone, no less than 17 cities stipulated “No Sabbath Observers” (NSO) in their quota restrictions. While these communities did not voice this prejudice forthrightly, their calculation and ultimate exclusion of religious functionaries and observant Jews was but a form of veiled anti-Semitism. A prejudice that had entrenched itself in the American mentality prior to the war, the presence of anti-Semitism continued to make life difficult for Jewish refugees seeking to start a new life in the U.S.

Finally, there were also instances where RFs pursued their own goals independent of any agency aid. Rabbi Baruch Goldstein, a survivor of Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and a death march, arrived in New York in 1947. Though he had grown up in a deeply religious home, seeing the magnitude of the Holocaust’s destruction and coming to terms with the murder of his family rushed his faith. His entrance into the U.S. was secured by the intervention of a young college student named Rifka, who, after hearing of Baruch’s situation from his aunt in

99 Quoted in Cohen, 83.
CALCULATED KINDNESS

California, implored her brother, a rabbi in Pittsburg, to sponsor him. Eventually, he enrolled in a yeshiva, regained his faith, and married Rifka. Thus, while it was possible to forgo agency aid, not all refugees could afford to make this choice. Refugees were oftentimes very dependent on the aid, albeit calculated, that the USNA and its collaborating agencies provided. This dependency, as seen in the narratives of refugees as a whole, helped to subjugate them to the agency’s policies, even if it contradicted what they themselves expected and desired.

SPECIAL CASES: MINORS

Minors, like religious functionaries, represented another special case. Unlike all other refugees, they remained dependents of the agencies until they were adopted, reached adulthood, or got married. The mobilization of an effort to bring in these young charges can be traced to the German-Jewish Children’s Aid (GJCA) established in 1934 by the U.S. to resettle German refugee children in the country. The GJCA was a “landmark: the first agency in the United States to be involved with the protection of the rights of alien children.”102 The standards for finding refugee children new homes as well as for supervising their placement were established by this agency. When the United States Committee for the Care of European Children, also known as the U.S. Committee, was founded in 1940, the GJCA became one of its partner agencies by helping it fulfil its mission of rescuing European children endangered by the war. The U.S. Committee would then determine which children were eligible to enter the U.S.

A year later, in 1941, the GJCA was renamed the European Jewish Children’s Aid (EJCA), and was solely responsible for the placement of Jewish refugee children allowed into the country by the U.S. Committee. While its activities dwindled during the war period, after the war, EJCA resumed its work with the U.S. committee in placing refugee children. Upon arriving, orphaned children with no family in the country became charges of EJCA and were temporarily housed at a reception center in NYC. They remained there for several weeks and were mentally and physically evaluated while the EJCA worked to find them suitable homes. Additionally, the EJCA was responsible for submitting semiannual reports to the U.S. Children’s Bureau – a federal agency that set standards for local child-care agencies—and the immigration and naturalization authorities.103

Unlike the 140,000 DPs who reestablished themselves in the United States, the majority of these minors, about 1,000, arrived between 1946 and 1948 under the Truman Directive. Statistical figures are inconsistent, however, as an unknown number of children entered the U.S. under Section 3 (b) of the DPA that called for the admittance of 3,000 non-quota children.104 Alex Orkow was one of these children. His adoptive parents, a New York

102 Cohen, 95.
103 Cohen, 94-96.
104 Cohen, 96.
City couple, had spent the wartime years stationed in the Bahamas and Alaska working for the United States Corps of Engineers. After the war, David, a doctor, and Ruth, a teacher, joined the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, or “Joint,” in its mission to rehabilitate Holocaust survivors living in DP camps in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Childless, the Orkows hoped to adopt two orphaned children of their own. In the summer of 1947, both were assigned to the American zone in Germany. Ruth was given a position in the financial department, while David was appointed chief emigration officer for Bavaria. The search for orphaned children, however, proved to be difficult. Almost no children under the age of six had survived the concentration camp system. Meanwhile, those children that survived the Holocaust had been hidden during the war in Christian homes, in convents and monasteries, and in the countryside by underground Jewish organizations. Before finding Alex, the Orkows had one adoption attempt fall through. The child they had hoped to adopt, a 12-year-old boy, had plans to bring his surviving father to America.

Things changed on Christmas Eve of that year when the Orkows learned that there was a two-year old baby boy living at the Burgl Gut orphanage in Salzburg, Austria. The couple decided to adopt him on the spot as the infant was scheduled to leave for Israel with a group of orphans the next day. And so, after a snowy winter’s drive across the German-Austrian border, little Alex Klein became Alex Orkow and found himself on his way to a new life. To this day, not much is known about his life before Burgl Gut except that the people who left him there requested that he should be told nothing of his origin. It is likely that he, like other orphaned infants, was a child of survivors who had either died in the last months of the war or shortly after liberation, or who had found themselves in a situation that would have forced them to give him up.

Alex thrived with the Orkows, and soon, a little sister for him, Linda Ann, was found. However, even after being formally adopted, the Orkows learned that their children were still subject to the United States immigration quotas. Entrance into the country, they were told, was not likely to happen in the immediate future. Using his influence within the Joint’s immigration department, David was able to share this dilemma with a group of congressional aides who were doing research for what would become the DPA. The aides promised to see what could be done, and when the act was passed in May, Alex and Linda were issued visas #1 and #2 under the “3,000 non-quota children” provision.

The troubles for the Orkows, though, did not end there, nevertheless. After returning to New York in 1948, their happiness was threatened once again when Jewish welfare agencies began to question the legitimacy of the children’s adoption procedures. Seeking

106 Personal interview of Alex Orkow by author, February 8, 2014.
107 “David and Ruth Orkow,” 149; Orkow interview.
legal advice, David and Ruth were encouraged to move to the Midwest where agencies would allegedly prove to be more sympathetic to their situation. Shortly thereafter, David was offered a director’s post of a Jewish home for the aged in Omaha, Nebraska, and the family relocated. Though Alex, now an architect and businessman, does not consider himself a “survivor” and may have led a relatively “normal” life, the tragedy of his existence lies in not knowing the truth about why he was left at Burgl Gut.108

Unlike Alex and Linda, the majority of the children that entered the U.S. under the DPA were unaccompanied minors. To be eligible, the child had to be under the age of 16 and have entered the American zone by June 25, 1948. Minors under 21 were brought into the U.S. through affidavits under the regular quota. In keeping with the demographics of the refugees who entered after 1948, the majority of these young charges were of Eastern European descent. The average age of the group was between 17 and 18 years of age. Media coverage, however, tended to overlook this fact and impressed upon the American public that these refugees were young children and not young adults perhaps in an attempt to make them more acceptable, for lack of a better word, in the eyes of their audiences. The New York Herald-Tribune provides just one example, publishing an article on October 1, 1946 titled: “20 War Orphans among 945 on the Ernie Pyle . . . Waifs’ Ages Range from 2 Months to 18 Years; All Will Go to Foster Homes.”109

An illustration of this ignorance is reflected in the numerous letters sent by prospective adoptive parents to the USNA after the passage of the Truman Directive. In their correspondence, these hopefuls voiced their desire to adopt an orphaned “child” and were often very specific on the age and gender. Many voiced a preference for young children or infants, mostly under the age of twelve. A few of these letters read as such:

“I am interested in adopting an Infant girl approximately 5 –months. And of Jewish faith.”110

“A young Jewish couple has requested that I write to you to determine the possibility of their adopting a European child, male or female, as young as possible.”111

“We are interested in adopting a little refugee girl, two years or younger.”112

108 “David and Ruth Orkow,” 150-151; Orkow interview.
109 Cohen, 96–97, 94.
110 P.F. to USNA, letter, November 1950, RG 249 (German Jewish Children’s Aid Records, 1933-1953) MKM 8.13, File 232, YIVO Archive, Center for Jewish History, New York, NY [YIVO Archives].
111 F.L. to EJCA, letter, March 195[?], RG 249 (German Jewish Children’s Aid Records, 1933-1953) MKM 8.13, File 233, YIVO Archive.
112 J.R. to EJCA, letter, October 9, 1957, RG 249 (German Jewish Children’s Aid Records, 1933-1953) MKM 8.13, File 234, YIVO Archive.
“If possible we would like to adopt a child, boy, of 4 to 6 years of age, a Protestant, and white race.”

“We would be interested in a German child below the age of 2 years, younger if possible. Is there such a child that needs a home?”

Unlike other refugees, orphans’ sponsors assumed responsibility over them until they married or became legal adults.

Given the nature and background of these minors, the question of whether or not they required treatment different than other foster children generated debate. In a May 1948 presentation before the National Conference of Jewish Social Welfare, Deborah Portnoy presented her observations. Noting the adolescents’ behavior and state of mind in comparison to that of typical teens, she attempted to apply a psychological lens to their situation. While she cites that some psychological factors explained the behavior of these orphans, she does not dwell of what this trauma was.

“A confluence of factors—agency policies, foster care placement, location of settlement, children’s wartime experiences—shaped the resettlement of these most vulnerable charges. Some of the questions and dilemmas that faced older refugees applied. But there were other considerations, unique to orphans, which necessitated different responses.”

Like adult DPs, the reality that these orphans faced upon resettlement is varied and oftentimes contradicts any suggestion of success from the agencies’ perspective. A study of 38 children who arrived in Detroit between 1946 and 1948 deemed half of the placements “unsatisfactory.” Overall, while it was recognized that orphaned DPs had needs that differed from their adult contemporaries, the overall agency policy operated under the attitude that these charges were not to be treated any differently than other clients. For these orphans, the presence of such attitudes determined the experience they would come to have in the United States.

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113 G. H. to DPC, letter, September 12, 1951, RG 249 (German Jewish Children’s Aid Records, 1933-1953) MKM 8.13, File 234, YIVO Archive.
114 H.H. to DPC, letter, June 26, 1951, RG 249 (German Jewish Children’s Aid Records, 1933-1953) MKM 8.13, File 234, YIVO Archive.
115 Cohen, 97-98.
116 Cohen, 95.
117 Cohen, 100.
118 Cohen, 97-98.
As charges, minors were completely dependent on the agencies and had little say in their future. Some grew up in orphanages and others were placed in foster homes or adopted by American families. But there were those who were not entirely alone, those who were sponsored by family members in the country. Like adult DPs who arrived on individual affidavits, these sponsors assumed responsibility over the welfare of these minors and were sometimes eligible for monetary assistance from the agencies. This incentive, however, came to have negative repercussions in the experience of Michel Jeruchim. Sponsored by an uncle in Brooklyn, Michel and his two siblings did not feel very welcome in their uncle’s home, namely due to their aunt who did not feel responsible for their welfare. However, when Michel and his older brother left to find a place of their own, his uncle’s family was upset by the fact that they would be losing the supplemental income they had been provided with. Of course, not all instances were like Michel’s.

Eric Cahn’s experience is interwoven with both grief and hope. Born in Mannheim, Germany in 1938 Eric was two years old when he and his infant sister, Suzanne, were placed in a freight train with their parents, Julius and Hannah. The train took them to Camp Gurs in southern France. Two years later, in late August of 1942, Eric, now four, along with two-year old Suzanne, were rescued from the camp by the Oeuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE) in its endeavor to save Jewish infants and children. Both were placed in a children’s home in Chabannes, France and shortly thereafter taken in by French Christian families who hid them for the remainder of the war. Letting her children go was their mother’s last act of hope; a month later, she and Julius were deported to Auschwitz; only Julius survived the war.

In the spring of 1944, Eric and Suzanne were reunited in an orphanage outside Paris. After liberation, their father returned to Germany and began to search for them. He was not alone in this quest. Their mother’s immediate family, who had left Germany in April 1939 through the sponsorship of an American family member, were also looking for Eric and Suzanne. Because Hannah had been married by the time this affidavit was granted, she, Julius and the children were unable to escape Germany as the sponsorship could only cover one family. After the war ended, Hannah’s parents, who had settled in Pueblo, Colorado, learned of their grandchildren’s fate through the OSE office in NYC and wrote to the orphanage on February of 1945. Though they expressed their desire to bring the children to the U.S., the OSE hesitated and wanted to delay their emigration, believing the children were too young to travel. Their father located them in November of that year, and was reunited with them on September of the following year. Julius Cahn was different man, however, as Eric explains:

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119 Cohen, 105.
Personal interview of Eric Cahn by author, February 6, 2014.
121 Cahn and Saltzman, *Maybe Tomorrow*, 7-9, 25-27.
My father had survived Auschwitz and physically he was fine, but as a person he had lost a lot. He never spoke of his experiences or what he had to do to survive. He told us mother had died but would not discuss how she died. After a few months, because I think he realized he wasn’t being the kind of father he should or wanted to be, he made plans for my sister and I, just the two of us, to come to American under the Displaced Persons Act.\footnote{Cahn interview.}

In the spring of 1950, Eric, now twelve, and his sister boarded a plane for the United States. After arriving, they were temporarily placed in an orphanage in New York while their paperwork was sorted out. They arrived in Pueblo that May and were immediately enrolled in school so that they could begin learning English. Living with their grandparents, however, proved to be a difficult experience for Eric. Though his grandfather was kind, his grandmother was very critical of him.\footnote{Cahn interview.} Both were also elderly which might partially explain why they decided to place them in foster care a few years later. Their reasons, nonetheless, remain unclear:

We never knew why Oma and Opa decided to retire at that time or why they didn’t offer to take us along [to New York]. We never heard any reasons why Simon or Molly, their married children, didn’t offer to take us in. The family was shedding its responsibility for us as easily as it had accepted that obligation only three years earlier.\footnote{Cahn letter.}

Suzanne and Eric were placed with separate families in Denver. The arrangement did not last long, however, and both ultimately ended up at the Jewish National Home for Asthmatic Children, which also housed a small number of orphans. Unhappy and disillusioned with the number of times he had been transplanted from place to place, Eric credits the Home with being the place where “for the first time in my life, I felt completely happy.”\footnote{Cahn interview.} He stayed at the home until he graduated from high school. Afterwards, he attended the University of Colorado in Boulder where he majored in math, a subject he taught for three years at the junior high level. He later served as the Home’s residential program director for six years, before embarking on a career as a financial planner, marrying, and raising a family. Eric, now retired, serves as a Red Cross volunteer in Denver and is actively involved with the local Jewish community.\footnote{Cahn letter.}
SUMMARY: SPECIAL CASES

In the context of the overall number of DPs who entered the U.S., religious functionaries and unaccompanied minors were minorities. Because RFs had special training in their fields, the Religious Functionaries Department was charged with the task of helping them find employment ideally, but not exclusively, within their fields. Intent, however, was not always reflected in practice. This was unfortunately the case for this group, as not all of them were able to find employment or qualify for training in the American way of sermonizing. Furthermore, individual beliefs clashed with agency policy. Orthodox functionaries for example, believed that their religious values defined who they were and how they wanted to live. Yeshiva students, similarly, anticipated that their religious communities would financially support them during their studies. In the end, such expectations did not always fit within with the reality that agencies were willing or able to provide as the push for self-sufficiency remained a universal objective. This mindset drove these organizations to push these refugees to acquire more employable skills. Students, meanwhile, had the added difficulty, after January of 1949, of having to find a job within a month of their arrival. To top it all off, the presence of anti-Semitic prejudice remained an issue, as seen in the rejection of “Sabbath Observers” and “Mixed Marriages” by communities across the country.

Minors, meanwhile, were by and large the most vulnerable of all refugees. Like the rest, they too had to meet requirements before being allowed to enter the United States. In comparison to most, Alex Orkow’s experience stands as an exception to the reality that most of these children and young adults faced upon being designated charges of numerous of agencies, orphanages, and relatives. Misconceptions about their youth were held and one could argue, promoted, in order to make them more “acceptable” to the American populace. Stability in their situation of these minors once they entered the country was not guaranteed, as Eric Cahn’s story demonstrates in his displacement across land and sea that began the moment he and his family were put on that freight train in 1940. Unable to have a say in their futures, these young refugees remained the charges of their sponsors until they married or became of legal age. This is perhaps the only generalization that can be made about this group—and of all refugees: the fact that their lives were shaped by the efforts of agencies and sponsors.
PART III: “CALCULATED KINDNESS” RECONSIDERED AND THE POST-DPA SITUATION

“AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM”

The call to bring about the DPA, the legislative battle that ensued, and the ways in which agencies implemented policy are not the only instances where “calculated kindness” can be detected in the U.S. postwar accommodation of refuges. In fact, the quest for practicality in the efforts to bring the “DP crisis” to an end is also evident in what agencies chose to promote, and perhaps even more tellingly, in what they chose not to. One of the vehicles by which agencies promoted their work is “American exceptionalism,” or the belief “that the United States is not just the richest and most powerful of the world’s more than two hundred states but is also politically and morally exceptional.”117 This interpretation was appealing because it allowed these organizations to blanket their “calculated kindness” under the justification that their endeavor to resettle Jewish refugees was “in keeping with the great American tradition of asylum.”118 Agencies presented their work using pamphlets, articles, newspapers and other media outlets. USNA’s annual reports, for example, regularly featured survivor accounts and their successes as “New Americans.” Likewise, the USNA News, would often publish stories with headlines that emphasized the significance of the agencies’ efforts to resettle incoming refugees.

In another example, a pamphlet titled “Wanderers Yesterday—Americans Today: A Photo-Story of a Family’s First Days In the U.S.A” the work of the USNA in placing a refugee family in the Midwest is likened to the American tradition of extending the blessings of liberty.119 The title of this publication, nevertheless, is troubling. Whether intended or not, the word “wanderers” is evocative of the “Wandering Jew” myth, a medieval folk tale about a figure, later known as Ahasverus, who was “forced to wander the earth because he had rejected Jesus Christ.”120 This myth persisted well into the twentieth century and was used in Hitler’s propaganda to cast the Jew as “the eternal foreigner, who would never learn to speak the national language property or strike roots in the soil.”121 The insinuation, therefore, is that upon entering the U.S. this “Wandering Jew” became a proactive, American citizen and that agencies, and the populace as a whole, should take pride—and comfort—in that.

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119 “Wanderers Yesterday—Americans Today: Photo-Story of a Family’s First Days In the U.S.A,” n.d. 1-93, Box 23, Folder 9, AJHS Archives.
121 Quoted in Crowe, The Holocaust, 25.
In the end, the use of “American exceptionalism” helped to generate an incomplete and selective reality where success, or the appearance thereof, took predominance over the real issues that these immigrants faced upon entering the U.S. It is a perspective that ignores the difficulties of refugees having to learn a new language and live in a country with a culture and history that was different from their own. It also does not take into account the added pressure that “able-bodied” immigrants faced in having to find suitable employment before agency assistance was terminated. In the end, these “New Americans” stood as an identifiable group in the communities, newcomers whose differences had to be blanketed in order to be made acceptable, and whose presence served as a living reminder of an event most people wanted to forget. Many were met with ambivalence:

People wondered how they had survived. They speculated on possibilities like collaboration with the Nazis, unfair play, [and] prostitution. Some people asked these questions out loud while others did so silently. Neither course was conductive to trust.33

**THE “MYTH OF SILENCE”**

Perhaps most remarkable, however, is the fact that the psychological trauma of these refugees, some of whom were concentration camp survivors, was largely ignored. At the time, in fact, it was generally accepted that these refugees were simply not ready to talk about their WWII experiences, a supposition known as the “myth of silence.” However, as Beth Cohen, argues, this “silence” began not with survivors, but with the agencies and American society as a whole in shutting out a reality they did not want to hear. The psychological community is partially responsible as some of its proponents held that survivors needed to move on and stay occupied in order to keep them from dwelling on guilt and loss. If the agency referred a survivor to psychological help, it was often because of an issue that interfered with their employment. In the end, however, the real issue for many of these victims laid in having to cope with a past that threatened to dismantle their efforts to start anew. As inconceivable as this may seem today, this conspiracy of silence was the reality that refugees faced. Though HIAS did continue to work close with arrivals after the DPA expired, “for the most part, Holocaust survivors dropped out of sight” after 1952 when their plight was largely forgotten by the media, the American public, and even certain parts of the Jewish community.

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33 Epstein, 98.
33 Epstein, 98.
35 Cohen, 148.
36 Epstein, 97.
It was not until the passage of a series of acts in the 1950s that psychiatrists and a small number of lawyers began to take interest in the survivor community. This began with the Luxembourg Agreement of September 10, 1952, which required the Federal Republic of Germany to partially recompense the Jewish people for material damage incurred under the Nazi government.\(^{137}\) This was followed by the German Federal Restitution Law of 1957 which set out to compensate Nazi victims for the loss of furnishings, jewelry and precious metals, bank accounts, securities, and other objects confiscated by the Nazis. This indemnification was to be carried out through a series of payments that were to replace the restitution of the actual lost properties. Meanwhile, personal wrongs suffered by survivors like injuries to health, loss of liberty, property damage, harm to professional or economic advantage and other hardships were to be addressed by the German Federal Indemnification Law, first passed in 1953 and overhauled in 1956.\(^{138}\)

These provisions were difficult to address and demanded the work of lawyers to carry out an effective litigation process. Some survivors saw these monetary compensations as “blood money,” and refused to accept it claiming that nothing could ever restore their lost family members and make up for the wrongs that they had suffered. Out of those that did accept these indemnity payments, many found themselves in financial straits and decided to press claims, particularly on the grounds of loss of health. To do so, however, these claimants had to undergo medical and psychiatric examinations to establish a connection between their present physical and mental sufferings with the abuse they had endured during WWII. This process, in turn, motivated the development of a subgroup of psychiatrists. Their work, however, was obstructed by a number of difficulties from the start as the reality of survivors defied anything they had previously studied in textbooks:

Many examiners, who had been schooled in strict Freudian tradition, were unprepared to accept the notion of mass, adult trauma and refused to believe that the Holocaust and its aftereffects might cause permanent psychological and physical change. According to their textbooks, ‘Traumatic Neurosis,’ the term they used to describe what survivors had undergone, was a short-term, self-limited syndrome. Survivors were expected to display clearly defined and consistent symptoms that would eventually disappear.\(^{139}\)

Survivors presented them with a number of issues to consider. A small number of them had been hospitalized for psychiatric disturbances after being resettled. Others

\(^{137}\) The first part of this agreement called upon Germany to provide some $714 million in goods and services to the State of Israel. An additional $107 million was to be given to a “Claims Conference” who was to represent a number of Jewish organizations. Another stipulation was to enact far-reaching German legislative measures to compensate individual victims. See Epstein 99.

\(^{138}\) Epstein, 99-100.

\(^{139}\) Epstein, 101.
appeared to have reestablished themselves well and were only prone to chronic periods of difficulty. And still there were those who had appeared to take on unperturbed lives that resembled their pre-war circumstances. The repression of trauma, moreover, led survivors to present issues years after their liberation. Many were ambivalent about having to undergo such evaluations in order to claim restitution and “resented the doctor for representing an authority whose opinion would validate their experience.”

A small number requested treatment as receiving psychiatric help carried the implication that Hitler’s era was not over and that their continued suffering was evidence of a posthumous victory for Nazism. As years passed, the study of massive psychic trauma continued to be developed and perfected by a burgeoning psychological community in the late fifties and into the 1960s and 1970s. Psychosomatic disorders, depression, anxiety, social and asocial behavior, withdrawal, fear, and numerous other concerns took on a different form in the study of Holocaust victims.

Lamentably, this interest was not present at the onset. And, as Paul Friedman remarked in the American Journal of Psychiatry in 1949, “[i]t seems altogether incredible today that when the first plans for the rehabilitation of Europe’s surviving Jews were outlined, the psychiatric aspect of the problem was overlooked entirely. . . Everyone engaged in directing the relief work sought solely on terms of financial assistance.”

In the end, “American exceptionalism” and the “myth of silence” distorted the Jewish immigrant experience. The first, did so by promoting a success narrative that commended the work of agencies but ignored the difficulties that these “New Americans” faced after entering the U.S. The second is an example of how far this directed oblivion could go, this time by misinterpreting the alleged “silence” of refugees and failing to recognize the extent of their psychological trauma. Ultimately, both of these lenses helped to legitimize the “calculated kindness” of the U.S., its agencies, and its populace by presenting their actions as a source of national pride. In reality, however, these efforts were but a means to maintain the silence of a group whose trauma stood as a reminder of a period many wanted to move past.

WHAT HAPPENED NEXT: LOOKING BEYOND THE DPA

The DPA was amended in 1950. President Truman, in his statement upon signing this bill, claimed that:

When I reluctantly signed the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, I did so in spite of certain of its provisions which imposed unworkable restrictions and resulted in unfair discriminations. Nevertheless, I felt it was necessary to

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140 Epstein, 103.
142 Quoted in Epstein, 98.
make a start toward a resettlement program for these victims of totalitarianism who yearned to live as useful citizens in a free country.\textsuperscript{143}

Overall, this amendment did eliminate much of the “unworkable restrictions” upheld by the first version of the bill. The preferences for agricultural workers and Baltic citizens were dropped, the number of visas was increased to 341,000, and the cut-off eligibility entry period into the Allied camps was extended to January 1, 1951. However, even after the DPA expired, Jewish refugees continued to immigrate to the United States through the sponsorship of relatives, and agencies continued to help rehabilitate them even without a formal legislation dictating them to do so.

Osi S. was one of these individuals. Born in Presov, Slovakia in March of 1935, he was eight years old when his parents had him smuggled into Kassa, Hungary to be hidden by relatives. After Hungary fell to the Nazis on March 1944, Osi was reunited with his mother and father, and the three managed to survive the rest of the war hidden in the Tatras Mountains. Though his family managed to recreate their musical instrument store after the end of the war, the rise of Communism led them to migrate to Israel in March of 1949. Upon arriving, they were temporarily placed in a holding camp outside Haifa. Osi, however, was an independent and restless spirit and snuck out of the camp after a few days. Afterwards, he joined a youth settlement for a year where he met other kids from his Slovakia and learned Hebrew and Jewish history. Afterwards, Osi, now fifteen, apprenticed at a fine mechanics shop before entering high school a year later. His parents, meanwhile, tried and failed to reestablish their business in Israel and immigrated to Caracas, Venezuela in 1954. After graduating high school, nineteen year-old Osi served in the Israeli Army as a musician for three years before joining his parents in Caracas in 1957. He immigrated to the United States a year later through the sponsorship of one of his father’s cousins who managed to secure a scholarship for him to attend a music school in Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{144}

CONCLUSION

In examining the experiences of Jewish refugees who entered the United States after 1948, it is important to remember that they were survivors of an unnamed catastrophe, the extent of which had yet to be uncovered and reckoned with by the American consciousness. These individuals were unique, and in many ways, much unlike those who had previously entered the nation. As a generally youthful generation of immigrants, their future rested on the work of their sponsoring agencies, families, and the communities that took them in.

\textsuperscript{144} Personal interview of Osi S. by author, February 7, 2014.
With regards to the agencies’ relocation of these refugees, it would be unfair to claim that their efforts were ineffectual; in fact:

Never before had cooperating communities been called upon to participate in this manner: to accept refugees in their midst, offer financial aid, locate housing, find jobs, provide social casework services, extend medical care, advise on immigration laws.  

Survivors, however, present a narrative that qualifies the extent of this success. For many, the aid provided often fell short of their expectations and neglected needs that should have been but were not addressed. Unmentioned were the struggles of having to learn a new language, the dependency on agency aid, the lack of sympathy and understanding of their own trauma, and the pressure of having to secure work in a foreign society with its own history of anti-Semitic prejudice. While the work of the USNA and its collaborating agencies may have been unprecedented in terms of humanitarian immigrant care, these agencies operated in terms of what they perceived to be the best for the refugees within the bounds of their own limitations. Their work, hence, was but a form of “calculated kindness” that was legitimized by the employment of “American exceptionalism” and the “myth of silence.”

“Calculated kindness” serves as a unifying factor between the varied experiences of Jewish refugees as agencies and the American public answered the call to action within the limits of their ability and willingness. This phrase, “calculated kindness,” is particularly appropriate in examining this area of history, as calculation was present at all levels of the resettlement process. It guided the legislative path to the DPA, it determined who got to come to the United States and who did not, and it established the kind of aid provided, to whom it was to be made available, and for how long. Did it generate a perfect resettlement program? No. Was it exceptional? Perhaps, but only to an extent. As the beneficiaries of retrospective consideration, it is up to us to look beyond the selective reality once propagated and recognize the effects of the ever-present calculation that shaped the experiences of these immigrants.

Cohen, 50.
APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ American Council on Judaism
AJC American Jewish Committee
CCDP Citizens’ Committee on Displaced Persons
DP(s) Displaced Persons
DPA Displaced Persons Act
DPC Displaced Persons Commission
EJCA European-Jewish Children’s Aid
GJCA German-Jewish Children’s Aid
HIAS Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society
IRO International Refugee Organization (IRO)
NRS National Refugee Service
NYANA New York Association for New Americans
RFD Religious Functionaries Department
UJA United Jewish Appeal
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
USNA United Service for New Americans
VSD Vocational Service Department

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"The USNA Story: A Summing Up, 1933-1953 of 20 Years of Service to Jewish Refugees By the American-Jewish Community," March 1954, I-93, Box 23, American Jewish Historical Society, Center for Jewish History, New York, NY.
AN INTERVIEW WITH ANNE ELLER

Professor Anne Eller joined the Yale History Department in 2012, after receiving her Ph.D. from New York University, where she won the Dean’s Prize for Outstanding Dissertation in the Humanities. Her work explores political movements, identity, and citizenship in the Caribbean and Latin America, with a particular focus on Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Her articles have appeared in Small Axe and the Journal of Early American History, with a forthcoming manuscript on the 1861 Spanish reoccupation of the Dominican Republic. The Yale Historical Review Associate Editor David Shimer ’18 sat down with Prof. Eller to discuss her work, history at Yale, and the state of the field of Latin American and Caribbean history.

Interview and photograph by Associate Editor David Shimer, DC ’18
YHR: What led you to specialize in Latin American and Caribbean history?

ELLER: I entered graduate school to train as an African historian, actually while [still] a high school teacher. During my first year of graduate school, I switched to the African Diaspora.

YHR: What does your current research focus on?

ELLER: My current research is about the Caribbean just after the end of slavery. I am looking at how people managed to fight to end slavery and win emancipation, including the difficulties they confronted and the projects they were able to realize.

YHR: Are there any lessons or patterns from your research that, in your view, could help to address present-day developments in Latin America?

ELLER: Absolutely. All of the fictions that we have about “post-racial” subjects, or all of the ways that racism hides itself in modern society, rely on an erasure of the historical processes of racism. The nineteenth century is when you see that really clearly. It was when there were a number of things in contest about labor roles and land tenure, and the discourse coming from people with power is reasonably dishonest. They say, ‘everyone is equal now, let’s see what you do with things,’ and this is a great experiment. But it’s not equal at all! They do measure after measure to stack the deck. They restrict, for example, small farmers from being able to own their land; they restrict voting rights. And so after they set up this unequal stage, then they say with great theatrics and a tremendous amount of intellectual production: oh well, the experiment has failed. With all of the presentation of no bias, you see a lot of historical processes that go toward creating inequality, and the idea of the individual – this sort of liberal, economic, rational actor that is divorced from any kind of context or history and is always male – becomes deracinated in that period. And so if you see how this was a willful construction of a very specific person growing out of colonialism and slavery, then you can start to deconstruct its abstractness and understand how even that very concept is working to produce inequality.

YHR: What do you see as the most exciting developments in your field right now?

ELLER: That one is easy. Historians are always grappling with how to move beyond the archive, and there are literatures in South Asia and Africa that do this very well. But for some reason, maybe because of its difficulty, a lot of research in this field is focused on just the British Caribbean or the French Caribbean. But the way people lived on the ground, though of course shaped by empire, was also shaped by [the geography of] islands, travel, communication and things that happened off the record. So if you are just an average person in the Caribbean, let’s say in the nineteenth century, it’s likely that you’re getting news about what neighboring islands are doing and making your decisions based on that, whether you’re
going to migrate, etc. It’s entirely possible in many places – the Dominican Republic, for example, which I specifically work on – that you will never leave any trace, so historians have started to think really creatively about how to see this inter-island movement. As a result, lots of research coming out right now is intensely pan-Caribbean.

YHR: Is that where you hope to see Caribbean/Latin American Studies go in the future?

ELLER: Sure, absolutely. The problem is that there are institutional barriers. Multi-archival research costs money. There are interesting digitization projects going on right now. Professor Jane Landers at Vanderbilt is part of a team working with endangered archives throughout Latin America and beyond, and they have digitized all of the Catholic Church records. So folks studying this area can have a sense of the way people acted in multiple sites. The Transatlantic Slave Trade Data Base, which has been in production in one way or another since the work of Philip Curtin in the 1960s, has facilitated our understanding, for example, of all of the boats on record crossing the Atlantic. That sort of work is helping people out. But there are still difficulties to face, including that you have to be able to speak multiple languages to engage in this research, and the [increased] cost of research.

YHR: Which other historians have most influenced your thought/work?

ELLER: Eric Williams, who wrote a classic book in the 1940s called Capitalism and Slavery; Julius Scott, who is now at the University of Michigan, was really formative; and my own advisor, Ada Ferrer, at NYU. Her first work was on the ending of slavery and independence in Cuba, and now she’s looking at relationships between Cuba and Haiti – she’s also a beautiful writer. There are many others. One person I wouldn’t want to omit is Michel Rolph-Trouillot, who was an historical anthropologist. His work is absolutely seminal.

YHR: What was the best history class you have ever taken?

ELLER: We’re talking undergrad now! Gregory Mann at Columbia. I took two of his classes, one was “Main Currents in African History” and the other was “West African History.” They were both phenomenal. The survey course allowed a breadth of thematic considerations that allowed you to see patterns across the continent. The more specific class allowed for his work as a researcher to shine, including his work with oral history. And he also was just a phenomenal professor – one of those professors who is so smart that even during his asides you’re constantly writing things down.

YHR: Why did you choose to come to Yale?

ELLER: I was at the University of Connecticut prior to coming to Yale. And leaving was not
an easy decision. Each environment brings positives. One of the wonderful things about being at Yale right now is how supportive [the department] is of my research, and my incredible colleagues. I’m learning new things all the time here at Yale, and I’m very excited to continue teaching and research.

**YHR**: *How would you describe a Yale history student in three words?*

**ELLER**: Phenomenally smart; eager.