The Yale Historical Review provides undergraduates an opportunity to have their exceptional work highlighted and encourages the diffusion of original historical ideas on college campuses by providing a forum for outstanding undergraduate papers covering any historical topic.

The Yale Historical Review Editorial Board gratefully acknowledges the following donors:

**FOUNDING PATRONS**
- Association of Yale Alumni
- Weili Cheng
- Department of History, Yale University
- Matthew and Laura Dominski
- Jeremy Kinney and Holly Arnold Kinney
- In Memory of David J. Magoon
- Sareet Majumdar
- Brenda and David Oestreich
- The Program in Judaic Studies, Yale University
- South Asian Studies Council, Yale University
- Stauer Undergraduate Organizations Committee
- Derek Wang
- Yale Club of the Treasure Coast
- Yale European Studies Council
- Zixiang Zhao

**FOUNDING CONTRIBUTORS**
- Council on Latin American and Iberian Studies at Yale
- Peter Dominski
- J.S. Renkert
- Joe and Marlene Toot
- Yale Center for British Art
- Yale Club of Hartford
- Yale Council on Middle East Studies

**CONTRIBUTORS**
- American Historical Association
- Department of the History of Art, Yale University
- The Ethnicity, Race, and Migration Program at Yale
- Near Eastern Languages & Civilizations Department at Yale

Yale
- Jacob Wasserman
- Greg Weiss
- Annie Yi

For past issues and information regarding submissions, advertisements, subscriptions, and contributions please visit our website:

HISTORICALREVIEW.YALE.EDU

Or visit our Facebook page:

WWW.FACEBOOK.COM/YALEHISTORICALREVIEW

With further questions or to provide feedback, please e-mail us at:

HISTORICAL.REVIEW@YALE.EDU

Or write to us at:

THE YALE HISTORICAL REVIEW
206 ELM STREET, #205145
YALE UNIVERSITY
NEW HAVEN, CT 06520

The Yale Historical Review is published by Yale students. Yale University is not responsible for its content.

Correction for print edition of the Yale Special Issue of the Review: The article titled “Town, Gown, and the Great Depression” misstated Yale’s payroll in 1932 and the amount that Yale students spent in New Haven. They should be $4.3 million and $3.5 million, not $4.3 billion.

**ON THE COVER**
LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Russian collusion. Border conflict. Religious persecution. Struggles for cultural and national identity. These are just some of the themes that can be found this issue of The Yale Historical Review. In many ways, these subjects bring to mind current events as much as past ones; many in the West today recognize that we live in what feels like an unusual time, in which trends in public discourse seem at once both retrograde and unprecedented. Now more than ever, history is needed to elucidate the past for a new generation of citizens seeking its example. Although not centered around any geographic or temporal theme, the essays in this issue deal with topics that, we hope, speak to some of the most serious challenges and controversies of our modern political environment.

In perhaps the most topical essay of this issue, Emma Platoff, MC ’17, explores the U.S. government’s anti-communist investigation of Department of Veterans Affairs Doctor Paul Harold Lavietes to illustrate the invasiveness of McCarthy’s crusade. Platoff’s story reminds us of a not-too-distant time that is arguably relevant to our current national conversation.

Two of our essays examine tensions between transnational cultural exchange and the establishment of distinct national identities. In his essay on the early history of the Toronto Blue Jays, Graham Ambrose, BR ’18, illustrates the little-known history of baseball’s introduction to Canada, an event that transformed both the sport and Canadian culture as a whole. Focusing further south, Yoselyn Paulino, University of Miami ’17, details how Dominican ruler Rafael Trujillo sought to cleanse the Dominican Republic’s western border of Haitian influence to achieve a non-Black conceptualization of Dominican national identity.

Two other essays discuss instances of dramatic religious conflict and persecutions. In a fascinating piece, Gabriel Groz, JE ’19, investigates the English persecution of early Methodists during the first Great Awakening, asserting that public figures, legal institutions, and mob violence together served to suppress early Methodism for fear of the sect’s socially destabilizing characteristics. Looking to a more recent time, Daisy Li, University of Western Ontario ’16, traces the roots of modern ethnic and sectarian conflicts in the Balkans and Middle East to the late Ottoman Empire’s millet system. Li asserts that Ottoman governance cemented ethnic differences through socioeconomic stratification, leading to violence upon the introduction of Western nationalist ideas over the course of the twentieth century.

Finally, we conclude with an interview with Professor of History Timothy Snyder, a renowned twentieth-century European and American historian. In his recent book On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century, Snyder draws from the rise of twentieth-century totalitarians to offer important, applicable lessons for democracy’s modern-day defenders. In the interview, we explore some of these lessons with Snyder, as well as discuss his work in the field of history more generally.

As we reflect on the past, we remain grateful for the work of our editors, particularly our graduating seniors, Emily Yankowitz, Eva Landsberg, Maxwell Ulin, and Isabelle Taft. Thank you also to all of the students, both at Yale and at other schools, who were generous enough to allow us to share their essays with readers. We hope you enjoy reading these papers as we have enjoyed preparing them, and that you walk away with lessons you carry into your understanding of not just the past, but also the present.

Sincerely,

Maxwell Ulin and Eva Landsberg
Editors in Chief
## CONTENTS

5  **A MAN OF PRINCIPLE**  
   Paul Harold Lavieties, 1907-1910  
   *Emma Platoff*

29  **MADE IN AMERICA**  
   The Blue Jays Land in Toronto, April 1977  
   *Graham Ambrose*

47  **SANGRE, FUEGO, Y TRUJILLO**  
   Dominican State-Formation and the Destruction and Rebirth of the  
   Haitian-Dominican Border and Samaná  
   *Yoselyn Paulino*

66  **VIOLENT STABILITY**  
   Methodism, Moderate Politics, and Persecution in Great Awakening England  
   *Gabriel Groz*

88  **SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT**  
   Divide in the Pre- and Post-Ottoman Empire  
   *Daisy Li*

114  **AN INTERVIEW WITH TIMOTHY SNYDER**  
   Richard C. Levin Professor of History  
   Conducted by *Mark Gustafeson*
Paul Lavietes was an intern at the West Haven Veterans Affairs Medical Center, an employee and alumnus of Yale, and a father of two when he was pulled aside at work for questioning over suspected disloyalty to the United States. Transporting us to the moment of Lavietes’ sudden accusal, Emma Platoff, MC ’17, insightfully reveals the impact of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Executive Order No. 10450 upon American society and offers a vivid glimpse into New Haven life in the McCarthy era.

By Emma Platoff MC ’17
Written for “The Art of Biography”
Professor John Gaddis
Edited by Kas Tebbetts, Katie Shy, and Flora Lipsky
AUGUST 1955

They began again on Wednesday, in the same room where they had been the day before. It was dim, with a chair in the center and a stenographer situated at a desk in the corner. She typed fast and kept her eyes down, hugging the wall as if she wished she could become a part of it. Neither man paid her much mind.

“Have you ever advocated communism as a replacement for the present system of government in the United States?” David Doherty asked.

“No.”

“Did you ever endeavor to impose such a thought upon your associates or any students you might have had?”

“No.”

Doherty sighed. The clacking of the stenographer’s typing paused.

“Doctor, there is information on record from while you were a staff member of the School of Medicine, Yale University, during 1938 and 1939, that you did advocate communism as a replacement for the present system of government in the United States, and encouraged the reading of the works of Marx, Stalin and other communists. In view of that information, Doctor, do you care to revise or amplify or in any way change your previous answer?”

“No.”

“During early 1940, were you a signer of a statement raising a warning against denying communists the full freedom of the Bill of Rights or any suppression of the Communist Party?”

“I do not recall.”

“If you were a signer, don’t you think you would recall?”

“I’m not sure.”

“Doctor, you recall yesterday you indicated that if I gave you a particular question in writing that you would consider whether or not you would answer,” the lawyer said.

Doherty was an attorney for the United States Department of Veterans Affairs who had arrived the day before at Paul’s VA hospital office to conduct “an interview.” When Doherty began to lob questions, Paul, startled and unprepared, claimed not to know the answers to many of the questions and refused to answer some others. Presumably Doherty had expected increased cooperation, or information, in today’s meeting. Paul had not come prepared to provide either.

Paul was all too familiar with the government questioning that seemed to dominate the 1950s. He knew that employees of the VA were subject to investigation at any time. He knew also that a negative outcome from an interview like this could lead to his suspension or termination from a position he enjoyed—and, more importantly, federal dis-
loyalty charges. But “whispering Paul,” as his colleagues knew him, although quiet, was staunchly principled. And he was never shy about his beliefs.

Doherty continued, talking faster now than before, one hand stuffed deep into a pants pocket and the other holding a packet of questions curved slightly so it didn’t flop.

“I am now handing you a question in writing which reads as follows: ‘Have you in any manner rendered support to any organization carrying on the line of propaganda and activities advocated by the Communist Party or any affiliated organizations?’ Later on, after you have had an opportunity to consider it, I will ask you whether or not you desire to answer that question.”

He handed Paul a slip of paper, and Paul set it on his lap, smoothing it so it lay flat over his right thigh. He considered Doherty’s words as he read them typed out in front of him. The typist was clacking more quickly now, straining to keep up.

The lawyer did not give Paul long to peruse the question. “During 1951, were you a signer of a statement to the American people sponsored by the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions requesting the dismissal of the indictment of W.E.B. Du Bois for failure to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act?”

“The answer…” Paul trailed off. “I am not sure. I may very well have.”

“Were you a member of the National Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions?”

“Not as far as I know.”

“Were you associated with the organization in any manner?”

“Not as far as I know.”

“Do you recall what motivated you in opposing the indictment of Dr. Du Bois?”

“I do not recall.”

“Are you conscious of having any particular feeling about his having been indicted?”

“I do not recall any of the circumstances. I do not have a copy of the petition or letter at this time.”

“Were you aware or suspicious that DuBois was affiliated with communist activities?”

“I was not and am not.”

“Don’t you have any recollection of any feeling about the situation that motivated you in protesting the indictment of Du Bois?”

“No. I am a scientist.”

“Don’t scientists have feelings and motives?”

“We have feelings based on facts and I have got to have the facts.” Paul punctuated the word by pounding his fist on his leg. The piece of paper on which the question was written fluttered to the ground.
Paul didn’t pick it up before continuing. “I am not going to give answers on impressions,” he said, slower this time. “Furthermore I do not see how my motives are very important in this thing. Facts I am willing to testify to.”

“Motives are important, too, in relation to facts are they not?”

Paul frowned. “You ask your questions and I’ll answer them in my own way.”

“During late 1951…”1

JANUARY 1956

Paul did not hear about the outcome of the interview for almost six months.

It was a chilly Monday in January of 1956 when he finally did. It had been a long day and Paul, a New Haven internist known to most as Dr. Lavietes, was glad to be home. He started most weekdays no later than 6:30 a.m., when diabetic patients called for advice on what certain measurements meant and which medicines to take. Workdays often stretched into evenings, and patients were always welcome in the family’s home. Alongside applesauce and grape jelly, patient samples of blood and urine lined the walls of the family refrigerator.2

Paul was a tall, skinny man, with close-cropped brown hair and glasses. He held several positions — consulting at the West Haven VA Medical Center and four other hospitals in the area — but did most of his work in his private practice on Howard Avenue. More than anything, Paul loved his patients, who ranged in wealth and standing from the former first lady of Yale, Katherine C. Angell,3 to the men he treated every Friday evening at the Union of Indigent People on Dixwell Avenue.4

His family’s home was a gray stone Tudor on the corner of Alston Avenue in New Haven’s quiet Westville neighborhood. It was full of life. Paul had a daughter, Sylvia, who was six; his son Marc, eight years older, was slogging through high school. Paul’s wife Ruth, a slim, reticent woman, had had a normal day of housework and quiet discontent on that Monday. She was stately, the beauty of her family, and she always seemed to light up when Paul came home.5

As he usually did right after arriving, Paul removed his work pants, lay down on the couch in the living room with a glass of Scotch on the floor beside him, and sent Sylvia out to the front yard for the paper. He read the New Haven Register every evening and the New York Times every morning, and the delivery game was their little ritual. Sylvia brought him the paper and settled in on the Oriental rug, kneeling near his head. As always, they read the comics first.6

The suburban quiet of January 16 was colored by the fat envelope of bad news Paul had received.7 The letter inside held five pages of charges against Paul, and it came with an appendix: a copy of Executive Order No. 10450, accompanied by VA regulations
It was signed by Mr. A.H. Corley Jr., the director of Security Service at the VA's central office in Washington, D.C. Paul’s mind flashed to August.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower had issued 10450 almost three years earlier. The order, much stricter than President Harry Truman's system that it replaced, stopped distinguishing between labels of low-security risk and labels of outright disloyalty. The order enumerated several criteria for disloyalty, including membership in any organization deemed “totalitarian, fascist, communist, or subversive.” It also required the investigation of all new applicants to government positions, as well as an investigation of any employee not previously investigated.

The VA regulations explained how such security investigations would take place. An initial investigation—like Paul’s August interview—could be made of any employee if there was reason to suspect him of being disloyal. Evidence of disloyalty, as enumerated in Executive Order No. 10450, included everything from “any behavior, activities, or associations which tend to show that the individual is not reliable or trustworthy” to a documented violent attempt to overthrow the government of the United States. If, after receiving an initial investigative report, Corley found any evidence that an employee was a threat, he could move to suspend or terminate him. It then fell to the employee’s manager to inform the employee of the decision.

Recalling the unapologetic stance he had taken the summer before, Paul was not entirely surprised to get the letter. Even still, his stomach dropped as he read it.

Paul had watched colleagues go through similar proceedings, and he understood how they often fell out. John Punnett Peters, the famously socialist academic and a close friend and mentor to Paul since the younger man’s medical school days, had only recently concluded his own loyalty case.

For Peters, the process had been long and drawn out. It began in 1949, when Peters received the first notice that his loyalty was being questioned. The most damning charges against him came from unnamed accusers, which Peters and his lawyers considered ludicrous. Peters answered the accusations under oath and was told there were “no reasonable grounds” to evince his disloyalty. In spring 1952, Peters was questioned and cleared again. A year later, the Loyalty Review Board declined to accept the decision of the previous agency and held its own set of hearings. Unlike the two before it, that board found reasonable doubt of Peters’s loyalty, and he was soon removed from his part-time position within the Public Health Service. After a Federal Court of Appeals sustained the loyalty board’s ruling, the Supreme Court agreed in November 1954 to hear his case.

Peters had not taken the case to court to reclaim his position—his term would have run out three months after the dismissal regardless. Rather, he had made an assertion of principle: about his constitutional right to face his accuser and about the
questionable constitutionality of the loyalty review boards that had stripped him of his position. The case would test the right of the government to use unnamed informers against a federal employee accused of disloyalty. In the end, the court ruled for Peters on a technicality, declaring that the loyalty review board which had questioned Peters did not have the authority to review his case as he had previously been cleared by a departmental board. It was not the way Peters or his lawyers had wanted to win, but it was a win nonetheless.

Paul and Peters often discussed the threats such matters presented to members of their profession. In January of 1953, they worked together on the case of their colleague Dr. Charles Nugent, who had been drafted into the army as a private instead of as a commissioned doctor. Nugent had apparently been denied the medical position he had applied for because he had refused to fill in a form that specified his past associations, even though the Fifth Amendment afforded him the right not to list them. Paul and Peters collected 59 signatures from fellow doctors, asking that the government either grant Nugent the medical commission he sought or allow him to remain a civilian. Paul himself had signed the letter accompanying the petition—which he sent directly to President Eisenhower, as well as to two Army generals and a senator. General Lewis Hershey, one of the letter’s recipients, replied to Paul personally and enclosed a copy of a relevant Supreme Court decision. Paul told Hershey he “did not find [his] reply entirely satisfying.”

Paul had taken the lead on this correspondence, partially because Peters was ill at the time. The illness did not go away over the next two years. In October of 1955, just a few months after winning his Supreme Court case, Peters suffered a heart attack while making rounds at Yale-New Haven Hospital. He died on December 29 of the same year.

Paul talked about Peters a lot, and before the man died he had often been around the Lavietes’s house. The kids knew him well, mainly as a giant—a physical one for younger Sylvia and an intellectual one for Marc, who was old enough to understand what Peters had achieved. Paul’s association with Peters had not escaped the government’s notice; their conversations had hardly stayed between them. Paul’s own outspokenness in the Nugent case, and the role of Peters—who, by the time Hershey responded, was embroiled in his own loyalty case for the third time—could not have been missed. It all felt unpleasantly familiar.

When the family sat down for dinner that January evening, Paul was quieter than usual. The children were used to spending family dinners listening—Paul liked to talk to them, about his patients, about philosophy, about the news. Their father did not need to raise his voice for them to sit forward attentively. He spoke seriously at dinner, without much interruption from the three of them, talking often about topics beyond their understanding. Once, when an elderly patient of his was suffering horribly, Paul had spent
the meal discussing the merits of euthanasia—a term Sylvia could not yet define. For the most part, no one interrupted when he talked. That evening felt different.

After the children went to bed, Paul and Ruth went through the charges together. They did not get beyond the first page before she began to cry.

Ruth was proud, as everyone knew, to be Paul’s wife. She loved being married to a doctor, making a home for him, keeping it beautiful. She loved their beautiful and smart children and their weekend tennis games. She loved listening to the opera with him on the radio and playing duets together, he on the clarinet and she on the piano.

What she did not love were his politics. Ruth was political to some extent: She was a Democrat who followed the news and was always interested in the presidential election. But the conversations Paul had with Peters, and the work he did with the indigent—his talk of equal health care for all—were a step beyond for her. The Nugent letters and the Communist Party rally he had attended in Central Park in the ’30s set her on edge. She had seen Wisconsin senator Joseph McCarthy on television and watched Eisenhower speak about 10450. To her, these ideas, these principles Paul held so close to his heart, were not worth a threat to their beautiful Tudor home, their weekend tennis games, their comfortable life as beloved doctor and beloved doctor’s wife.

“Paul, why do you have to do this?” she asked. He put his hand over hers on the table, and did not answer.

Paul’s first step was to contact Yale Law School professor Thomas Emerson, a close personal friend and distinguished scholar. He had told Emerson about the August interrogations, and together they had quietly, naïvely hoped that it would end there. Emerson, who had worked in several government agencies during time of the New Deal and on several high-profile legal cases, was known for his work in civil liberties.

The first note Paul sent him was nonchalant.

“Dear Tom,” he wrote, “See what you think of this and let me know at your convenience. I take it I have until [February] 15 to reply since it was delivered to me on [January] 16.”

Emerson sprang into action. By early February, he had written to Corley asking for a monthlong extension for the response letter. It would be “exceedingly difficult, if not impossible” to obtain documentation on the twenty-three charges leveled against Lavietes in just a month, he said. Corley allowed the extension.

The two also reached out to lawyers and friends who had been involved in the Peters trial. Peters had died just a month earlier, and Paul—who would keep a framed photo of his mentor in his office for the rest of his life—was still grieving. The accusation had come too soon, like salt in a cut that had just begun to scab over. More than anything Paul wished he had his friend to advise him through the process.
Still, the pair worked efficiently and thoroughly. Paul wrote to Vernon “Vern” Countryman, one of Peters’ former lawyers and a friend of Paul’s, who sent a long letter of advice. Much of what Countryman told Paul he had already heard from Emerson, but seeing it in black and white somehow made it more real.

The suspension letter had laid out a few options. He could submit an answer refuting or explaining each listed charge, and give the responses either under oath or not. He could also request a hearing, should his reply not clear him of all charges. If he did nothing, a determination in his case would be made on the basis of the nearly two dozen charges the VA had on record. But beyond what the dozens of pages of regulations spelled out for him, Paul knew there were other paths he could take. He could resign from the VA, for example, and simply accept the suspension—most of his income came from his private practice, anyway, and the suspension at the VA did not as of yet interfere with his duties at Yale. Or he could take the accusations to court. At stake, Paul knew, were questions not just of legality but of principle. He did not feel it was right for him to resign his position at the VA for the sake of conformity.

The first decision to make was whether to ask for an administrative hearing. Countryman put the odds of winning such a hearing at a disheartening one to three. A failure at the hearing would be a worse blow to Paul’s record than a simple resignation—unless, of course, the hearing board’s decision was reversed in court. And even an unlikely win at the hearing, Countryman warned, would have established “nothing by way of principle,” though it would clear Paul’s government record.

Still, Countryman advised Paul to take the hearing. There was little to lose, he said, and at the very least a hearing would offer some closure: If it did not end the matter, it would force Paul to decide whether to take the accusations to court.

It was clear what Peters would have done. Paul asked for the hearing. Countryman helped them obtain transcripts of Peters’s three hearings, as his case would mirror Paul’s, although on a smaller scale. Peters, too, had seen his first attack through a dismissal from a part-time government position—his had been the U.S. Public Health Service. Peters, like Paul, had no access to classified materials through this government job. And, strikingly, the worst accusations against Paul came from unnamed sources.

Paul and Emerson were not blind, either, to the likelihood that Paul was being targeted because of his affiliation with the famously socialist academic. Among the dozen or so Peters disciples, Paul had been one of the most outspoken. Paul was suspicious of the accusations from the start. He knew his work at the VA had been exemplary. Furthermore, that unnamed sources had supposedly reported him for trying to turn their medical school classrooms red seemed suspect. There had been just seventy-six members in the classes of ’38 and ’39, and Paul remembered many of them personally.
Paul had a firm sense of fairness, and felt that he deserved to be rewarded for the service he’d given his country for three years during the war and through almost a decade at the VA.\textsuperscript{45} The accusations, he felt, were more about his affiliations than his actions. He had been a sponsor, for example, to the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, an organization deemed suspicious by Executive Order No. 10450, for four years.\textsuperscript{46} And he had no doubts that his relationship with Peters had been similarly damning.

As they continued to make decisions on their course of action, Emerson went to work refuting specific charges and claims. It was not an easy process. There were twenty-three charges to answer, the earliest reaching back two decades to 1936, when Paul signed a nominating petition to place the names of two Communist Party leaders on Connecticut’s ballot for president and vice president of the United States.\textsuperscript{47} The vast majority of the charges involved letters or petitions that Paul had signed, including supporting W.E.B. Du Bois when he was indicted for non-compliance with the Foreign Agents Registration Act and protesting the prosecution and imprisonment of Abner Green, the executive secretary of the American Committee for Protection of the Foreign Born.\textsuperscript{48}

Emerson began to request old issues of the Daily Worker and New Masses to corroborate these claims.\textsuperscript{49} It soon became clear that Paul, as the doctor himself recalled, had signed at least the majority of such statements. Most could be confirmed by documents they procured from Green and other sources. Others they did their own research on, and though they could not confirm all the specifics, Paul often thought it likely that he had signed.

Emerson’s task, then, was to prove that supporting these initiatives did not constitute disloyalty to the country. In the case of the Communist Party’s ballot petition, for example, Paul had supported the party more than a decade before it was declared an enemy. In cases where the organizations unquestionably did fall within the parameters of Executive Order No. 10450, Emerson made whatever distinctions he could. Paul had, for example, sponsored a 1951 conference run by the American Committee for the Protection, but had not attended it. Paul had signed a petition in support of the International Workers’ Order, an insurance organization that was disbanded for its Communist Party affiliations, and indeed believed that the organization did good work in providing inexpensive insurance to working people. But, as their response letter insisted, Paul had never been a member of the group.\textsuperscript{50}

For many charges, Emerson listed the names of other prominent U.S. intellectuals and celebrities who had also supported them.\textsuperscript{51} Reading over the names of these figures made it yet more clear that Paul’s investigation came thanks to his affiliation with Peters. The work was frustrating.

Paul’s task, meanwhile, was to procure affidavits and other statements of support. On March 4, Paul wrote to dozens of colleagues, friends, and former students.\textsuperscript{52}
Within days he had received dozens of affidavits from peers across the country. Many who wrote offered, without being asked, to testify on Paul’s behalf should he ever need them. But some colleagues were cautious, no doubt concerned that their own associations with Paul could lead to suspicion of their own activities. Many doctors who no longer worked with Paul were careful to specify that they could not speak to Paul’s activities or character in the intervening years. Their answers were worded carefully; they “had never witnessed” Paul advocating communism, or they “had no reason to believe” he would take such an action. He had never called on them to follow Marxism “as far as they could recall.”

Dr. Russell Elkinton, a former Yale colleague, wrote a statement of just two lines, conceding to Paul that he had been aware of his “leftist sympathies” while they worked together.

Some took the accusations more seriously than others. Dr. Morris Tager of Emory University, who had known Paul both as a fellow student and as a colleague at the medical school, wrote that although he was sorry to hear about the “stupid charges” made against Paul, he was confident his friend would soon be vindicated. One former student offered to help fund Paul’s fight. John Fulton, a colleague and former patient of Paul’s, went so far as to accuse the government of negligence; the unnamed sources accusing Paul would be discounted in “any court of law,” he asserted. In his affidavit, he chastised the accusers for lending credibility to “hearsay evidence.” In an accompanying letter to Paul, he went even further.

“The whole thing is shocking to a degree — unnamed medical student informers, and everything else that would have put Jack Peters into a state of righteous fury, even as it has me,” Fulton blustered.

The note made Paul smile. He felt a particular pang when he read the messages that mentioned Peters, as many did. Just the month before, he had sent out a note to some of his fellow students of Peters with a draft of a letter he was planning to send seeking funds to establish a memorial lecture series in his mentor’s name. Several friends and colleagues sent in notes praising Paul’s draft alongside their statements in his support. The irony was not lost on him.

John Hodge Peters, the eldest of John Punnett Peters’s sons, wrote in a note alongside his statement that he was worried his support might not help Paul at all. “My concern is not that my position may be compromised, but that yours may by association,” wrote Peters, who was then employed at the U.S. Veterans Hospital in Atlanta. His affidavit was significantly longer than most, and full of clear assertions of Paul’s loyalty to democratic principles. Paul and Emerson ultimately decided to include him anyway.

Paul was particularly focused on procuring affidavits from the members of the classes of ’38 and ’39 at the School of Medicine because of the hefty charge accusing him of advocating communism to students. He had, reportedly, encouraged medical students to read the works of Marx, Stalin and other communists. Fifty-one members of the two class years
ultimately wrote on his behalf, denying that Paul had ever turned their classrooms political.\textsuperscript{63} In the end, Paul and Emerson included thirty-eight of the statements and affidavits they had received—ten from ’38–’39 students; eight from current administrators and faculty at Yale; eight from former Yale professors; two from former armed service associates; and nine from fellow New Haven residents, including the Yale University Chaplain, Paul’s rabbi, and a handful of prominent lawyers and businessmen, some of whom were Paul’s patients.\textsuperscript{64} Altogether a rather impressive group, they agreed.

The two wrote draft after draft of the letter, moving sections around, editing out harsh language and occasionally putting it back in.\textsuperscript{65} As they worked, they kept a careful eye on a case pending before the Supreme Court. The saga that became Cole v. Young had begun in 1950, when Kendrick M. Cole, a New York inspector for the Food and Drug Administration, was accused of having a close relationship with reported Communists and a sympathetic association with a “subversive” organization, Nature Friends of America. Cole declined to answer the charges, leaving it to his department head to decide based on the evidence at hand. He was fired.\textsuperscript{66}

But Cole’s was a special case: As a World War II veteran, he could appeal his dismissal to the Civil Service Commission under the Veterans’ Preferences Act, which gave those who had served in the war preferential treatment in government employment. The commission, however, rejected Cole’s case, arguing that the act did not extend to charges of disloyalty, and furthermore that Cole had been fired under an act of August 26, 1950, which allowed heads of government agencies to suspend or terminate employees in the interest of national security.\textsuperscript{67} Such decisions were final.\textsuperscript{68}

Cole’s case, though, was more complicated still: In 1950, the act had originally only specifically applied to eleven “sensitive” agencies, though the president could extend it to other departments in the interest of national security. Executive Order No. 10450 had extended the act to include every federal employee. The Supreme Court now had to decide whether the president had the authority to extend the act to allow agency heads to unilaterally fire federal employees who did not have access to sensitive information, like Cole\textsuperscript{69}—and Paul.

Emerson knew whatever was decided in Cole v. Young, should it stick, would set some sort of precedent for what happened to Paul. If Cole were cleared, Paul should be too—but the legislative and executive branches had been hostile to the Supreme Court in recent years, and bills could surface that would attempt to dodge or reverse even a favorable court ruling.\textsuperscript{70} Emerson and Paul hoped it was a good omen that the court heard the case on March 6,\textsuperscript{71} just as they were beginning to finalize the letter.

The final version came in four parts. In addition to the answers to specific charges and the attached affidavits, Emerson included a page of legal objections and Paul wrote a brief story of his own life. Emerson sketched out five legal arguments they hoped would deter
the agency from proceeding to a hearing, several rooted in technicalities and others based on Countryman’s suggestions or arguments made in Peters’s case. Denying Paul access to all the evidence being used against him—namely, the anonymous sources who condemned his advocacy for communism in 1938 and 39—violated his Fifth Amendment rights, they argued.72

Paul’s summary of his life highlighted his three years of wartime military service and his love for the country and its constitution. For much of it, he pandered to what he must have thought the loyalty board would want to hear: a true story of the American Dream. Paul’s family story was one about immigrants: in 1889, Paul’s fifteen-year-old father and his family left their sugar beet farm in the state of Kiev to escape Russian persecution of Jews.73 Philip Lavietes, Paul’s father, established a modest business in the U.S., and the family climbed to the middle class. Paul graduated from Yale College in 1927 and the School of Medicine in 1930. He served stateside for three years during World War II, first at a VA hospital in Ohio and then at Moore General Hospital in North Carolina, and was discharged as a captain in 1947. In the letter, he emphasized this work and the work he had done for the VA hospital since.74

“In acting as consultant to the VA, I have felt as if, in a humble way, I was articulating my love for this country and the principles of equality and freedom on which it rests,” Paul wrote.75

But “whispering Paul” would not send off the letter entirely free of defiance. He made reference to the “great good fortune” he had had to work under the leadership of Peters, whose recent, high-profile loyalty case could not have been unknown to the loyalty board who would receive the letter. Peters’s own answers to the government had, incidentally, included similar disdain for the process: in one, he told the chairman of the Board of Inquiry on Employee Loyalty at the Federal Security Agency that the letter outlining procedures for his hearing was unintelligible, to the point that it was “a perfect gem” for Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass.76

Though he did not go this far, Paul did toe the line, discussing many times his constitutional rights to certain actions and his opinion that the attorney general had overstepped his role by declaring so many organizations subversive. And in the final lines of his brief autobiography, he discussed his political leanings and emphasized the principles, which guided him and which he would not abandon for anything.77

“I suppose this all adds up to being a ‘liberal,’” he wrote. “Such a philosophy plainly precludes submission to the dictates of the Communist Party. Nor can such a philosophy, which has its roots in resistance to nineteenth-century Russian totalitarianism, condone the twentieth-century version. Conversely, such a philosophy insists that everyone—citizen or alien, white or black, rich or poor, whatever his religion or his politics—be allowed to think and speak as he pleases. Our Constitution does not ask whether a
person is a Jew, a Jehovah’s Witness, or a Catholic; a Nazi, a Trotskyite, or a communist. It protects us all and therefore I cherish and defend it.”

They sent the letter off on a Tuesday, March 13. The document, which was twenty pages long and accompanied by more than forty pages of supporting statements, had occupied much of their lives and most of Paul's sanity in the two months they had spent composing it. In the end, Emerson considered the letter rather impressive, though he was not sure it would strike the VA that way. He was aware of how important Paul’s principles had been in shaping the letter; as a result, it was thorough but not the least bit apologetic. Paul and Emerson were, if not optimistic, proud of the work they had done.

Though the efforts had dominated Paul’s time at home, and often preoccupied him at work, he did not speak much about the proceedings to his children. Paul read to Sylvia each night, sitting on the side of her bed. She was an anxious child. Paul rubbed her back when she had trouble sleeping, which she often did. One night, instead of telling Sylvia a made-up story before bed, Paul told her about the older sibling she’d once had: a girl named Barbara Ann who died after just four months, two years or so before Sylvia was born. Barbara was the first of two children Ruth had who did not survive. Paul told Sylvia not to tell her mother, and the little girl was confused—surely her mother knew already. Paul warned that it would make Ruth upset.

Sylvia felt closer with her father than with her mother. She always knew where to find him when she wanted him: late at night, at the red formica table in the kitchen. Every night around 11 p.m., Paul made his signature treat: vanilla ice cream with Rice Krispies and maple syrup. When Sylvia joined him, they sat and talked, spoons moving through the air. She felt nurtured.

But Paul and Ruth often left questions unanswered. Sylvia wondered about her mother’s father, whom she had always been told was an Orthodox Jew. Neither Ruth nor any of her six siblings were particularly observant. The family joined Congregation Mishkan Israel only after Marc came home from third grade one day complaining that he didn’t know what it was to be Jewish. Marc felt that the family paid lip service to holidays and rituals. But his own Judaism was something that Paul would have been acutely aware of; in the 1930s, he was one of two Jewish doctors on the faculty of the medical school. Religion, like family controversy, was rarely discussed.

Marc, who was older, understood slightly more, though he did not ask many questions. He did not feel as close to his father as Sylvia did. The one time Marc felt Paul was available to him was during the twenty-minute ping pong games they’d play around dinner time. Marc sometimes overheard his father and Peters discussing Peters's
own case. He had read the headlines, and he understood the stakes involved in such investigations. But Marc was focused on making good grades and getting into Yale, and though Paul was affable, he was rarely entirely open with his children. He had always been withdrawn, and now it seemed he did not want to burden Marc and Sylvia with his stress.

Feeling the tension in the household, Sylvia and Marc sometimes locked themselves in Marc’s room on Saturday mornings, listening to music behind the door. They liked to play “Barbara Ann,” some sort of rebellion against the household which never felt open for discussion on things that mattered, like a lost sister. Their mother seemed repressed. Their father meant well but sometimes did not get it.

The Lavietes often had friends over to the Alston Avenue house. In the 50s, Peters came over after tennis games, and later it was the Wyases, who lived nearby in Hamden, or Rebecca and Charlie Solomon, who drove down from West Hartford. They occasionally held dinner parties, and every Sunday night they watched “Omnibus.” Ruth and Paul liked going to friends’ houses to play chamber music. Fallow Harper, a lawyer who had represented Peters, often brought his wife Miriam over to play bridge against Paul and Ruth. Sylvia liked to sit in Fallow’s lap, and she loved his wife. Miriam, who was a social worker, became a sort of role model for Sylvia, who would enter the profession herself. That spring, Ruth began to plan their annual summer vacation to Lakeville, Connecticut, unsure whether the case would preclude them from leaving New Haven. Family life flowed on.

Meanwhile, Paul was continuing his work putting together a memorial for Peters. In March, he was asked to write a tribute to his mentor, and the document occupied his thoughts as he moved through his days, while treating patients and sitting with his children. Peters’s four children stayed in touch, especially Alice Peters Irwin, who lived about an hour away in Connecticut. She had affection for Paul, as her father had, and offered anything she could give to help him through the loyalty case.

Thoughts of the investigation did not dissipate as they awaited a response. Emerson and his wife had long been close friends, who came over for dinner or drinks or after a tennis game. Now the tenor of their visits changed. It was not pure fun anymore, but often business. Paul and Tom Emerson’s conversations turned serious more quickly than usual, and their voices turned quieter. Ruth seemed to fret ever more over the dishes.

Just over a month after they submitted the letter, Paul heard back from Corley. Their letter had not shown sufficient cause for lifting Paul’s suspension, and his case would proceed to a hearing. The date was tentatively set for May 15.

Two weeks’ notice would not be enough, Emerson knew. He immediately wrote to Charles King, the chairman of the Security Hearing Board, asking for at least a month before they’d have to appear. King granted the time.
There was a great deal to do before the hearing. In the months since the letter had gone out, Paul had begun to familiarize himself with the rights afforded to him. Paul and Emerson had also begun to discuss who should serve as witnesses, drawing up a list of thirteen men whom Emerson would call for an initial interview. Two never returned his calls, and two Emerson ruled out after speaking with them. Ultimately they settled on nine witnesses. Emerson called each more than once to go over the questions they’d be asked and to determine when they should be heard. The hearing procedures allowed the employee and his counsel to draw up the schedule for witness testimony, and Emerson reorganized the schedule several times to ensure that everyone would be available.

The hearing began at 1 p.m. on Monday, June 4, in room G-61-M of the VA in West Haven, the building where Paul had been questioned for the first time almost a year prior. To him the time felt much longer.

Security board hearings were to be conducted in “an orderly manner, and in a serious, business-like atmosphere of dignity and decorum.” Paul, who was known for his dry humor, found it funniest that the hearings were to be “expedited as much as possible,” a provision which seemed impossible given that the sessions were also to begin with the solemn readings of the letter setting forth charges against the employee, as well as the statements and affidavits the employee had provided in answer. In Paul’s case, this totaled nearly 100 pages. As the accused employee, it fell to him to read them aloud. He read solemnly, keeping the absurdity to himself. It took nearly an hour.

When formalities were finished, Emerson began.

“I’d like to request a transcript, pursuant to VA Regulation 709 J.” The prosecutor nodded.

Emerson then moved to dismiss all charges, based on two legal arguments they had used in Paul’s original answer. Neither seemed to take. Emerson turned next to the Cole case, which they knew the Supreme Court could decide on any day. He reserved the right to raise these legal arguments again should the Cole decision be handed down.

After requesting VA documentation of the charges filed against Paul, Emerson called his client and friend as a witness. They started with technicalities; Paul agreed that their letter, and its answer to the specific charges, could be taken as testimony given under oath. He described his duties at the VA, emphasizing that he never had access to classified information. Then they got into the charges.

They did not finish with Paul before it was time to question the witnesses, as Emerson had expected. Paul could rest for a bit. Three hours after the hearing had begun, Emerson called the first witnesses. He had allocated the three who were to be called on Monday just a fifteen-minute slot each, knowing that should the prosecutor cross-examine them, it would take longer. The room was mostly empty — just the three members of
the security hearing board, a stenographer, Emerson, and Paul himself.\textsuperscript{101}

The witnesses were allowed to be present only when giving testimony.\textsuperscript{102} Emerson began with Dr. Edward Nichols while the other two witnesses slated to speak that afternoon waited in the hall.

“How long have you known Dr. Lavietes, and in what context?” Emerson asked. “What has been your association with him?”\textsuperscript{103}

Nichols was not unused to the process, having served as a witness in Peters’s 1953 hearing.\textsuperscript{104} Nichols explained that he had entered the Yale School of Medicine in 1934 and later worked as an intern on Paul’s metabolism service. Since then, they had remained in close contact, traveling together to conferences, and on one occasion sharing hotel accommodations. In all that time, Nichols said, he had never heard Paul personally advocate Marxism or any philosophy that could be confused with it. Paul, he said, was intellectually independent, and his idealistic viewpoint was incompatible with any sort of external pressures. Communism was so “incongruous” with Paul’s beliefs “as to approach the absurd,” Nichols finished.\textsuperscript{105}

The next two witness examinations went much the same way. Gerald Klatskin, who had first met Paul as an intern in 1933 and had maintained contact since, often with weekly lunches, said he had not often discussed politics with Paul. He did remember that Paul had favored Adlai Stevenson and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in recent elections. He had not known of Paul’s membership in the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born until two years ago, when Paul asked him if he was interested in signing a petition.\textsuperscript{106} The hearing pressed on. Thomas Robinson, a New Haven defense attorney who had known Paul since his time as a medical student, affirmed his faith in Paul as a “loyal, honest, and conscientious man.”\textsuperscript{107}

The witnesses finished around 5 p.m.\textsuperscript{108} Paul and Emerson left the VA exhausted.

The next day started early, at 9 a.m., with Dr. William German, who’d known Paul when they were both medical students. German could not speak much to Paul’s politics, but spoke positively of his sympathy as a doctor.\textsuperscript{109} Next up were Dr. Arthur Geiger, Dr. James William Hollingsworth, and Robert Savitt, a patient of Paul’s who had won a Purple Heart.\textsuperscript{110} Hollingsworth knew that Paul had voted for Stevenson, a Democrat, in the 1952 election, but not much more; Savitt could not speak to Paul’s political views but lauded him as humanitarian. They took an hour-long break before Emerson questioned Dr. Louie Claiborn, a colleague who said there had been no rumors of Paul advocating communism to medical students in the late 1930s.\textsuperscript{111}

Harry Most, by far Paul’s closest friend among the nine witnesses and also the one who had traveled the farthest, spoke after lunch.\textsuperscript{112} Most had worked with Paul in North Carolina during the war, and they remained close friends afterwards. After a detailed
EMMA PLATOFF

explanation of their associations, Most defended his friend’s character.

“Are you acquainted with Dr. Lavietes’s interest in civil liberties?” Emerson asked.

“Does he support civil liberties for all, regardless of their beliefs?”

Most said yes.114

“And, in your view, does his interest in civil liberties indicate support for the Communist Party?” Emerson continued.115

Again, Most nodded yes. Paul supported Americans of all beliefs—the Constitution afforded them equal rights.

“I am firmly convinced of Dr. Lavietes’s loyalty and integrity,” Most finished. “I would have no hesitation in recommending his appointment to any position—including a sensitive governmental assignment—and I would consider it an honor to be associated with him in any scientific or other capacity.”116

Witnesses finished, the hearing turned back to the specific charges leveled against Paul. As Emerson had anticipated, questioning Paul himself spanned more than a full day. Cross-examination was another several hours; the prosecutor turned out to be “a real son of a bitch,” as Nichols later described him.117 After three days, they were finished, and the matter was left to the board to decide. Overall, Emerson thought, it had gone as well as could be expected.118

On June 11, before they would get a response, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in the Cole v. Young case. In a 6–3 decision, the court found that the 1950 Act permitting agency heads to conclusively suspend or terminate employees deemed dangerous only applied to sensitive agencies. For other agencies, departments could only dismiss employees using standard personnel laws.

Cole, as an FDA inspector, did not qualify as a “sensitive” employee.119 Neither, it seemed, would Paul.

On June 16, U.S. Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. announced that seventeen non-sensitive employees in pending loyalty cases had been restored to their positions.120

Two days later, Paul received another letter from Lewis G. Beardsley, the manager of the West Haven VA, re-designating him as a consultant to the facility.121

Paul immediately wrote to Emerson. Again he was curt.

“Dear Tom,” he wrote, “The enclosed letter which this copy mentions is a form such as the one you have, designating me as a consulting physician for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1956. I haven’t reached Dr. Beardsley yet.”122

Implicit in his note was the question that would linger in both their minds for the next few days: was it over? Emerson began to ask.123 King, the chairman of the security
board, told him the board would take no further action in connection with the case.\textsuperscript{124} Emerson was cautiously optimistic—Paul’s suspension had been cancelled, but he was not sure whether the charges against him had been dismissed or withdrawn entirely. The VA’s office informed him that Paul’s case would be “held in abeyance” while the office studied how the Cole decision would impact the personnel security program.\textsuperscript{125}

Indeed, the Cole case, initially seen as a triumph for individual privacy, provoked significant outcry from Congress in the weeks after the decision was handed down. By the first week of July, officials including McCarthy himself had proposed legislation that would effectively reverse the Court’s decision by applying the 1950 security act to even non-sensitive government employees. One bill, proposed by representative Francis E. Walter gained support from the White House and the attorney general.\textsuperscript{126} But none passed both houses before the legislative session ended July 27.\textsuperscript{127}

Emerson began to write back to the sources that had helped them compile information. He told Green that Paul had been reinstated, likely more thanks to the Cole decision than the strong defense they’d put forth in the hearing.\textsuperscript{128} Emerson returned American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born documents and the transcripts of the Peters hearings, telling the firm that had lent them to him that the outcome in his case had been favorable. Paul was—at least for now—cleared.\textsuperscript{129}
NOTES

1. All dialogue taken from interview: Paul Lavietes interview by David Doherty. Government interrogation. West Haven, August 3, 1955, Paul Harold Lavietes Papers, Box 2, Folder 4, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. Hereafter referred to as PHL.
3. Katherine C. Angell, “Affidavit” March 10, 1956, PHL.
7. A.H. Corley to Paul Lavietes, January 11, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
10. Ibid.
11. Joseph McElvain to John Punnett Peters, January 7 1949, John Punnett Peters Papers, Box 5, Folder 125, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives. Hereafter referred to as JPP.
13. Joseph McElvain to John Punnett Peters, February 18, 1949, JPP, Box 5, Folder 125, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
19. Charles Nugent to John Punnett Peters, February 10, 1953, JPP, Box 6, Folder 164, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
21. Paul Lavietes to Dwight Eisenhower, March 24 1953, PHL, Box 1, Folder 8, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
22. Lewis Hershey to Paul Lavietes, April 1, 1953, ibid.
23. Paul Lavietes to Lewis Hershey, April 16, 1953, ibid.
24. Charles Nugent to John Punnett Peters, February 10, 1953, JPP, Box 6, Folder 164, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
28. A.H. Corley to Paul Lavietes, January 11, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
30. Ibid.
32. Paul Lavietes to Tom Emerson, January 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 51. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
33. Thomas Emerson to A.H. Corley, February 3, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
34. A.H. Corley to Thomas Emerson, February 8, 1956, ibid.
36. Vern Countryman to Paul Lavietes, February 9, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 3, Yale University Manuscripts
and Archives.

37. A.H. Corley to Paul Lavietes, January 11, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
38. Vern Countryman to Paul Lavietes, February 9, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 3, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
39. Ibid.
40. Marguerite O'Brien to Tom Emerson, February 9, 1956. TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
42. A.H. Corley to Paul Lavietes, January 11, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
44. Paul Lavietes to Thomas Emerson, n.d. TIE, Box 36, Folder 517. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
46. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
47. A.H. Corley to Paul Lavietes, January 11, 1956, ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Abner Green to Thomas Emerson, March 6, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
50. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
51. Ibid.
52. Paul Lavietes to colleagues, March 4, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
53. Russell Elkinton. “Affidavit.” March 7, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 2, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
58. John Fulton to Paul Lavietes, March 6, 1956, ibid.
59. Louis Welt to Paul Lavietes, March 9, 1956, PHL, ibid.
60. John Hodge Peters to Paul Lavietes, March 8, 1956, ibid.
62. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
63. Paul Lavietes to Thomas Emerson, n.d. TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
64. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
67. Ibid.
72. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
73. Phillip Lavietes. “To My Russian Ally,” June 24, 1943. PHL, Box 1, Folder 5, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

74. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

75. Ibid.

76. John Punnett Peters to Joseph McElvain, March 8, 1952, JPP, Box 5, Folder 126, Peters archive, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

77. Paul Lavietes to A.H. Corley, Jr., March 13, 1956. PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

78. Ibid.

79. Ibid.

80. Thomas Emerson to Abner Green, March 22, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.


82. Ibid.


84. Ibid.

85. Alice Peters Irwin to Tom Emerson, March 10, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.


87. A.H. Corley, Jr. to Paul Lavietes, April 26, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

88. Thomas Emerson to Charles King, May 2, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

89. Charles King to Thomas Emerson, May 4, 1956, ibid.

90. Thomas Emerson. “Witnesses,” n.d., TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

91. Ibid.

92. Ibid.

93. Emerson, Thomas. “PHL Hearing,” n.d., TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.


95. Ibid.

96. Thomas Emerson, “PHL Hearing,” n.d., TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Thomas Emerson to Charles King, May 16, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

100. Thomas Emerson, “Witnesses,” n.d., TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.


A MAN OF PRINCIPLE

109. Ibid.
110. Robert Savitt. “Affidavit.” March 10, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 2, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
111. Thomas Emerson. “Witnesses,” n.d., TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
113. Ibid.
114. Harry Most. “Affidavit.” March 5, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 2, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
116. Language taken from: Harry Most. “Affidavit.” March 5, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 2, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
117. Edward Nichols to Paul Lavietes, June 21, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 3, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
118. Thomas Emerson to Abner Green, June 11, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 518, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
121. Lewis Beardsley to Paul Lavietes, June 18, 1956, PHL, Box 2, Folder 1, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
122. Paul Lavietes to Thomas Emerson, June 20, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
123. Thomas Emerson to Charles King, June 22, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
124. Charles King to Thomas Emerson, June 25, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 516. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
125. Robert Lamphere to Thomas Emerson, July 5, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.
128. Thomas Emerson to Abner Green, June 22, 1956, TIE, Box 36, Folder 517, Yale University Manuscripts and Archives.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abramovitz v. Ahern, 96 F.R.D. 208 (D.Conn. 1982);
John Punnett Peters Papers. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT.
Laura Manuelidis, interview by author. New Haven, April 20, 2016.
Paul Harold Lavietes Papers. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT.
Thomas Irwin Emerson Papers. Yale University Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, CT.
A MAN OF PRINCIPLE

TITLE IMAGE

From the Paul Lavietes archive in Yale University Manuscripts & Archives.
http://drs.library.yale.edu/HLTransformer/HLTransServlet?stylesheet=yul.
ead2002.xhtml.xsl&pid=mssa:ms.1589&query=paul%20lavietes&clear-stylesheet-
In 1977, Toronto embarked on the ambitious project of bringing baseball to the Great White North. So eager was Hogtown to host baseball, that, having settled for a subpar stadium, city leaders took care to spell out the game's rules, lingo, and mathematics to the newspaper-reading public, hoping to convert thousands of Torontonians into baseball's first Canadian fanbase. The trappings of baseball culture in the States were an integral part of the move—from the songs to the drinks in the stands—all of which became incorporated into a new synthesis of baseball and Canadian culture. Graham Ambrose, BR ’18, colorfully captures the Toronto Blue Jays' thrilling first season and popular success. Visiting the machinators behind baseball’s rise to success as well as public’s reactions, the following pages are an immersive look into the pastime’s often-surprising first years in Canada.

By Graham Ambrose, JE ’18
Written for “Quebec and Canada, 1791-Present”
Professor Jay Gitlin
Faculty Advisor: Jay Gitlin
Edited by Christine Wang, Gillian Page, and Heidi Katter
Toronto alderman George Ben had earned a reputation for sternness. A veteran of the Royal Canadian Air Force during the Second World War, Ben exhibited little patience for the more frivolous ventures of the Toronto City Council. Across fifteen years in public service, few such ventures proved more frivolous to the Spartan, Slovakian-born lawyer than the arrival of Major League Baseball in Toronto. “I have no desire to go into never-never land,” the councilman said, “and join Peter Pan at the ballpark.”

After years of talks, stalls and setbacks, negotiation and compromise, in April of 1977 the newly-minted Toronto Blue Jays were to become the second professional baseball team—after the Montreal Expos began play in 1969—to call Canada home. All across Toronto, Ontario and greater English-speaking Canada, the Blue Jays represented a new outlet for entertainment, an exciting albeit imperfect entry-point into a favorite cultural avocation of Yankee Land.

Yet below the hype, the arrival of the Blue Jays in the spring of 1977 brought to the fore a farrago of responses from politicians, community leaders, sports officials, and everyday Torontonians, many of whom saw the importation of America’s pastime as a distraction from Canada’s unique cultural identity. Alderman Ben represented one vocal leader of such critics.

The motivations that brought 44,649 people to the first-ever Blue Jays game at Exhibition Park on April 7, 1977 varied. Some sought simple entertainment, others a means of escapism. Many wanted to participate in “history.” Some came out of a deep-seated love of the game, while others used the occasion for political pageantry, purportedly responding to a sense of “civic duty.” The story of those spectators, of the men and women who campaigned to bring the Major Leagues to Toronto, and of that fateful first contest on a blizzardy Thursday in early April captured like few moments in modern Canadian history the dynamic, oftentimes haphazard playing out of an extra-Canadian import within a uniquely Canadian milieu.

Like the tale of Peter Pan and “never-never land,” baseball in Canada represented a mythical attraction often more story than substance. Yet the game that began as a foreign commodity underwent a distinctly Canadian process of domestication. By the end of the Toronto Blue Jays’ first game on April 7, 1977, baseball had begun to shed its exotic quality in English-speaking Canada. Just fifteen years after that portentous first baseball game at Exhibition Stadium, the American national pastime would be Canadianized.

Years before Toronto welcomed the Blue Jays in April of 1977, visionaries of the game had begun scheming to found a permanent Major Leagues outpost in the 416. Just a decade before the Blue Jays were to arrive in Toronto, the city lost its only professional ball club when the Maple Leafs, a Triple-A Minor League franchise playing in the International League, moved to Louisville, Kentucky. By the end of 1967, after more than eighty years of professional ball in Toronto, Canadian baseball was declared dead.
But over the next twenty months, an unexpected series of events outside Metropolitan Toronto buoyed the floundering dream of baseball in Canada—most significantly, the entrance of the Montreal Expos into the National League in 1969. To Torontonians’ shock, their city had not merely been snubbed as the capital of Canadian baseball, but snubbed by longtime historic rival Montreal, a French satellite city many Anglophones had blithely assumed to be more attentive to European fashion than to American athletics.

The arrival of the Expos sent Toronto into “an absolute frenzy of envy.” For the next seven years, private residents and public officials continually campaigned to host a Major League franchise. Already Toronto boasted, and flaunted, numerous assets attractive to a professional team: wealth, sports-loving citizens, and a populous surrounding area. However, despite its proud history of baseball and its sizable fan base readily seeking a new mascot to cherish, Toronto lacked the basic infrastructure needed to support a team—most importantly of all, a ballpark. The absence was not merely incidental; securing a permanent venue proved make-or-break to the decision-makers at Major League Baseball. Bowie Kuhn, then MLB Commissioner, laid out the league’s simple prerequisite for admission to early Toronto hopefuls: “First, you provide a major league baseball park up there in Toronto, and then we’ll see about a franchise.” After the demolition of Maple Leaf Stadium in 1968, Toronto had nowhere to house a team. But equipped with the wisdom made famous by Kevin Costner in Field of Dreams—“if you build it, he will come”—champions of Toronto baseball creatively maneuvered to materialize a stadium and realize the contingent dream of baseball in Toronto.

Ambitious proponents of baseball like Paul Godfrey, Chairman of Metropolitan Toronto, wanted to build a state-of-the-art domed stadium fit for a world-class sports franchise. But no officials from the Metro, province, or federal government were willing to lend the needed funds to construct a new stadium. “The best Godfrey could hope for,” said Canadian sportswriter Stephen Brunt, “was to somehow retrofit Exhibition Stadium so that it might accommodate both football and baseball.” The result was a compromise that left few parties happy. The modified Exhibition Stadium, retrofitted to support a new baseball club alongside the extant Argonauts—a professional football team—was calamitous. “Wrigley Field it wasn’t,” Brunt stated diplomatically. Godfrey himself conceded the shortcomings to a reproachful Toronto press. “It’s in the wrong location. It’s got terrible sight lines. There’s going to be a terrible traffic mess,” he said. The finished stadium, with an official capacity just over 43,000, became known as “the mistake by the lake.” “It wasn’t just the worst stadium in baseball,” said former Blue Jays and later Major League Baseball President Paul Beeston, “it was the worst stadium in sports. But it was ours, and we were quite proud of it.”

The refurbished Exhibition Stadium cost $15 million and a generation of dis-
contented fans. But the effort ultimately proved fruitful. When the American League voted
to expand in 1976, Toronto, along with Seattle, submitted a winning bid. “They took a
bad football stadium and they made it a worse baseball stadium,” said one high-level Blue
Jays executive speaking with anonymity. “But if they hadn’t built the stadium, there’s no
way there would have been a team.” After seven years, baseball was returning to the Queen
City.

As a cultural import in Canada, baseball represented a small but significant pivot
toward the United States. Toronto, endearingly dubbed “Hollywood North” in honor of
the city’s renowned entertainment centers, wanted to round out a recreational repertoire
dominated by hockey and the Canadian Football League, a successful yet ultimately re-
gional enchantment. Don McDougall, a local businessman who helped lead the campaign
to bring the Blue Jays to Toronto, saw in baseball an opportunity for cultural transforma-
tion. “Baseball is going to be bigger than ever,” he predicted. “It has to do with the social
climate these days…I see the 1980s in Canada as being beer, baseball, and the Conserva-
tive Party.”

Yet by early 1977, Toronto faced a major roadblock to fulfilling its fledgling dream
of pitching a successful ball club: Canadians. Despite antecedents dating back to the
late-nineteenth century, baseball remained largely unknown to residents of the True
North outside all but a few pockets. Canadian ignorance of the game was immortal-
ized in a twenty-four-page Opening Day supplemental published by the Toronto Star on
April 6, 1977, just a few short hours before the first pitch at Exhibition Stadium. The spe-
cial insert touched all bases, from a lengthy summary on baseball’s Toronto homecom-
ing to a detailed look at the ’77 squad to photo collages that documented the team’s
star pitchers and sluggers.

To welcome beginners to the sport, the Star printed the full lyrics to “Take Me
Out to the Ball Game,” including two verses largely ignored by Americans on “Nelly Kelly,
a girl well ahead of her time, and her passion for baseball.” For the more arithmetic-
savvy fans, or those with an already-respectable grip on the sport, the supplement in-
cluded a digest on “The Mathematics of Baseball.” Canadian fans could thus appreci-
ate the game for a reason Americans did not—with an understanding of statistics. Star
sports columnist Neil MacCarl even penned a primer on the rules of the sport, writing
to a lay audience no more familiar with baseball than “an immigrant [just] off the ship.”
The comparison revealed how many Canadians like Alderman George Ben saw baseball
as an import from “never-never land,” a little-understood foreign commodity transplant-
ed onto alien soil.

Yet perhaps no aspect of the supplemental more acutely reflected contemporary
Canada than the inclusion of a comprehensive wordbook of terms, which the editors de-
scribed as a “baseball glossary that glosses over nothing, from ‘Banjo Hit’ to ‘the Seventh
Inning Stretch.”32 The terse dictionary defined over seventy phrases, expressions, and key-
words central to the game, from the strike zone (“the space over home plate which is be-
tween the batter’s armpits and the top of his knees when he assumes his natural stance”33) to the bunt (“the batter lightly taps or shoves the ball with the bat, rather than swing-
ing”34). Small cartoonish caricatures accompanied some of the more peculiar terms, lend-
ing lighthearted, comic imagery to the unfamiliar vocabulary.

The glossary carried significant practical and symbolic value. Beyond offering
newcomers an easily accessible avenue into the sport, the wordlist represented an act
of translation, and one in a nation hyperconscious of linguistic divisions. But unlike the
usual acts of translation common to metropolitan Canada—namely, between English
and French—the Star baseball glossary performed a translation from American Eng-
lish into local English-Canadian parlance. Indeed, the inclusion stood as a testament
to the importance of language, both for a sport as old and storied as baseball—where
the linguistics matter to diehard fans in equal measure to the “mathematics”—and also
for English-speaking Canada, where one’s patterns of speech dictate much of daily life
and convey important aspects of identity. To the Canadian editors at the Toronto Star,
correcting for cultural ignorance first necessitated bridging the linguistic divide via the
shared language of baseball.

Bridging that divide, though, inherently required Canadians to cross over onto
American soil. Indeed, the glossary, primer on rules, summative history of Canadian base-
ball, and season previews evidenced the extent to which Toronto had its eyes on America
during the birth of the Blue Jays—and for more than mere semantics. In fact, though com-
mentators correctly noted the role that the Montreal Expos played in abetting Toronto
demands for a ball club, many misidentify the true exemplar framing the Blue Jays’ early
dreams: the New York Yankees. For though the Expos provided the key spark of inspira-
tion that spurred leaders in Toronto to action, the Yankees represented the true aspiration
of the Blue Jays—the former a legendary Major League titan, perennially in contention for
the pennant; the latter a fledgling flock of expansion team neophytes and misfits35 with a
promising future and no past. One article included in the insert, aptly titled “The Yankee
Mystique,” set out to examine the Bronx Bombers’ illustrious history, strategy, and brand
to learn how to build a “dynasty”36 the New York way. “How have they succeeded where
others have failed?”37 As an expansion league team yet to play its first game, the Blue Jays’
dreams of dynasty were still embryonic. League rules essentially prevented Toronto and
Seattle from acquiring major talent their first years.38 Still, the Yankee model proved highly
influential. When picking management for the early franchise, Blue Jays executives tried,
with some success, to handpick names from the New York payroll.39 Just as the Yankees
typified an image of American boldness, of success in the Big Apple, of Pax Americana, so
too did the Blue Jays strive to build a “strong, aggressive…gutsy and good looking”40 im-

age to personify the city of Toronto and, more ambitiously, all of Canada.

Emblematic of the trajectory that professional sports had taken in America, the twenty-four-page supplement was also replete with advertisements. Companies near and far wasted little time cashing in on the lucrative new market opened by baseball advertising. Canadian whiskey,^{41} sneakers,^{42} cigarettes,^{43} personal radios,^{44} baseball equipment^{45} and apparel all landed coveted ad space, some even for a full page. If money was the language of America, Canadian companies were picking up conversational proficiency.

One business, though, had already gained fluency: Labatt, a Canadian brewery and partial owner of the Blue Jays, famous for producing a distinctive Pilsner Lager widely known in Canada as “Blue.” Labatt’s Blue occupied a full-page ad on the Star supplement’s back page,^{46} the choicest real estate for product marketing. The placement was no mere coincidence. After the new baseball franchise had announced their move to Toronto, Labatt began advertising the drink heavily. Many even accused the brewery of using the franchise as a public relations tool to market their product.^{47} After all, as a partial owner, Labatt played a central role in naming the team. “It was assumed that the naming was just a cheap advertising ploy, a way of subliminally making people think of a cold Labatt product when they thought about the baseball team,” said Stephen Brunt. “Fans might even call them the Blues for short, rather than the Jays” and unconsciously associate Labatt’s signature drink with the beloved baseball club.^{48}

The charge held water. The name’s champion within the club, Art Lennox, worked full-time as national director of advertising for Labatt.^{49} When the Star ran an unrelated profile of Labatt president Don McDougall in January of 1977—the man who, with transparent motivations, had earlier predicted that beer and baseball would be centerpieces of 1980s Canadian life—the newspaper took for common knowledge that the brewery executive “set out to bring baseball to Toronto [because] his company badly needed a sports image to fight the beer competition.”^{50}

Indeed, of the thirty thousand entries submitted to the club’s naming contest, not “Blue Jays” but “Maple Leafs” earned the most submissions, and by a hefty margin.^{51} Still, “Blue Jays,” the only candidate submitted as a finalist by the committee nominated to select the moniker, became the team’s official name, much to the chagrin of Torontonians. “Who’d believe a ball team called ‘Dingbats’?”^{52} ran one headline in mid-1976. Fans were even less enthused. “That’s not what they are going to call the team, are they?”^{53} asked Jack Gorrill, chairman of Little League baseball in Metro Toronto. “It lacks appeal to me.”^{54} The only support came from team executives and, expectedly, environmentalists like Ron Thorpe, president of the Toronto Field Naturalists Club. “It’s a super idea,” Thorpe said. “It just goes to show how much people are more environmentally oriented than they used to be.”^{55} In the estimation of critics, “Blue Jays” as the official brand all but assured Labatt’s Blue would be the team’s official drink.
But “Toronto the Good” would not have it. The city, which did not fully legal-ize liquor sales until the early 2000s, announced that alcohol would not be permitted to be sold at Exhibition Stadium by Opening Day, 1977. Fans protested loudly and frequently. In the months leading up to the first game, the Toronto Star received hundreds of letters on the status of beer at the ballpark. Many, like David Elms of Willowdale, asked for compassion. “C’mon, government. When are you going to start letting the common man enjoy his humble little life? Beer served in a paper cup for a half a buck? All in favor say aye!”

Canadians were not just in favor of beer—they were in favor of beer just as Americans had it. “I’ve attended many games in the States,” Elms added, “and I didn’t find one stadium that did not serve nice cold draft beer.” Don Phillips of Toronto lambasted the ban’s discordance with the public. “Consumer Relations Minister Sidney Handleman discounts recent surveys which show overwhelming approval for beer sales,” he said. To voters like Phillips, the decision “demonstrates the man’s contempt for voters of this province.” Indeed the beer ban was more than a damper on recreation—it was an affront to a sacred cultural pastime, however foreign and novel that pastime might have been.

For their part, local officials indicated some plasticity, particularly as Opening Day approached. “The door is still open,” said Ontario Attorney General Roy McMurtry hours before the first pitch of the franchise opener. McMurtry, who brought milk to the game, said the provincial policy banning beer was not “the final answer.” On April 6, the day before the opener, the Metro Council voted 21-11 in favor of amending the Liquor Control Act and bringing beer to Exhibition as part of a six-month trial. But according to Liberal Party leaders, the vote was only preliminary to “show the party’s commitment to the issue”; a full vote from the Council would not arrive until the next legislative session. Opposition leader Stephen Lewis expressed support for the proposed bill though still remarked that “this issue is the silliest thing I have had to deal with in years.” “I have given it my time,” he added, “about three seconds of it.”

Fans would have to wait for their beer. In the meantime, the delay was not well received. When Metro Chairman Paul Godfrey welcomed the Jays to City Hall in an Opening Day ceremony, one boisterous fan in the crowd of 1,500 interrupted: “it’s going to take seven more years to get beer at the park.” Team manager Roy Hartsfield soberly thanked the crowd for the enthusiastic welcome, then promptly exited. He had a ballgame to play.

The Toronto spring did little to help. In true Canadian fashion, Opening Day brought down a particularly “hellish” cocktail of the elements onto the ballfield: a thick snow, heavy wind, and knee-bucklingly low temperatures that hovered around freezing
through the late afternoon into the night. “Happiness,” declared an Opening Day headline in the Star, “is baseball and a warm blanket.” Star fashion writer Stasia Evasuk, in an entire article devoted to the anticipated weather, warned fans to wear layers and to avoid conditions that could lead to frostbite. “Baseball was meant to be played in the glorious summer sunshine,” said Evasuk, “but the Toronto Blue Jays are starting in the cold,” an environment more local than American. If Torontonians held anxieties about appropriating America’s national pastime, the brutish late Canadian winter intervened to dispel any notions that baseball in Canada would be a mere facsimile of the game in the States.

Few weather-induced variables proved as important to the unique character of Exhibition Stadium as the wind. Because of the stadium’s haphazard retrofitting, poorly-designed structural gaps existed throughout the stands, most perceptibly in left field where the old football bleachers met the new baseball seats. The opening created a perfect wind tunnel, which blew air left to right across the field. For the next twelve years, until 1989 when the Blue Jays moved to the SkyDome, Exhibition Stadium would come to be known as a left-handed hitter’s ballpark. With even a meager wind, fly balls to right field would float far and deep over the fence onto the adjacent AstroTurf. Exposition Stadium’s right field quickly developed a reputation as “the favourite of every power hitter in the American League.” The wind proved so influential in the early days of Exhibition Stadium that the team was forced to practice with unorthodox tools to train players to account for the wind factor. The week before the season opener, coach Don Leppert used his personal bazooka gun to fire fly balls into the outfield. Players were adapting to Canadian weather in real time.

By Opening Day, that grisly Toronto weather had become a frequent talking point for the press, and a sticking point for the players—but not a point of contention for Blue Jays devotees. 44,649 fans crammed into the makeshift stadium to attend Opening Day, well exceeding the Jays’ estimated capacity of 43,373. Of the nearly 45,000 in attendance, the guest list was “diamond-studded.” Beside the full lineup of Blue Jay executives, including the team General Manager and President, the game attracted notable persons from all corners of society: San Diego Padres General Manager Buzzie Bavasi, father of Blue Jays GM Peter Bavasi; Labatt Breweries President Don McDougall; Major League Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn; American League President Lee MacPhail; Ontario Premier Bill Davis and Canadian Minister of Finance Donald Macdonald, both of whom were booed at the game for their work “helping to keep the populace pure by forbidding the sale of beer”; Montreal Expos owner Charles Bronfman; Toronto Mayor David Crombie; Mayor July Gould of Dunedin, Florida, where the Jays played spring ball; and former Metro Chairman William Allen. Even Robert Redford, the California-based movie star, was rumored to have purchased a ticket, though records were mixed on whether he actu-
ally attended. Everyone wanted to be at Exhibition, or so the press reported: “Grandmothers are too busy to die today; they planned to be at the ball game themselves,” wrote Star reporter John Brehl.

The players, too, could feel the energy. “The fans really got me pumped up,” said Blue Jays first baseman Doug Ault after the opener. “I wanted to play. The stands were full, and it was Opening Day. I felt they would do everything to play the game.” Bill Singer, the Jays’ inaugural starting pitcher, attributed his performance to the crowd. “I love the fans here…they cheered just about everything that happened out there.”

Ault and Singer were Americans—insiders to the game of baseball but outsiders to the True North Strong and Free. The Blue Jays’ Opening Day lineup boasted only a single Canadian: third baseman Dave McKay, who experienced “an emotional moment” during the game. “I broke out in goosebumps when Anne Murray sang O Canada, and that kind of surprised me,” he said. “Sure I had the jitters. My hands were shaking from the cold.” For McKay, though, the sport transcended national boundaries. “Once the game started I wasn’t the lone Canadian. I was a member of the Blue Jays team.”

On the afternoon of April 7, 1977, after years of anticipation, months of coverage, a long spring training, and armies of volunteers scrambling last-minute to prepare the field for play, Toronto almost missed the entire spectacle. To blame was the weather. In the week leading up to Opening Day, locals worried that a rainout might delay the much-anticipated franchise commencement to Easter Sunday, a dreaded alternative that disfavored postponement. Indeed, by game time on Thursday, April 7, 1:48 PM, a blanket of snow had accumulated over the field, forcing General Manager Bavasi to nearly call off the match. But, eventually, with a lull in the “full-scale blizzard,” the festivities commenced only a few minutes after schedule. To the rescue came the quintessential Canadian method of arena preparation: a Zamboni, the great symbol of national recreation, brought out to squeegee precipitate off the AstroTurf. The adverse conditions, use of non-traditional groundskeeping, and decision to forge ahead would collectively become a trademark for the Jays. “Not giving in to the elements,” wrote Stephen Brunt, “became the Blue Jay way.”

Pre-game ceremonies were kept brief, much to the appreciation of freezing fans and players. The 48th Highlanders marched onto the outfield and played “The Star-Spangled Banner.” Then pop sensation Anne Murray sang “O Canada.” At long last, baseball in Toronto had become a reality.

The first pitch in Blue Jays history was a high fastball for a called strike to 1974 National League Batting Champion Ralph Garr of the Chicago White Sox. Under orders from the league, home plate umpire Nestor Chylak immediately removed the ball from
play so it could be sent to and preserved at the Canadian Sports Hall of Fame.\footnote{96}

Not that all forty-four thousand fans saw the first at-bat, which ended in a walk: a massive traffic jam left hundreds of ticket holders stranded on the streets outside the stadium.\footnote{97} Worse, by Garr’s plate appearance, the punctual fans on time to the stadium were growing cold and impatient. Chants of “we want beer” had built to a crescendo throughout the stadium, implicating many of the very policymakers in attendance. The players sympathized. “Those fans are great,” bull pen pitcher Pete Vuckovich said after the game.\footnote{98} “I loved that chant, ‘we want beer.’ I’m inclined to agree with them.”\footnote{99} (Later, in the sixth inning, a small plane flew overhead dragging a banner with thick upper-cased letters: “Good Luck Jays! Now Give Us Beer Bill.”\footnote{100} The plane had been rented by the Toronto Sun as a good-humored publicity stunt.)

Ultimately, though, fans found their way around the prohibition. Thousands of attendees, “desperate for a quaff with big league baseball,”\footnote{101} smuggled in flasks, bottles, and other receptacles filled with beer and hard liquor. “Mickeys of rye, vodka, scotch, rum, and liqueurs were openly flaunted” with little reprobation.\footnote{102} In fact, according to reports from the game, “when stadium employees began collecting trash after the first inning, the clunk of empty whisky and wine bottles was as loud as the rustle of empty popcorn boxes.”\footnote{103} Toronto the Good had made an Opening Day exception to its own continence.

On the field, though, without the relief of libations, frustrations mounted through the first inning. Singer, “pitching in mud”\footnote{104} atop an uncooperative mound mired in sleet, gave up two quick runs to an offensively stacked Chicago squad. The troubles continued as the White Sox took the field in the bottom half of the inning when John Scott and Hector Torres, the first batters in Blue Jays’ history, struck out swinging. Then Ault came to the plate. On a 1-1 count, the slugger from Texas lifted an outside curve-ball high and deep over the left field fence. A home run. The first ever for the Blue Jays franchise. “What a thrill for this crowd,”\footnote{105} shouted television announcer Don Chevrier over a protracted standing ovation from the fans. “They’re roaring like a World Series crowd here.”\footnote{106} By the end of the first inning, the Blue Jays had checked off a number of club milestones: their first hit, first run, first homer, and first error, committed by catcher Rick Cerone on an errant throw to second base.\footnote{107} As the second inning began, Toronto trailed the White Sox, 2-1. But already the team had won the crowd.

Over resistance from nature, the full nine-inning game would go on for three hours and twenty-two minutes to feature a number of other such firsts: most notably, the first Blue Jays win, 9-5. The game created stars in Ault and Singer, whose legacies as Blue Jays founding fathers were cemented in history. On April 7, 1977, for at least a single night, the dream of baseball in Toronto had triumphed.

“We’re going to go out and play every game just like this,”\footnote{108} said Doug Ault,
Opening Day hero, after slugging two home runs to help lift the Blue Jays over the White Sox. “All we’ve been hearing all through spring training is how we’re going to lose two-thirds of our games...we don’t feel that way. We feel that we can win every day we go out, no matter what team we’re playing.”

After the game, the city’s first baseman vaulted to superstar status. Across Toronto, children looked up to Big Ault with starry eyes and full hearts. He was, according to contemporary Toronto sportswriter Jim Proudfoot, the Blue Jays’ first “instant hero,” their first “legitimate matinee idol, with both ability and charm.”

Indeed, by the late evening of April 7, 1977, if Toronto rested its dreams of baseball on any single mortal, Doug Ault singly shouldered the burden. With a dash of luck, the Texan could become Toronto’s Babe Ruth, Roger Maris, or Joe DiMaggio. “It was the start of a romance that looks as though it might last,” Proudfoot touted. “Love for the Jays and, in particular, for the newest heartthrob in Toronto sport, Douglas Reagan Ault.”

Hopes ran high. “Today marks a new era in Toronto,” announced Metro Chairman Godfrey before the game. “It took seven years of hard work before they gave us a team, but we finally got one, and it’s a good one.” As fans left Exhibition Stadium after their team’s first-ever victory, chants echoed into the Toronto night: “We’re number one! We’re number one!”

Yet for the players, the franchise, the fans, and the city, the future of baseball would not prove so ceaselessly rosy. Despite the promising start, the Blue Jays finished the 1977 season dead last in the Majors, with 54 wins and a staggering 107 losses—45½ games behind “baseball’s most glamorous team,” the 1977 World Champion New York Yankees.

As an expansion team, the fledgling organization struggled to develop a robust scouting system capable of cultivating players ready for the big leagues. “While the management of the Company is committed to building a strong farm system,” wrote General Manager Bavasi in late 1977, “it may not be until 1981 before the first minor league players are ready to perform capably for the Major League Blue Jays.” With expectations intentionally kept low, over the next five years attendance would slowly dwindle from a peak of 1.7 million in the 1977 season to 1.5 million in 1978 to just 1.2 million in 1982 when, under the management of Hall of Fame coach Bobby Cox, the Blue Jays finished sixth of seven teams in the American League East.

It would not be until the mid-1980s that the farm system, in seemingly permanent development, produced a period of extended success. In 1985 the Jays won the AL East with a 99-62 record, missing a championship berth by just a single game. The bluebirds would rally for the playoffs in 1989 and again in 1991, with the biggest breaks coming in 1992 and 1993 when the Jays clinched back-to-back World Series victories in a new stadium—the SkyDome, later renamed Rogers Center—better suited to their tal-
ent and climate.

By the mid-90s, Canada’s second Major League team had consistently outshone its national rivals to the east, the Expos. After thirty-five years without a pennant, the Montreal squad packed up and moved to Washington, D.C. in 2004. The Queen City was not only the most recent inheritor of the Canadian baseball dream, but now its heir apparent. Toronto the Good had proven itself great.

The stars of the 1977 season, though, ultimately fared less fortunately than the ball club they had helped found. Surrounded by unprecedented stardom and monstrous expectations, Doug Ault baulked. He played unremarkable ball for another three years before exiting the Majors forever in 1980. For the next two decades, Ault rotated between managerial positions in the Minor Leagues, retiring in 1994 to become a car dealer in Texas. He eventually moved to Florida to be closer to Blue Jays spring training in Dunedin where his life, career, and dreams once thrived. But without baseball, Ault struggled. Chronic depression, two failed marriages, and bankruptcy instantiated his undoing. In late 2004, three days before Christmas, Ault was found dead in his Florida home from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. He was just fifty-four years old.

For Singer, the starting right-hander who heroically battled the elements, Opening Day represented “the beginning and end of it for him.” Injured by early summer, Singer underwent career-ending back surgery in July of 1977 and spent the entire 1978 season on the disabled list. By Opening Day 1979, the right-hander had returned to California to sell real estate. Over the next thirty years, he would bounce between three different ball clubs as a managerial assistant and professional scout. He returned to the spotlight in 2003 when, as a special assistant to New York Mets General Manager Jim Duquette, Singer was fired following racially insensitive comments made toward Dodgers assistant general manager Kim Ng, a Chinese-American baseball executive. Singer later apologized, attributing his remarks to drunkenness.

Pete Vuckovich, meanwhile, managed the most successful career of any individual from the 1977 squad. After the inaugural season, each Blue Jays coach was polled on which roster players they thought might be successful. Only one coach – and not even the pitching coach – mentioned the then-relief pitcher at all. Vuckovich, who earned the save on Opening Day in 1977, stayed in the bigs another nine years, playing for three teams as a starting pitcher. After being traded to St. Louis in the 1977 winter meetings, Vuckovich eventually wound up in Milwaukee, winning the 1982 Cy Young Award with an 18-6 record and 3.34 ERA. Torontonians were shocked. For better or for worse, their baby Jays had grown up.

Naturally, many in 1970s Toronto like alderman George Ben spurned fantasies of baseball’s arrival. Like “never-never land,” Exhibition Stadium promised something mas-
sive and perhaps unattainable to the people of Toronto: an escape from the drudge of everyday life, a form of entertainment in the empty summer months, and an exotic import from faraway America.

Toronto, though, could not help but leave an inerasable imprint upon the sport of baseball. From the distinctly Canadian weather to the uniquely Ontarian clamor for beer to the cultural ignorance of the game that persisted for many years after the first Opening Day, the arrival of the Blue Jays embodied much of the Canadian way in the late twentieth-century. Pulled in opposite directions, between following the States’ lead and retaining a quiet cultural isolation, and between appropriating an extra-national tradition and rightfully integrating a new convention as its own, Toronto supervised the importation of baseball the very way it had struggled to balance many aspects of its dual identity—from English and French to European and American to a whole slate of domestic issues narrowly bifurcating the populace—with growing pains.

After 1977, baseball in Toronto followed a circuitous trajectory that many, like the low-expectation-setting baseball executives, had anticipated but that few have fully appreciated. The late 70s and early 80s were anything but smooth for the fledgling franchise. But by the early 90s, the back-to-back World Champion Jays had secured a spot in history, both for their organization and for their country. Indeed, after that fateful season in 1992, when the first non-American team won the World Series, the game was no longer America’s pastime, but the pastime of the Americas. And that transformation began amid an early April blizzard in the spring of 1977, when the Blue Jays were stuck in “never-never land,” a fantasy world ostensibly more fiction than fact, more dream than reality.

“Pan,” asks Captain Hook in the 1911 classic Peter and Wendy, “who and what art thou?”

“‘I’m youth, I’m joy,’ Peter answered at a venture, ‘I’m a little bird that has broken out of the egg.’”

Somewhere in never-never land, the Toronto Blue Jays had at last broken out of their egg.
NOTES

2. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 75.
19. Ibid., 17.
24. Ibid., 34.
25. Ibid., 19.
26. Ibid.
33. Ibid., G7.
34. Ibid., G6.
35. *Diamond Dreams*, 34.
37. Ibid.
38. *Diamond Dreams*, 73.
39. Ibid., 88.
42. Ibid., G8.
43. Ibid., G17.
44. Ibid., G16.
45. Ibid., G23.
46. Ibid., G24.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
51. *Diamond Dreams*, 60.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
59. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. *Diamond Dreams*, 75.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. *Diamond Dreams*, 79.
76. Ibid.
81. *Diamond Dreams*, 78.
83. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. “April 7, 1977 Chicago White Sox at Toronto Blue Jays,” video uploaded to YouTube by Top
MADE IN AMERICA

Of the Third on April 6, 2016.
97. Diamond Dreams, 75.
99. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
106. Ibid.
108. Diamond Dreams, 80.
109. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
113. Diamond Dreams, 81.
116. Diamond Dreams, 89.
118. Ibid.
120. Ibid.
121. Diamond Dreams, 79.
122. Ibid.
125. Diamond Dreams, 90.
127. Ibid.
129. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


“April 7, 1977 Chicago White Sox at Toronto Blue Jays.” YouTube, uploaded by Top Of The Third, April 6, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=85x6eY65B3A


Beggy, Carol, and Mark Shanahan. “Baseball executive strikes out; ballet receives a lift.”
WOdtCLvyvfs
“Take Me Out to the Ball Game.” *Toronto Star*, April 6, 1977.
“Young Fans Play Hookey for Game.” *Toronto Star*, April 7, 1977.

**TITLE IMAGE**

Rafael Trujillo assumed power in 1930 over a Dominican Republic that had been free of U.S. control for only six years. As he bolstered his government and himself, Trujillo worked to forge a new, clearer sense of Dominican character and identity, or Dominicanidad. Yoselyn Paulino, University of Miami ’16, exposes Trujillo’s nationalist ambitions by juxtaposing two regions which challenged the homogeneity of the leader’s vision of Dominicanidad. In tracing the state’s intervention in each of these locations, Paulino raises important questions about the subsequent reconstruction of Dominican national identity.
"National consciousness [has been] lethargic under the weight of a government without ideals...and it is in the shadow of this, backed by the people, where the prodigious work of national reconstruction will now be realized."¹ In his inaugural address of 1930, Dominican President Rafael Leonidas Trujillo alluded to the concept of "the nation" over twenty times. He established his vision of a nation as a territory with clear cultural, historical, and geographic demarcation as well as the role of the government in upholding a nation's defining institutions and ideals.² Inheriting a Dominican Republic whose nationhood had been undermined by the United States' occupation (1916-1924) and, in his view, by decades of regionalism, rurality, and foreign encroachments, Trujillo took unprecedented measures to implement the national identity he considered absent prior to his thirty-one-year dictatorship. Despotic and populist, the Trujillo government was also nationalist, concerned with the construction of a powerful Dominican state.

Dominicanidad, Trujillo's conception of nationhood, was guided by the goal of "aggrandizing [the] country in all spheres: economic, social, cultural, [and] moral."³ The regime's economic and political decisions centered on a near obsession with modernity, specifically with "applying the principles of economic liberalism...for regions [to be] highly industrialized and highly populated."⁴ Trujillo's regime implemented land reform, massive public works projects, and taxes to accomplish economic modernization and to increase state control over the country, particularly in historically disjointed regions. His government similarly increased national sovereignty by paying off foreign debts and delineating borders. This vision of modernity also encapsulated Trujillo's racial ideals. A historical antihaitianismo held by the Dominican elite was institutionalized and converted into popular rhetoric under Trujillo (who, ironically, was of Haitian descent). According to Trujillo, Dominican culture was exclusively Hispanic, Catholic, mono-ethnic and non-Black. Trujillo believed that physical and cultural unification would not only be a testament to the country's success but also to his personal strength – concepts that became notoriously interchangeable during his regime. Thus, those who did not embody or assimilate into Dominicanidad threatened not only the nation but also Trujillo.

At one end of the country and of this vision of Dominicanidad was the border with Haiti. The border, extremely porous after being legally undefined for over one hundred years, was known to be a "transnational frontier world" where differences between Dominicans and Haitians were more imposed by the state than inherent to the people, "constituting notions of difference but not...otherness or marginality."⁵ The high degree of interconnectedness between Haitians and Dominicans along the border defied Dominicanidad as both groups lived in the same communities, intermarried and reproduced frequently, travelled across the border incessantly, and synergized their cultural
identities. Unlike the sugar plantations on which Haitians were frequently recruited to labor, society near the border was not hierarchical and did not automatically place Haitians in inferior social or economic positions prior to Trujillo’s era, and there was very little antagonism between the groups.

At the other end of the country was Santa Barbara de Samaná: the peninsula, bay, and town known simply as Samaná. Samaná had been home to Ciguayo Indians, Spanish, Dutch, and French colonizers, Canary Islanders, and Haitians throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Beginning in 1824, Samaná also became home to a group of African-Americans who migrated to the island of Hispaniola as part of the colonization scheme of President Jean-Pierre Boyer, who unified and ruled over Hispaniola from 1822 to 1844. Working with abolitionist groups in the United States, Boyer extended free passage and land access to all African-Americans willing to migrate to Hispaniola. Migration served as a mutually beneficial opportunity for African-Americans to escape the racism of the United States and for Boyer to increase the island’s population and productivity; as many as 6,000 African-Americans migrated, and about 200 were sent to Samaná. Deeply connected to the African Methodist Episcopal Church, the African-Americans in Samaná became the only one of Hispaniola’s African-American “colonies” to endure as a culturally distinctive community. An account of the community dating from 1871 described it as a “real American mass meeting in the midst of a tropical island.”

Both of these regions, though at geographic opposite sides of the country, represented powerful threats to Dominicanidad. As transnational spaces that symbolized the resilience, fluidity, and undeniable presence of Black culture in the country, these regions blatantly disproved the myth that the Trujillo regime purported: that the Dominican Republic was a non-Black, Hispanic nation. As an added motivation for Trujillo to control these regions, both were historically outside the geographic and political reach of Dominican governments. Isolated, independent, and culturally heterogeneous, both the Haitian-Dominican border and Samaná became important showcases for state-formation and power under the Trujillo regime. Through the forced interaction of state violence and state mechanisms at these two sites, Trujillo sought to define and impose his vision of Dominicanidad over the entire country. Never juxtaposed in existing literature of Dominican history, the parallels and connections between these two sites illuminate understanding of Trujillo’s legacy in Dominican culture and geopolitics.

HAITIAN-DOMINICAN BORDER COMMUNITY

Up until 1937, the public could not detect a particular intensification of antihaitianismo on the parts of key officials of the Trujillo government. Along the border, all
citizens were initially extended equal opportunities to become legitimate participants in the regime, particularly with regard to land ownership and civic participation. All had access to land if they agreed to meet state stipulations of productivity, and all could participate in the numerous civic ceremonies that served as symbols of political loyalty. These local opportunities were reinforced by the positive diplomatic relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The symbolism of actions such as Trujillo’s kissing the Haitian flag and renaming streets after Haitian President Sténio Vincent signaled a degree of respect and admiration for Haiti, and Trujillo was even known to indulge Haitian elite with special visits and funding for projects. These positive relations ultimately culminated with the border treaty signed between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1936, a treaty that had been contested for nearly three centuries. In celebration of the 1936 border settlement, a Dominican headline read, “The new generation does not remember…the old misunderstandings [between Haiti and the Dominican Republic].” Dominicans would soon be reminded by the unprecedented measures Trujillo would take against the Haitian diaspora along the border from 1937 onwards.

Despite Trujillo’s public displays of affection towards Haiti and border agreements, the border presented an increasing challenge to Trujillo’s personal authority. The borderlands had resisted government subjugation for generations, partly because of geographic isolation and partly because of their “economic and social reciprocity with Haiti.” The hub of border society was, in fact, Port-au-Prince, due to its greater proximity than the Dominican capital. Residents were inclined to utilize Haiti’s markets and schools, and many continued to cross the border for these needs after the 1936 border delineation. This porosity was a worry for Trujillo. The trade between Haiti and border residents was considered to be “illicit” because it evaded state taxation meant to profit from all economic activities in the country. Uncontrolled movement could also challenge state sovereignty, as it would be easy for political opposition groups to gather in Haiti and enter the country through the border. What’s more, the border region also defied Trujillo’s vision of modernity. Largely inaccessible due to the lack of infrastructure and deemed unproductive because of its low population density and less technologically advanced agricultural practices, the area represented to Trujillo an uncivilized, backwards, and criminal region.

The most significant threat from the border, however, was to the Trujillo’s regime’s mono-ethnic Dominicanidad. The border was “bicultural, bilingual and transnational” in every aspect, particularly in the North. Haitian descendants had always represented the majority of the population along the region, and their way of life defied anti-Haitian discourse that emitted from the urban elite. Because of a high degree of intermarriage and cohabitation, the majority of border residents were mixtos, mixed residents who identified with both national groups and that were legally Dominican. Spanish and Creole were spoken almost interchangeably by many residents and Vodou was more influential.
in the region than the Catholic Church, whose power was notably weak in the region until the 1940s. Furthermore, the architecture of many homes along the border followed the Haitian construction style of wattle more closely than the typical Dominican style. Showcased by the Dominican elite as proof of the “pacific invasion” of Haitians into the Dominican Republic, the border offered physical, material, and cultural contradictions to a Dominicanidad that still needed to be constructed and internalized by the masses. By 1937, it became apparent that the “shifting, complex, ambiguous national identity” that refused to conform to Trujillo’s vision could be brought in line only through conscious efforts.

The first public action that the Trujillo regime took against the border population came on October 2nd, 1937 in an event remembered as el corte in Spanish, kout kouto-a in Creole, and the Haitian Massacre in English. At the conclusion of a tour through the west of the country, Trujillo ordered the Dominican army to kill all Haitians living in the northwest region of the country. The order would not be halted until October 8th, and between ten and twenty thousand were slain. Widespread displacement and deportations of people along the border whom officials identified as Haitian followed the state-sanctioned genocide for months. Infamous for the subjective and often futile criteria used to distinguish between Haitians and Dominicans and for the sheer amount of blood sacrificed in the name of Dominicanidad, the Haitian Massacre undoubtedly represents the most violent and ruthless turn of the Trujillo regime.

As the first step in a long agenda of hardening the border, the Haitian Massacre provided the public with clear messages about antihaitianismo, an ideology that was in many ways on the “backburner” of the regime prior to the genocide. Not only would Haitian-descendants no longer be considered Dominican citizens, their lives would be criminalized as sacrifices in the “ideological and institutional war against Haitians and their influence in the border region.” This position was reinforced by the justifications that the government issued for the Haitian Massacre. According to state-produced testimonies, Haitian-descendants along the border were uneducated criminals who poisoned the economic, religious, and racial character of the Dominican Republic. On the evening of the first day of the Massacre, though federal culpability was always later denied, Trujillo delivered a speech in El Cibao, in the north of the country, comforting “the Dominicans who were complaining of the…[Haitians’] thefts of cattle, provisions, fruits, etc., and [who] were thus prevented from enjoying in peace products of their labor” to assure them that “we have already begun to remedy the situation.” The United States memorandum on the Haitian Massacre additionally reads “Troubles [in the Dominican Republic] have been generally due to…activities of Haitian bandits…bandits [of] cattle, pigs, or chickens…whose…operations [have become] bolder and on a greater scale.” Criminalization, public emphasis of Haitians’ supposed cultural deficits, and the thousands of murders endorsed by the Trujillo regime
permanently excluded Haitians and Haitian-descended Dominicans from the national narrative.

Beyond the thousands of innocent lives lost, the Haitian Massacre’s larger casualty was the community that existed on the border of Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Historian Richard Turits depicts the Haitian Massacre as “a world destroyed, a nation imposed.” Despite the strong sense of cohesiveness along the border before 1937, some Dominicans participated in the slaughter by providing soldiers with information about specific families and, to a lesser extent, by killing themselves. Beyond the influence of border denizens, however, was the narrative that the Trujillo government constructed for the nation and the world about the origins of the massacre. The regime maintained that the massacre was a battle waged by Dominican farmers against Haitian thieves, evidenced by the use of machetes in the majority of the murders. Despite the unlikelihood of this claim, oral histories indicate how hegemonic it became. Decades later, some border-residing Dominicans agreed that “el corte was necessary...because by then [Haitians] were invading us and we had to do something about it.” In contrast, one Haitian-descended Dominican remembers that “there were no problems that I remember between Haitians and Dominicans—for example, [there was] no jealousy for Haitian land.” The Haitian Massacre completely shattered the “prevailing norms of nation and ethnicity in the pre-massacre frontier” through both state violence and state response, and in this shattering made physical and cultural headway for the ensuing Dominicanization project.

The goal of the Dominicanization project, also referred to as border colonization and the nationalization project, was to reinforce the physical border with an “absolutely impassible social, ethnic, economic, and religious fence.” As an extension of the Haitian Massacre, the post-1937 border became a national crusade, government showcase, and obsession of the Trujillo regime. One of the most practical ways for the Trujillo government to establish the impermeability of the border was spatial: specifically, by making changes to the physical landscape of the border. The broadest change came with the creation of provinces. Whereas before 1937 the border was divided into just three provinces, Trujillo divided it into over ten, all with Spanish names, such as Benefactor—a common nickname for the dictator—and San Rafael, creating public signifiers of his authority. Clearer delineations would theoretically increase surveillance over the population and migration flows. The renaming of provinces was meant to clearly indicate the national and linguistic ties of border residents.

Continuing prior agrarian policies, the Trujillo regime created colonies along the border where residents were forced to meet production quotas. While most residents of these border colonies were prisoners made to work as forced laborers, some residents were citizens who willingly relocated for the promise of free land and state resources. Between 1937 and 1960, forty colonies were created with approximately 10,000 colo-
nists, supervised by the state to enforce their productivity.\textsuperscript{32} The structure of these colonies advanced the Trujillo regime’s goals of strengthening control over the region while using soldiers as the encargados who assumed administrative and security responsibility for the area.\textsuperscript{33} In some colonies, residents had to go so far as requesting permission to leave the premises. Conversely, colonists were subject to a state-produced morality, as there are cases of colonists facing eviction and even arrest for behaviors such as prostitution and vagrancy—reflecting the newfound moral implications of being a Dominican citizen.\textsuperscript{34}

With the increased militarization of the border, the Trujillo regime produced a broad range of legislation that would be enforced by encargados. Many aspects of Haitian popular culture were criminalized. Law 391 (1943) punished the practice of Vodou with confiscation of all religious objects and deportation.\textsuperscript{35} Regulation of movement was a top priority of the regime in order to suppress unauthorized migration and trade. A national mandate for all citizens to carry state-issued identification known as cedulas was stringently enforced along the border. Law 66 (1938) mandated that citizens who crossed the border into Haiti had to leave cedulas with encargados and upon coming back had to pass an inspection before their cedulas would be returned.\textsuperscript{36} Additionally, border crossing could only occur between the hours of six in the morning and six in the evening.\textsuperscript{37} The use of the military was paramount in institutionalizing and enforcing new political and cultural norms.

The Catholic Church—with which Trujillo enjoyed an intimate relationship for most of his regime—served as an important cultural tool in the Dominicanization project. Given how indispensable Catholicism was considered to be to Dominican identity under Trujillo, increasing the Church’s presence and its following in border towns dominated by Vodou was a crucial part of bringing the towns into the national fold. The Church was granted state permission and resources to carry out “border missions.”\textsuperscript{38} In these missions, priests traveled throughout the border to hold Spanish-language masses, conduct Catholic rites such as baptism, and construct churches and schools wherever possible. During masses, priests infused their sermons with nationalist and propagandist undertones, “preaching of prudent advice in the patriotic, in the political, in the health, and even in the agricultural.”\textsuperscript{39} The content of such sermons also stressed the “Hispanic and Catholic character of the Dominican people.”\textsuperscript{40} In clear political alliance with the Trujillo regime, the Church understood that in converting Catholics, it was converting border residents into new Dominicans by erasing previous connections to Haitian culture.

Schools also represented a major vehicle for Dominicanization and modernization. Those along the border were especially instrumental and thus, received specialized curricula and resources. Whereas before 1937 only ten schools existed in the border region, there were 185 by 1941 and 251 by 1955.\textsuperscript{41} All of the schools were named after state-approved figures in Dominican history. In accordance with Law 2909, “the content
of education provided by Dominican schools...[was] based on the principles of Christian civilization and Hispanic tradition." The curriculum of border schools included reading, writing, agriculture, arithmetic, and hygiene. Schools worked not only to transform the border into a monolingual region by teaching children to read and write in only Spanish, but also to socially assimilate a region that was stigmatized as dirty for its poverty and association with Haiti. Schools indoctrinated students into becoming model Dominican citizens with content “full of distortions, exaggerations, and outright falsifications...that inflamed national resentment against Haiti...and served to justify the 1937 massacre, the maintenance of a large army, and the exploitation of the black masses.”

Schools, their curricula, and their social services such as vaccination campaigns were carefully designed to create citizens who would be incorporated socially and intellectually into the nation despite their proximity to Haiti.

It is clear that antihaitianismo officially began its process of institutionalization under the Trujillo regime in 1937 with the Haitian massacre. Though the racist ideology had formed over centuries, it had not been consumed by the general population, especially among people on the border who experienced consistent interactions with the Haitian diaspora. After the 1936 border treaty failed to create formal separation between Haitian-descended Dominicans and non-Haitian Dominicans, however, the state took actions compensate for its ineffectiveness. These actions caused thousands of Haitian and Haitian-Dominican deaths from the Haitian massacre and increased the region’s public works projects, military presence, churches, schools, and ties to the central government.

THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN MIGRANT COMMUNITY OF SAMANÁ

As Trujillo came to power in 1930, the African-American enclave at Samaná celebrated its one hundredth and sixth year in the Dominican Republic. After one hundred and six years, the African-American enclave managed to be the only surviving colony of Haitian President Jean-Paul Boyer’s nineteenth century colonization schemes. Whereas the majority of the other African-American emigrés either returned to the United States upon being unable to acclimate to Haitian ways of life or fully assimilated to the respective local culture, the community in Samaná possessed both longevity and cultural distinctiveness.

Known to local Dominicans as *los Americanos de Samaná*, these migrants retained pride in their American identity and cultural forms as they made their home in the Dominican Republic over the course of several generations. This cultural continuity was enabled by several communal and national factors that were all undermined by state-formation efforts under the Trujillo regime.

The strongest institution in the enclave, which the migrants brought with them when they arrived in Samaná, was the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church. Presi-
dent Boyer’s representative in the United States, Jonathon Granville, worked closely with the Mother Bethel AME Church in Philadelphia to encourage congregation members to migrate to Hispaniola. Of the 200 migrants who settled in Samaná, the majority were Philadelphian members of Mother Bethel AME who brought longstanding religious and racial beliefs with them; the AME church was the first to allow African-Americans to become preachers in order to negate “the negative theological interpretations which rendered persons of African descent second class citizens.”

The Samaná migrants immediately opened an AME-affiliated church, and by the 1930s there were two churches that served the population: St. Peter’s Wesleyan Church and the Bethel African Methodist Episcopal Church. Both churches were responsible for establishing and implementing the norms of the community. As a group, los Americanos de Samaná took great pride in distinguishing themselves from the “natives” of the Samaná community as “honest working people.” A major element of this morality was religiosity. Weekly sermons at the churches drew crowds of up to four hundred from across the island. As a tool of connection, the churches provided consistent opportunities for colonists to interact and forge permanent bonds. As a source of identity, the churches helped colonists retain ancestral religious and world views by providing instruction in a morality that rejected racism.

The church also played an instrumental role in the colonists’ retention of a strong American identity. For most of the church’s history, all content from sermons to hymns was delivered in English. Public celebrations with origins in the United States were common, including, most notably, harvest festivals. During harvest festivals, church members would prepare and sell traditional African-American foods such as “grits, cornbread, Johnny cakes, collard greens, and ginger beer,” foods in stark contrast to traditional Dominican cuisine. They would also perform Negro Spirituals from the days of North American slavery. This commemoration of African-American culture and history is significant. In a country whose Blackness had been vilified by the elite for decades, the colonists’ celebration of a specifically Black identity blatantly contradicted the national narrative and made the African-Americans of Samaná an especially distinctive group.

Another important factor in the enclave’s cultural continuity was the strong family structure present among los Americanos de Samaná. In the first few decades of settlement, research suggests a strong degree of intermarriage within the community. According to studies, “endogamy, with a homogenous religious base, has been and continues to be encouraged” in the community. The surname was of particular importance to migrants, and a degree of honor was and arguably still is associated with having an identifiably “American” last name. Partly because of this, and partly because of the negative cultural traits that migrants ascribed to locals, marriage and mating within the migrant community were highly encouraged by family and church leaders. Though intermarriage with local Domini-
cans was significantly more common among later generations of the community, the efforts made to sustain surnames and heritage are noteworthy.

The second most important institution for Samaná migrants after the church was the school. Like religiosity, formal education was a key component of the “honest, hard-working morality” that migrants constructed as their distinguishing facet of American identity. Until the Trujillo era, formal education was neither mandated nor provided by the Dominican government, and thus many local people in Samaná were illiterate and uneducated. In reference to education on the island, a leading bishop said in 1871, “We are not willing to have our children grow up in ignorance and we have little schools to teach them what we can. As for the natives, the government does not do anything for them, and they don’t do much for themselves.”

Despite the lack of government support, the migrants created and operated schools out of their churches. As early as 1871, there were two formal schools serving the Samaná community in addition to various informal classrooms in private homes. Schools taught future generations to read and write in English and to transmit culturally specific content about the group’s African-American history. Education played a crucial role in the intergenerational maintenance of English as a primary language as well as in “the establishment of a separate communal identity…with an emphasis on formal education.”

By Trujillo’s era, los Americanos de Samaná still identified as an African-American community. The group spoke English, took pride in their African ancestry, practiced a sect of Christianity marginal to the majority of the Dominican Republic, and did not consider themselves Dominicans despite having lived on the island for generations. Additionally, this group of cultural separatists occupied a significant portion of land. As a peninsula and bay, Samaná was economically and strategically important to the Dominican state. Even the United States had made various claims to Samaná over the nineteenth and earlier twentieth century, first through a failed attempt to purchase Samaná as a naval base in 1870 and then through the establishment of a customs receivership in Samaná to manage foreign debts in 1903. Despite its importance, Samaná was isolated from the rest of the country. A lack of infrastructure coupled with physical obstacles, including mountains and canals, gave Dominican governments, including Trujillo’s, difficulties in exploiting the strategic importance of Samaná and in assimilating its distinct cultural groups. The threat that Samaná posed to Trujillo’s visions of modernity, state control, and monoethnicity helps to explain the state violence and political efforts in the area during the second half of the Trujillo regime.

On October 13, 1946, a destructive fire engulfed the town of Samaná. The fire burned ninety-four homes, many of the businesses in the town’s commercial zone, and government buildings containing “most of the documents related to land tenure, debt, mercantile exchanges, and records pertaining to the history of the community and its...
unique ethnic and cultural population.” While a singular or conclusive explanation for the fire remains elusive, many oral historical accounts place the blame on “The Benefactor” himself. Several oral history accounts point to how government officials did nothing to quell the fire and actively prevented residents from extinguishing it. According to one witness, “The police prevented people from putting the fire out...[and] the governor refused to participate...He said that Trujillo set the fire because he was envious of the prosperous affairs in Samaná.” This explanation of Trujillo’s ordering of the burning out of jealousy appears in multiple accounts of the event. These personal accounts may find support in an article about the fire published in the national newspaper Vanguardia del Pueblo the next day, a surprisingly succinct piece that merely stated that a fire occurred in Samaná and that many of its wooden and zinc homes had been destroyed. The lack of concern for finding the cause of the fire may suggest the government’s hand in producing it.

This fire had significant repercussions for both the Samaná community and the Dominican state. Though the limited records available on the event indicate no fatalities, the physical damage was extensive, effectively making Samaná a sort of ground zero with almost nothing except (perhaps miraculously) the St. Peters Church left standing. The destruction, catastrophic for a community that had forged an identity from its history, proved to be a remarkable opportunity for the Trujillo regime to finally succeed in coercing “the Afro Caribbean community to...succumb and consent to the nation-building pressures of the Dominican state.” After the fire, los Americanos de Samaná would never be the same, with some historical analysts arguing that this was “the beginning of the end” for the Samaná community. Largely because of the unprecedented policies pursued by the Trujillo regime regarding the fire, los Americanos de Samaná would officially become Dominicans thereafter.

The obvious first target of the Trujillo regime in Samaná was the AME Church. Known to be the “beacon of resistance, place of expression and collaboration and a place to maintain the language and identity of the community,” the AME Church was dangerous because of its indispensability to the communal identity of los Americanos and because of the violation it posed to the national narrative of Catholicism. Perhaps because its building managed to survive the fire, Trujillo knew he could not totally destroy this institution. He instead coerced it to aid in the Dominicanization of Samaná residents through a series of laws. Though the AME Church had begun to incorporate the Spanish language in 1930 to expand its reach to “natives,” Trujillo’s anti-English legislation officially prohibited the use of English to deliver sermons or to conduct any other religious activity. Additionally, after the 1947 fire, local records indicate a spike in the number of Dominican pastors serving the AME church. While few of these local records attribute this solely to Trujillo, it is probable that the Church was encouraged if not forced by government policy to incorpo-
rate them. The banning of English in the Church erased a link between the Church and the community’s linguistic and historical past.

If the first target of the Trujillo regime was the AME Church, the second was surely the Samaná education system. Following the 1947 fire, the government quickly appropriated ownership and control of the schools that the migrants had created for their children. Despite the obvious injustice of the action, los Americanos knew the dangerous consequences of contesting Trujillo’s decisions. The English ban had even greater repercussions in schools than in the Church. Whereas Samaná schools had enjoyed relative independence throughout their existence and were able to teach students to read and write in English, they were now forced to conduct instruction in Spanish and to teach literacy in Spanish only. In a 1980 interview, a resident explained the ruling as stemming from Trujillo’s conclusion that Samaná’s residents did not speak proper Spanish, which he reached after several visits to Samaná. For the first time, Samaná schools were provided a national curriculum that they were obligated to follow. This national curriculum, the same one followed in border schools, was a formalization of the propaganda and state control that infiltrated every aspect of life under Trujillo. It “highlighted the benefactors of the nation, rewrote stories of conflict…emphasized the Spanish and Indian backgrounds of the population, excluded Afro-diasporic peoples and demonized Haitian neighbors.” The curriculum the Samaná schools were forced to follow not only eliminated the possibility of teaching about any of the group’s history but also actively instructed students in anti-Blackness and antihaitianismo. Because of the newfound instruction in Spanish and the curricula’s, younger generations of Samaná residents became more assimilated into the rest of the “Dominican” nation.

Specific national legislation also challenged the identity of the Samaná enclave. Like all Dominican citizens, Samaná residents were required to carry cedulas with them as proof of citizenship. These cedulas required citizens to indicate their racial category, and ‘Black’ was simply not an option. All non-white Dominicans, the majority of the population, automatically defaulted into the indio category. This institutionalized act of erasure may not have been developed with the Samaná residents specifically in mind, but it certainly began to drill anti-Blackness into the psyche of the enclave from then on. These cedulas were strictly enforced in the region and proved to be essential tools in the process of criminalizing “foreign.” Anyone who did not have physical proof of citizenship and “appeared” to be something other than Dominican was subject to government harassment and punishment. In the 1980s, a Samaná resident recounted an experience from his adolescence under Trujillo, when a group of soldiers approached his dark-skinned group of friends and, not having their cedulas with them, had to convince the soldiers that they were Dominican citizens in order to avoid arrest. Since the English language was criminalized, speaking English was grounds for questioning the citizenship of those who spoke it and even arresting
them. Dominican nationality, with its constructed anti-Blackness and pro-Hispanicness, was thus reinforced in the daily lives of Samaná residents who learned how to identify as Dominican and denounce elements of their communal identity, at least publicly.

In addition to permeating the communal institutions and identity of Samaná, Trujillo also permanently altered its physical landscape. Samaná’s geographic isolation from the rest of the country had allowed the enclave to maintain its identity. Presenting himself as a modernizer, Trujillo invested heavily in infrastructure and public works to connect Samaná to the rest of the country. Whereas for decades the easiest way to get to Samaná was by boat, the government built roads to and within the town. An essential component of industrial modernization, this construction also made Samaná more accessible both to Dominicans wishing to visit or migrate to the region and to the military.

The intergenerational communal identity of los Americanos de Samaná threatened the Dominicanidad that the Trujillo regime had begun to impose in the Haitian-Dominican border in the 1930s. By 1946, Trujillo had turned his focus to the east of the Dominican Republic and the biracial community of Samaná. Ultimately, the resilience and resistance of the community did not protect it from the Dominicanization program forced on the region. The great fire of Samaná was followed by state intervention in the community’s schools, churches, infrastructure, and language, all of which aimed to transforming los Americanos de Samaná into los Dominicanos de Samaná.

CONCLUSIONS

On May 30th, 1961, Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo was assassinated by a group that included some of his closest advisors—late retribution for the casualties he inflicted during his thirty-one-year dictatorship. Notorious for the sadistic murders of any individual or group suspected of opposing his government, Trujillo’s two largest casualties were the transnational worlds that thrived at the Haitian-Dominican border and in the town of Samaná prior to his dictatorship. The communities that flourished at these two sites transcended boundaries that Trujillo’s government attempted to draw and reinforce as it oversaw the construction of Dominican nationhood and identity. The interactions between the language, culture, and communal identity of Dominicans and outside groups created transnational spaces that contributed to one of the regime’s biggest fears: Blackness. Trujillo’s Dominicanization campaigns targeted Blackness and the geographic, political, and social independence of Black communities.

The process of Dominicanization at both locations modeled the same process of state-induced destruction followed by state-controlled rebirth. Through acts of state violence, the Trujillo government first destroyed the foundations of both communities in order to permeate them. At the border, this step assumed the most horrific dimensions, with
the murder of thousands of individuals identified as Haitian by the Dominican army. In Samaná, this first step manifested itself as a fire that did not result in death but that did de-
stroy the majority of the town's physical structures and historical records. With blood along
the border and with ashes in Samaná, the regime forced the same question in both regions:
How does a community rebuild itself after it has been destroyed? It then granted itself the
authority to answer this question for the previously semi-autonomous communities.

At both sites, answers to this question came with extensive state interventions.
Education, religion, language, infrastructure, public works, military, and national mea-
sures played integral roles in materializing the visions that Trujillo had for both regions.
Education and religion taught individuals that being Dominican involved practicing Ca-
tholicism, speaking Spanish, projecting patriotism, and above all repudiating Blackness.
Public works projects and increased state presence replaced the autonomy of these re-
gions with cultural and political unification in the name of Dominicanidad.

The processes sponsored at both sites instructed the institutionalization of rac-
ism in twentieth-century Dominican Republic and beyond. The antihaitianismo that was
consecrated at the border was merely a specific manifestation of feelings of anti-Black-
ness that later motivated actions taken against los Americanos de Samaná. Though the
two sites involved two different subgroups of the Dominican Republican's Black popu-
lation, they served to advance turning racist discourse from “elite constructions” into “a
popular attitude.” It is difficult to imagine the almost total assimilation of los Ameri-
canos without the threat of the actions taken against Haitian-Dominicans looming in
their communal imagination. By the same token, it is also difficult to conceptualize the
Haitian massacre and all other actions taken against Haitian-Dominicans without the
existence of a larger ideology of anti-Blackness. Contextualizing the events at these two
sites in the broader process of anti-Black antagonism in the Dominican Republic yields
insight into their national and global importance.

Locally, these measures had mixed success. Ironically, although the Dominicaniza-
tion campaign was much more extreme along the border, it proved much more successful
in Samaná. Haitian presence persists at the border as contact, trade, and migration have
continued to flourish throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. Antihaitianismo
along the border has, however, flourished as well. Border Dominicans are much more likely
to express antagonistic and racist attitudes towards Haitians and their Dominican descen-
dants today than prior to the Trujillo era. In Samaná, although the cultural signifiers of
the African-American community are still present, they have dwindled. Anthropological
research has shown that descendants of the African-American migrants are substantially
more likely to be monolingual in Spanish and to identify their nationality as Dominican
despite their distinctive surnames. Though the Church still stands, descendants of the
migrants are hardly the only group who attend it, making it more of a general community landmark. This outcome certainly seems to suggest that policies of assimilation proved more powerful than those of elimination in the case of the Dominican Republic.

Nationally, these processes were integral to the formation of Trujillo’s Dominican Republic. Prior to 1937, the country’s border and one of its most important ports were transnational spaces. As such, in Trujillo’s eyes, they weakened Dominican national identity and strength. For Trujillo, strong nationhood came from homogeneity, a belief stemming partly from racism but also from his personal hunger for power, for a homogeneous population would be easier to define and control. Incorporating the borderlands and Samaná into the nation—through violent force as well as state investment—was necessary to satisfy his will to exert absolute national control as well as to satisfy the agendas of the racist intellectuals that advised him. Thus, the processes of state violence and state incorporation seen in the border region and Samaná must be understood not only as extensions of antihaitianismo but also as extensions of personal ambition, state control, and ultimately Dominican nationalism.

The similar process observed at the border and at Samaná ultimately brings into question the place of Blackness in Dominican national identity. Can Blackness be part of a national discourse that vilifies and aims to eliminate it on both an individual and institutional level? What lessons do the border and Samaná offer in terms of the value of both assimilation and resistance in the formation of a national identity? Can a national identity be imposed from the top-down? The Trujillo era is frequently and rightfully condemned for its antihaitianismo and extreme exhibitions of racism and xenophobia, yet the historical implications and legacies of these ideologies must now be considered from multiple angles. The cases of the border and Samaná certainly provide valuable insight into the fire and blood, and the destruction and rebirth, that are part of Dominican transnationality, history, and identity.
NOTES

4. Ibid., 6.
10. Ibid., 163.
11. Ibid., 160.
13. Ibid., 4.
16. Ibid., 27.
17. Ibid., 25.
22. Ibid., 9.
31. Ibid., 160.
32. Ibid., 141.
33. Ibid., 164.
34. Ibid., 167.
37. Ibid., 138.
42. Ibid., 62.
43. Sagas, Race and Politics, 62.
45. Ibid., 225.
46. Ibid., 227.
47. Ibid., 226.
48. Ibid., 232.
50. Ibid., 170.
53. Ibid., 113.
54. Ibid., 95.
55. Ibid., 67.
57. Ibid., 226.
58. Ibid., 227.
61. Ibid., 223.
64. Fellows, “African-Americans from back yonder,” 47.
65. Ibid., 48.
66. Ibid., 177.
68. Ibid., 232.
71. Ibid., 180.
72. Ibid., 177.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


—“Mate selection as indicator of ethnic identity and maintenance: A case analysis of the immigrants in Samaná, Dominican Republic.” PhD diss., University of Florida,
1986.

TITLE IMAGE

As the First Great Awakening swept across eighteenth-century Britain, English religious leaders began grappling with the challenges of an increasingly sectarian society. After the religious and social upheavals of the previous century, England now faced the rise of Protestant Methodism, whose religious rituals and evangelical enthusiasm ran aground of the nation’s mainline Anglican traditions. In this essay, Gabriel Groz, JE ’19, examines three prominent Anglican opponents of Methodism to illustrate how England’s existing religious order sought to maintain social and religious stability through a campaign of sectarian persecutions. According to Groz, elite figures, English legal arrangements, and mass violence together provided the operational foundations of Methodist and Catholic persecutions in the eighteenth-century.
On August 25th, 1748, John Wesley was almost murdered. The Methodist preacher had entered the village of Roughlee, an isolated hamlet in the Pendle district of Lancashire, and was preaching to a small group of villagers when a mob laid siege to the building in which he was conducting the sermon. The mob was armed with clubs and staves and, in Wesley's judgment, had spent the entirety of the morning drinking. After they had broken down the door and forced their way into the meetinghouse, Wesley was startled to learn that their ringleader was no ordinary ruffian but rather a law enforcement officer: the organizer of the would-be lynching was none other than the village's "deputy constable," Richard Bocock.¹ Constable Bocock ordered Wesley to follow him outside, and, after some deliberation, the preacher decided to comply.

That was when the real abuse began. "A man of Bocock's company struck me with his fist in the face with all his might," the preacher would later recall in his journal, "and another threw his stick at my head." But Wesley managed to endure these blows and was eventually led more or less intact to an abandoned house in nearby Barrowford. There, over the course of several tense hours, Bocock and the others demanded that Wesley cease all missionary activities in the area. Under heavy duress, the preacher reluctantly agreed to stop preaching in the parish, fearful that any resistance would only bring more persecution on him and Roughlee's beleaguered Methodist community. Methodism had lost in Roughlee. But the threats did not prevent Wesley from writing a strongly worded letter to James Hargrave, the village's chief constable and Bocock's superior, chastising him for allowing an atmosphere of violence to exist in the village and threatening him with legal action. The letter went unanswered.²

While the incident at Roughlee stands out for the brutality with which Wesley was treated, Methodists in the eighteen century could expect to suffer mob violence wherever they went. Mob violence is a constant theme in Wesley's personal journals, which together constitute an excellent repository of information about early Methodism. These incidents of persecution were, as Henry Rack has written, "some of the most spectacular and heroic episodes" in early Methodism.³ But John Wesley and his colleagues would encounter another kind of opposition, one that would pose a much more substantial threat to the Methodist project than any single incident of mob violence or provincial preaching ban. Here the antagonists were elite members of the powerful English establishment, ecclesiastical and political figures alarmed at the astounding growth of the Methodist preaching circuits and suspicious of the new sect’s influence on English religious life. Among the more famous of these adversaries was William Warburton, a moderate Anglican who detested the theatrics of Methodism's experience-based rituals and religious services and decried the enthusiasm of Methodist camp meetings and conversion practices. Warburton perceived the threat Methodism posed to society as urgent and unparalleled, even going so far as to devote a section of his magnum opus, the Divine Legation of Moses Defended, to an outright refuta-
tion of Methodist principles. John Wesley responded with a lengthy public letter, and a legendary feud was born; much has been written about the Wesley-Warburton dispute, an ugly public controversy that damaged the reputations of both men and proved a major distraction to their careers.

For all the energy he devoted to criticizing the new religion, however, Warburton was far from the most vociferous or vitriolic public opponent of Methodism. That title belonged to George Lavington, a mainline Anglican cleric who served as Bishop of Exeter between 1746 and 1762. In his capacity as Bishop, Lavington published several anti-Methodist and anti-Moravian pamphlets. By far the most notorious of these defamatory essays was "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared," published in 1750. While it sought in part to demonstrate to the public Lavington's personal aversion to Methodist revivalism, the express purpose of the essay was to warn mainline Protestants about the dangers of evangelical enthusiasm by "drawing a comparison between the wild and pernicious enthusiasms of some of the most eminent saints in the Popish communion and those of the Methodists in our own country." The work elicited immediate responses from John Wesley and his colleague, the charismatic preacher George Whitefield, and galvanized prominent members of the Methodist laity to denounce Lavington as an illogical and wrongheaded bigot.

After the Methodists joined the debate, Lavington drafted a second pamphlet, this time turning the focus of his attacks on John Wesley's moral character. A battle of pamphlets ensued; Lavington and Wesley traded barbs over the course of two years, with Lavington alleging lasciviousness and inappropriate contact with a lay member and Wesley responding. The public feud soon petered out, however. Lavington would die in 1762, retaining his position as Bishop of Exeter until the day of his passing. Wesley would go on to see Methodism overcome its critics and persecutors and succeed beyond any of the founders' wildest expectations, attracting devoted converts from across the English-speaking world.

And yet several questions emerge from this relatively straightforward story. Why were Lavington and his peers so concerned about the Methodists? What were the theological starting points and stakes of their dispute? What are the broader historical and cultural contexts behind this religious conflict?

A closer look at the documents coming from the Wesley-Whitefield-Lavington controversy reveals that this religious dispute had very little to do with religion. Instead, the conflict is emblematic of the basic fragility of eighteen-century English political life, where difference of opinion was viewed as a social evil. Enthusiasm – popular religious feeling – was perceived by those in power to be a threat to cultural and political stability. Using the Lavington-Wesley dispute over Methodism as a starting point, this essay seeks to explore the underside of the eighteenth-century English politics of moderation and stability. It intends to paint a picture of a political ideology in which the maintenance of the status
quo was the paramount political good, and of a frame of mind terrified of sectarianism and interdenominational religious strife. As will ultimately be shown, stability during the Great Awakening was not antithetical to violence or disputation; on the contrary, it was a combination of elite reproach and popular attack that enforced the moderate status quo.

The first section of this essay engages with the substance of the original controversy and balances Lavington's attack with what I hope is a more nuanced discussion of religious enthusiasm. The essay then moves forward twenty years to examine the letters of the social activist Jonas Hanway, a prototypical man of the Enlightenment who read the Enthusiasm and, in response, published his own attacks against Methodism. Here I will discuss the Enlightenment's complicated relationship with enthusiasm, noting the allure of intolerance for anti-rationalist religious groups to otherwise liberal and enlightened audiences, before launching into an exploration of the history behind this attitude. In doing so, I shift the focus of the essay to the broader historical and cultural contexts of the dispute, tying the cultural memory of the Civil War and the Jacobite rebellions to the middle-way politics of stability and persecution of peripheral religious groups. In this section of the essay, I also provide the legal background for the state-sponsored persecution that Methodists faced, outlining a third, crucial dimension to stability politics: persecution enshrined in law. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of William Warburton's Alliance Between Church and State, a text that explicates the cultural and historical background to the persecution of Methodists and describes the communitarianism that informed arguments for stability politics and religious uniformity.

PRELUDE TO CONFLICT: GEORGE LAVINGTON AND JOHN WESLEY

1748 was not a good year for George Lavington. Only recently consecrated as the Bishop of Exeter, Lavington immediately found his ascending career jeopardized by the appearance of pro-Methodist papers with his name on them; whether Lavington wrote them or not we do not know. He responded with a full denial, and, with Exeter’s religious elite supporting him, was eventually able to rebuild his reputation as a defender of the faith. But Lavington knew that his image would be forever tarnished in the eyes of his congregation if he left things with a mere denial. He resolved to take revenge on the Methodists, and to do so promptly and effectively.8 Never one to pick the low-hanging fruit, Lavington set his sights on Methodism’s founder himself: John Wesley.

Lavington’s background was patrician and his educational record exceptional. His father Joseph was a wealthy, staunchly anti-Jacobite Anglican cleric. George would follow in his father’s footsteps towards becoming a theologian, attending Winchester College before matriculating at New College in Oxford for advanced theological study. At New College, at that point a Jacobite stronghold, Lavington was a devoted supporter of the Ha-
noverian line, no small feat given the heightened political tensions that beset the school. But Lavington held his ground, and his loyalty would pay off. After graduating in 1713, Lavington was approached with a job offer by Thomas Coningsby, a well-connected Member of Parliament who was held in high esteem by George I. Coningsby had taken notice of Lavington’s political positions and recommended him to the king as a potential candidate for the office of chaplain. Lavington went on to serve with George I for several years before accepting George’s nomination for a curate position. With his career in the Church off to a remarkably positive beginning, Lavington must have thought he was a made man. Methodist interlopers had now dared to threaten that success. Now, as the clouds of controversy finally began to recede, Lavington leveraged his rhetorical skills and access to the channels of power to issue a public denunciation of the Methodists and their founder, John Wesley.

No playwright could have fashioned a better foil for George Lavington than John Wesley. Born in 1703, almost two decades after Lavington, Wesley was, like Lavington, a minister’s son who attended Oxford, graduating from Christ Church in 1724. But the similarities between the two men ended there. While at Oxford, Wesley had not curried favor with Anglican elites but had instead begun a very different sort of journey, one of self-discovery and intellectual risk-taking. As an undergraduate, Wesley took to keeping journals and reading the devotional works of Thomas à Kempis and Jeremy Taylor. After receiving a fellowship from Lincoln College, he was able to stay on in Oxford for several more years as a lecturer and priest. At that time, his brother Charles had just begun his study at Christ Church, and the two brothers quickly founded the “Holy Club,” an experimental religious fellowship that can be described as the earliest rendition of Wesleyan Methodism.

What was the Holy Club? In John Wesley’s words, it was little more than a “company”—a nonelitist euphemism for “club”—that, as he wrote, was intended “to read over the classics, which we had before read in private, on common nights, and on Sunday some books in divinity.” But despite its seemingly noncontroversial goals, Wesley’s company immediately attracted the derision and scorn of the larger Oxford student body. The pejoratives “Enthusiasts,” “Supererogation Men,” “The Reforming Club,” and, of course, “Methodists” were hurled at Wesley, in no small part because of his club’s reputation for seriousness and emphasis on a methodical, stringent form of personal devotion. Theologically, Wesley’s motley group of Oxford students and recent alumni was not in any sense radical. But by the early 1730s, the Holy Club had commenced a prison ministry and, with the approval of the local bishop, visited the sick on a regular basis. This was a departure from the general modus operandi of collegiate religious societies, and the Holy Club developed a reputation as an organization committed to charitable works as well as the theological discourse that had been its erstwhile center.

Something about Wesley had changed, though it would take him several years to realize it; much like those of the men and women whose religious fervor started...
the worldwide Protestant revival that would later be called the First Great Awakening, Wesley’s journey of spiritual self-recognition was an ongoing one. The next phase of his career would be overseas, in the American colony of Georgia, where he established schools and ministered both to white settlers and the beleaguered native population. Crucially, he made the voyage with several German missionaries who would teach him the rudiments of the German language—a valuable skill that would propel Wesley’s evangelical projects forward. Returning to London after his Georgia endeavor petered out, Wesley began preaching with a circle of Moravian Christians and, taking his message out to the most remote corners of the country, had by 1748 achieved a significant level of fame and, more importantly, attracted to the Methodist cause tens of thousands of converts. Wesley was endowed with a personal charisma well suited to preaching and taught a captivating theology of grace that appealed to a population at once disenchanted with dour Calvinism and frustrated with what they perceived to be the waning religious passions of a secularizing age. Methodism’s special appeal came in part from its prolific use of the conversion narrative in its religious discourse, a characteristic that shaped the religion’s texts, worship practices and institutional structures.¹⁴

Watching Wesley’s rise from the ornate bishop’s throne of Exeter Cathedral, Lavington had cause to be anxious beyond the immediate threat to his reputation. Methodism had made inroads in the most religiously conservative areas of England and was building a base among the country’s most disaffected and marginalized communities. Now, Lavington thought, was the moment for the establishment to strike. Strike it did. Lavington set about writing, and produced one of the most famous pieces of anti-Methodist literature ever to be published. Titled "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared," Lavington’s 1748 pamphlet would precipitate an intense public controversy, drawing John Wesley and George Whitefield into the fray. The next section of this essay analyzes the substance of the initial controversy before engaging with the broader topic of religious enthusiasm.

THE CONTROVERSY: COMPARING METHODISTS AND PAPISTS

Reading "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared" is a profoundly disorienting experience. Lavington’s prose is ornate, accusatory and polemical, and the internal logic of the essay is at times difficult to follow. But, when taken as a whole, the pamphlet is a powerful work of anti-Methodist rhetoric.

Lavington’s thesis — if such a work can be said to have a thesis — is simple enough. “It is my principle design,” he writes in his preface, “as a caution to all Protestants, to draw a comparison between some of the most wild and pernicious enthusiasms of some of the most eminent saints in the Popish communion and those of the Methodists in our coun-
try.”

Before moving on to the substance of Lavington’s argument and Wesley’s subsequent rebuttal, we must take up the onus of defining the term “enthusiasm,” a critical piece of Lavington’s argument. A word that Lavington uses almost interchangeably with enthusiasm is fanaticism; that is an acceptable definition for the casual reader. But we want something sharper. Writing almost two centuries after the Lavington-Wesley controversy, the English theologian and historian R.A. Knox gives his own definition:

If I could have been certain of the reader’s goodwill, I would have called my tendency ‘ultrasupernaturalism.’ For that is the real character of the enthusiast; he expects more evident results from the grace of God than we others. He sees what effects religion can have, does sometimes have, in transforming a man’s whole life and outlook; these exceptional cases are for him the average standard of religious achievement. He will have no ‘almost-Christians,’ no weaker brethren who plod or stumble, who would like to have a foot in either world, whose ambition is to qualify, not to excel. He has before his eyes a picture of the early Church, visibly penetrated with supernatural influences; and nothing else will serve him for a model.

One could say—very fairly—that Knox’s words are prejudicial, and indeed an entirely separate essay could be written about historical responses to evangelicalism. But Knox’s essential points are strong. Enthusiastic movements—revivalist, emotive, excitable—stress the immense spiritual power of the (chosen, pious) individual’s personal relationship with the divine. Knox’s description of the enthusiast’s contempt for “almost-Christians” brings to mind the exclusivity of Wesley’s righteous Holy Club, and his focus on the early or primitive Church as an organizational and spiritual model is visible in much Great Awakening thought, with Wesleyan Methodism being no exception.

Bearing Knox’s framework in mind, we will now examine the thrust of Lavington’s argument. Lavington begins with an account of the Montanus heresy, an episode from the history of Early Christianity that historians, including Knox, traditionally categorize as the first instance of an enthusiastic movement within the Christian world. Knox, no defender of enthusiasm himself, calls Montanism “less worthy of respect than most of the enthusiastic sects that followed its example and borrowed its language.” So it is no accident Lavington begins here; his initial section serves to provide the reader with a sense of the deeply troubling historical origins of enthusiasm, origins that disqualify any movement that would draw inspiration from enthusiastic sources.

But this digression does not take long, and Lavington quickly settles comfortaby in the meat and potatoes of his accusation: a side-by-side comparison of John Wesley’s writing with scenes from the lives of Catholic saints. One example, selected for its vividness, gives a sufficient idea.
But oh! How good, and saint-like it is, to go dirty, ragged, and slovenly? And how proudly did Mr. “Whitefield therefore take care of the outward man? My apparel was mean—thought it unbecoming a penitent to have powdered hair: —I wore woolen gloves a patched gown, and dirty shoes.” Thus his predecessor in saintship Ignatius loved to appear with old dirty shoes, used no comb, let his hair clot, and would never paint his nails. —A certain Jesuit was so holy that he has above 150 patches upon his breeches, and proportionably on his other garments. Another had almost 300 patches: and his garments after his death were hung up in public view, as an incentive to imitation.

Lavington continues in this vein for several chapters. Wesley and Whitefield are compared to St. Francis for their “profession of poverty,” to St. Anthony for their propensity to endure hardships over the course of proselytizing, and to Magdalen of Pazzi for their “delight in contempt and confusion.”

The anecdotes are rhetorically effective, and do much to mock the outward piety that Wesley and Whitefield so prided themselves on having. Driving the point home, Lavington uses direct quotes from John Wesley’s own journals; much like a contemporary journalist might compose an exposé, Lavington combines sarcastic commentary (“How good and saint-like …”) with direct quotations, a juxtaposition which both implicates and derogates.

But something is striking about Lavington’s charges against the Methodists. Yes, Lavington spends the majority of his time comparing John Wesley and his colleagues to Catholic extremists, but—crucially—never on theological terms; "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared" is categorically not a theological text. Rather, it is fundamentally political. Each one of the comparisons Lavington draws between Methodists and Catholics has to do with the social implications of their actions rather than the religious ones. St. Ignatius is not problematic for Lavington because of his theological outlook; instead, Lavington is afraid that his example of poverty will be “imitated” by the ignorant masses, threatening the fabric of basic decency that underpins civic life. Indeed, each of the subsequent saints to whom Wesley is compared is not criticized for having strange or deviant theological beliefs; the threat they pose is to social stability. Over the course of the pamphlet it becomes clear that Lavington’s objection to the Methodist movement does not originate from simple religious prejudice but from a fear of the social instability he believed would inevitably come as a consequence of religious enthusiasm.

This fear of social instability—Lavington’s paramount concern about the Methodists—comes out most explicitly in the second chapter of Lavington’s pamphlet. At the climax of the argument, Lavington turns to the subject of conversion, in which the Method-
VIOLENT STABILITY

ists “triumph beyond measure” by preying on the whims of the vulgar masses.

For considering how inconsiderate and injudicious, how unlearned and unstable, a large portion of mankind is, together with their various infirmities and diseases of the body; it must be allowed that the ostentation of a sanctified look, specious address, fantastical oddities, innovations in doctrine and places of teaching, zealous professions of piety, affectation of godly and scripture phrases, and high pretensions to inspiration, will hardly fail of drawing and deceiving the multitude.22

Here, Lavington’s true fears about the Methodist cause are brought out into the open. The danger Methodists pose to society comes from their ability to stir up the passions of others—to inculcate social instability. If left unchecked, Lavington argues, they will deceive the multitude into adopting a religious lifestyle that encourages the injudicious elements of society to hold themselves up as saints endowed with preternatural abilities and unalterable virtue. The doctrinal specifics themselves are not Lavington’s concern; in its theology, Methodism is as different from Catholicism as any other non-Protestant Christian denomination. Methodism’s effects on societal stability—its ability to disrupt conventional social norms and precipitate a kind of mass hysteria—are the chief targets of Lavington’s pamphlet.

Wesley responded with a full refutation of Lavington’s pamphlet. In a scathing open letter, he dissects Lavington’s argument page by page, denying each of Lavington’s charges as they come up. Wesley’s prose is lively, and his tone mocking and caustic: “And first, you say, I ‘represent conversions as sudden and instantaneous.’ Soft and fair! Do you know what a conversion is?”23 The text abounds in such direct attacks on Lavington’s intelligence and theological knowledge, and, more often, attacks on his very ability to cite Wesley’s work. But towards the end of the essay a more deliberate Wesley addresses the heart of Lavington’s criticism, defending his cause, the “New Dispensation,” against charges of immorality and of instigation. Lavington was “hindering” the movement by affixing to it “indignifying names”; his writing would only serve to “prevent the spreading of this serious, sober religion,”24 running contrary to God’s work. Thus, according to Wesley, Lavington was wrong on two counts: his fears were rooted in ignorance and poor scholarship, and his opposition was merely the illogical prejudice of a man intent on preventing the growth of a respectable and moral religion.

But Lavington’s fears of social instability did not arise in a vacuum. Instead, they were formed by a specific cultural and historical context. After a century of civil war and political upheaval, order had only recently been restored to Great Britain. Enthusiasm did not only belong to the Catholic saints of the distant past; it had,
in the minds of many moderate Protestants, been the deciding factor leading up to Cromwell’s disastrous Commonwealth and the civil wars that accompanied it. To further understand the politics of stability and cultural fear of instability, in this next section I will examine a contemporary response to Lavington’s pamphlet.

**LAVINGTON’S AUDIENCE: JONAS HANWAY**

Lavington’s works found their way to audiences across England. Even as Wesley was preparing his own written responses to "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared," he saw the effects of Lavington's pamphlet firsthand. Over the course of his travels, Wesley encountered mainline Anglican congregations whose pastors had received copies of the Enthusiasm from their bishops with the instruction to use portions for the Sunday sermon. But the Enthusiasm did not only appeal to conservative rural Anglican clerics, and seems to have had significant staying power. As we shall soon see, Lavington’s pamphlets had reached elite, cosmopolitan audiences, and were still in circulation in the 1760s.

Jonas Hanway had been a merchant, pamphleteer and philanthropist, and was committed to the kind of well-rounded intellectual inquiry that characterized the enlightening upper-middle class culture of his day. On a trading trip in the Middle East, he had been captured by— and negotiated his own release from—Turkish pirates, become extremely wealthy as a result of those same trading activities and, in his life’s second act, engaged with a diverse array of social issues affecting the London of his day, ranging from prostitution to the rights of chimney sweeps. But Lavington’s Enthusiasm caught his eye and, interested by Lavington’s strong prose and force of argument, Hanway turned his attentions to Methodism. In a series of blistering public letters addressed to an anonymous correspondent, Hanway picked up where Lavington left off, embarking on a critique of Methodism at once more substantive and more strident than Lavington’s. The letters help fill in the gaps of the original Wesley-Lavington controversy, and indicate the appeal of Lavington’s work; broadly conceived, anti-Methodism could appeal to a host of different constituencies, ranging from provincial English villagers to cosmopolitan liberals like Hanway.

Hanway’s argument goes a long way towards demonstrating how conservatism and reverence for order permeated the English political consciousness. Aside from his concerns about the specifics of the Wesleyan theological program— Hanway was a devout mainline Anglican whose letters contain hymns of his own composition— Hanway believed that Methodist enthusiasm was profoundly dangerous for civil society. The Methodist project, in Hanway’s view, rejected all forms of argumentation and rhetorical appeal other than those that claimed legitimacy from direct divine inspiration, or “illumination.” The gravest effect of this new kind of logic was to sweep aside the authority of reason and with it the
authority of rational institutions. “Talk to them (the Methodists) of order and subordination as essential to good government and the peace of society,” he writes, “and the answer to this is: ‘We must obey God and not man.’”

Here, one can see the integration of Lavington’s initial claims regarding the dangers of enthusiasm within a broader and perhaps more subtle political context. Methodism was not simply dangerous because it was heterodox. Hanway notes aptly that “if it can with truth be said anywhere that every man has a religion of his own, it is in this nation,” and “sects” were bound to come into being as a natural byproduct of such diversity. This diversity in religious preference did not worry Hanway. But the Methodists had crossed the proverbial line by taking their heterodoxy into the public sphere. The dangers that public religious disputation posed to social order in Hanway’s mind could not be greater or more vivid. He was terrified that Methodist enthusiasm would bring about a new era of chaos, much like the civil war that had nearly destroyed England only a century earlier. Hanway believed that Cromwell’s Commonwealth was the result of years of enthusiasm running amok, unchecked by reason and permitted to overcome civic institutions. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 eventually restored social order and promoted balance in religious life, a balance that Hanway valued above all else. “After this religious frenzy, or mad hypocrisy, had its play, we returned to the primitive plan of true reformation,” Hanway writes. The present religious crisis of the Great Awakening, he goes on, was a product of “overshooting the mark” and going “quite in the opposite direction.” Thus the threat religions like Methodism posed to civil society was an existential one; its enthusiasm threatened to upend the social order and do away with the newfound stability England enjoyed.

Of all of Hanway’s many passages describing Methodism in harsh and unequivocal terms, none is so vivid as is a fascinating tableau comparing Methodist services to witchcraft. The passage captures the contemporary fear of social disorder, and adds nuance to Hanway’s previous claims that Methodism’s chief danger lay in its aversion to rational discourse. Hanway writes:

I must inform you that opposite to this celebrated preacher sat a dozen or more of old women, of that class, who within this half century might easily have been persuaded by threats or premises that they rode in the air on broomsticks, and confessing it might have been put to death by people as much bewitched by themselves.

Here Hanway’s critique becomes still more complicated. The passage reveals Hanway’s anxiety about the prominent role women played in Methodist services; the trope of the old crone is instantly recognizable, and one doesn’t need to read between the lines to see the presence, in full force, of the chauvinistic and classist attitudes towards uneducated female worshippers that prevailed in Hanway’s day. The depiction, however sexist, responds to a real demographic trend; Wesley gave a license to preach to the Methodist
organization’s first female circuit rider in 1761, and Wesley’s Journals contain numerous references to women taking active roles as facilitators, preachers and lay participants in Methodist services at a time when female piety, lay or otherwise, was very much at the margins of religious life. Hanway’s antipathy towards female piety can be conceived of in the context of stability politics, as well; Methodism’s danger to the nation might bleed into that last bastion of Christian virtue, the home, threatening to disrupt conventional hierarchies and giving women significant power in an area in which they previously had none.

But the passage contains a second criticism of Methodist practice, one that has important implications for our understanding of eighteenth-century moderation politics and its relationship with intolerance. The Methodist “witches,” in Hanway’s view, were a threat to the collective morality of the community; this aspect of his critique is apparent. But the danger the witches posed was not confined to the mainstream community; in a more barbaric age, the women Hanway describes “might have been put to death by people as much bewitched,” bringing as much if not more harm onto their own heads. In Hanway’s conception, then, the threat Methodists posed to society at large was multiplied by their ability to incite violence against their own movement. Much like the conflict between Puritan and Catholic extremists that occurred in the civil war, enthusiasm of one kind begot enthusiasm of another. Hanway insists that the nonconformist be punished—or at least publicly chastised—because people might want to kill her! Coercion is, for Hanway, the means of preventing further violence.

Here one can see the dark side of the communitarian ethic of moderation that informed Hanway’s thinking. Instead of pursuing social reforms or legislation to protect the rights of persecuted minorities like Methodists, Hanway—like Lavington, Warburton and the rest of the English establishment—was intent on restricting their growth through aggressive public opposition. Social order was too important for public religious controversies to be allowed, and the intervention of enlightened activists like Hanway bolstered this order. But this intervention did not always come from the sphere of letters; government action was the galvanizing force behind much anti-Methodist violence. I will return to the incident at Roughlee to help illustrate this broader political context. Crucial to this context will be the eighteenth-century legal regime, which endorsed violence against dissenting religious groups in an attempt to secure social harmony.

THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

John Wesley would never return to Roughlee. His complaints to a local magistrate demanding the prosecution of the offenders and an end to the persecution of Methodists would go ignored. Much about the events that occurred at Roughlee is surprising to the modern audience. But the most shocking aspect of the near-massacre at Roughlee was its
legality; the would-be lynch mob was acting well within the confines of contemporary English law. And George Lavington, writing in his palatial study in far-away Exeter Cathedral, was one of its chief enablers.

To understand this connection between elite reproach and popular attack, one must begin with the contemporary legal regime that enabled religious persecution. When Wesley writes in his journals about “national persecution” he is not only raising a rhetorical flourish; he is referencing actionable policy. Throughout the eighteenth century, state persecution of religious minorities—a remarkably diverse group that ran the full theological spectrum, from Catholics to nonconformist and evangelical Protestants—was codified as English law. The penalties for participating in Catholic rituals and preaching nonconformist sermons were referred to as disabilities, a term which evolved into the modern legal term “civil disability,” meaning a withdrawal of civil rights as a penalty for a crime. The disabilities imposed on Catholics and dissenters were, as this section will show, stringent and significant.

In an article exploring the political culture of religious intolerance in seventeenth-century England, the historian Mark Goldie asserts, “Restoration England was a persecuting society.” The claim is a convincing one; Goldie describes the collaboration between the Anglican Church and the English state to crack down on religious dissenters, as well as the ideological rationale behind the state-sponsored persecution. Goldie's essay makes a compelling argument for how a political culture that insisted on absolute religious conformity justified extensive repression, in some cases endorsing open physical violence against nonconforming Protestants and Catholics.

The same claim of a “persecuting society” could be made, perhaps with the same accuracy, of eighteenth-century England as well. Over the course of the century Parliament would not only uphold existing persecutory laws; it actively pursued a legislative agenda that included dozens of regulations on religious freedom and expression. In 1714, Parliament sent the Schism Act to the Queen Anne’s desk, a bill that introduced and codified a number of new disabilities for nonconforming Protestants. Chief among them was a religion-based restriction on eligibility for teaching. Section III of the statute, dealing with religious affiliation and education, stipulates that any person who, while teaching at a “public or private school or seminary, or instructing any youth as tutor or schoolmaster,” takes part in religious rites different from the “liturgy and practice of the Church of England…[shall] thenceforth be incapable of keeping any public or private school or seminary, or instructing any youth as tutor or schoolmaster.” The potentially disastrous consequences of the law for religious minorities cannot be overstated; England’s religious elites had realized that maintaining control over the country’s growing educational system was key to maintaining political hegemony, and the law would have been a devastating blow for religious minori-
ties attempting to secure institutional continuity through education.

Also on display here is the English elite’s attention to the connection between religious practice and social class; difference of religious opinion seems to have been far more tolerable among elites than among the middle classes and the poor. The same statute that threatens to shut down all dissenting schools adds a provision that the “act shall not extend to any tutor teaching or instructing youth in any college or hall within either of the universities of England, [i.e., Oxford and Cambridge] nor to any tutor who shall be employed by any nobleman or noblewoman to teach his or her own children, grandchildren or great-grandchildren only.”36 This rings true with the notion that religious difference was, in the eyes of the elites, more a threat to social stability than to some idealized conception of public virtue or morality. It mattered who the worshippers were.

In a truly bizarre turn of events, however, the bill never went into effect. Queen Anne died the morning of the first day of the Schism Act’s enforcement, and the Whig government that would come to power in the wake of her passing had little interest in upholding the law. Still, the question of actual enforcement aside, the very fact of the bill’s passage speaks volumes for the political-religious culture that produced it; the lax enforcement of the Schism Act and its eventual repeal, on the other hand, were matters of political contingency. The reverse scenario—one of wide-scale enforcement and forced school closures—could just as easily have occurred had the Whigs not trounced the Tories in the 1715 general election, thereby removing hardline Anglicans from power for the foreseeable future.37

The failure of the Anglican party to enforce the Schism Act, however, should not convince the reader that all similar efforts failed. To serve our purpose of understanding the legal restrictions specifically imposed on Methodists, we will now examine a second law, equally harsh in its attitude towards religious minorities but with a different target: England’s Catholic minority.

The turn of the eighteenth century bore witness to Parliament’s adoption of one of the last truly stringent pieces of anti-Catholic legislation. The Popery Act of 1698-1699, also referred to by its more evocative subtitle “An act for further preventing the growth of popery,” stands out for its potential to incite violence—and its potential to harm other religious minorities besides it nominal Catholic targets. The law would also last, remaining on the books for over a century until its eventual repeal by the Religious Disabilities Act of 1846.38 Anti-Catholic legislation constitutes its own legal milieu, replete with its own rhetorical tropes and trademark means of disenfranchisement. But the Popery Act goes well beyond the standard combination of policy (namely, the religious test-law) and rhetoric (the characterization of the pope as a foreign agent). The law explicitly promised cash rewards for physical violence against Catholic practitioners.
One of the central provisions of the act—one that truly sets the Popery Act apart from similar anti-Catholic legislation in its potentially violent consequences—was an offer of a monetary reward to individuals who apprehended Catholic priests and turned them over to local authorities for punishment. The law states:

Be it enacted that all and every Person and Persons who shall apprehend and take One or more Popish Bishop, Priest or Jesuit and prosecute him or them so apprehended and taken until he or they be convicted of saying Mass or of exercising any other Part of the Office of Function of a Popish Bishop or Priest within these realms shall receive from the Sheriff or Sheriffs of the County where such Conviction shall be made (without paying any Fee for the same) for every such Offender so convicted the sum of 100 pounds.³⁰

To rephrase: in order to preserve religious conformity, the English government was, as late as 1700, actively encouraging its citizens to summarily arrest suspected Catholics and to bring them to local authorities for punishment.

Now at last it becomes clear that George Lavington’s repetitive characterization of the Methodists as Catholics was much more than flashy rhetoric or simple bigotry. It was a carefully constructed argument that brought with it the danger of physical violence against the Methodists—a violence endorsed and encouraged by the law. The accusation of being a “Papist” or Catholic recusant in eighteenth-century England could, as this statute amply shows, bring about summary detention and citizen’s arrest. If one could connect Methodists to Catholics, even rhetorically, the logic follows that one might find a legal justification for their repression.

What follows is a model outlining how elites such as Lavington might well have manipulated the Popery Act to serve their agenda of religious uniformity and anti-Methodism. As mentioned earlier in the essay, Wesley encountered numerous Anglican congregations that had received advance copies of Lavington’s Enthusiasm from their bishops. The congregations would have heard excerpts from the pamphlets read aloud as part of standard Sunday sermons, and, in doing so, would have come to associate the Methodists with a defined group, one that they had been legally encouraged to persecute: Roman Catholics. If this did not provide incentive enough to persecute, the economic reality might have. Roughlee was an impoverished rural district, and the financial boon of collecting a “Catholic” might have been encouragement enough for local men to harass Methodists. Even if one takes the financial incentive out of the picture, state-sponsored arrests of “Papists” had been commonplace enough in the past that provincial and village leaders could, with little difficulty, encourage their subjects to take action against a new quasi-Catholic threat.

Conceived of in the broadest possible terms, then, it would seem that the enforcement of religious stability—that is, the total domination of a non-enthusiastic and centrist
Anglican theology—was sustained by three distinct pillars. The first was the elite power base—people like George Lavington, Jonas Hanway and William Warburton—who, for all their evident political clout, remained mostly in what might be called the “public sphere.” Their power came from reputation and public standing; it was this kind of power that allowed Lavington, for example, to spread his words to a mass audience through pamphlets, or for Hanway to campaign against Methodism in London’s world of letters.

The second pillar was the law, which legalized persecution. A cynic might object to the separation of these two categories. She or he might say that the law is inextricably connected to the public elites who in practice had the lion’s share of political power and the ear of Parliament. The existence of this relationship is undisputable. But they are not one and the same; there is a subtler dynamic at work here. While the laws might be dangerous enough for Catholics, they do not say anything explicitly about Methodism. One requires the persuasion of a cultural or religious authority figure, like Lavington or even Jonas Hanway, to make the logical leap of faith from persecuting Catholics to persecuting Methodists. "The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared" accomplishes this task; its equation of Catholic and Methodist was the persuasive element needed to galvanize support for persecution.

But the actual enforcers of stability—moderation’s shock troops—were not clerics or jurists. George Lavington never laid eyes on John Wesley until a full decade after the assault at Roughlee, and never personally ordered his parishioners to attack Methodist laity. The attackers—the third pillar of moderation—were, by and large, ordinary people, exhorted to violence by parish priests and propaganda pamphlets. The legal system provided amnesty for them, and, at least in theory, a reward. In this way dissent was crushed by equal parts pamphlet, proclamation and pogrom.

To understand the historical underpinnings of stability politics, I conclude by examining the work of William Warburton, an active opponent of Methodism and promoter of religious conformity.

WILLIAM WARBURTON, CULTURAL MEMORY, AND STABILITY

William Warburton has hung over the entirety of this essay like a specter, and it only seems fitting that we conclude with him. A vociferous and prominent opponent of Methodism and a leading Anglican moderate, Warburton occupied numerous high church offices throughout his illustrious career as a theologian and public intellectual, culminating with his tenure as the bishop of Gloucester. Much like Lavington and Hanway, Warburton saw the Methodists as posing a grave danger to the English state; in his magnum opus *The Divine Legation of Moses*, Warburton employed the com-
mon trope of associating Methodists with the excesses of Cromwell’s Commonwealth and the violence of the civil war to criticize Wesley and his followers; Methodism was “a new species of Puritanism, or rather the old one revived under the same name,” founded by “enthusiasts.”40 It is important to consider that even though Warburton calls Methodists “Puritans,” the argument should not be construed as substantially different from Lavington’s allegations of papism; at the time Puritan and Papist were terms of equivalent rhetorical power and, in the context of the politics of stability, had equivalent resonance. Much as Catholics were a threat to social stability by virtue of their alleged foreign loyalties, the Puritan was a threat to the social order because of his enthusiasm and wild utopianism.

In this disparaging remark, Warburton’s attitude toward the Methodists seems to fit into the standard mold of anti-Methodist propaganda. But his writings do much to illustrate the cultural and political rationale behind stability politics writ large, arguing the case for government-enforced religious hierarchy with more subtlety and depth than any of the anti-Methodist writers profiled thus far. Examining Warburton in this final section may render the monomania for stability which is evident in Lavington’s writing in a more nuanced light, and will help provide firmer context for the dispute itself.

We will now consider Warburton’s second great work, *The Alliance Between Church and State*, in the context of its time, attempting to understand the historical rationale behind the ideology of stability. Warburton wrote the Alliance in 1736, only ten years before the Lavington-Wesley controversy, in the politically uncertain aftermath of the English Civil War; although the Glorious Revolution had restored a kind of normality to England, Jacobite rebellions and the Great Awakening were posing new threats to the social order, threats that Warburton was quick to link to the civil wars and conflicts of the past. The effects of the civil war and its aftermath on the eighteenth-century English political conscious cannot be overstated. Warburton’s Alliance Between Church and State displays the consequences of such a social catastrophe on one man’s political thought, and, by extension, that of his country. It also explains, in part, the obsession with stability evidenced even by enlightened English writers such as Jonas Hanway.

The religious test law, the focus of Warburton’s Alliance, was a legal measure intended to promote good social order and to avert chaos. This chaos—that had nearly destroyed England in the previous century—for Warburton had its origins in sectarianism. “Wherever there is diversity of religions, each sect, believing its own the truest, strives to advance itself on the ruins of the rest,” Warburton contends. Upon failing to achieve this supremacy through reasoned argumentation, Warburton continues, these “partisans … are apt to have recourse to the coercive power of the state.” The effects of these attempts are “well known to those acquainted with the history of mankind.”41 This is clearly in
reference to the English Civil War, the aftermath of which Warburton and his generation were still forced to contend with. Thus a test law is necessary; by preventing religious non-conformists from entering public office, a sectarian battle for control over the government might be averted.

But Warburton’s argument is subtler, and deserves further consideration as a less extreme representative of stability politics. Unlike Lavington, who throughout the Enthusiasm is unwavering in his opposition towards the Methodists and bears no sympathy for Wesley and his ilk, Warburton makes a deliberate effort to acknowledge the inevitable unpopularity of religious uniformity among the nonconformists, going so far as to concede that it will be a “pain” for those affected. But by establishing a test law, Warburton argues in a response to critics, the character of the state will actually become less repressive; in its attempt to “repel an evil,” the state will employ “restraint only,” as opposed to punishment. The test law, then, is a proactive measure intended to disarm opponents before they bring harm upon themselves. Warburton makes a great effort to emphasize this point, stating that the law is by no means akin to reactive, oppressive measures that attempt to punish nonconformists. He does so by comparing the test law to religious laws from previous ages that “extend pains and penalties to the burning the Atheist; to the banishing the Papist” and similar excesses of state violence. The test law, he argues, circumvents these backwards punishments by preemptively disabling problematic religious minorities. Warburton’s logic here is strikingly similar to that of Jonas Hanway; much as Hanway insists that the Methodists be suppressed before they instigate even worse punishments for themselves, Warburton proposes the test law as a means of ensuring a double stability: one that counters both state excesses and sectarian religious conflict.

In the end, however, this concession is not the crux of Warburton’s argument. Boiled down to its essence, Warburton’s main justification of the test law employs a fundamentally communitarian logic: “if opinions … obstruct the effects of civil society, it follows, that they must be restrained.”

Here, in Warburton, we at last find a political theory of moderation and stability outlined in its clearest and most condensed form yet. This communitarian ethic of social preservation, so perfectly encapsulated by Warburton’s declaration, can be seen as the subtext behind Lavington’s polemic against Methodist enthusiasm. It was this same ideology, one that prioritized the durability of normal society, which informed Hanway’s letters against the Methodists as well. Methodism had the potential to “obstruct” the functioning of English society — to transform its religious institutions, its cultural and economic values, and its spiritual identity itself. It was this potential that justified persecution.

Despite the best efforts of the Anglican aristocracy, however, the Methodists would persist, eventually entering into the religious mainstream. Sometimes truth is stranger
than fiction; late in his life, Lavington would meet Wesley at a church-sponsored dinner held in Wesley’s honor, and the two men would reconcile. Methodism was no longer a threat. As had occurred with other evangelical Christian movements, Methodism had become middle-class; its adherents’ newfound material success shut the door on the ecstatic enthusiasm of their forebears.

This essay set out to understand the nature of moderate religious politics in eighteenth-century England. What it found was that moderation insisted on a stability that was not alienated from disputation or violence. The enforcement of moderation regarding religious matters required the establishment of a political order based on three mutually supporting pillars: the stipulations of the law, the advocacy of the church and of sympathetic intellectuals, and the violence of the mob. But there is a broader, more important point to be observed here: Moderation was anything but moderate. The preservation of banality—of the status quo, the normal order—required the constant attention and robust political commitment of the preservers. Stability depended on violence.
NOTES

9. The Jacobites were a loosely organized Catholic militant faction that advocated for the return of the British crown to the House of Stuart. The movement had its origins in the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution, in which the pro-Catholic monarch James II had been deposed and replaced by the more moderate William and Mary. After James died in exile at the court of Louis XIV, the Jacobites continued to advocate for a Catholic restoration to the throne, taking up arms on three separate occasions: 1699, 1715 and 1745. They were soundly defeated on each occasion, but their influence on the course of English political history cannot be overstated. The last section of this essay engages with the relationship between the Jacobite insurrections and stability politics.
12. Dr. Johnson’s Dictionary entry for the term gives a Warburton quote as a usage example, and the entry underscores the pejorative origins of the word: “They, who are now called Methodists, in the days of our forefathers called precisians.”
20. Lavington, Enthusiasm, I 21. Note that the quotation marks in this excerpted passage signify that the text is taken from John Wesley's journal entries—which he had published in Methodist circulars or pamphlets—or his other public writings.
22. Lavington, Enthusiasm, II 2.
24. Wesley, Letter, 43.
26. Details about Hanway’s life, including his family history and career path, can be found in the


28. It is also worth noting that Hanway wrote this series of letters in 1761, a full decade after the Enthusiasm was published.

29. Hanway, Thoughts, 541.

30. Ibid., 537.

31. Ibid., 554.

32. Ibid., 548.


33. Religious demographics from eighteenth-century England are spurious and hard to come by. An article recently published in The Journal of Ecclesiastical History by Clive Field makes a new attempt at a headcount, and discusses the diversity of religious affinity practice among the group labeled nonconformists. The group included the “Old Dissenters,” separatist Protestants who traced their history back to the religious conflicts of the seventeenth century, as well as the swelling Methodist and other evangelical communities, including Moravians, Inghamites, Swedenborgians, Sandemanians and dozens of smaller sects. For a full demographic survey see “Counting Religion in England and Wales: The Long Nineteenth Century,” The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 63 (2012): 710.


37. 1715 marked the beginning of the so-called “Whig Supremacy,” a period in English political history in which the Tories, discredited for their involvement in the Jacobite rebellions, remained shut out of government for nearly fifty years.


39. Williams, The Eighteenth Century Constitution, 332. It is also worth noting that 100 pounds sterling in 1700 converts to approximately $19,000 in 2016; it is a hefty reward by any metric.


42. Ibid., 121.

43. Ibid., 123.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Hanway, Jonas “Thoughts on the Methodists: The Absurd Doctrines and Manner of
Preaching in Use Among Them.” (London; John Rivington, Publisher)
Warburton, William. The Alliance Between Church and State. London; Fletcher Gyles, 1736.
Wesley, John. A Letter to the Author of The Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists Compared (London; H. Cock, 1750) 25

TITLE IMAGE

Political violence occurs regularly in the post-Ottoman region. To date, conflicts in Syria, North Africa, Turkey, and the Balkan Peninsula often dominate the headlines. In examining the history of the region, Daisy Li, University of Western Ontario ’16, explores factors that contributed to identity fragmentation in the Ottoman Empire. An analysis of historical accounts reveals that involve self-identification derived from ethno-religious elements sustained by the millet system. These forms of identification, Li argues, became entrenched as the basis of socioeconomic stratification, leading to localized violence during the penetration of Western ideologies in the twentieth century.
INTRODUCTION

Massacres of minority groups in the faltering Ottoman Empire over the past two centuries indicate the deeply entrenched problems of intrastate conflict. Policies of the empire were characterized by ethnic coexistence, where self-governing millets were administered under an overarching Ottoman identity. Following the French Revolution in 1789, non-Muslim subjects became increasingly dissatisfied with their secondary status. Inspired by sentiments of self-identification, various groups attempted to find their niche in the deteriorating state. However, religious differences and Ottoman failure to adapt to the rapidly changing sociopolitical outlook hastened the decline of the imperial system.

Social scientists interested in political violence often differentiate the catastrophes in Eastern Europe from those of Western Asia. The former region’s racial makeup, cultural proximity, and geopolitical relevance to the West place it within the breadth of prominent scholarly analysis. However, underlying factors for these calamities are similar, with ethnic cleansing and genocide appearing frequently in both regions. Within the premises of the Ottoman realm, “genocide” has been applied to the mass killing of Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrians.1 “Ethnic cleansing” has been used to describe the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, the Istanbul pogrom of 1955, human catastrophes in the Balkan Peninsula, the massacre of Kurds in Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and—occasionally and more recently—the underlying cause of the ongoing Syrian crisis. Despite embedded identity frictions, it is reductionist to evaluate these conflicts as having “solely monolithic ethno-religious” elements.2 Similarly, political factors are significant in civil strife. However, they fail to explain the mounting identity instabilities that mark the Ottoman region. It is worth noting that clashes in the past two centuries have been similar in their initiations and continuations, as a narrative criminalizing future victims and emphasizing the inconceivability of ethnic coexistence became crucial in justifying violence.

This paper aims to analyze contributors to violence in the pre- and post-Ottoman setting. It will assess ethnic amalgamation as the result of Ottoman governance in affiliated territories. Further, Western influence including postwar treaties and the notions of nationalism and self-determination will be evaluated. This paper will examine the millet system and the general theory used to approach Ottoman demise. Findings concerning the cause of the ethnic divisions will be employed to analyze several cases—the causes of balkanization, the rise of Armenian and Kurdish identity, as well as the emergence of Arab nationalism—to ensure adequate elucidation of the theory. While these cases have their own sets of particularities, together they share commonalities. The gap between socio-economic classes based on ethnic-religious differences has become fundamental in the distinct perception of “self” and “other.”
OTTOMAN DECLINE THEORY

Scholarly analyses often suggest that Ottoman decline was the result of Ottoman-centrism. The very greatness of Ottoman achievement under Suleiman I carried “within it seeds of ultimate degradation.”\(^3\) Successive Sultans proved to be lesser statesmen. Their disinterest in state affairs and unfeasible ambitions was accompanied by bureaucratic corruption and neglect of national governance. Europe’s scientific progress throughout the seventeenth century was in stark contrast to the lack of technological advancement in the Ottoman Empire. This imbalance contributed to a halt in Ottoman territorial expansion, which some academics have identified as a crucial cause of economic stagnation and, ultimately, civil disunity.\(^4\)

However, recent studies show that the Ottoman Empire did not experience an irreversible decline in the seventeenth century as suggested. While its international position did diminish, the state exhibited the ability to adjust to changing socioeconomic circumstances in the following centuries.\(^5\) The Ottoman bureaucratic system was flexible in containing rebellious groups through negotiations until the nineteenth century.\(^6\) Despite the continuous conflicts it faced from the 1770s onwards, the empire was able to survive into the modern era with most of its governmental institutions intact.\(^7\) Jonathan Grant opposes theories of Ottoman technological stagnation by stating that the empire was able to remain on par with their competitors, in particular, the Venetians and the Russians.\(^8\) While Western European advancements were superior during the Enlightenment, the Ottoman Empire was able to catch up to its rivals by the end of the eighteenth century.\(^9\) Süleyman Özmucur and Şevket Pamuk argue that there was a “guardedly optimistic revisionism regarding Ottoman standards of living, both in the early modern era and in the wake of the Industrial Revolution.”\(^10\) By comparing the real wages of urban construction workers between 1489 and 1914 in Ottoman cities to European cities’ price and wage trends during the same period, Özmucur and Pamuk refute the theory of Ottoman decline.\(^11\)

While there is evident tension amongst the Ottoman inhabitants, the relation between escalating internal conflicts and Ottoman sociopolitical status remains unclear. To this end, the often-overlooked Ottoman governance should be re-evaluated. Its multifaceted system was fundamental in upholding a tolerant peace during early centuries. However, its inability to generate a shared sociopolitical identity was detrimental to domestic stability in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Ethno-religious factors were further exacerbated by Western intervention and became a politicized weapon in identity segregation and Ottoman fragmentation.
SOCIOECONOMIC DIVIDE: THE MILLET SYSTEM AND WESTERN INFLUENCE

Owing to the Ottoman Empire’s complex historical ventures, it is difficult to illustrate a clear-cut Ottoman identity. While academia often places emphasis upon its “Islamic and Turkish character,”12 these definitions do not adequately define the intricate nature of the empire. The term “Turks,” used to describe Ottoman inhabitants, did not carry any nationalist or ethnic meaning in a modern sense.13 Before the twentieth-century, “Turk” largely referred to the peasants residing in the outskirts of Anatolia, whom the Ottoman elites preferred to keep distant. Such socioeconomic divisions were essential to Ottoman governance. According to Ziya Gökalp, the overall Ottoman identity before the twentieth-century was, in fact, the identity of ruling nobility.14 Furthermore, there is also debate in regards to Ottoman religious identity. To many, the idea of an “Ottoman citizen” is dependent on the underlying notion of Ummah, which refers to a collective Islamic identity that is the “paradigm of a complex, non-territorial, post-national form of allegiance.”15 However, while Islam influenced Ottoman social, administrative, and judicial arrangements, it was interpreted as an instrument that supported Sultan authority.16 This is evident in the acceptance of religious pluralism, which became the basis of the millet system.17

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism were the three largest religions within the Ottoman state. To sustain a tolerant peace between its different occupants, the millet emerged as a political system that divided non-Muslim communities, or dhimmis, based on religious affiliations. The term millet has several definitions, often translating into “religious community” or “nation” in the Ottoman context.18 The system preserved a religious and cultural system within the different millets while introducing Ottoman influence through certain civic duties.19 The administration did not aim to create definitive parameters based on ethnic affiliations. Rather, flexible ethno-religious boundaries existed between the Muslims and non-Muslim Ottomans. Groups with distinct administrative procedures were granted the capacity to establish separate societal arrangements.20 Dhimmis were exempt from military service but paid a tax applicable to adhered adult males.21 Coupled with teachings from the West, they were often better educated and engaged in roles of merchants, craftsmen, and tradesmen.22 These were fundamental factors in the wealth accumulated by dhimmis and the preservation of their self-identities.

Ottoman tolerance was, at its basis, a maneuver intended to provide stability to the expanding empire. Despite intended religious acceptance, there remained deep-seated prejudice against non-Muslims, who were perceived as “separate, unequal and protected.”23 During periods of Ottoman disintegration, many local authorities took advantage of their non-Muslim subjects through imposing taxes, looting properties, or enforcing rigid legislations.24 Discontent has been particularly vivid in the agrarian Balkans, as Muslims held sole landownership.25 By preserving their distinctive culture and social customs, religious
solidarity under separate millets often superseded Ottoman loyalty. Although explicit sub-identities were lacking within the Rum millet, these Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Albanians, and Romanians were aware of their differences. Notions of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century perpetuated separate identities and heightened liberal ideologies. Two stages of de-identification occurred among the Ottoman minorities: nationalism-inspired movements in the nineteenth century and an ethnic awakening exacerbated by the concept of self-determination after WWI. While non-Muslim minorities experienced these sentiments because of inherent differences, they were largely the basis of tension between members of the same millet before the Enlightenment. Greek dominance in the Rum millet often provided them with extensive power over Orthodox Christians. This led to the oppression of non-Greek subjects, such as the attempted demolishment of Slavic history through book burnings. In response to the inequalities, a period of Islamization emerged in the Balkans in response to associated socio-economic benefits. Under Ottoman reign, conversion to Islam was encouraged and accepted regardless of one's ethnic identity. After mastering the official Ottoman language, anyone could become a member of the elite Ottoman. The elite and the masses became two distinct classes with the cosmopolitan Ottoman aristocracy—which saw itself as the millet-I hakime, the sovereign nation, who governed the millet-i- mahkure, the inferior nation. Conversion in the Balkans became a widespread phenomenon in the sixteenth century as a result of market pressure, lifestyle adaption, and religious factors. In 1525, conversion to Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina was twice that in most of the other Balkan territories. The seventeenth century was considered to be the “age of conversion” in the peninsula, with extensive Islamization encouraged by economic and religious elements. Since agricultural output was the primary source of revenue in the Balkans, ethno-religious stratification became an embedded element in the region owing to Muslim landownership. This provided the basis to religious frictions during the era of nationalization.

According to Ernst B. Haas, nationalism refers to a collective consciousness that differentiates a group of people from others through a set of common characteristics. It fosters the notion that they must constitute a nation, or that “they already are one.” Coupled with political discourse, nationalism evolves into ideologies that shape the sociopolitical forecast of a people, whether it attempts to rid them of traditional values through revolutionary teachings or amend these values through syncretistic principles. As a result, movements emerge, either to seek a homogenous order or to reconstruct governance in an attempt to self-perfect, restore a “golden age,” or achieve any political goal in-between. The French Revolution took on the form of sociopolitical reconstruction. The movement spread ideas of nationalism throughout the world, polarizing social, political, and intellectual structures whilst laying the foundation for modern liberal democracy. As a result of its subordinated political status, the Ottoman Empire underwent several Great Power
interventions that demanded equality for Christian subjects.\textsuperscript{39} Owing to its association with Christendom, the Rum millet formed distinct ties with the Western powers through economic and social arrangements.\textsuperscript{40} These religious sentiments were ripe with purpose; nationalism only provided them with a political direction.

Ensuing conflicts were laden with the desire for autonomy. However, despite ethnic differences, the will to combat Muslim “infidels” became a shared Christian purpose. Centuries of religious segregation cultivated the nationalization of religion. According to Jayeel Cornelio, nationalization of religion occurs when “the performances of religion are cloaked in a nationalistic character that renders the religious significantly invisible and the prevailing political order unquestioned.” This is evident in the extermination of Muslims during the Greek Independence, the assertion of the “other” in the Armenian and Assyrian massacres, and the subsequent rise of Turkish and Arab nationalism. In reaction to the nationalization of religion, religious nationalism became a fundamental element during the period of Ottoman Islamization under Sultan Abdülhamit II and in present day pan-Islamism. To clarify, religion was not the sole basis for these conflicts. However, the religious element was heavily underscored by the ineffectiveness of religious coexistence. It provided a justification for the regional violence that was perceived as a necessary instrument for ethnic survival.

With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca following Ottoman defeat in the 1768–74 Russo-Turkish Wars, Russia sought the right to act as the protectorate for Christian subjects in the Ottoman Empire. For Greek Christians, the maneuver was seen as liberating. While Greek Phanariot nobilities retained a relatively lavish lifestyle, most of the Greek provinces were reduced to subsistence farming under Ottoman rule. Discontent with economic and political turmoil in Greece led to minor rebellions by Greek Christian klephts and armatoloi. Over 6,000 men between 1800 and 1810 were involved in these regiments, which provided them the means to basic living.\textsuperscript{42} This figure is substantial considering that the Greek Revolution barely exceeded 20,000 men in its initial year. Between 1809 and 1814, diverse factors led to the disbandment of these corps, which left numerous Greek Christians without a means of survival.\textsuperscript{43} Coupled with the notion of Greek identity as fostered by the French Revolution, economic disparities heightened tensions among sociopolitical classes represented by different ethno-religious groups. This is most evident with the members of the “Philike Hetairia” (Friendly Society), which instigated the 1821 Greek Independence. The 1819 records of the association reveal that the majority of its 452 members had neither a wealthy nor influential background.\textsuperscript{44} Approximately a quarter (153) were identified to be merchants and shippers, while others varied from soldiers to priests and doctors.\textsuperscript{45} Evidently, revolutionary ideals were also attractive to those with some political status. Yet initial rebellions were instigated by people of a lower socioeconomic class relative to their Ottoman Muslim counterparts.
Despite claims of the secularity of the Greek nationalist movement, it is important to note that over time Christianity has become a part of the cultural construct that defined the Greek identity. The extent of so-called “religion suffused nationalism” is evident in the 1821 massacre of Tripolitsa, where approximately 20,000 Muslim inhabitants and some Jewish minorities were slaughtered by the Greek community during their struggle for independence. Many ethnically Greek Muslims did not escape the massacre, in which mosques too were destroyed and converted to churches. In William St. Clair’s words, “the orgy of genocide exhausted itself in the Peloponneso only when there were no more Turks to kill.” As mentioned, the notion of “Turk” lacked ethnic relevance in the contemporary sense. The Great Powers labeled all Ottoman Muslims as “Turks” in reference to Ottoman ancestry to Central Asia Turkic clans. As such, there was no distinction between a “Turk” and other Ottoman ethnicities.

In response to the loss of its Eastern European grounds, the Ottoman Empire commenced the Tanzimat reforms. Between 1839 and 1876, a period of secularization was initiated by reformist Sultan Mahmud II. It upheld Ottomanism, which recognized all inhabitants as equal citizens under Ottoman law. However, freedom given to Christian subjects did not result in corresponding loyalty to Ottoman rule. Instead, it was used to secure further support from European powers in separatist movements. During this period, Muslim refugees who resided in the Balkan Peninsula swarmed the remainder of Ottoman land, further dividing Eurasia along religious lines. In Anatolia, economic prosperity experienced by the non-Muslim population in the latter nineteenth-century fueled Muslim resentment towards their comparably privileged counterparts. At the same time as the rise of European imperialism on former Ottoman soil (specifically the French presence in Tunisia and Algeria), many Muslim inhabitants became ever more attached to the identity of Ottoman Caliphate. In 1875, conflict emerged in Bosnia and Herzegovina between exasperated peasants and their Muslim landlords. As part of the Tazimat reforms, the Safer Decree was introduced in 1859 to classify and divide the land between agaliks and begliks. The former established a legal relationship between landowners and peasants; the latter established the properties of the landholders. While the decree attempted to codify customary law to grant legal rights for farmers working on the agalik estates, it undermined Christian peasants through its imposition of high taxes and fixed loopholes for Muslim landholders.

Responding to the rise of nationalism, a poor harvest season, and worsening relations between classes, the Bosnian peasants revolted in the spring of 1875. The movement quickly spread to neighboring territories, which “inflamed the whole South Slav population and was a signal for revolt in other parts of the Balkans ruled by Turkey.” Rebellion extended to Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Albania, while Habsburg held Dalmatia, Croatia, and Vojvodina; the events came to be known as the “Eastern Crisis.” Leveraging
the tumultuous situation, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire in 1876.\textsuperscript{59} In Bulgaria, the April Uprising commenced with the slaughter of Muslims by the Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee.\textsuperscript{60} In response, Bulgarian civilians were later massacred during the mobilization of Ottoman regular troops and irregular bashibazouks. Under these circumstances, Sultan Abdülhamit II initiated an era of pan-Islam to strengthen the territorial integrity of the empire. Initially intended to strengthen the deteriorating state by reinstating the role of Caliphate, the counter-reformation process exacerbated prior socioeconomic conditions.\textsuperscript{61} In 1877, Russia waged war on the Port. Continuous Ottoman defeat led to the Congress of Berlin, which resulted in the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro, as well as an autonomous Bulgaria. Cyprus was transferred to British administration and Bosnia to that of the Habsburg Empire.\textsuperscript{62} It is within this economic and political context that the Hamidian massacres occurred in the mid-1890s.

As for the Greeks in their crossroads location between opposing civilizations, Christianity is also crucial to Armenian ethnic identification.\textsuperscript{63} The ethno-history of the people was heavily linked to the Armenian Church.\textsuperscript{64} The Armenian society generally “identifies their ethnicity by their religious affiliations… and disapproved deviations from the general norm.”\textsuperscript{65} From 1768 to 1878, six wars were waged between Imperial Russia and the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{66} Millions of Muslim people in Imperial Russia were driven into Ottoman-held Armenian land while a vast number of Armenian Christians fled into Russian-held Armenian territory.\textsuperscript{67} During the Tanzimat Reforms, the Armenian and Assyrian people achieved greater economic and political influence, with the former securing the title of Millet-i-Sakika (The Loyal Millet) and the latter acquiring its own millet.\textsuperscript{68} However, the implementation of pan-Islam by Sultan Abdülhamit II and gradual independence of Balkan states incentivized the Armenian populace to seek internal autonomy from the Port. In the 1890s, these sentiments manifested in the rise of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun.

Elements of the Armenian insurgences resemble Balkan revolts. Like the Balkan farmers, the Armenian peasantry endured a system of heavy taxation. Both groups were taxed by the central government and again by local Muslim landowners.\textsuperscript{69} Furthermore, they were influenced by external and internal elements, notably encouragements from Western powers and nationalistic ideals from domestic revolutionary committees.\textsuperscript{70} These factors served as a pretext for the 1894 Sasun Uprisings.\textsuperscript{71} As the first potent fighters of the Armenian resistance movement, the Sasun Mountaineers were subjected to the “exactions of the Kurdish chieftains [which] had evolved into an organized system of tribute by blackmail, paid for their protection by the Armenian population.”\textsuperscript{72} These mountaineers protested against the oppressive taxation by stating that they “couldn’t serve two masters at the same time.”\textsuperscript{73} The distress became a crucial element in the Sasun uprising against
their Muslim landowners in 1894. While the insurgency was quickly put down by Kurdish irregulars and Ottoman troops, it resulted in estimated death counts between 6,000 and 10,000 civilians. The resistance strengthened nationalistic sentiments among both Armenians and their oppressors. It triggered a decade of ethno-religious clash in the Caucasus Mountains. The Hamidian massacre from 1894 to 1896 led to the estimated death of 80,000 to 300,000 Christian minorities. Religious undertones were evident. While the mass killings were to repress Armenians, Syrian Christians in the same region also experienced annihilation. An estimated 25,000 Syrian Christians were slaughtered during the process, 3,000 of whom were burnt alive in the cathedral of Edessa. Ethnic tension also grew between the Armenians and their Azerbaijani neighbors owing to preferential treatments based on ethno-religious differences. Otherwise known as the Armeno-Tatar war of 1905, the encounter was a pivotal moment of national awakening for both peoples. However, it was not until 1914 that Dashnak-led Armenia began seeking independence from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).

Dismayed by the deteriorating Ottoman state, the Young Turks emerged as a reactionary force to the absolute rule posed by Sultan Abdülhamit II. Originally a secret society, the CUP began as a liberal reform movement influenced by the Meiji Restoration in Japan. In 1902 and 1905, the CUP formed coalitions that united the Turkish population in the Caucasus and the Balkans by adopting a forceful Turkic line. However, the Young Turks did not hesitate to leverage Islam in the process of delegitimizing the Sultan and criticizing European imperialism. To unite the Muslim population, they maintained that European colonialism had a hidden Christian agenda aimed at discrediting the Ottoman Muslims. In tandem with the fear of Great Power intervention in Macedonia, the CUP initiated the Second Constitutional Era of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite an emphasis on Turkic elements, the revolution appeared to offer remaining minority groups the equality and internal autonomy they had long desired. Not only did the Young Turks cooperate with minority committees including the Dashnak, but a few of the original CUP members were in fact of Kurdish origin. In Albania, the Muslim-dominated demography was threatened by rival Christian neighbors and continuous European intervention. As a result, the Committee for the Liberation of Albania allied with the CUP while its guerrilla units fought Christian terrorists and the Ottoman government. However, the Young Turk movement was ultimately dedicated to the strengthening of the empire. Shortly after the Balkan War, it adopted a fear-based agenda, where the systematic division of “self” and “other” became crucial to the dynamics shaping Ottoman socio-political conducts.

In the early twentieth century, the internal economic problems as faced by the newly independent Balkan states resulted in a need for additional land. As a region heavily reliant on agricultural production, independence accelerated state expenses and reduced exporting
markets. Political corruption, overall economic backwardness, and population growth transformed mounting tensions into the first Balkan War between the Balkan League and the Ottoman Empire. In the years leading up to the war, arms bandits and paramilitaries emerged throughout the peninsula. Many organizations and committees used direct and violent methods to attack Ottoman forces and rival groups. The war resulted in the mass extermination of Muslim communities. Within a year, 1.5 million Muslims in the Ottoman Europe were purged or forced to exile, leading to the formation of homogenous nation states around Anatolia. Guerrilla troops annihilated numerous Turkish and Albanian communities, with Bulgaria destroying “practically all the Muslim villages,” Serbs purging Muslim communities in Northern Macedonia and Albania, and Montenegrins demolishing Northern Albania. Following the war, CUP coerced approximately 100,000 Greeks out of Istanbul and 200,000 Greeks out of the Aegean coast of Asia Minor. With the pretext of ethno-religious polarization, Ahmet Cemal Pasha, Ismail Enver Pasha, and Mehmet Talat Pasha initiated a military coup along the radial ideologies of ethnic homogeneity in 1913. Their rise to power accompanied further acts of segregation to which defined twentieth-century Ottoman.

The creation of the modern Turkish Republic began with a gradual process of exclusion. Ottoman elites governed the remaining territory by a “fear-based belief system” comprising prejudice, negative stereotypes, and scapegoating. As such, ethnic violence transformed into a locally normalized practice for pre-emptive action against co-nationals. One of such ethnic massacres occurred in 1914 in Diyarbakir, a city that contained a mix of Muslims, Armenian, and Assyrian inhabitants. After a failed attempt by the CUP at attacking Russian troops in Sarikamish, ethnic tensions in Diyarbakir prompted violent searches that accused minorities of treason and espionage. During this period, many statesmen radicalized and blamed Christian minorities as the cause of Ottoman degradation. In his post-war memoirs, Mehmed Reshid, the Governor of Diyarbakir, wrote,

My appointment to Diyarbakir coincided with a very delicate period of war. Large parts of Van and Bitlis had been invaded by the enemy; deserters were transgressing, pillaging and robbing everywhere. Yezidi and Nestorian uprisings in or at the border of the province required the application of drastic measures. The transgressional, offensive and impudent attitude of the Armenians was seriously endangering the honor of the government.

Prejudice against Christian minorities was apparent in the Ottoman Empire. Although the period witnessed the rise of a secular Turkish identity, violence evidently had religious undertones. Intolerance was intensified by the conflicts with the West. In Diyarbakir, Reshid appointed anti-Armenian radicals to office and took severe measures
in arresting and prosecuting Armenian subjects on arbitrary grounds. Anti-Armenian forces incarcerated Christian servicemen, political elites, and religious leaders. Massacres spread throughout the province, but some Christian families were able to survive the atrocities by conversion to Islam.

The rejection of ethnic pluralism is a recurring theme throughout the Ottoman region. From the IMRO to the Serbo-Croatian Četniks, various paramilitary groups emerged with the hardline policy of ethnic homogeneity. After WWI, Ottoman grounds fostered further identity disintegration by taking part in the “Wilsonian moment.” Originally aimed for colonial powers, the notion of national self-determination initiated movements for the “rights of people” throughout the world. Leaders of minority groups espoused the principle in declaring their struggle for autonomy. Evidently, ethnic sentiments were not new in Anatolia. Under the Young Turks, the process of Turkification became a nation-building project through the assimilating and dissimilating Anatolian communities. However, this did not evoke potent ethnic awakening amongst the Kurds until the twentieth century. Unlike the Christians in the Ottoman Empire, the Muslim population was not ethnic-conscious, owing to their collective identification with Ummah. Despite this, many Muslim groups did “retain their core identity,” such as their language or certain cultural practices.

The relationship between Ottoman Empire and the Kurds remains complex. As people committed to the empire, Kurds were treated as a distinct group and given their fiefdoms, or provinces, by the Sultan. In return for their semi-autonomy, they provided taxes and soldiers to the empire. However, the failure of the Tazimat reforms saw to the re-centralization of the deteriorating state, which ultimately led to the abolition of Kurdish semi-autonomy. In 1876, Sultan Abdülhamit II implemented the Hamidiye Alayları in eastern provinces to secure the Russo-Ottoman frontier and suppress Armenian uprisings. By creating the predominately Kurdish corps and supplying them with weaponry, the Sultan hoped to gain loyalty from the people. The division of Kurdish and Armenian populations in the region was to eliminate possible alliances between the two, as well as between the Kurdish tribes and the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, the abolition of hereditary semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities and the devastations of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) led to Kurdish revolts. The feeble socioeconomic conditions and ongoing famine prompted Sheikh Ubeydullah, a former landowner and religious leader from a powerful Kurdish tribe, to form a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire in 1880. While this was the first nationalistic Kurdish insurgency, it did not result in a potent national awakening for the Kurdish people. Nonetheless, the ethnic stratification in the Caucasus—notably the abolition of Kurdish self-governance and subsequent economic deprivation—was a fundamental cause of the initial uprising.

By the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire had sufficiently integrated a bulk of Arabic speakers into the empire because of their collective practice of Islam. Arab relations
with Ottoman rule were manifold. In fact, the degree of control over the Arabs varied between regions. The seventeenth century witnessed the virtual autonomy of Algeria, Tunisia, Tripoli, and Yemen while Ottoman reign over Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine became largely nominal. Coupled with spiritual separatism, tensions between feudal lords often resulted in political struggles with religious undertones. Moreover, the Porte attempted to liquidate collective ownership of land and claim state ownership in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. This act resulted in various Arab tribal uprisings. To worsen the situation, landlords often appropriated produce, while natural disasters frequented said regions. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, approximately 2,500 villages became extinguished around Aleppo. Subsequent Ottoman decline deprived feudal lords, or ayani, of their primary source of revenue. Economic stagnation bred dissatisfaction. In response, Arab revolt against local Pashas and Pasha insurgencies against the Porte became prevalent. Notably, liberation movements were reflective of socioeconomic stratification in the various regions. Nevertheless, these insurgencies did not carry nationalistic motives until the twentieth century.

Peasant uprisings—inherently class conflicts—spread throughout the Arab lands with significant disorders in Aleppo (1895) and Beirut (1903). Internal dissatisfaction during the period of political instability led to the Arab awakening in various Arabic-speaking Ottoman provinces. The process was two-fold. First, European influence was experienced by the Arabic-speaking Christian minorities. Second, Arab minorities demanded provincial autonomy due to inspiration from the independence of Ottoman Balkan territories. As in the rise of Kurdish identity, the Turkification of the empire was a key factor in the exacerbation of Arabism. By 1915, the Porte had banned the official use of Arabic and its teaching in schools. Furthermore, the construction of the Hejaz Railway, which connected Mecca and Damascus, threatened the region due to its facilitation of Turkish militants and Ottoman bureaucrats in the Arab heartland. Lastly, the Zionist settlement in Palestine challenged the sociopolitical status quo in the Arab provinces.

By World War I, the Arab people had become hostile to both the Anglo-French alliance and German-Turkish coalition. The economies of Syria and Palestine could barely withstand the detriments of war. The Ottoman 4th Army began requisitioning Arab peasants’ produce out of military necessity. In 1915, approximately nine-tenths of harvests in Lebanon and Syria were appropriated. Tens of thousands of people in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Syria died of starvation and disease. Widespread discontent led to hostility towards the Ottoman Empire and Turkish militants. In 1914, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, ruler of central Arabia, allied with the Wahabi Islamist movement in open criticism of the CUP as anti-Islamic. Coupled with the Young Turks’ pan-Turkic nationalist movement, many Arabic inhabitants in Greater Syria began rejecting the Ottoman identity. Leveraging
emergent nationalist sentiments, Britain and France directed Arabs against Ottoman rule. Cooperating with British Intelligence, the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization (OPAD) sent propaganda material to Syria and Palestine urging revolts against the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, British intelligence began renewing relations with Sharif Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi to instigate unrest in Hejaz. Aiming to establish a unified kingdom for the Arabs, the Sharif of Mecca commenced the Great Arab Revolt.

In alliance with France and Britain, the uprising led to Arab control of most of the Arabian Peninsula, southern Syria, and Petra. While Sharif Hussein aimed to institute an independent Arab state inclusive of all minorities under Islam, the colonial powers decided otherwise. From the Congress of Berlin to the Treaty of Lausanne, there were a number of negotiations that directly partitioned the Ottoman Empire. However, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 holds a decisive role in the contemporary state of tension in the Middle East. As a secret treaty between the Great Britain and France, the document divided Ottoman Arab land in accordance to proposed British and French spheres of influence. Shortly after the revolt, the League of Nations formalized French control over the northern Levant in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. At the same time, the British government began implementing the Balfour Declaration, which voiced support for Zionist settlements in Palestine. The subsequent partition of Arab land into Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine was mostly coherent with the strategic positions of Great Power imperialism. While some argue that the blame placed on the arbitrary borders is reductionist, it is irrefutable that the accord paved the way for identity fragmentation within the region.

Conflicts in many French-administrated territories were caused by sociopolitical inequality as a result of the exacerbated social cleavage between favored minorities and suppressed majorities. To undermine rising Sunni Muslim Arab nationalism, autonomous status was granted to areas where heterodox Muslim minorities were in consensus with French interests. While there were many wealthy Sunni Muslim landholders, “all units [of the 1949 Syrian Army] of any importance as well as the important parts stood under the command of persons originate from religious minorities.” The French occupants sought to divide and rule Syrians along sectarian lines. Social stratification and the struggle for “upward social mobility” became a potent element in the ethno-religious competition between Sunni majority and the Alawite minority. By militarizing different ethnic and religious factions, the French legacy in the Middle East intensified notions of “self” and “other” that became the backbone to violent political confrontations.

Similarly, French presence in Lebanon destabilized the religious factions. The Greater Lebanon as established by French occupation subjected Muslim territories to Christian Maronites. While the Maronites remain a unique precedent by which Christians became
a majority in an Arabic country, the conflict experienced by different sectarians remains a problem today. Between 1920 and 1943, the nationalization of religion was reinforced by French imperialism. Violent clashes emerged between Muslim and Christian inhabitants as the former demanded reunification with Syria. During the institution of the state of Israel, many Palestinians were displaced to Greater Lebanon, shifting the demographic balance towards a Muslim majority. Subsequent division in WWII resulted in the 1958 Lebanon crisis between Maronite Christians and Muslims, paving the way for the Lebanese Civil War between 1975 and 1990. Nevertheless, the conflict in Lebanon was not a French-imposed phenomenon. As early as 1845, sociopolitical stratification based on ethno-religious differences has been apparent. While hostilities were rooted in class division, the Druze-Maronite massacre of 1845 was tinted with religious undertones that resulted in the reciprocal slaughter of the “other.”

The struggle for Ummah between followers of the Sunna of the Prophet Mohammad and the supporters of Ali ibn abi Talib has come to characterize the politicalized identity disputes in and between Muslim nations. In Iraq, this ethno-religious stratification frequently extended to minorities. Under Saddam Hussein, a Sunni, various military operations were initiated against the Iraqi Kurds and Shia majorities. After the Anfal campaign in 1983, the Human Rights Watch estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 Kurds were victims of Iraqi extermination. In addition, groups including Yazidis and Christians have also been the targets of destruction. Following the Iran-Iraq war of 1980, sectarian militant groups began to multiply in the Middle East, with some of the most infamous activities undertaken by al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the recent Islamic State (ISIS). Hamas and Hezbollah are both organizations in reaction to Israeli undertakings, with the former operating against the occupation of Palestine and the latter a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

Carrying on the traditional interpretation of Ummah, religious nationalism became a fundamental tenet of the Islamic State’s (ISIS) agenda in consolidating all Muslim populations under the religious and political jurisdiction of the Caliphate. Thomas Piketty argues that social inequality is the driver behind the bulk of Middle Eastern terrorism, including the rise of ISIS. According to Piketty, the income inequality in the region exceeds that of the United States by 3.37% and almost triples that of France. When this is coupled with ethno-religious differences, the consequence becomes distinct. The relatively recent rise of ISIS was rooted in Syria and Iraq, both Shi’ite political regimes that dominated Sunni populations. In Iraq, the ejection of Sunni elites during the process of de-Baathification and the rise of Shia leaders to prominence fueled resentment towards the religious “other.” Protests were quelled with force, resulting in numerous Sunni deaths. These elements encouraged Sunni Muslims and Iraq’s Sunni military force to join the Is-
lamic State.\textsuperscript{137}

Similarly, the hostility towards different identity groups in the Balkans remains socioeconomically and ethno-religiously driven. In 1934, the Croatian Revolutionary Organization Ustaše was brought to power in Axis-occupied Yugoslavia under the Independent State of Croatia (NDH). To realize the creation of a Greater Croatia, they instituted policies that aimed to eliminate undesirable elements: namely, Serbs, Jews, the Roma, and Communists.\textsuperscript{138} The war saw to the deportation and massacre of hundreds of thousands of Serbs, as well as forced religious conversion to Catholicism.\textsuperscript{139} The nationalization of religion was a pivotal element in the Ustaše agenda.\textsuperscript{140} In cooperation with German fascism, the group aimed to create ethnic homogenization through instituting the notions of “state rights” and cultural exclusiveness.\textsuperscript{141}

The Serbian Četniks, or the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland (JVUO), resurfaced with the political aim of expanding a “homogeneous Serbia” in postwar Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{142} Similar to ustaštvo, Četnik ideology stressed the importance of the peasantry, as well as validating the use of its national identity in leading postwar Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{143} As most of the pretext to conflicts in the post-Ottoman arena, the JVUO justified violence by mass criminalizing “others” and underlying the impossibility of ethnic coexistence. Thousands of Croats and Muslims were killed during the massacres between 1941 and 1942 without regard for gender or age. In addition to these two organizations, other committees also fought to realize their respective agendas. Estimates of casualties in the kingdom ranged from 900,000 to 1.8 million throughout the duration of WWII.\textsuperscript{144}

In 1944, Josip Broz Tito succeeded to power. While his regime was heavily contentious, it is inarguable that the Communist imposition lessened ethno-religious massacres in Yugoslavia. This was the result of his economic reform policies and national identity policies, including the institution of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA).\textsuperscript{145} To strengthen relations with Yugoslavia during Cold War bipolarity, the United States provided $2.2 billion in military and economic aid between 1950 and 1965.\textsuperscript{146} In turn, the Soviet Union provided mass aid funding to the Yugoslav postwar reconstruction efforts. Understanding its strategic importance to both the USSR and the US, Tito leveraged the opportunity to initiate an inconspicuous bid for his support. The maneuver proved valuable, as the two competing powers strengthened socioeconomic initiatives in an attempt to entice Yugoslav allegiance. This provided a substantial basis to the economic reforms as led by the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY). In the early 1950s, the self-management program was instituted to tackle economic issues facing Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{147} Tito embraced a model of market socialism and saw Yugoslav economic growth as “the logical continuation of the present policy of equality among [Yugoslav] peoples.”\textsuperscript{148} Nevertheless, economic development was short lived. Despite the transition of Yugoslavia from an agriculture-dependent
economy into an export-orientated economy, regional contrasts in levels of prosperity and escalating foreign debt remained apparent. Tito’s death in 1980 further weakened Yugoslav governmental system. Combined with the repercussion of the OPEC oil crises, the 1980s economic recession, and internal failings, Yugoslavia’s socioeconomic conditions reduced living standards to “low 1965 levels.”

By the early 1990s, ethnic tensions reached a boiling point. Socioeconomic tensions contributed widely to the civil strife in Yugoslavia. When Slobodan Milošević became President of Serbia in 1989, he attempted to consolidate power by centralizing the six Yugoslav Republics. The maneuver triggered the Slovenian Independence War, which marked the beginning of the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s. On April 24, 1987, Milošević visited the town of Polje, Kosovo. In the predominately ethnic Albanian region, he exacerbated ethnic relations by announcing to the Serbian minorities: “From now on, no one has the right to beat you.” Milošević effectively appealed to Serbian heroism by legitimizing their presence in Kosovo. Notably, economic disparities enabled tensions among sociopolitical classes represented by different ethno-religious groups. Before the war, ethnic Serbs benefited significantly from redistribution policies in Montenegro and Kosovo. They were disproportionately and advantageously represented in the federal army, employment, and security forces. As such, the other republics often collaborated to check Serb ethnic interests. Coupled with Milošević’s Serbian nationalism, ethnic tension largely sustained by economic disparities evolved into a decade-long war.

CONCLUSION

The intricacy of conflicts in the pre- and post-Ottoman region denotes an extensive correlation between mass violence and socioeconomic elements based on ethno-religious differences. Political elites often mass criminalize ethnic others and undermine the possibility of national coexistence. The Balkan Peninsula continues to endure the after-effects of its regional conflicts. In Syria, the Alawites sect controlling state bureaucracy began cracking down on Sunni Muslim majorities, an act which the United Nations cautioned was a route “heading toward civil war” in 2011. In a recent report published by Amnesty International, the claim is made that IS has “systematically targeted non-Arab and non-Sunni Muslim communities,” slaughtering or abducting ethnic and religious minorities in captured regions. In all the cases discussed, it is evident that the rejection of ethno-religious pluralism is a recurring theme throughout the Ottoman Empire.

Under the multifaceted Ottoman Empire, the millet system played a vital role in preserving peace and stability. While it maintained a division between different religious factions, the system did not intentionally perpetuate animosity between its subjects. How-
ever, social stratification as rooted in the millet system became one of the underlying causes of the subsequent ethno-religious conflicts. Disparities heavily influenced ethnic tensions among socio-economic classes represented by different ethno-religious groups. The Ottoman Empire’s inability to generate a unitary socio-political identity that appealed to the masses was a fatal blow to its stability during Western interventions. Religion took shape in two forms following the spread of nationalism in 1789. Although most of the Christian independence movements were labeled as secularist endeavors, the supra-systemic position of religion was evident in the massacre of Ottoman Muslims and other ethnic minorities. Religious nationalism became a reactionary force implemented by Sultan Adulemet II in an attempt to sustain the remainder of the Ottoman Empire. The two processes continued to evolve simultaneously, which is evident by the development of a Turkish identity, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the development of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism as seen in the Middle East. Following the uprisings in the Ottoman Empire and the proclamation of self-determination by Woodrow Wilson, a vivid Kurdish identity began to flourish in the past century. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continues to wage armed struggle against the Turkish state for the right to autonomy.

Following the emergence of nationalism, socioeconomic classes based on ethno-religious differences became the basis for nationalist sentiments in the Balkans. Inspired by Balkan independence, Ottoman Armenians’ struggle for autonomy was met with detrimental repercussions and a lack of support from European powers. Wilson’s proclamation of the right to self-determination and various sociopolitical factors inspired Kurdish and Arab people to seek autonomy from the Porte. The subsequent divide of the Middle East placed Ottoman Arab lands under French and British administration. Western imperialism leveraged ethno-religious stratification in the suppression of Sunni Muslims in Syria and the general Muslim populace in Lebanon. In the remainder of the twentieth century, the schism between Shia and Sunni Muslims was frequently politicalized by Western powers and regional powers that sought for political gain. While social stratifications have been detrimental in the pre- and post-Ottoman region, tension has shifted from socioeconomic differences towards a predominantly ethno-religious incentivized rejection of the “other,” particularly in the current state of Middle East affairs.
NOTES

1. The Turkish government denies the Greek, Assyrian, and Armenian massacres as genocides. Under Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, it is illegal to insult Turkish government institutions. Some scholars (e.g. Bernard Lewis) question the extent of governmental involvement and believe that the mass killings were not systematic in nature.


4. Ibid., 264.


6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 296.


9. Grant, “Rethinking the Ottoman ‘Decline,’” 201.

10. Ibid., 317.

11. Ozmucur and Pamuk, “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,” 239.

12. F. Asli Ergul, “The Ottoman Identity: Turkish, Muslim or Rum?” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, (June 2012), abstract.

13. Ibid.


17. Ibid.

18. Ibid., 629.


20. Ibid., 17.


22. Ibid.


24. Ibid., 9.


28. Ibid., 10.

29. Minkow, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans, 34.

30. Ibid., 109.


32. Minkow, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans, 109

33. Ibid., 43.

34. Ibid., 109.
36. Ibid., 726.
37. Ibid., 727.
38. Haas, “What is Nationalism and why should we Study it?,”721.
40. Ibid., 8.
43. Ibid., 175.
45. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
51. Mango, Ataturk, 15.
52. Ibid., 105.
56. Ibid., 77.
57. Ibid., 73.
59. Ibid., 7.
66. Chatty, *Displacement and Dispossession in the Modern Middle East*, 139.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., 142.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
77. Ibid., 48.
80. Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution, 303.
81. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Üngör, The making of Modern Turkey, 53.
87. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Mango, Ataturk, 122.
91. Üngör, The making of Modern Turkey, 53.
92. Ibid.
93. Üngör, The making of Modern Turkey, 60.
94. Ibid., 61.
95. Ibid., 63.
96. Ibid., 65.
97. Ibid., 71.
98. Ibid., 80.
101. Ibid., 13.
102. Maya Arakon, "Kurds at the Transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic," Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 1, (Spring 2014), 140.
103. Üngör, The making of Modern Turkey, 80.
104. Ibid., 141.
105. Ibid.
106. Lutsky, Modern History of the Arab Countries, Chapter I.
107. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 176.
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICT


115. Ibid.

116. Ibid., Chapter XXVII.

117. “The Ottoman Empire: Rise of Arab Nationalism.”

118. “The Ottoman Empire: Rise of Arab Nationalism.”


120. Ibid.


122. “Ibid.

123. Ibid.

124. Ibid.


126. Ibid.


129. “French Mandate of Syria and Lebanon,”

130. Ibid.


136. Ibid.

137. Hasan Shahpari, Islamic Economy and Social Mobility: Cultural and Religious Considerations, (Pennsylvania: IGI Global, 2016): 120.


139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.


142. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
146. Ibid., 43.
148. Ibid., 173.
152. Ibid.
154. Ibid.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arakon, Maya. “Kurds at the Transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic.” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 13 No. 1, (Spring 2014) :140-148.


Ozmucur, Suleyman and Sevket Pamuk. “Real Wages and Standards of Living in the Ot-


Vujacic, Veljko. “Serbian Nationalism, Slobodan Milosevic and the Origins of the Yugoslav...

**TITLE IMAGE**

This October will mark the 100th anniversary of Russia’s historic Bolshevik Revolution. A hallmark of twentieth-century history, the October Revolution ushered in one of history’s most brutal and emblematic totalitarian regimes. Yet nearly thirty years since the fall of the Soviet Union, themes and questions surrounding the nature of modern authoritarianism seem as relevant today as they have ever been. In light of the uncertain state of American politics, Yale Historical Review Associate Editor Mark Gustaferro, SM ’20, sat down with renowned Cold War and Eastern European History Professor Timothy Snyder to talk about his work and what lessons we can draw from twentieth century totalitarianism to inform our response to modern politics in the United States and abroad.

Interview by Associate Editor Mark Gustaferro, SM ’18
Photo: “Keynote: Timothy Snyder” Stephan Röhl Fotografie.
https://c1.staticflickr.com/9/8616/16090210144_935ac06131_b.jpg
Yale Historical Review: Let’s start with your education and your youth. What drove your interest, at that age, in the history of Eastern Europe and the Holocaust? How does a boy from southwestern Ohio get from there to becoming one of the preeminent scholars of Eastern European history?

Timothy Snyder: Well, at that age, you don’t know what you are going to be when you are, say, 47. It’s a fiction to think that everything is present in young life and somehow unpacks itself over time. I think the things that one understands least well about oneself are one’s distant past, so I’m not going to venture too far down that road. I will speak, however, about the obvious turning points in my educational career.

One of the junctures that was clearly important was being able to studying on the East Coast in the late 1980s, at Brown, where I was lucky enough to have a few professors who were teaching Eastern European history. Thomas Simons, who was visiting Brown at that time, and Mary Gluck, from Hungary, were large influences. It’s important to recognize that I was studying Eastern European history at a time that communism was coming to an end. There was therefore this constant feeling that things, particularly in that Eastern Europe, were opening for the first time in a long time.

Another one of the important junctures was the opportunity to study at Oxford. At Oxford, I began not thinking that I was going to be a professional historian. I was thinking at the time that I was going to be a diplomat or a journalist, and simply that history was the best preparation for those careers. The early 90s at Oxford were a time that I could travel around and make friends and learn languages, and none of that led me feel immediately that I was really going to be a historian. I turned out to be a historian, but at the time, I was much more interested simply in the relationship between present and past. Still, the main goal at the time was how to learn languages, and the learning of the languages fundamentally changed me. Not only was it a change in that it was a lot of time spent doing really nothing else, but the learning of these languages changed me as other cultures started to come alive to me the way that my own was already alive. When you learn languages, you start reading novels and watching films and making friendships in other languages—that changes you. It gives you another point of view. You start to use tools from that culture to understand your own culture. That point in my life was very important.

The third critical time was in the mid 90s, when I was working on books and my languages and I didn’t have one specific job. And precisely because I wasn’t constrained by a traditional career, I got to have my “down-and-out-in-Eastern-Europe” period, which meant my language skills and friendships got stronger. In my travels, the territories like Kiev and Minsk that I write about in my books really came alive to me, and I think that had a lot to do with what people refer to as the “spatial turn” in my work. I don’t really write about memories that much, or familiar narratives, but rather places and the things happen-
ing on those places. These travels influenced that style of analysis. By the time I came back to Yale, these were things that had already happened.

YHR: I want to talk a little bit more about your knowledge of European languages. You said in an interview with The Economist that, “if you don’t know Russian, you don’t really know what you’re missing.” Could you elaborate on that?

TS: Russian is not at all my best language. But, with the writing of Bloodlands, the crucial thing was all the work that Russian historians had done, and I tried to stress that. Bloodlands is actually a very Russian book. The title is a citation, or rather slight deformation, of Akhmatova. The most important thinker in the background was Vasily Grossman. Much of the work which allowed me to write the chapter on the Polish Terror was done by the Russian historians, people collecting documents and writing short analytical essays. If it weren’t for the Russians, I wouldn’t have been able to make the Polish Terror make sense. And that little chapter on the Polish terror was, I think, especially significant, since it was the first serious treatment of the issue even in Poland. So I think that’s what I meant, when I spoke about the importance of learning Russian in my work.

YHR: Many of your books have been translated into other languages. Bloodlands has now been translated into over thirty. Do you ever read your works in other languages, and how, if at all, do you think their ideas change as a result of their translations?

TS: That’s a deceptively hard question. In general, I would rather read other things when I read in foreign languages, like poetry or novels (which I really like to do). Reading my own stuff in a foreign language is usually not a particular pleasure. When I can, I check the translations for the languages I know best—I proofread French, German, etc. However, if I spent two or three weeks proofing all the different versions of my books in all of the languages I know, that would take up almost a year’s worth of time. But to the heart of your question – do the ideas change? Of course the ideas change. If you imagine a language to be constellation of stars, and there are 60,000 stars (like there are 60,000 words you might use in English), you can of course arrange them in certain ways. However, you cannot invent, say, certain French words in English. The same stars simply don’t appear in every constellation. You can arrange English words in certain ways, of course, but, for example, the fact that Russian makes contractions of certain words changes its sounds and will always make it fundamentally different from anything you can express in English. The Russian word for "KGB" just sounds different that "KGB," no matter what you choose to do with it. Essentially, the idea is that there are some things that you can’t translate, and so the ideas must change. I think though, when I do read my own work in other languages, I
am too obsessed with whether it is correct that I can’t really reflect on the expression of the ideas in the different languages.

There are deep difficulties about all of this. For people who are bilingual, when they read in a different language, they become that slightly different person and their thoughts have those slightly different meanings. So, when I comment on an idea in French, it is almost like commenting on the French language because the idea must now conform to the linguistic properties of the language it is being thought in. For example, “révolution” has a different meaning in French than “revolution” does in English, because it has a different set of connections to the French revolution. It just simply means something different. I admit it is very vexing, all of this.

I want to close by saying that translators are indeed co-artists, and co-creators of books. When I win prizes for a translation of a book, I give half of the money to the translator, and I think all translators should get half. Because if the translation is good enough to win a prize, that means that that translator worked really hard.

YHR: You are on the Committee on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. According to its website, the mandate of the committee is to “alert the national conscience…to halt acts of genocide or related crimes against humanity.” What has your experience been like on this committee?

TS: So, to start, the committee really just involves going to annual meetings and listening to others speak about pressing issues. Mainly, though, my experience has been extremely positive. I think understanding the Holocaust means drawing partial lessons from it. You can choose to remember it, and one should, but if you go too far with your memory concept you must accept that every memory is specific and every memory is context-bound. Therefore, if you privilege the idea of memory, you might just end up essentially looking at something powerful, but ultimately transparent. The idea of the Committee on Conscience, is that one can learn and recognize other risks from the Holocaust. It’s not a matter of thinking that the Holocaust will repeat itself, which of course it won’t literally. It’s rather a matter of trying to be progressive in a certain way. It’s trying to figure out how risky Nigeria or Sudan is right now, based on what we have learned. The other thing that is refreshing about being on the committee is that I’m one of only a couple of scholars on the committee. Most of them are journalists or businessmen or politicians, and most of them are also from other countries. Every time I get out of purely scholarly circles, I realize that there are others who are thinking about the same ideas, even though it is not specifically their job to do so. That’s very heartening.

YHR: Do you see your writing as a means of alerting or awakening the national con-
TS: Not primarily. The only way to answer that question is to talk about what it means to be a historian. What it means to be a historian is to try to understand a past event, following historical methods, self-correcting all the time. What it certainly doesn’t mean is being concerned about the present, going back to the past, finding the passages in the past that resemble the present, and then being more concerned about the present. That’s not history, although a lot of people do that all the time. Insofar as I have things to say about the present, it is because I have understood certain things about the past, not perfectly but as well as I could. Sometimes it takes a factual form—I can correct misperceptions. If people think the Holocaust was about Germany purging German Jews, then it’s easy for me to say that 97% of the Jews in the Holocaust were not German and most of the killing happened beyond Germany. History can also involve saying, “I think I see some patterns here that political scientists and journalists cannot see in the present.” But I have to be primarily a historian, or else I have zero value. If I can comment on the present, it’s only because I am a historian. Let me be clear – it’s not that I worry about the terrible character of the present and then use history to write about the terrible state of the present. It’s only that, spending most of my mental energy in the past to begin with, I can surface every now and then and say something about the present.

YHR: And you have said something about the present. One of your Facebook posts which went viral and was picked up by the Huffington Post, In These Times, and several other sources under the title “20 Lessons from the 20th Century on How to Survive in Trump’s America,” has several great lines. Among them are, “believe in truth. To abandon facts is to abandon freedom” and “notice the signs of hate…do not look away and do not get used to them.” To what extent do you see parallels between the Trump administration, with its use of alternative facts and its policies on religious minorities, and the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century?

TS: Well, the trap to avoid is to say that it’s exactly the same. Of course it is not exactly the same. The problem is that, what people tend to do, and Americans in particular, in response to such an argument, is say, “well, it’s not exactly the same.” Americans don’t like history and they don’t like thinking about history – Americans don’t think history matters to us, though it might matter to other people. Americans think “we are exceptional.” That’s where Americans start. So if you bring the “it’s the same” historical argument, Americans will respond by saying “well it’s not like us in every respect, and therefore it’s not interesting,” which is easy and lazy. Essentially, the basic reaction for an American is to say, well, Trump doesn’t wear a hat like Mussolini and the boots of Hitler. The basic reaction for an
American is to say, well these policies don’t look like that movie I saw about the Holocaust, and therefore it’s not the same thing. As such, with Americans, you have to make a whole case in defense of history before you can make an argument about similarity. You have to say that history teaches us that certain patterns sometimes cohere, and that certain phenomena are much less likely to occur. It’s not that I know for certain anything about the present, but history informs us.

To get to the heart of your question, when I look at the Muslim ban, as a historian, I don’t think “oh here is some surprising thing which has never happened before.” I think, this is the beginning of a certain type of politics where one puts a face on globalization, and thereby distracts people from domestic reforms which they really need. This is a type of politics where one feeds energy toward discrimination against a particular minority group, which happens to be small and pretty well assimilated, like the Jews in Germany in 1933. And when you succeed with that, then you draw people into a world in which the main focus is not about dealing with objective problems, but rather identifying prospective enemies. Then, most importantly, everybody becomes part of it. For example, if someone from Yemen isn’t allowed to come to Yale, that opens up a spot for an American to come here. If Muslim scientists aren’t allowed to work in Silicon Valley, then other scientists will. Over time, all these people who fill these roles become, sometimes inadvertently and sometimes not, part of this process. The point is that they are eventually implicated, and eventually they are in. When I look at the Muslim ban, I don’t focus on its details. I look at it as a form of politics that I have seen before. It’s the ability to recognize what is happening against the whole backdrop of things that have been done in the past that is important. If you think only about the day-to-day, then the only thing you can do is to say “let’s wait for tomorrow.” But the time you get to tomorrow, the policy has already worked and has changed you and the whole population, and then it becomes normal. The only way to shake that normalization is to put your mind somewhere other than the present, and then perform the intellectual, moral act of looking at whether you really want society to be changed in this way. History allows us to do all of these things.

YHR: You spoke a little bit already about Americans’ perception of history. I want to point out that you close your introduction to Bloodlands with the following line: “During the year that both Stalin and Hitler were in power, more people were killed in Ukraine than anywhere else… in the world.” Why do you think that this probably comes as a shock to most readers (including myself), and especially Americans? Is this a result of a failure in our education on Europe, World War II, and the Holocaust?

TS: Well, there are a lot of reasons why this comes as a shock. The conceptual answer is that the victim groups that rise to our consciousness, in what we call memory, have only
a very tenuous relationship with the victim groups of history. And we have to make that distinction—things that are memorialized are generally memorialized for some reason, but they are also memorialized in a way that misleads us even about the group being memorialized. Further, and more importantly, the memorialization of one group often hinders us from asking the same questions about other groups. Memorialization has its own history, and that history is only tenuously connected to the history of suffering or death. To take an example, the second biggest victim group of the Germans after the Jews were Soviet POWs during the war. Nobody knows that though, because the Soviets didn’t want to commemorate them, they were not a national group, and so they have no memorial today. In fact, they might never be memorialized, even though 3 million of them died and that is a much larger figure that the totals for the many other groups we do remember.

With Ukrainians specifically, as you refer to in your question, there is quite a bit more going on. First, people are instructed to think that what they remember overlaps with history, but these are generally two really different things. Second, a problem arises from the fact that, as Americans, we come at history from the perspective of the West. Thus, in thinking about this time period, we think of the greatest casualties as being on the beaches of Normandy, or in the advance of Western armies through Germany. Luckily, the one crime which has surfaced over time has been the Holocaust, but even with this knowledge Americans committed an error by associating the Holocaust with only the parts of the war we had something to do with. As such, Americans think of only the camps in Germany that Americans liberated as being part of the Holocaust (though most Americans also hold the incorrect belief that we, rather than the Soviets, liberated Auschwitz). Overall, though, we assume that since we liberated camps, that the Holocaust must have happened in camps. This is misleading. On top of that is the problem of the Iron Curtain which descended over Eastern Europe following the war. The Iron Curtain meant that the memoirs of suffering that we remember, such as those of Anne Frank, come from the West as opposed to the East, where the much greater suffering actually was. As such, suffering in the East became harder to remember for 45 years. Then, in addition to that is the fact that Ukraine was not, and to some extent is still not, seen as a unit by that many people. And if a people isn’t seen as a unit, then it is hard for us to associate it with targeted suffering.

Another key phenomenon at play here is colonialism. We tend to think of atrocity in terms of gas or bullets, but in reality, when one is imposing colonial domination, starvation proves really a much more useful tactic. That is the Ukrainian story, or at least the story of the three million people who starved to death there in 1932-33. We have this implicit, racist colonial view that starvation, though it could happen easily in Bangladesh or Africa, could never happen in Europe in the middle of the 20th century or that it could be a matter of European policy. As such, the three million Ukrainians who died of starvation and the majority of the three million Soviet POWs who died of the same do not fit well into our tableau, since we think of ourselves as being Western, civilized, and advanced. Because
of this fact, we want even our atrocities to be civilized and advanced, and great death to be mechanized and modern. For this reason, we have great trouble processing the image of a prisoners surrounded by barbed wire just slowly dying, or the peasant who cannot leave his village starving to death. These images do not fit with our mental picture of what Europe is like.

YHR: To build off the images of suffering you just presented, let’s talk about the extraordinarily heavy material you deal with in your primary source exploration. I remember specifically, and I don’t think I’ll ever forget, an image you write about in Bloodlands in which a Ukrainian orphan is being devoured alive by his fellow orphans during the famines, and out of hunger and desperation he begins to try to eat himself as well. How do you deal with depressingly morbid images such as these in your daily research?

TS: There should be some answer of therapy that makes it all fine, but there really isn’t. It’s just as hard for me as it is for anyone else. I don’t do this research because I’m not sensitive to those sources—I am very sensitive to them. The only thing I can say is that, when I wrote about these subjects, I was sure that I was doing the right thing and that this study was important. I was sure that those primary sources coming from the victims, or close to them, were important. If I write a book about a Habsburg archduke, that’s a fine thing to do, but it doesn’t give me the same feeling that I am doing something important. When I was writing Bloodlands and Black Earth, I was thinking that these were the subjects that one should be writing about. That’s my only perspective to add on the subject.

YHR: In your lectures, you concern yourself quite a bit with the idea of “contingency” and “conjuncture.” Essentially, you advance the idea that many historical scenarios arise out of luck and bad luck, and though we have a tendency to see events as pre-ordained, that’s not necessarily ever the case. Does this idea bother you as a historian, specifically the fact that it renders you unable to say a given specific historical event was necessarily the product of the influences leading up to it? Most people, myself included, like to think history had to happen a specific way, at the very minimum because it is easier to think of it that way.

TS: No, not at all. Isaiah Berlin has this really interesting essay about history as a science, and one of his claims is that historians are pretty good at ruling scenarios out, but not at determining exactly which ones could occur. As a thought experiment, imagine that I was researching the year 1904 in the Russian Empire, and I somehow knew absolutely everything about the 1904 political, economic, and social climate in that region. Even with that
knowledge, at most I would be able to possibly hypothesize that there would be an outbreak of some sort of rebellion in 1905. Could I predict, knowing everything that I know, that there would be a shooting in St. Petersburg that would commence the revolution, or that there would be a revolution in specific Polish cities? No, probably not. So, this notion that things are predetermined, at least at the epistemic level, cannot be right. Even if you knew everything you could possibly know about a historical time period, you could not precisely predict what would happen next (or even what happened in the past before that point). It might be true in some deep physical sense, although I think that it’s not, that things are pre-determined, but at least they are not pre-determined in a way that we could ever possibly understand. If that’s true, that means that no historical actors were working in a world that was completely pre-determined to them. Essentially, I’m accepting that someday, with a deep understanding of quantum mechanics, we could have a deterministic universe, in principle, but asserting that no historical actor could have ever functioned that way. Lenin never said, in the midst of the chaos in Petrograd, that revolution would be inevitable even without his efforts. To the contrary, Lenin correctly thought that without his efforts there would be no revolution, and therefore thought that he had to seize the reigns of history himself. History happens as individuals recognize historical possibility, not historical necessity. If they thought in terms of historical necessity, they wouldn’t have done anything since they would have thought the outcomes would have come about anyway. There are things that Lenin could not have done at his time in Russia, and historians are here to tell us what those things are. Where history becomes an art is in recognizing what opportunities these significant individuals saw, from their points of view, in their time periods, and how that propelled change.

YHR: I’ll close with a question concerning your career at Yale. How did you decide to teach at Yale? What do you love (or not love) about teaching here?

TS: No one (or very few people) choose to come to Yale. I was in Europe in the 90s, and it was certainly good luck that there was a job opening in 2001 and that I got it. Afterwards, it seems normal and natural that I teach at Yale, but if things had gone slightly differently in the Yale historical department in 2001 then I would not be here today. I was very lucky. At the time, I was just a kid who had written a dissertation about an unknown Polish sociologist, and I applied to everything. Yale just happened to be the job that I got, and when I got here I wrote some more literature, got tenure, and decided to stay.

What do I love here? In all seriousness, I do love the students. The gratifying thing about the students is that, though they do not know very much, they learn very fast. After
a semester as a teacher, you can look and see just how much of this obscure subject your students have learned, and that is very gratifying. Truly, though, I have the good fortune of teaching students, most of whom do the work and want to learn things, and this aids my job tremendously. Teaching is hugely gratifying. I look out now and my former students are scattered around the world as journalists or politicians, and in these jobs the fact that they have a solid background about Eastern Europe matters. If people in my class are going to go on in life to travel to Ukraine to write about the current war, as some of them indeed have, it’s really good that they have some sort of background about what Ukraine is and where it comes from. Now I am old enough, since I have been teaching here for 16 years, that many of my students have had real careers and done significant things that have been affected by my classes.

From the research point of view, the attractive thing about Yale is really the library. I am always wishing I could spend more time there. People come here from Eastern Europe to use our resources in their languages, and that’s astounding. If you had to pick the thing at Yale that seems most impossible, it would be the Yale library. That there is this collection of books and knowledge that physically exists is extraordinary.