To many contemporaries, William F. Buckley’s decision to accept his 1973 nomination to the United States’ UN delegation came as a surprise. The prominent conservative commentator had risen to fame in part for his criticism of the international organization. However, as Raleigh Cavero ’15 examines, Buckley's acceptance of a role on the Third Committee offered him the opportunity to promote his interventionist, anti-Communist stance through a framework of human rights. Delving into the highly fraught spheres of national and international politics in the détente era, Cavero identifies how Buckley’s efforts to promote democracy on the UN floor laid the groundwork for an emergent alliance between conservatives and the branch of ex-liberals who, favoring Buckley’s unapologetic anti-Communist stance, came to be known as neoconservatives. Though Buckley himself finished his term disappointed by ineffectiveness, his powerful rhetoric throughout his UN term would come to have longlasting implications on the domestic politics of the United States.

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INTRODUCTION: WALTER MITTY GOES TO THE UNITED NATIONS

On a summer day in 1973, walking through New York City’s streets, William F. Buckley had a “pure, undiluted moment of ‘Walter Mittyism.’” He envisioned pleading for Soviet ballet dancer Valery Panov, exposing Chinese concentration camps, and hosting Alexander Solzhenitsyn in the UN for a triumphant speech to a global audience. In that moment, Buckley decided to accept the offer to become a US delegate to the United Nations.

Just a few hours before, Buckley had resolved to reject the proposal. His first reaction when the US ambassador offered the position: “Had he read what I had written in the past about the United Nations?” Buckley, like many conservatives, had criticized the United Nations for being anti-Democratic and ineffectual—a “surrealistic organization whose entire role is Aesopian.”

Buckley was a prominent national figure in the conservative movement, which historian George Nash says had just achieved “symbolic success” in 1970: Buckley had earned an Emmy in 1969 for his debating show *Firing Line*, where he showcased his famous—or, for his opponents, infamous—debating style. Buckley’s brother James was newly elected to the New York Senate, and there had been a surge of interest in conservative journalism as well as in the Young Americans for Freedom, a conservative youth organization that William F. Buckley founded. He was also the founding editor-in-chief of the flagship conservative magazine, *National Review*. Conservatism, and William F. Buckley, were on the rise.

Buckley had catapulted onto the national stage as a conservative firebrand soon after graduating from Yale with the publication of his *God and Man at Yale* in 1951; *McCarthy and his Enemies* followed three years later, cementing his reputation by supporting Senator Joseph McCarthy’s anti-Communist investigations. In 1955, when he founded *National Review*, Buckley felt that conservatism was an embattled minority in the national political landscape. Historian David Farber asserts that Buckley thought he was fighting conventional wisdom and powerful intelligentsia with *National Review*, providing a conservative intellectual opinion magazine to combat the predominantly liberal media. Buckley would become one of the great leaders of the conservative movement, intertwining its three warring factions—traditionalism, libertarianism, and anti-Communism—and helping it rise in the postwar years.

The last of these factions, anti-Communism, was shared across the political spectrum in the 1950s. Liberals preferred to focus on containment, or restraining the spread of Communism. Conservatives, especially intellectuals like James Burnham, advocated more aggressive policies against what the Right called “evil” states, using “victory” rhetoric to press for military intervention and “rollback” in places like Cuba and Vietnam—ideas which liberals called “wildly irresponsible.” Buckley responded that the “continuing blindness of liberals” to Communism was neither accident nor neglect, but a “deep psychological
problem producing paralysis.” Buckley’s strain of anti-Communism was especially intense, demonstrated in his vigorous defense of Senator McCarthy’s increasingly marginalized anti-Communist campaigns. With Buckley at the forefront, conservatism continued to champion the fight against Communism for decades. In fact, historian Lisa McGirr argues that anti-Communism helped “cement” myriad constituencies together under the conservative umbrella during the postwar period because so many Americans worked in the Cold War industry.

However, by the 1970s, the Vietnam War was beginning to disillusion the public with anti-Communism, leading both conservatives and liberals to alter their viewpoints. Previously conservatives had argued for pushing the Communists back from their territorial gains, while liberals had advocated containment. In the 1970s, the bloody foreign war was pushing the conservatives toward containment and liberals away from anti-Communism all together, preferring isolationism. The popular press began to describe liberalism’s philosophy as “back to isolationism via pacifism,” and conservatism began to more and more resemble older containment policies from the mid-century Left. However, a small, embattled group of Democrats remained fervently committed to anti-Communism, and they fought to regain control of their party throughout that decade. They soon came to be known as the neoconservatives. Ultimately, the group would fail in their “battle for the soul” of the Democratic Party, aligning themselves instead with the Republicans in 1980. In the United Nations in 1973, Buckley’s conservative anti-Communist rhetoric strikingly mirrored what the Democratic neoconservatives were arguing simultaneously, just on the other side of the aisle.

Both Buckley and the neoconservatives borrowed from President Truman’s mid-century rhetoric, which he used while expanding America’s presence in the postwar era. In the 1970s, Buckley and the neoconservatives co-opted his language to argue for diplomatically confronting and militarily containing Communism. Measures like the Jackson-Vanik amendment exemplified their aims: confronting the USSR on human rights and supporting American interventionism. Buckley and neoconservative leaders like Daniel Patrick Moynihan used their UN seat to urge the Nixon administration to take a stronger stance against the USSR—at times with grave consequences, because their words threatened to compromise the State Department’s overarching policy of détente, a foreign affairs mindset of the late ‘60s and ‘70s aimed at relaxing tensions with the USSR and moving “from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation.” The Nixon administration worried that détente could be compromised if rhetoric from Buckley or the neoconservatives humiliated or condemned the Soviets.

In 1973, the State Department prioritized its foreign policy — which had just helped win a re-election — far over Buckley’s desires to highlight Soviet human rights abuses. The American UN delegation repeatedly vetoed and silenced his speeches. However, his frus-
trated rhetoric prefigured a growing bridge between the neoconservatives and the conservatives, based upon anti-Communism and international interventionism. Buckley’s statements at the United Nations in the fall of 1973 foreshadowed the neoconservative-conservative alliance that would come to fruition in 1980.

**ROOTS ON THE RIGHT AND THE LEFT**

At the 2010 Organization of American Historians, a panel discussion was devoted to the topic, “How Should Historians Study Conservatism Now That Studying the Right is Trendy?”

The last twenty years have seen a surge of interest in conservatism among historians, and much of this new body of literature argues with the traditional view of conservatism as “backlash politics.”

Previous histories had traced the twentieth century’s development in terms of the civil, gay, and women’s rights movements, portraying the right as an ever-present pushback to progressive forces. These writers saw conservatism as isolated and marginalized in the national political arena. Even Ronald Reagan’s presidency, which most historians call a climax for conservatism in the 20th century, had been described as a backlash against black militancy, the gay rights and women’s rights movements, and Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society.

However, in the last two decades, a new wave of scholarship has begun to paint conservatism as a powerful parallel movement, developing alongside liberalism in constant contest and struggle. Conservative histories now describe a movement with original policy beliefs—a force that debated liberalism, rather than simply opposing it. Many historians now accept that significant parts of the American population opposed liberal reforms like the New Deal and the Great Society. Kim Philips-Fein argues that within this popular base, widespread support for conservative ideas like Reagan’s had been building for decades.

She writes that 1980 represented a shift in American politics toward the right, rather than a reaction to the reforms of the left. Instead of simply dismantling the Great Society, this conservative surge enacted original policies that lasted.

Buckley’s anti-Communist rhetoric in the United Nations supports the argument that conservatives had original ideals because it was born from belief in McCarthyism and vigorous opposition to the USSR, not simply from opposition to liberal post-Vietnam isolationism.

Buckley was also engaging with a longstanding debate between isolationism and interventionism on the Right. In the early 20th century, President Taft led a conservative movement dedicated to isolationism and a domestic focus in government policy that was cautious of steering others toward American beliefs.

Eisenhower began to move the party away from isolationism, and then shortly afterward Buckley helped solidify and lead a new, strongly anti-Communist conservatism that championed foreign entanglements over limited government.

Buckley supported expanding government to fight communism; the
foreign threat must be confronted first, he argued, even if it meant sacrificing limited government ideals in the interim.\textsuperscript{27}

Postwar conservatives also espoused an American duty to actively oppose the Communist threat—if necessary, using military means to act unilaterally.\textsuperscript{28} The 1970s saw some retraction from this “victory” mindset toward containment, and Buckley’s UN rhetoric fits into this trend. His arguments still advocate for interventionism over isolationism, but in the form of diplomatic rather than military confrontation.\textsuperscript{29}

Buckley’s 1973 public delegate tenure also contributes to a more nuanced vision of conservatism in power during the 1970s and 1980s. Though historians traditionally portrayed the Right as a fragmented and ineffective opposition to the Left, the new surge of conservative literature has swung the pendulum in reverse, too often portraying conservatism as a monolithic, united front fighting a fragmented postwar liberalism. This interpretation glosses over the complexity and fragmentation within the Right during the postwar period.\textsuperscript{30} Buckley had helped lead the more unilateralist, interventionist approach to conservative foreign policy after WWII, but during the Nixon years this view conflicted with official détente policy.\textsuperscript{31} Buckley’s arguments upheld the Right’s then-longstanding opposition to “evil” states, whereas Nixon and Kissinger aspired to a more cooperative relationship with the USSR that they felt would balance the global power structure in the Americans’ favor.\textsuperscript{32}

Nixon tried to rally support from men like Buckley, many of whom saw détente as retrenchment and an acknowledgement of weakness after losing Vietnam; as a result, some speculated that the President was trying to court Buckley by appointing him to the United Nations.\textsuperscript{33} However, Nixon failed to build a coalition behind détente and many conservatives grew disillusioned with the policy by the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{34} Buckley himself vocally criticized it.\textsuperscript{35} This issue, among others, convinced Buckley to suspend his support of the Nixon administration in July 1971.\textsuperscript{36} Two years later, as a delegate in the UN, Buckley continued combating Nixon’s détente foreign policy, sometimes sparking direct personal conflict. This intra-conservative fight is one example of the Right remaining complex and conflicted during the 1970s.

Finally, Buckley’s language at the UN marks an early moment where a conservative connected human rights rhetoric with an aggressive diplomatic agenda. Though human rights are often considered to be a focus for liberals, even the Left did not coalesce fully around human rights language until the 1970s, according to historian Kenneth Cmiel. It was during the détente years that voices from the Right and the Left began using this rhetoric to counter Nixon’s “realpolitik.”\textsuperscript{37} Conservatives only began fully articulating a stance in 1976, when they emphasized individual freedom, limited government, and the fight against Communism as paths toward full political, civil, and legal rights. Years before these arguments emerged, Buckley was not only an early conservative voice in human rights—he
was one of the first supporters of Amnesty International—but he also made an important philosophical step: connecting conservative anti-Communism with increasing human rights abroad.38 He said that the anti-Communist fight in the Cold War was the best way to support human rights internationally, a view the White House later espoused in 1980.39

Buckley’s human rights rhetoric closely mirrored language from the other side of the aisle during the early 1970s, but some of those on the Left espousing human rights confrontation were growing increasingly uncomfortable in their party. These Democrats, the neoconservatives, were beginning to coalesce during Buckley’s 1973 tenure at the UN. They had their roots in the anti-totalitarian liberals of the 1920s and 1930s, when Communists and Progressives sympathetic to Communism had a substantial role on the Left and published their opinions in magazines such as *New Republic* and *The Nation*. Anti-totalitarian liberals, the ancestors of neoconservatives, rebelled against the Communists and Progressives, and the neoconservatives similarly pushed back when they thought the Left was sympathizing with Communism during the 1970s.40

The neoconservatives wanted to revive a mid-century liberalism of anti-Communism and containment. Leftist thinker Reinhold Niebuhr first helped incorporate anti-Communism into liberal beliefs when, after visiting Europe during the postwar period, he changed his views to assert that Soviet expansionism increased in response to “every gesture of trust” from the West, thus threatening the European continent.41 In 1947, President Truman made a speech requesting aid for Turkey and Greece that painted a dichotomous worldview, describing a free world versus an enslaved one, and stating that the United States must intervene economically and politically in order to spread freedom in the face of Communist advances. Kennan’s 1946 “Long Telegram” solidified containment as the liberal expression of anti-Communist thought, and the policy gained primacy in the US government for twenty years. The philosophy came to be known as the “vital center” after historian Arthur Schlesinger’s 1949 book of the same name arguing that democracy and totalitarianism could not live together; he asserted that the US must “defend and strengthen free society” through containment.42

When the Vietnam War turned the Left away from anti-Communist containment toward demilitarized isolationism, the neoconservatives questioned the shift.43 New liberal approaches to foreign policy post-Vietnam ranged from statesman Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “technetronic” theory that technology would decrease ideological conflict to Stanley Hoffman’s assertion that Communist revolutions were not to be feared and American should focus on regional balance of power.44 None of these theories gained significant traction, and conservative intellectual James Burnham said in 1972 that liberals disillusioned with anti-Communism were still in a “transitional state.”45 Revisionist historians like Murray Rothbard and William Appleman Williams contributed to liberals’ distaste for anti-Communism by portraying the Soviets in a positive light and arguing that US foreign policy
had been dominated by a desire to access foreign markets and create an informal economic empire. As the war escalated, politicians like Democratic Senator J. William Fulbright began joining these voices, calling Vietnam a misguided desire to “remake” the world in America’s image.\(^4\)

This was the moment when the neoconservatives began to split from the Democratic ranks, fighting to retain the anti-Communism of the Truman era.\(^4\) They bought a *The New York Times* ad to announce the foundation of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, which fought to bring their foreign policy ideals back to the Party, and the full page notice announced a “clear signal to the Democratic Party to return to the great tradition through which it had come…the tradition of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, John F. Kennedy…” In *The Rise of Neoconservatism*, John Ehrman entitles his chapter on the neoconservatives’ search for a leader, “Looking for Truman.”\(^4\)

At the same time, Buckley adopted human rights rhetoric more similar to liberal language like Truman’s than that of his own conservative party as he served in the United Nations. A rhetorical bridge centered on the American duty to spread freedom through anti-Communist interventionism was beginning to emerge between the neoconservatives and the Right, and it foreshadowed stronger, more tangible connections to come.

**CONSERVATIVES UNITED AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS**

It was a weekday afternoon in mid-June 1973 when US Ambassador to the UN John Scali called William F. Buckley and requested an urgent meeting. When Buckley suggested the next week, Scali said that it simply wasn’t “soon enough.” They agreed to breakfast the next morning in the UN ambassadorial suite in the Waldorf Astoria.\(^4\)

The two men had come to know each other on Nixon’s visit to China shortly before, where Scali had been a special consultant to the President and Buckley had traveled as part of the press corps.\(^5\) Scali had a knack for attracting “men of power.” President Kennedy had consulted with him privately during the Cuban missile crisis and he was a personal friend of President Nixon. The President had asked him to retire from his career as an ABC newsman to become the Permanent Representative (Ambassador) to the UN. Buckley described him as a man of “salty tongue and disposition,” predisposed to chain smoking and getting quickly to his point.\(^5\)

Now, Scali leaned back in his chair and got to his point: asking Buckley to be a public delegate to the United Nations for the 28th session of the General Assembly.\(^5\) The public delegate was a unique position in the US delegation designed to bring diverse perspectives from outside the establishment.\(^5\) Buckley had the opportunity to join a group comprised of five ambassadors, two legislators (one Democratic and one Republican), and five alternate public delegates. Specifically, Scali asked him to join as a public delegate on the Third
Committee, the body considering human rights issues. Buckley was astonished. Not only had he written scathing reviews of President Nixon in his syndicated column, but he also thought he had completely burned his bridges with the Nixon administration in 1971. Buckley had rejected a re-appointment to his USIA (United States Information Agency) advisory board post and had backed John Ashbrook’s protest candidacy against Nixon. Nixon had won by a landslide, but Buckley’s disillusioned opposition was gaining traction. Why the administration would want Buckley, one of its foremost critics, as a delegate to the United Nations seemed a mystery.

Initially, Buckley internally resolved to reject the offer. He later said that the only thing keeping him from simply walking out of the room was “courtesy.” Buckley, along with many conservatives, thought the United Nations was mainly united in its opposition to the United States. Buckley had called the UN a “hypocritical,” “anti-Democratic” place of “selective condemnation” where the USSR and many developing nations condemned the US while escaping criticism for their own human rights abuses—often while receiving American foreign aid. Buckley had recently demanded “a large dose of realism and candor” in American policy toward the UN, calling for a tighter, more limited budget and more centralized control in the Secretary General, the leader of the UN assembly, rather than the Security Council, a body whose decisions could be vetoed by the USSR. For example, Buckley had been frustrated when the UN Commission on Human Rights took action neither after Bengali educated elites were massacred in 1971, nor when President Idi Amin of Uganda wanted to expel Asians from his country. Yet a General Assembly resolution condemned NATO countries, including the United States, for supporting countries like Portugal who retained colonies in Africa. Buckley echoed many conservatives’ anger that the United States did little to defend itself against condemnations and criticism from countries supported by American foreign aid.

Nixon and Kissinger defended their actions by insisting their ultimate goal was to preserve détente with the USSR and avoid offending the powerful non-aligned movement, which commanded many votes in the Assembly. The non-aligned grouping began during the postwar period as a collection of Third World states across Africa and the Middle East that wanted to create a third force in the dichotomous geopolitical balance of power and avoid “alignment” with the USSR and the US. China and the Soviet Union both strove to lead this group, though neither fully succeeded. The non-aligned began to hold conferences at places like Algiers and Bandung, where they defined core values: anti-colonialism, increased foreign aid from developed nations, and fighting against racial discrimination. This movement openly criticized the United States, and commanded a high number of votes compared to the US and its allies. Meanwhile, conservatives like Buckley resented the fact that the United States had become further isolated in the UN due to the Soviet bloc and the new, non-aligned group.
For all of these reasons, Buckley left the Waldorf-Astoria determined to reject the offer to become a United Nations delegate. Then, a brief moment of inspiration hit—the tantalizing possibility of fame on the bully pulpit of the General Assembly. Buckley returned to the National Review offices to confer with his fellow editors.

Scali had said that the appointment had not been cleared with Nixon yet, but Buckley and his fellow editors speculated that this could simply be the “official explanation—Scali, after all, was close to Nixon,” and both the President and his ambassador already clearly understood Buckley’s opposition to détente. One editor suggested that the President might want to make a “gesture” toward the right wing of his party. Someone else objected that reaching out to conservatives through an appointment to the United Nations would raise more doubt than confidence, considering the conservatives’ view of the institution. Buckley listened, considered, and finally concluded that someone—Nixon, Scali, or another high-ranking official—must have “set out to redefine America’s relationship to the UN” by choosing him. He called Scali and said yes.

**THE RISE OF NEOCONSERVATISM AND THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT**

August 19, 1973: Virgil Popescu goes on hunger strike outside the doors of the United Nations in New York City, New York. He wants to be reunited with his wife, Cristina, who is trapped in Romania.

August 27, 1973: Popescu has lost 10 pounds during his eight day fast. National newspaper coverage says that he has collected almost 2,000 signatures from passersby appealing to the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the Romanian government for the freedom of his 23-year-old bride. He said his father had been killed simply for being a priest and that he, his brother, and his sister had been persecuted and deprived of higher education. On July 28, 1972, he said he crossed the Danube River with his bicycle on his back.

September 18, 1973: Popescu visits US Ambassador Clyde Ferguson to ask for American help in his wife’s emigration. Three members of the local Romanian community support him because he is too weak to walk after a month of fasting. Romanian officials insist his wife does not want to emigrate because Popescu maltreated her. Popescu maintained his wife had been “deprived of work” and threatened by Secret Police for wishing to leave the country.

could conceivably die few yards from where anniversary of Human Rights Declaration being celebrated.”

September 20, 1973: A Romanian priest and NYC police take Popescu to the Jewish Memorial hospital after he complains of chest pains. Reports call his condition “grave.” The hospital feeds him intravenously. Doctors conclude his heart condition almost certainly resulted from prolonged fasting.

In the margin of the September 20th brief, Buckley scrawled: “This a real story. This guy is NOT a phony. He really is fasting.” He underlined the last word twice.

While Popescu was starving outside the gates of the United Nations, there was much talk within the building about emigration from the Soviet Union. Throughout the early 1970s, dissident Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn had been drawing attention to Soviet oppression through books like One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, which chronicled life in a Siberian labor camp, and in 1970 he won the Nobel Prize for Literature. In August 1973, while Popescu began his hunger strike, the Soviets imposed an emigration tax that primarily affected Jews.

Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson wrote an editorial in The New York Times during September 1973 that compared the USSR to Nazi Germany and called for a more “human détente” that respected human rights within communist states. During the week of September 18th, when Popescu was one month into his strike and the UN had just begun its fall session, Buckley said that coverage of emigration rights in the USSR in the Sunday New York Times “almost rivaled Watergate.” Buckley was hoping to ascend to the US representative position on the Third Committee, tasked with the very human rights issues that were now at the fore of the national conversation and embodied in a hunger strike at the gates of the UN.

One year earlier, on October 4, 1972, Senator Jackson of Washington State had proposed his co-sponsored Jackson-Vanik amendment. It was introduced in early 1973 and continued to be debated until it passed as an amendment to the Trade Reform Act on December 20, 1974, gaining significant support from the American public and from conservatives like Barry Goldwater and John Tower. It proposed withholding “Most Favored Nation” trade status from the Soviet Union until the country allowed more emigration rights, saying that such a measure represented the American dedication to the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights more than 25 years earlier.

One of Jackson’s co-sponsors, Democratic Senator Abraham Ribicoff, joined some liberal politicians’ moral arguments for the amendment, calling the Soviets’ actions “heinous” and “barbaric.” Before long, the amendment’s supporters increasingly used such human rights language as well. The measure threatened to humiliate the Soviets and
collapse Nixon’s détente, thereby undercutting the Americans’ attempts to maintain cordial relations—and Congressional liberals who supported détente hesitated.83 Jackson, on the other hand, made a fiery anti-détente speech in early 1973.84 This was one of the first moments when a new, more confrontational foreign policy persuasion rose within the Democratic Party, headed by Senator Jackson, and began to split from the rest of the liberal movement. The Jackson-Vanik amendment was at the core of the national conversation about human rights in the fall of 1973 while Buckley was a UN delegate.

Soviet ambassadors to the UN expressed their displeasure with the amendment both publicly and privately. The USSR had just dropped its exit tax in early 1973 and raised emigration levels in response to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, though such measures apparently had not aided Virgil Popescu.85 On Buckley’s first day at the United Nations, Soviet Ambassador Yakov Malik expressed the Kremlin’s “deep annoyance” with the Jackson-Vanik amendment and its “opposition to the spirit of détente.” Ambassador Scali apologetically explained that the President did not control Congress.

In the middle of the conversation, Buckley entered the room. Scali introduced them, and Buckley recounts the following exchange:

Malik: “Ah, yes, I know all about Mr. Buckley…But let me tell you something.”
He paused and looked at Buckley as the room froze in anticipation.
Malik: “I don’t agree with you about everything!”86 The room sighed in relief.

A week later in the General Assembly, Buckley reflected that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was “much exercised, as Malik had been the week before, about the Jackson amendment.” Gromyko’s speech cautioned against “teach[ing] others how to manage their internal affairs,” attacking the American legislature. “Were we to take the path of imposing our practice upon other countries,” he declared, “then those who are now trying to persuade us to adopt alien laws, morals, or customs would probably object, and this is understandable and justifiable.”

In response, Buckley wrote: “The impudence is mind boggling.”87

The United Nations is divided into subsections: the General Assembly, including representatives from every member state; the Security Council, which hosts some rotating members and five permanent ones with veto power; the Economic and Social Council; the International Court of Justice; and the Secretariat.88 The General Assembly itself divides into six committees to consider proposals, and human rights-related issues go to the Third Committee. Scali had offered to make Buckley the US representative to the Third Committee on Human Rights. As such, Scali suggested, Buckley would occupy the same Third Committee public delegate seat that had been held by luminaries like Eleanor Roosevelt and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.89 Scali never delivered on his promise to make Buckley the
primary US representative on the Third Committee, but Buckley did take advantage of his position’s connection to Democratic politician Daniel Patrick Moynihan.

Moynihan and Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson were two leaders in the budding neoconservative movement as it split slowly from liberalism throughout the 1970s. McGovern’s neo-isolationist foreign policy in the 1972 election spurred Senator Jackson and his followers to call for a return to the more muscular liberalism of Truman and Kennedy.\(^9^0\) They also opposed Nixon’s détente because they saw it as legitimizing the oppressive Soviet regime rather than trying to change it.\(^9^1\)

Senator Jackson and his foreign policy-minded staffers joined an already existing group of Jewish intellectual Democratic voices in New York City that objected to domestic issues like Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty and the radical social movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Irving Kristol headed this group and its members emphasized the limits of social engineering, often publishing in Kristol’s magazine *The Public Interest.* Senator Jackson’s group coalesced more around foreign policy than domestic issues, and they often voiced their views in fellow neoconservative Norman Podhoretz’s *Commentary,* though Podhoretz had been part of Kristol’s early group. There was some crossover between Kristol’s first wave and Senator Jackson’s second wave, with some early members joining the Scoop Jackson Democrats’ anti-Communism and some of the second wave adopting Kristol’s domestic views. However, neoconservatism remained remarkably diverse; its most important figure, Kristol, did not share Senator Jackson’s beliefs. Kristol and Podhoretz sometimes described neoconservatism as a “persuasion” or “tendency” rather than a movement.\(^9^2\) Neoconservatives mainly agreed on the fact that they shared no “manifesto, credo, religion, flag, anthem, or secret handshake.”\(^9^3\)

The group’s members were “extremely well placed…in government, in the academy, in journalism—in short, in all those modern institutions out of which influence can be radiated.”\(^9^4\) Daniel Patrick Moynihan would become the first successful neoconservative politician, elected as a Democratic senator in New York in 1977.\(^9^5\) By 1980, the neoconservatives aligned with the Republicans based in large part on their anti-Communist views, and some of Jackson’s prominent staffers like Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Elliott Abrams, and Richard Perle later rose to high positions in the Reagan administration.\(^9^6\)

However, during Buckley’s UN tenure, neoconservatives were still an embattled group of Democrats who were beginning to endure criticism from their fellow liberals and praise from conservatives.\(^9^7\) In 1970, the *The Wall Street Journal* called Norman Podhoretz an “improbable conservative” to his chagrin, and three years later the same newspaper coined the term “neoconservative” to describe Moynihan and others associated with Irving Kristol.\(^9^8\) Socialist Michael Harrington used the term neoconservative as an “epithet” in autumn 1973.\(^9^9\) Kristol, Podhoretz, and others were unhappy about being called conserva-
tive, though Kristol quipped that, having been named Irving, he was “relatively indifferent to baptismal caprice.” Ultimately Kristol would “unenthusiastically” cast his vote for the Republicans in 1972, and he reluctantly accepted the title “neoconservative” while maintaining that there was no such thing as neoconservatism. While Kristol et al. had friction with fellow liberals, they garnered praise from the other side of the aisle. In June 1972, William F. Buckley wrote a tribute in *The Alternative*, where he said Kristol was “writing more sense in the public interest these days than anybody I can think of.”

As they uneasily coalesced in the mid-70s, neoconservatives’ strongest common points became anti-Communism, interventionist foreign policy, and US moral leadership. Historian Justin Vaisse argues they had their rhetorical roots in conservative thinkers like James Burnham and presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, though in their moment the neoconservatives called for a return to Truman and Kennedy’s anti-Communism. Kennedy had asserted that the US would “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and the success of liberty.” Even as early as 1972, historians say that the neoconservatives had a solid “freedom agenda” and interventionist outlook, though they disagreed about how interventionist the US should be. These calls for mid-century ideals were solidifying at just the time that conservatism was beginning to more and more resemble mid-century liberalism, moving from “victory” to containment rhetoric. The neoconservatives further widened their schism with the Democrats by prophesying that McGovern’s “accommodationist” foreign policies would cause electoral failure on the Left; when many liberals cast votes for Nixon in 1972, they felt their prediction had come true. The neoconservatives launched a campaign to retake the party after McGovern’s defeat.

They founded the Coalition for a Democratic Majority to unite Jackson supporters and bring the party back to the days of “Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Adlai Stevenson, John Kennedy, LBJ, and Hubert H. Humphrey.” The coalition urged the Democrats to accept a global leadership role for the United States and recommit itself to the fight against Communism. They also denounced the New Politics and the New Left for creating what they called a dangerously radical, anti-establishmentarian, and anti-Semitic shift; their feelings were especially strong given the fact that many neoconservatives were Jewish. The neoconservative campaign therefore combined the domestic ideals of first-wave neoconservatism and the foreign policy of the second wave. Ultimately, their effort would fail in rallying the Democrats, and the campaign’s only true success was keeping Jackson supporters together, according to his staffer Richard Perle. However, it did foreshadow growing similarities between neoconservatism and conservatism, the year before Buckley entered the UN.

These tensions between the neoconservatives and the Democratic Party underlay the
Congressional battle over the Jackson-Vanik amendment during Buckley’s public delegate tenure in the fall of 1973. Conservatives and neoconservatives alike saw Jackson-Vanik as a welcome turn away from détente, a policy that they thought compromised American values by ignoring Soviet human rights abuses. Kissinger and the State Department insisted that private diplomacy succeeded where public humiliation failed, calling the Jackson-Vanik amendment “excessively moralistic” and “quixotic or dangerous,” leading to “ineffectual posturing or adventurist crusades.” Kissinger asserted that he had been quietly prod-ding the Soviets in private negotiations to improve Jewish emigration rights, and this was the official policy while Buckley was working under the State Department at the United Nations. When the Jackson-Vanik amendment passed in 1974, Kissinger’s moderate success was undone; the Soviets felt humiliated and decreased their quotas in response. However, during the fall of 1973, the Congressional debate was still strong, and Buckley demanded Soviet humiliation.

Sir Alec Home, the British foreign minister, visited the US to address the United Nations General Assembly during Buckley’s tenure, and Buckley invited him to appear on his television show, Firing Line. The British foreign minister, Buckley said, was known to be a strong supporter of human rights. On the show, Buckley asked Home how he would push the USSR to respect human rights. Home replied that he wanted to “begin to try to create for the Soviet Union that kind of confidence that allows free movement within the law—I must insist of course—always of the country concerned.”

Buckley: “If, let’s say, Senator Henry Jackson were sitting in your chair, and he had used the phrase, ‘We should do something to remove barriers,’ and I were to say to him, ‘What do you propose to do?’ he would reply, ‘Well, I propose to withhold certain trading privileges unless they do as Sir Alec has suggested. So here he has a concrete non-rhetorical sanction that he is prepared to deploy. Question: (a) Do you have any sanctions that you are prepared to deploy or (b) if there are, must you for diplomatic reasons keep them under wraps?’”

Home: “[I don’t think] you want to talk in terms of sanctions… I think you must use persuasion to the limit. If you can’t persuade the other side… then we simply just revert, as I said, to a state of passive confrontation, which is very unsatisfactory.”

“So much for the flame of Helsinki,” Buckley later concluded. “Helsinki” became a synonym for international human rights due to the historic Helsinki Accords—and Buckley felt that Home’s hesitance to support sanctions like the neoconservative Jackson-Vanik amendment was antithetical to human rights.

In December of 1973, yet another group of human rights advocates burst into a
Security Council meeting in the United Nations, demanding action against human rights abuses in the USSR. Their outburst came three months after Virgil Popescu vacated the UN gates. There is no record of Popescu’s fate after he entered the hospital.114

BUCKLEY AND MOYNIHAN CONFRONT THE UNITED NATIONS

At an informal dinner on the first day of the General Assembly, Buckley asked Scali to sponsor a resolution inviting dissident Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn to address the General Assembly. Buckley knew this would effectively confront Soviet human rights abuses like labor camps—which Solzhenitsyn had exposed in his trilogy *Gulag Archipelago*—on a global stage. Scali enthusiastically called over fellow ambassador Tapley Bennett to discuss the idea. It certainly couldn’t be done directly, Bennett said, but perhaps if another country sponsored the resolution—and if Solzhenitsyn were invited with other speakers as part of a series—inviting him to speak might be achievable in five years.115

However, Bennett and Scali were unable to think of any satellite nation that could sponsor the bill, and the group dropped the topic. Buckley later remarked that the US was the only superpower without a satellite in the UN—China had Albania, and the USSR had the Soviet bloc.116 Both China and the USSR also enjoyed the support of the non-aligned nations on many resolutions. President Mobutu of Zaire said that African and Asian countries even further “consolidated” ties during Buckley’s term, the 28th session of the General Assembly.117 Buckley resented the USSR and the non-aligned nations’ power in the UN compared to what he saw as isolation and inaction on the part of the US delegation.118

“Wouldn’t we all profit from inviting Solzhenitsyn anyway, even if the invitation was shot down by the Soviet Union in some way or other?” he reflected. “Wouldn’t it embarrass the UN to vote not to invite someone so distinguished?”119 Ultimately, he concluded, “When human rights plays at the UN, human rights loses.”120 Détente, he said, was to blame for simplifying the US delegation’s mandate in the UN to one item: “Do not offend.”121 Throughout that fall, Scali vetoed many of Buckley’s speeches for being too “provocative,” until Buckley said it became an “astonishment” if one did pass inspection.122

Buckley found his inability to respond infuriating because he believed the non-aligned and the Soviet bloc were launching harsh polemics against the US. One non-aligned ambassador in particular grated his sensibility: Jamil Murad Baroody of Saudi Arabia. Buckley wrote that Baroody “had a following” at the UN because he had been delegate since the organization’s inception, carrying a “carte blanche” from the Saudi Arabian king that enabled him to “speak without fear.” Buckley called him an “oratorical bore,” and he was frustrated that though he had heard Baroody speak one hundred times, “no one dared oppose him…[and] nobody, but nobody, ever replie[d] to Baroody.”123
One of the Saudi Arabian ambassador’s speeches that especially galled Buckley criticized the American system of government during a Plenary session, calling it “democracy by subscription and contribution.” “The spoils system in Government is rife,” Baroody said, “and the mass media of information are twisted and slanted to distort the truth at the expense of the suppressed people in Africa.” Buckley underlined each phrase on his copy of the speech, and later reflected that an anti-American “mobocracy” ruled the UN; the organization’s charter, he said, was “simply a protean umbrella that cover[ed] the particular interests of the mob.”

Buckley was not the only public delegate to have grievances with the UN. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, soon to become a prominent neoconservative, had occupied Buckley’s public delegate seat just two years before. He was a liberal Harvard sociologist who had earned important political positions under Kennedy, an assistantship to a member of President Nixon’s cabinet, and became the ambassador to India seven months before Buckley’s term at the UN. He was quickly becoming a leader in the neoconservative movement throughout the early and mid-1970s—a liberal with anti-Communist views on foreign policy.

Moynihan’s time as a public delegate had changed his thinking in a lasting way. During his time there, the Third Committee had considered a “Report on the World Social Condition,” which had evaluated countries’ well-being based on the presence of “one single denominator: the presence or absence of social protest.” Moynihan said that he was outraged: “Presence proved trouble. Absence proved peace. This all-purpose social indicator established, for example, that the people and government of Czechoslovakia lived in perfect harmony, whilst the US was rapidly approaching anarchy and long delayed, much deserved—revolution.”

Following this experience, Moynihan gave an interview to The New York Times saying that American diplomats were unable to defend against ideological attacks, and that they needed to stand against the argument that totalitarian societies “had some good points.” For years, he continued to argue that the United States needed to stop “apologizing for an imperfect democracy.” He wrote in 1973: “What drove me to despair was the complacency—I look down the list of those who go along and those who go along by abstaining. In half of them the present regimes would collapse without American support or American acquiesce. To hell with it.” Moynihan advocated that the US suspend support for countries that criticized it, branching out from the Democrats on foreign policy.

After Buckley’s first meeting with Scali about going to the UN, he heard that Moynihan would soon visit New York City for a few days. Buckley recalled the former delegate’s “superb speech” about the UN from two years before and called to ask his advice about taking the appointment. Buckley said that Moynihan urged him to take the position,
assuring him that delegates had some latitude in giving extemporaneous speeches since these could not be reasonably submitted for clearance. 135 This advice likely resounded with Buckley, a vocal opponent of the State Department’s détente policy.

As Buckley’s speeches continued to be silenced, he bitterly reflected that Moynihan’s appointment had been “pre-détente,” which could have allowed Moynihan to make more extemporaneous statements than he was currently allowed. He also imagined that Moynihan, “a UN-loving liberal Democrat,” might have been given more freedom than a “curmudgeonly Republican conservative” like himself.136 After his first few challenging weeks at the UN, Buckley typed out a memo to Kissinger and Scali declaring his intentions to “feel free to discuss human rights even if the inference can be drawn from what I say that I also believe in human rights within the Soviet Union.” He felt that the United States could pursue cordial relations with the Soviet delegates while still “maintain[ing] a dogged position” on public debates about human rights and the Declaration of Human Rights, of which the Soviets were a signatory.137

He assured them that he would do this “most tactfully,” but that the “genius” of the public delegate format was that he should be able to cast himself as a “detached” agent from the delegation. Scali took him aside and insisted that détente was the overarching policy, but he assured Buckley that he would be able to speak on human rights in language applicable to China and the Soviet Union once the delegation developed a “strategy.” Finally, Scali asked him to never send copies of memorandums to Kissinger.138

Meanwhile, Moynihan was making his opinions known about the US delegation’s actions in 1973. In August, he took the highly unusual step of sending a congratulatory cable to John Scali after Scali denounced Cuban “meddling” over the status of Puerto Rico. He wrote that “something specifically bad” should happen to countries that make unfounded accusations against the US. “When it has happened,” he wrote, “they should be told that Americans take the honor of their democracy most seriously.”139

During Buckley’s first session in the Third Committee of the United Nations, he seemed to have similar goals in mind. Baroody spoke at great length about eliminating an item from the agenda, but Buckley thought that the committee was supposed to be discussing the agenda order rather than the merits of each item. He rose and asked Baroody to confine his statements to the order of the agenda items. The president of the committee seemed astonished at the new US delegate’s impudence—or perhaps ignorance.140 Scali chided him after the session for opposing Baroody when the US sorely needed his vote. Buckley was not the only delegate to extemporaneously face off with Baroody; another public delegate once spoke out that he could not “take responsibility for the Crusades, the Fall of Rome, and everything else Mr. Baroody accuses us of— I have listened to that speech of Mr. Baroody’s five times since I came to the General Assembly.”141
After some time, Kissinger tried to distance the State Department from Buckley. Buckley had known Kissinger professionally long before he joined the United Nations because Kissinger had previously courted Buckley’s conservative support for Nelson Rockefeller’s presidential campaign. When the Secretary of State arrived to give the opening address at the GA, Buckley greeted Kissinger: “How is it going, Doc?” A months into the fall session, Buckley mocked President Mobutu of Zaire in his syndicated column: “Such menial tasks as placing one’s own speech on a podium are inconsistent with the pride of the President of Zaire.” Kissinger and Scali told Mobutu that Buckley’s views did not represent those of the American government. Scali said that Mobutu’s support was necessary because Saudi Arabia was sponsoring a resolution to pull UN forces out of Korea, which the US thought would be disastrous for peace; in his view, the non-aligned votes were important because it would be hard to coalesce American public support, considering the country’s desire to demilitarize post-Vietnam. “The stock reply,” Buckley thought, “should be that the erosion of American influence during the past few years suggests that we have been doing something wrong…by sitting still, numbly, for rhetorical assaults from anyone, on any subject.”

By early November, Buckley began to occasionally keep such thoughts to himself. Once, Buckley uncovered a display of photos from the Angola Liberation Front showing dead Portuguese soldiers and burning vehicles. “This struck me as odd,” he wrote. “The Portuguese and French are both members of the UN, the Liberation Front of Angola is not, yet the Front can attack the two members right in the halls of the UN…The sign says in accordance with a decision taken by the 4th Committee on the 27th of September, by the UN Office of Information. Nutty?” He confined his comments to his personal reflections.

By December 10, Buckley’s concerns about the non-aligned seemed to be at least partially founded: members of the US delegation feared that the United Nations Secretary General was going to be “emasculated” by the non-aligned. There was a Security Council meeting scheduled for that afternoon, which the non-aligned nations had convened to authorize the Secretary General to attend Middle East peace negotiations in Geneva.

“ISSUE: The issue is more important than it appears to be. Aside from the theatrics, the non-aligned are making a subtle but determined effort to bring the Security Council to heel. They do not want to have Waldheim freewheeling with the generic support of the advice from the US and the USSR. Everytime [UN Secretary General] Waldheim moves they would like to have him report to the Security Council to explain what he has done, what he will do, and how. Not only is this impossibly inefficient and impractical but it will thoroughly emasculate the Security-general if successful, and eventually will make the Sec Council and appendage of the General Assembly. [misspellings and grammatical errors original]”
Meanwhile, Scali never appointed Buckley as the US representative to the Third Committee. Buckley finally wrote a pointed note to Scali: “At what point does your Excel-

lency appoint me to Human Rights?” Scali hedged by assigning Buckley numerous resolv-

ons amongst varied committees, including the General Assembly, the Third Committee, the Second Committee, and the Special Political committee.149

Though Buckley’s tenure would ultimately end in frustration, Moynihan would take up the banner of confrontational UN diplomacy two years later. Kissinger read Moyni-

han’s article in Commentary, a neoconservative magazine, deploring a “thirty year pattern of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal” and a “massive failure of American diplomacy” to defend liberal policies.150 The Secretary of State promptly called Moynihan about becoming the UN ambassador.151 However, Kissinger would soon need to politically isolate himself from Moynihan just as he had from Buckley.

During Moynihan’s term, the Ugandan dictator Idi Amin made “wild accusations” against the US and called for the extinction of Israel as a state. Moynihan responded with a speech in San Francisco calling Amin a “racist murderer.” The State Department tried to distance itself. Moynihan responded simply, “I have said what had to be said.”152 He made a similarly outspoken stand against a UN resolution declaring Zionism a form of racism, declaring flatly, “This is a lie.”153 After these bold statements, The New York Times Magazine published a flattering profile, the Chicago Tribune praised his “relentless harpooning of Third World idiocies,” and National Review called him the “Man of the Year.” A Time cover story about Moynihan in January 1976 cited an opinion poll showing 70% of respondents wanting him to keep speaking out, even if it was undiplomatic.154

Moynihan continued attacking the Soviets, saying that they would “exploit our ev-

ery weakness” and that US foreign policy had been outmatched. When the Soviets sup-

ported Communist liberation movements in non-aligned countries like Ethiopia and An-

gola, he said that these revolutions were a “progressive brutalization of politics which is being carried on by the Soviets in the name of national liberation.” It was the Americans’ duty, he said, to make sure the world understood this.155 However, a story soon appeared reporting that Kissinger had privately rebuked Moynihan for his conduct, which Moynihan said was false. He thought Kissinger had circulated the rumor. Quotes from Kissinger then appeared in The New York Times saying that he and Nixon privately deplored Moynihan while publicly supporting him. Rather than be undercut, Moynihan resigned.156

From opposite sides of the political spectrum, Buckley and Moynihan made similar arguments in the United Nations about confronting the Soviets on human rights abuses, defending American values against accusations from the non-aligned, and decreasing the United States’ isolation in the UN. Both felt that the US was losing its role as a global lead-

er and failing in the worldwide struggle between Communism and democracy.157
FORESHADOWING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIANCE

push for anti-Communist, diplomatically interventionist foreign policy foreshadowed the impending alliance in 1980 between the conservatives and neoconservatives.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn echoed Buckley and Moynihan’s arguments. At nearly the same time that Buckley was pushing to invite him to the UN in September 1973, Solzhenitsyn discovered that the KGB had interrogated his typist, who hung himself afterwards. The KGB then unearthed a copy of Solzhenitsyn’s book *The Gulag Archipelago* that exposed Soviet oppression in labor camps. The author and his family received death threats, and in February he was arrested, deprived of his citizenship, and deported. In 1975, when he visited Washington, President Ford declined to meet with him on the advice of Henry Kissinger. On June 8, 1978, at a Harvard University address, Solzhenitsyn deplored the “decline in courage” in the West, “in each country, each government, each political party, and, of course, in the United Nations.” At the celebration of the 25th Anniversary of the Declaration Human Rights that December, Buckley wrote, “…the shadow of Solzhenitsyn was over that Assembly, but nobody spoke his name.”

AN UNLIKELY RHETORICAL ALLIANCE

Late in the fall of 1973, William F. Buckley finally spoke on human rights at the United Nations. He had not expected the speech to pass through the delegation but, to his surprise, he arrived to the UN that morning and discovered it had been approved. The Third Committee had been considering appointing a High Commissioner on Human Rights for eight years. Each session, it was put off to the next year for further discussion. Some countries objected that the commissioner could interfere in internal affairs for sovereign nations.

“Human rights is an ideal to which we all pay lip service,” he proclaimed. “Among those who spoke yesterday in opposition to a High Commissioner for Human Rights were states who would have you believe that such is the congestion of human rights within their frontiers that it is necessary to surround themselves with great walls and oceans to prevent these human rights from emigrating.” It is unlikely that Buckley’s reference to the Jackson-Vanik amendment went unnoticed by the USSR.

Buckley’s confrontational human rights rhetoric had strong parallels with the mid-century Truman Doctrine. In Truman’s 1947 speech to Congress, the President tried to convince his listeners that Greece and Turkey required massive economic support to remain independent from the growing Soviet bloc. He argued that American intervention would help ensure the spread of freedom in a world at risk of spiraling toward oppression under Communist leadership. “The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms,” he said. “If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of
the world. And we shall surely endanger the welfare of this nation.” His words described a world locked in struggle between liberty and tyranny, and he insisted that the United States had a duty to fight against what he portrayed as a Communist menace. This rhetoric helped solidify the “Vital Center” around anti-Communism in the Democratic Party during the postwar period.

Buckley ascribed to Truman’s anti-Communist dichotomous worldview, believing that America was a force for good against oppressive Soviet domination. His fond discussion of the Jackson-Vanik amendment also mirrored Truman’s advocacy for an international, vocally public program spreading “freedom” and directly contesting the Soviets’ authority. However, Buckley’s uniqueness came from his use of human rights rhetoric to support these aims; though Truman supported freeing other countries from Communist domination, he did not reference improving individual human rights within Communist nations. Buckley took American interventionism one step further, in a vein more similar to Kennedy’s “support any friend, oppose any foe” speech, purporting that the US had a moral duty to uphold freedom for people living within Communist nations. Buckley endorsed confrontational diplomacy as an ideal tool to pressure the Soviets into giving their citizens rights—a goal that he said upheld the ideals of the United Nations. His ideas echoed Truman’s speech defending aggressive diplomacy as a means to greater freedom for Greece and Turkey.

As neoconservatives drew closer to the Republican Party, conservative historian George Nash says their foreign policy rhetoric also became much closer to “Mr. Acheson and Truman’s internationalism” than to the left wing isolationism of Eugene McCarthy and his supporters. Buckley himself compared Moynihan’s rhetoric to the “tradition of Dean Acheson [and] Harry Truman” in June 1979. Moynihan, like Truman, believed in a global struggle between Communism and the “free” world and affirmed that it was the United States’ duty to promote liberal democracy abroad. In fact, Moynihan’s “United States in Opposition” article espoused the theory that the British Empire had spread socialist opinion throughout the world, and he argued that the US had faltered in effectively combating that ideology.

Moynihan’s desire to promote democracy abroad even hearkened back to Wilsonian principles. In his February 1975 speech to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Was Woodrow Wilson Right?” he argued that America had a duty to spread “freedom.” Moynihan said that “democracy in one country was not enough simply because it would not last,” and therefore the United States had the responsibility to “defend and, where possible, to advance democratic principles in the world at large.” Soon, Moynihan began to echo Buckley’s compelling combination of human rights rhetoric and anti-Communism. In the late 1970s, he opposed Carter’s approach to human rights, saying
that Carter was pursuing “international social work” whereas human rights policy should actually be a “political weapon” to be used in the “battle against totalitarianism.”

Senator Jackson was another leader committed to the anti-Communist ideals rooted in Truman’s speech. The Jackson-Vanik amendment had direct parallels with Truman’s plan for aid to Europe: both measures won widespread support as less severe, but still anti-Communist policy alternatives to military intervention. In 1947, containment-supporting liberals rallied behind broad based economic aid for Europe that required no military commitments. The Jackson-Vanik amendment had a similar pitch in the 1970s: improving emigration rights for Soviet Jews through economic means. Isolationist liberals opposed continued overseas commitments that could lead to another Vietnam, but they could easily support an amendment furthering human rights without military involvement. Senator Jackson’s Truman-like anti-Communism also made him the neoconservatives’ first choice for the presidency in 1972.

Buckley, Jackson, and Moynihan employed Truman’s mid-century liberal language toward what had become conservative foreign policy aims during the early 1970s. Where 1970s liberalism wanted to retreat from the world, they pushed for intervention. While revisionists argued the United States had caused the Cold War, neoconservatives and conservatives pushed for defending and spreading American actions and values abroad. Truman’s language—championing anti-Communism, confrontation, and the spread of democracy—helped these three figures create a unique mélange of liberal rhetorical means and conservative ends.

This rhetoric prefigured the 1980 alliance between neoconservatives and conservatives. Both Buckley and the neoconservatives departed from their respective parties’ traditional language to create a rhetorical bridge that stretched back to the days of President Truman. The neoconservatives adopted classic liberal language, but that rhetoric and its goals differed from some of their fellow Democrats in the post-Vietnam foreign policy era. Buckley’s connection between conservative anti-Communism and human rights allied him with contemporary neoconservatives but differentiated him from the Right’s silence on human rights during the post-war period. His argument spread across the party toward the end of the decade. When it did, near 1980, the neoconservatives and conservatives fully entered an alliance, though not purely based on this early 70s bridge coming to fruition. Rather, conservatism’s logical tie between its foreign policy and greater human rights abroad coincided with the neoconservatives’ migration to the Right based on foreign policy as well as other domestic issues. Buckley’s human rights advocacy in the UN in the early 1970s foreshadowed these changes in the conservative movement later in the decade.

Buckley used his unique rhetoric most boldly in a speech he never gave. It was to be delivered on the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
in early October 1973. A cable from the Washington diplomatic headquarters demanded, “There should be no repeat no mention of specific countries or specific cases involving human rights violations.” (grammatical errors original) Buckley wrote a speech defining the world in terms of countries that “grant human beings human rights” and those who do not. He requested in the draft that all countries who “systematically deny the human rights associated with the UN Declaration should gracefully absent themselves from this chamber.” His aide thought the speech would go over well. After all, Buckley had softened his demand with a cautionary line: “I do not wish to be censorious…but those countries whose own policies are not congruent should leave.”

That night, when Buckley returned home, he found that Scali had left him a message to call him “instantly” in Washington, “no matter how late.” Buckley guessed what it was about, and went promptly to sleep. The next morning, the US ambassador explained that the speech simply could not be delivered as it was, because the State Department was in the midst of delicate negotiations concerning the Yom Kippur War, and anything “smack[ing] as a defense of Jews could be devastating” to relations with the Arabs and the Russians. Scali assured Buckley that the “top leadership” of the delegation was personally in “whole-heart[ed]” agreement with his speech, and that he would get a chance to “vigorously” express his views on human rights after the Middle East war had concluded. However, Buckley declined the chance to deliver an edited, less confrontational version of the speech; instead he concocted an excuse to leave town that day. An alternate delivered the edited statement.

A SUCCESSFUL SILENCE

Buckley had a growing sense that “Walter Mitty was dead.” It had been building since Scali had not posted him as the delegate on the Third Committee, continued to grow when his memo was firmly rejected, and solidified as Scali assigned him to a range of resolutions on committees that would take him away from the Human Rights Committee. Luckily, his brother Jim had just been elected Senator of New York in 1971. Buckley called for advice.

After some research, Buckley’s brother read aloud from Public Law 357, the 79th Congress UN Participation Act of 1945, Section 2C: “The representatives provided for in Section 2 hereof, when representing the US in the respective organs and agencies of the UN, shall, at all times, act in accordance with the instructions of the President transmitted by the Secretary of State…”

“In a nutshell, Bill, you are not a free agent,” Jim said. Buckley considered resigning. There had been very little public attention to his appointment, and he felt that the State
Department would continue to frustrate the work he believed he should be doing for the US. Suddenly, Buckley had an idea. He would write a book—a journal—documenting his experiences in the United Nations as a delegate, revealing useful insights from someone outside the bureaucracy. “I would not, after all, emerge the screwy,” he crowed.185

Later that winter in Switzerland, where he went to write his book, he reflected back on his months at the United Nations: “Even now I do not understand the purpose of the layman-delegate.”186 His attempts to make speeches and contribute to policy had been repeatedly frustrated, and the public delegates had been “entirely left out” of negotiations for the Yom Kippur War that had broken out during their General Assembly session, he wrote discontentedly.187 Even after he published these reflections in his book, United Nations Journal, there was relatively little notice paid to his efforts.188

What Buckley’s persistence in the United Nations did achieve was a rhetorical foreshadowing of the neoconservative-conservative alliance in 1980. Both groups’ rhetoric reached back into Truman’s speeches. There, Buckley, Moynihan, and Jackson would find the necessary structures to articulate their conservative foreign policies in the 1970s. Both Buckley and the neoconservatives branched away from their respective parties, moving closer together toward a common language and, eventually a common party.

In December 1973, Buckley was simply looking forward to ending his experience in the United Nations. On the last day of his term, the closing statements ran late. It was 8:30PM, and US Ambassador Tapley Bennett had yet to give his address. Buckley felt sorry for him, but he had promised his harpsichord teacher he would attend her recital. He knew she would miss him, and that Bennett would forgive him for leaving. He did not read the final remarks the next morning.189

NOTES


3. Ibid.


7. Judis, Buckley, 1-12, 264.
9. Farber, *Conservatism*, 59-67. Farber says Buckley called the early years of his career “crying in the wilderness: liberals ruled the citadels of culture and politics and the masses had fallen prey to their machinations.” Farber also writes that there was no intellectually credible magazine of opinion for conservatism at the time.
11. Ibid.
12. Farber, *Modern Conservatism*, 50-52
15. Qtd. in Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism.”
17. Ben Wattenberg, a commentator and author who was part of the neoconservative group, quoted in Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 47-50, 59-61.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
the Republicans away from isolationism, see Farber, Modern Conservatism, 316. Refer once again to Nash v-viii also for a summary of Buckley’s critical coalescing leadership in the first postwar conservative resurgence.

27. Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 125.

28. Farber, Modern Conservatism, 262. See also Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 169-170.

29. Outside the United Nations, Buckley was concurrently advocating for American military intervention in Latin America. He supported American involvement in General Pinochet’s overthrow of Salvador Allende, a democratically elected socialist leader in Chile who established diplomatic relations with Cuba. See Judis, Buckley, 370-372 for the fascinating story about Buckley’s involvement founding a Chilean lobbying organization, the American Chilean Council, and supporting pro-Pinochet coverage in the National Review. For more information about American attitudes toward Allende and perceptions about Chile’s relationship to Cuba, see “The Nixon Administration’s Response to Salvador Allende and Chilean Expropriation,” “Nixonontapes.org,” last updated 2007, http://nixonontapes.org/chile.html. Within the United Nations, there was a particularly exciting episode where Soviet ambassador Malik announced to the UN that the Chilean government was going to execute a Communist senator at 4PM that day. Ambassador Bazan from Pinochet’s government said the allegations were untrue, but not before many members of the Soviet bloc denounced the execution. United Nations Journal, 108-113, Box 425, Folder 294, Buckley Papers.

30. Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide.”


32. Farber, Modern Conservatism, 262.


36. Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 334. Judis argues with this date, saying that over six months Buckley took confused and uncertain actions—“so much so that Buckley himself could claim in retrospect that he called for Nixon’s resignation, while Nixon loyalists like Pat Buchanan could recall Buckley as one of the few conservatives who didn’t ‘hit us when we were down.’” Judis says that it was not until June 1974 that Buckley finally adopted the same stand he had privately advised his brother to take: calling for Nixon to quit. Judis, Buckley, 352-357.


42. Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 11-18, and Farber, Modern Conservatism, 52.

43. On public opinion turning against interventionist foreign policy, see Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 316 and Williams, “Détente and Domestic Politics.” A Department of State Bulletin described Americans’ widespread disillusionment: “This has been the longest, the most difficult war in American history. Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all 9 years ago; and there has been disagreement on the conduct of the war.” No author, Department of State Bulletin, Box 45, Folder 2, United Nations. On neoconservatives’ discontent with the Democratic Party in the early 70s, see Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 2-10, 28-32, 47-50, 59-61.


46. Ibid, 316-320. John Gaddis argues that the idea originally surfaced with Charles Beard, but that the idea came into its “most influential characterization” with Williams. These revisionist views were vulnerable to conservative accusations of “anti-Americanism,” and Buckley wrote an editorial early in the 70s saying that “to dismiss even contemporary America as one vast plot against the survival of our eternal souls is Manichean and boring.”


49. United Nations Journal, 1, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.


53. Ambassador Tapley Bennett, one of the subordinate ambassadors, stressed the importance of the public delegates in contributing alternative points of view to the delegation during their initial Washington briefing. The five delegates in the fall of 1973 included: Margaret Young, the widow of civil rights leader Whitney Young; Mark Evans, a personal friend of the President who was Mormon; Richard Scammon, Scali’s friend and Director of Elections Research Center. Margaret Young withdrew halfway through for health reasons, but she made several statements on minority rights. Scammon’s duties in Washington also kept him away from New York City most of the time. Two ambassadors on the delegation besides Bennett were William Schaufele, a lifetime foreign ambassador, and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, previous ambassador to Uganda and General Counsel to the US Commission on Civil Rights. There were also two congressional representatives, one from each party: Democrat Robert C. Nix and Republican John Buchanan. Ibid, 3-6, 10-13.


55. United Nations Journal, 2, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. See also Judis, Buckley, 351, and Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 334.


58. For a contemporary writer calling Buckley a critic of Nixon's administration, see Redman, “Buckley Reports.”

59. United Nations Journal, 5, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. He wrote sarcastically that if Scali had asked him to be a dictator of the Gulag Archipelago, he would have reacted similarly: he would have asked a few questions and said he would think about it.

60. Nash, Conservative Intellectual, 265 and Buckley, Journal, 130, 253, 257. Buckley quoted a limited circulation cable from Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Ambassador John Scali in August 1973. Buckley also describes a situation where the UN enacted sanctions against Rhodesia. The US then had to purchase chrome from the USSR instead at a higher price, sponsoring a nation whose human rights abuses — according to Buckley — were far more egregious. The American Congress then enacted the Byrd amendment requiring the US to purchase chrome at the lowest price; the US, to the UN’s chagrin, returned to purchasing from Rhodesia. The delegates were told that the Byrd amendment had gotten the US into “the most fearful problems with the UN.” Buckley shows this as an example of the USSR escaping criticism for its human rights violations. United Nations Journal, 18-19, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. Scali also notes criticism of the US within the UN about the Byrd amendment. Memo from John Scali, October 1, 1973, Box 332 Folder 336, Buckley Papers. In his reflections on his UN tenure, Buckley wrote that most countries in the United
Nations were “effectively protected” against “criticism of their neglect of, or suppression of, human rights, with the traditional exceptions: South Africa and Portugal, of course; and any states which, from time to time, persecute Communist parties, or overthrow left-minded governments.” Buckley, *Journal*, 221.


63. Ibid.


66. Political Declaration of the Fourth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Algiers, September 5-9, 1973, Page 33, Item 6: “Further condemns the continued economic, financial, and military assistance given to S. Africa by certain NATO powers, in particular the United States of America, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, thereby enabling the Government in Pretoria to maintain and reinforce its policy of repression and apartheid.” Box 332, Folder 335, Buckley Papers.

67. Buckley, *Journal*, 190, 232, Appendix B. This appendix shows the United States’ numerical isolation in General Assembly voting, showing the numbers of votes cast with and against the US, and assigning a numerical rating for each. The rating was determined by assigning +1 for voting with the US, -1 voting against, and 0 for abstentions. The appendix was based on 14 resolutions chosen as a cross-section, touching on issues like terrorism, colonialism, the Middle East, nuclear proliferation, and the recognition of revolutionaries and governments-in-exile. There were only two countries with a rating over 10: Portugal and South Africa. In Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s cable re-published in the *Journal*, Moynihan says that there were some instances when the United States had the support of smaller nations, but that these were the exception rather than the norm. Buckley, *Journal*, 257.

68. *United Nations Journal*, 3-6, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.


71. Telegram Ambassador Scali to US Embassy in Bucharest, September 19, 1973, Box 261, Folder 2255, Buckley Papers.


73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Telegram from Ambassador Scali to US Embassy in Bucharest, September 20, 1973, Box 261, Folder 2255, Buckley Papers. It should be noted that the records do not indicate whether Popescu was Jewish, though he suffered under the Soviet bloc’s emigration restrictions. His strike earned national coverage in *The Daily Herald* in Chicago, the *St. Petersburg Times*, and other papers.


77. Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics.”


82. Keyes, Reclaiming American Virtue, 122.
84. Keyes, Reclaiming American Virtue, 122.
85. Ibid.
87. Ibid, 78-9. This likely is a reference to the Soviets’ “Iron Curtain” over Eastern Europe.
88. There is one further subsection that currently only meets when required. The Trusteeship Council supervises eleven “trust territories,” or territories preparing to gain independence. The last territory to gain its independence was the American Pacific Islands. “United Nations in Brief,” United Nations website.

89. Buckley, Journal, 1-15. See also Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 76-78.

90. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 1-2; Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics.” The Scoop Jackson Democrat neoconservatives were the true ancestors of the modern neoconservative group, who are known for their moralistic, muscular foreign policy views that encourage the US to advance into the world to shape it according to American values. Vaisse, “Neoconservatism,” 1-3.

92. Ibid.
93. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 45-46.
95. Ehrman, Neoconservatives, 62.


109. The neoconservatives were averse to what they perceived as anti-Semitism and militancy in the New Left, especially given that many of the neoconservatives were Jewish. Increasing student radicalism, including events like the Columbia protests in 1967-68, alienated the neoconservatives. There was also a rising pro-Palestine sentiment in the left among figures like Noam Chomsky and IF Stone. Ehrman writes this was a key turning point for Jewish neoconservatives. They felt both of these movements were taking over the Left, and this sentiment helped ignite their push to take back the party. Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 38-41, 58-61.


112. Ibid.


114. Telegram summarizing Security Council meeting, from Secretary of State in Washington to USUN in NYC, December 10, 1973, Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers. During the Guinean Representative Madame Cisse’s speech there was a “brief outburst” in the gallery.


116. Ibid.

118. Ibid, Appendix B. Unsigned typewritten note, January 1, 1974, ND, Buckley Papers. Typewritten note attached to clipping discussing previous day’s election of 15-man board of UN Industrial Development Organization for three-year terms. The note says US was a candidate but didn’t make it. Rather, the Soviet bloc elected two members, Africans four, Arabs five, and Latin America one. Latin America’s delegate was from Argentina, who the author says voted with the non-aligned. The author further wrote that Switzerland and Austria were the only friendly countries on the board. “One more step toward the day when the non aligned will decide how to spend our money—and one day closer to the effective end of the UN. Our people didn’t think this was very important and didn’t care whether we were elected to the Board or not. Maybe they know something I don’t know.” Style suggests Buckley. Also, box does contain signed notes from other authors.

119. Ibid.
120. Ibid, 221.
122. Buckley, Journal, 228 and Judis, Buckley, 352.

124. Transcript of Plenary 2162, November 1, 1973, Pg. 81, Box 332, Folder 334, Buckley Papers. Also, Memo from John Scali, October 1, 1973, entitled “Tanzanian Fonmin (Foreign Minister) Openly Attacks US,” Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers. Also unsigned typewritten note, ND, attached to a New York Times article, “The Genocide Convention Time” by William Korey, Folder 336, Box 332, Buckley Papers. On November 8th, 1973, the Secretary of State wrote a telegram to the USUN about a Recovery and Rehabilitation program to improve a famine in the Sahel. Buckley scrawled in the margin, “While the Africans tee off on us resolutely in the UN, we are the few who have really helped [the famine] in Sahel. Telegram from the Secretary of State in Washington to the USUN in NYC, November 8, 1973, Box 332, Folder 335, Buckley Papers.

126. Moynihan had only gone to the United Nations as a public delegate three days a week because he “insisted that he would need to continue to meet his two seminars in Cambridge two days a week.” United Nations Journal, 1-15, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.
129. Ibid.
132. Ibid, 82.
133. Ibid, 83-86.

139. Ibid, 83. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 253-60.
141. Buckley was not the only public delegate who would extemporaneously face off with Baroody. On November 7, 1973, the Saudi Arabian ambassador (whom Buckley privately called the “Prophet of the Plenary”) proposed in the Special Political Committee that the US fund the entire Palestinian refugee budget because American aid to Israel was the only reason there were Palestinian refugees in the first place. The US, he said, had already demonstrated its ability to provide $2 billion “in one day” to Israel. Mark Evans, another public delegate, spoke out extemporaneously against the proposal. Evans said that this would be the first time at the UN that a country would be singled out in this way; further, the US already contributed $23 million annually to the UN Relief and Works Agency – 64% of the total contributions since 1950. The exchange was “blistering,” as Buckley noted in the file. Unsigned typewritten note preceding transcript of Special Political Committee session 879, November 7, 1973, Box 332, Folder 334. On the corresponding transcript, the following exchange occurs: Evans: “I can’t take the responsibility for the Crusades, the Fall of Rome, and everything else Mr. Baroody accuses us of—I have listened to that speech of Mr. Baroody’s five times since I came to the General Assembly in six weeks [ago]...I was told to ignore the delegate from Saudi Arabia, that there was only one way to handle him and that is to ignore him and let him talk, because nobody listens to him...[after speaking for a time] I have never seen the Saudi Arabian delegate sit and listen so long—I am grateful for that.” Baroody later said in the speech that President Truman originally designed the Israel-Palestine partition for “selfish reasons” and violated the Palestinians’ right to self-determination under Wilson’s original declarations. Transcript of Special Political Committee session 879, November 7, 1973. Box 332, Folder 334. A memo from Scali follows saying that he was working to block this “mischief-making” from Baroody. Buckley later wrote that Baroody often criticized the US for being under the control of Zionist Jews. *United Nations Journal*, 63-70, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers.
142. *United Nations Journal*, 42-49, Box 425, Folder 293, Buckley Papers. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 42-49, 57-60. During the confirmation process for the General Assembly, the FBI called Buckley’s co-editor to discuss his connections to members of the Nixon administration and attitudes towards it. “Has Mr. Buckley done anything since 1969 that might embarrass the Nixon administration?” “No,” Rusher reportedly responded, “but since 1969 the Nixon administration has done a great deal that has embarrassed Mr. Buckley.” Judis, Buckley, 352. Also see Buckley, *Journal*, xxvi.
147. Typewritten Note, November 12, 1973, Box 332 Folder 335, Buckley Papers.
148. Unsigned typewritten note, ND, attached to telegram summarizing Security Council meeting
of December 10, 1973, Box 332, Folder 336, Buckley Papers.

149. Buckley, *Journal*, 20, 92-94.
150. Ibid, 96-97.
151. Ehrman, *Neoconservatism*, 83. Moynihan was outspoken even on transcription practices in the Security Council. He requested a change in UN procedure that ignited a chain of letters involving the Secretary-General. Letter Daniel Patrick Moynihan to Kurt Waldheim, ND, Unsigned “Note for the Secretary-General,” March 3, 1976, Note Kurt Herndl Deputy Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General to M. Glaissner, Director of Security Council, Letter Elaine Sloan Director of the General Legal Division to Ambassador Tapley Bennett March 24, 1976, Box 44, Folder 5, United Nations.
156. Ibid.
159. Buckley, “Human Rights and Foreign Policy.”
161. Buckley, *Journal*, 244. Selvi Siplik, Assistant Secretary-General for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs, delivered a statement implying that the Third Committee had failed to fulfill its humanitarian duties. “Statement at the Third Committee on Tuesday, 16th October 1973,” Third Committee of the General Assembly 28th Session, No Box, No Folder, United Nations Archives. Buckley writes that a British diplomat also quipped at the end of the 28th session that Third Committee resolutions were ineffectual, compared to the Sixth Committee and the Security Council. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 246.
162. Buckley, *Journal*, 221-230. Buckley delivered another minor statement on the Freedom of Information Act in the General Assembly on December 14th, 1973. It fills only four paragraphs. “My Government wishes to record very briefly its special disappointment that the General Assembly has once again passed over an opportunity to affirm a declaration on freedom of information.” He argued that declining to share the discussions in the United Nations “profane[d] the very purpose of the body…” Baroody, the Saudi Arabian ambassador, responded, “I think it is marvelous that for once I should be in agreement with the representative of the United States…” Transcript of Plenary 2201, pp. 30-31, December 14, 1973, Box 332, Folder 334, Buckley Papers. See also Buckley, *Journal*, 151.
164. Ibid, 228-229.


166. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 13.


170. Ehrman, Neoconservatism, 134.

171. Ibid, 83, 95.

172. Ibid, 76-80.

173. Ibid.


175. Williams, “Détente and Domestic Politics.”


177. Ibid., 18-25.


179. Henry Kissinger was in the midst of shuttle diplomacy, a term applied to his peace negotiations between the Israelis and Egypt beginning in in late 1973. The Soviets had tried to jointly enforce a cease-fire, but Kissinger had refused the request, ordering a short nuclear alert to back up his rejection. See Gaddis, The Cold War, 204-5. UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim wrote a confidential letter to Kissinger that shows the US Secretary of State was continuing the process largely outside of the United Nations. Waldheim writes, “I have received constant and pressing calls from Ambassador Malik for the activation of the Soviet observers in the Middle East… I have told Ambassador Malik that the agreement that the Soviet Union and the Americans would provide 36 observers each was reached in Washington…I would much appreciate it if the problem could be discussed urgently with Ambassador Dobrynin and the necessary agreement reached.” Letter Kurt Waldheim to Henry Kissinger, CC Mr. Roberto Guyer, Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, and Mr. Anton Prohaska, Box 45, Folder 2, United Nations. Roberto Guyer identified using the following resource: “Interview with: Roberto Guyer,” United Nations Oral History, http://www.unmultimedia.org/oralhistory/2013/01/guyer-roberto/. Anton Prohaska identified using this resource: “Secretary-General Visits China,” United Nations News Media and Photo, http://www.unmultimedia.org/photo/detail.jsp?id=673/67330&key=12&query=coverage:%22China%22&so=0&sf=date.


181. Ibid, 52.


183. Buckley, Journal, 94-95. The bill continued to say that the representatives of the UN should abide by the Secretary of State’s directions “unless other means of transmission is directed by the President.”
185. Ibid, 98
187. Buckley compared his nomination to the UN to Nixon “appoint[ing] his Irish setter as delegate” — it would not have been noticed, “unless it was suspected that he was being put beyond the reach of the Watergate grand jury.” Buckley, Journal, 96-100
188. Ibid, 135-140. Eric Redman wrote in a review of United Nations Journal in The New York Times. He praised Buckley’s writing style but critiqued his stances on human rights. The article argued that human rights were “relativist”: the US should not argue against decreasing democratic freedoms in other countries if doing so achieves social goals. Redman, “Buckley Reports.”
189. Ibid, 252.
190. Philips-Fein, “Conservatism”
191. Judis, Buckley, 357
193. Eckel and Moyn, The Human Rights Breakthrough, 163-165. Reagan said that the US had a mission for “all men and women to share in our tradition of individual human rights and freedom, with government the servant and not the master.”
197. Farber tends to portray conservatism as alarmist and dated. For example: “Taft, cheerful as any mortician, had a hard time saying something positive about most anything. William Buckley did his best to break the conservative mold by smiling a lot and demonstrating that he knew how to have fun. But his essential message was that as long as Americans continued to allow liberals to rule they all were surely going to hell in a hand basket, and deservedly so.” Farber, Modern Conservatism, 160.
198. Buckley admits that the journal was focused very “subjectively.” Buckley, Journal, 253.
199. Ibid, 96-97.

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