During the first half of the twentieth century, Southern senators and representatives were among the most fervent supporters of international organization and cooperation. However, after 1950, the Southern opinion dramatically reversed. The question of what caused this profound aboutface has puzzled historians. By examining the role of race in Southern isolationism and constructing a chronology of the South’s political reversal, Maxwell Ulin ’17 offers one explanation. In his study, Ulin argues that Southern opposition to the United Nations first emerged among politicians, before expanding to the public, as Southerners became worried about the fate of domestic segregation in the increasingly diverse, racially progressive international arena. By examining a wide range of sources, he ultimately demonstrates that Southern opposition to internationalism was primarily motivated by the politics of race, rather than from socioeconomic upheaval.

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“This treaty,” Senator Jeff Sessions declared before the US Senate, “is unnecessary in fact and dangerous to our sovereignty.” The day was December 4, 2012. On that cold winter morning, the junior senator from Alabama had taken to the floor to oppose Treaty Document No. 112-7, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Thirty-five other senators, including all but six members of the Southern delegation, joined him in opposition. “We do not need the United Nations bureaucrats changing [disability law] in our country in the name of worldwide application,” argued Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma. “I do not support…potentially over-zealous international organizations with anti-American biases that infringe upon American sovereignty,” Inhofe concluded. “Let’s do more for the disabled worldwide,” Sessions urged, “but let’s do it without enmeshing our nation into another binding international organization that will cause more grief than benefit.” The Senate’s debate to ratify the UN convention in 2012 served as a reminder of how deeply some Americans, particularly in the South and Midwest, continue to distrust the United Nations.

Yet in the American South, politics surrounding the UN have not always been so hostile. Indeed, throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Southern senators and representatives stood among the strongest supporters of international organization and cooperation. In rallying nationwide support for the League of Nations, for example, President Woodrow Wilson relied heavily upon the help of Southerners in Congress like Carter Glass of Virginia and John Williams of Mississippi. In March of 1920, only Southern Democrats stood overwhelmingly in favor of the League of Nations when it came time for Senate ratification. Moreover, between 1935 and 1945, 99 percent of congressional Southern Democrats supported US participation in the United Nations, the World Bank, and other venues for international cooperation, compared with just 73 percent of Democrats from elsewhere. By these standards, until 1950 the American South had proven the most consistently internationalist region of the country.

Suddenly, however, Southern congressional opinion changed. In 1953, Southern senators began voicing their growing opposition to multilateralism through overwhelming co-sponsorship of the Bricker Amendment, a proposal to limit the President’s treaty-making powers that all but directly challenged American participation in the United Nations. In 1954, Southerners in Congress proved less disposed than their Northern counterparts towards reauthorization of the Mutual Security Act, a foreign aid program meant to continue the efforts of the Marshall Plan. By the late 1950s, Southern representatives were casting considerably fewer votes for measures supporting multinational organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Development Association (IDA), International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), and World Bank than were their non-Southern colleagues. After nearly 40 years of zealous, Wilsonian multilateralism, Southern politicians overturned the region’s foreign policy doctrine in the span of a single presiden-
tial administration.⁵

The Southern bloc’s attitudinal reversal raises a number of questions: what happened to change Southern opinion, and when specifically did that change occur? Did Southern opposition in Congress reflect a shift in regional sentiment generally, or were Southern politicians acting independently of constituent opinion when they reversed their stances? Perhaps most interestingly, what regional concerns and interests prompted the South’s unique foreign policy overhaul?

Scholars have sought to answer these questions over the past half-century, but their accounts offer conflicting causes and chronologies for the South’s isolationist shift. Political scientist Paul Seabury, for example, posits that the South’s wartime industrialization may have weakened sectional interests in free trade and enabled the region’s parochial sentiments to undermine Southern internationalism.⁶ Foreign policy theorist Charles O. Lerche, Jr. points to similar forces of socio-economic change, but argues that isolationism principally emerged as part of a populist reaction to the rapid pace of regional transformation.⁷ By contrast, scholars like Joseph Fry and Alfred O. Hero Jr. assert that Dixie’s anxieties surrounding segregation prompted Southerners to decry the increasingly diverse, racially progressive international arena.⁸ Moreover, writers on this topic disagree as to the specific turning point in Southern opinion; Seabury dates the beginning of the South’s decline in UN support to 1949,⁹ while Lerche and Fry assign the moment to around 1953, and Hero to 1956.¹⁰ Existing scholarship thus paints a confusing picture of potential timelines and causes for the region’s attitudinal shift.

This paper seeks to enhance current understandings of the topic in two ways: first, with the benefit of hindsight, these pages seek to affirm Hero’s and Fry’s causal arguments emphasizing the role of race in Southern isolationism. While both Seabury’s and Lerche’s explanations have merit, both strongly imply predictions for the future of Southern foreign policy that remain unrealized decades later. As current senatorial opposition to UN measures shows, Southern opinion surrounding the United Nations has neither conformed to the national average, as Seabury suggests, nor returned as Lerche predicts to its formerly internationalist tendencies.¹¹ Evidently, reasons for the shift prove more deeply ingrained in the fabric of Southern politics than either Lerche or Seabury suspected. Hero’s and Fry’s attribution to race—long considered the central organizing principle of Southern politics¹²—offers the clearest and most convincing explanation for the region’s lasting foreign policy adjustment.

Second, this paper strives to clarify the chronology of the South’s political reversal. Taken individually, scholars offer fragmented pictures of the South’s foreign policy overhaul; Lerche, Seabury, and Fry analyze Southern elites by tracking votes of the region’s congressional delegation, while Hero centers his analysis on popular opinion polls directed generally at the Southern public. These incomplete studies produce conflicting accounts
of when Southern opinion on the United Nations truly changed. Read together, however, the assembled data reveal a complex, graduated process in the evolution of Southern international opinion. This essay thus seeks to consolidate the work of existing scholarship and paint an even more detailed picture of these developments through the inclusion of newspapers, current events, and constituent correspondence.

Based on a range of materials and research, it appears that Southern opposition the United Nations emerged into two distinct phases: in the first stage, Southern elected officials, activist groups, and other members of the region’s political elite began dissenting from the United Nations as early as 1950, initially in response to the UN Genocide Convention. In the second, broad-based, popular opposition, only emerged in force around 1956-1957, as setbacks to white supremacy both at home and abroad led to a rise in Southern racial sensitivities. Southern politicians’ opposition to UN efforts, therefore, actually presaged their constituents’ general distrust of the organization. At all levels of the opposition movement, however, politicians, activists, and ordinary white Southerners largely came to distrust the United Nations as a result of Southern insecurities surrounding segregation and fears that the enemies of Jim Crow would use the racially diverse international arena to end the Southern way of life. Hence Southern opposition to the United Nations stemmed less from contemporary forces of socio-economic upheaval than from the enduring politics of race.

“A NOBLE BEGINNING”: SOUTHERN INTERNATIONALISM, 1945-1950

In 1945, Southern internationalism waxed triumphant. On April 25th, delegates from across the world met in San Francisco to lay the grounds for a United Nations Organization. The conference, steered principally by Southern leaders like Senator Tom Connally of Texas, produced the United Nations Charter, a constitution that in many ways reflected the original Wilsonian vision at the heart of the failed League of Nations. Given President Wilson’s Virginia heritage and Georgia upbringing, Southerners as a whole championed Wilson as the first president “of Southern blood” since the Civil War and even claimed ownership of the late president’s foreign policy doctrine.13

With national opinion finally behind such an organization after the war, Southern politicians saw the opportunity to realize Wilson’s vision and rectify the isolationist wrongs of the past quarter century.14 “The failure of the League of Nations in the eyes of many people is the fault of this country,” wrote The Houston Post in 1945.15 Had we joined the League of Nations in 1920, Texas’ Longview Daily News argued, “World War II…doubtless would have been avoided.”16 Indeed, as Tennant S. McWilliams notes in his book The New South Faces the World, Southern elites “seemed to rejoice in the possibility that their benighted region had, after all, produced an idea that would rescue the world from itself.”17
As a result, when approval of the UN Charter finally came to a Senate vote on July 28th, 1945, every Southern senator voted in favor of ratification.18

Southern papers heaped praise on the emerging United Nations Charter. “Charter Is a Big Step But Only a Start,” read the front page of The Southern Weekly, a conservative Southern newspaper.19 “The [UN] charter, regardless of its details, can be a ‘solid structure’ upon which to try to build security,” wrote The Shreveport Times from Louisiana that July.20 “[R]atification of the United Nations charter,” penned The Atlanta Constitution days after the Senate vote, “is cause for nationwide gratification.”21 Connally, the architect of the UN Charter, also received praise for his work back home. “[T]here is reason to believe that now and even more so in time we [Texans] shall take greater pride in the part he [Sen. Connally] played at San Francisco,” The Big Spring Daily Herald declared.22 Similarly, The Houston Post deemed Senator Conally’s efforts “a noble beginning.”23 Overall, it seems, the Southern press maintained a positive opinion of the emerging United Nations throughout 1945 and the late forties as a whole.24

Contemporary polling data also reveal that Southern public opinion of the United Nations remained equal to, if not slightly higher than, that of most Americans through the late forties. According to a poll taken in late 1946, 74 percent of Southerners favored maintaining UN permanent headquarters in the United States, compared with 72 percent of Northeasterners, 68 percent of Midwesterners, 65 percent of Plains States residents, 64 percent of those from the Rockies, and 76 percent of Far Westerners.25 Similarly, when UN officials began to seriously consider relocation to Europe in 1948, 68 percent of Southerners considered the potential move a “bad thing,” while only 57 percent of Northeasterners, 63 percent of Midwesterners, and 56 percent of Westerners shared a similar opinion.26

In April of that same year, while less than half of Americans outside the South approved of sending US troops to Palestine as part of a larger UN force, 57 percent of Southerners favored the idea.27 Throughout the late 1940s, Southerners proved just as likely, and in some cases more likely, than other Americans to believe that the United Nations should be strengthened, that the United States should strive to make the United Nations a success, and that the United Nations’ work on the world stage “thus far” had proved satisfactory.28

Regional polling differences prove even more striking when we discount those who registered “no opinion” or “undecided” from the equation. For example, while 69 percent of both Southerners and Northeasterners judged the United Nations to have done a “good” or “fair job” in May of 1946,29 87 percent of Southerners who had a clear opinion thought favorably of the United Nations’ work, compared with just 75 percent of Northeasterners who held a given view. Overall, Southern public opinion in the late forties appears to have been slightly more favorable to the UN than public sentiment elsewhere.

Additionally, constituent letters to senators from this period further demonstrate Southerners’ generally positive views of the United Nations. Among those collected by
various Senate offices around this time, letters received by North Carolina Senator Clyde Roarke Hoey prove particularly instructive. Beginning in July 1947, letters from across North Carolina arrived in concentrated bursts at the Senator’s Washington office and continued throughout the next three and one-half years. Many letters came from churches, women’s clubs, youth groups, and other community organizations representing often hundreds of people. A number of others came from distinguished public figures across North Carolina, including newspaper editors, university officials, and state senators. Virtually all of these letters urged for the expansion of the United Nations’ military authority to form the basis for what they termed “world federation.” As the effort culminated in January 1950, Senator Hoey brought forth to the Senate a petition bearing the names of one hundred and fifty North Carolina public leaders in favor of world federation. Signatories included many of the state’s leading bankers, business owners, university presidents, labor organizers, and local commanders of the American Legion. Also listed were all members of the Governor’s Council of State and other prominent North Carolina politicians—including one “S. J. Ervin, Jr.” of the State Supreme Court. Clearly, North Carolina political activists and public leaders held the United Nations in high regard as the decade began.

At the same time, however, Southerners appeared to harbor major misconceptions about the intended role of the United Nations in world affairs. In particular, most Southerners conceived of the United Nations exclusively as a militarily-focused, peacekeeping organization. Throughout multiple surveys of Southern opinion at mid-century, between 55 and 80 percent of Southerners listed preservation of peace as the United Nations’ central objective, while less than one fifth of those polled ascribed any other objective to the organization. Many in the Southern press reflected this misconception in articles and editorials, as well. As it happened, in the lead up to Senate ratification for the UN Charter in 1945, several Southern newspapers quite tellingly heralded the creation of a “World Security Charter,” including major publications like the Atlanta Constitution.

Indeed, based on constituent correspondence from at least one state, Southern popular support for the United Nations was often explicitly founded upon this assumption. Virtually all of the more than eighty pro-UN letters received by Senator Hoey’s office referred solely to the organization’s peacekeeping responsibilities. “There is strong sentiment in NC for [strengthening the United Nations] as the only means of averting war,” Clarence Walton Johnson of Asheville wrote in July 1947. Phrases like “to prevent war” and “to maintain peace” almost unfailingly followed calls in these letters for a stronger United Nations. In a telegram to Senator Hoey the following year, for example, Thomas W. Hicks called explicitly for “making the United Nations capable of enacting interpreting and enforcing world law to prevent war [sic].” Similarly, Peter Cooper of Salisbury wrote in 1948, “I can see now no other way than a world government of limited powers adequate to prevent war and preserve peace.” While the presence of these security-related phrases
may at first seem unremarkable, they subtly qualify constituents’ support for international organization. Constituents’ failure to reference any other objectives of the United Nations suggests that they might not have even conceived that others existed.

Admittedly, Southern misconceptions surrounding the United Nations were understandable. Having witnessed the destructive effects of two world wars, allied leaders in the 1940s had sought principally to establish the United Nations as an institutional mechanism for preventing conflict. Authors of the UN Charter reflected the primacy of this objective by presenting it first in the preamble’s list of justifications for the UN’s founding. Moreover, leaders in Washington helped affirm popular understanding of UN objectives; having negotiated much of the initial framework for international cooperation in 1944, US Undersecretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr. described the proposed United Nations as “an organization that will make possible…effective international cooperation for peace and security.” Two years later, President Harry S. Truman proved even more forceful in emphasizing the UN’s peacekeeping role, as he declared to the United Nations Conference in San Francisco, “Our sole objective at this gathering is to create the structure…[to] provide the machinery which will make future peace not only possible but certain.” Hence at the close World War II, public discussion of the United Nations focused almost exclusively upon the body’s collective security role, creating an understandable popular conception of the organization as intended for peacekeeping alone.

Critically, however, the United Nations maintained a number of additional organizational goals outside of its role as peacekeeper. In addition to preventing armed conflict, Chapter I, Article 1 of the 1945 Charter commits the United Nations to fostering economic cooperation, as well as to “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” This latter commitment came at the behest of American civil rights groups and various developing nations at the San Francisco Conference, who insisted that the Charter include clear and explicit human rights provisions. Still, the Charter’s “domestic jurisdiction” clause, inserted by Senator Connally and other American negotiators, assured that human rights guarantees within the Charter remained non-binding. The UN Charter’s human rights language proved practically toothless and, as evidenced by the constituent letters, failed to shape early public understanding of either the document or UN objectives. Nonetheless, these provisions would become critical in the formulation of the United Nation’s early policy agenda, placing the newly formed organization on a collision course with white Southerners racial interests.
Within five years of the United Nations’ inception, popular misconceptions of the United Nations became glaringly apparent, as global politics of the postwar period drastically reshaped UN priorities. As the onset of the Cold War polarized international affairs, the United Nations became increasingly incapable of taking decisive military action in conflict zones without the objection of at least one of two opposing powers on the Security Council. This fact robbed the United Nations of its capacity to assume a meaningful peacekeeping role in most Cold War affairs. As a result, UN officials began channeling their energies increasingly towards the advancement the United Nations’ secondary goals, including the promotion of human rights and racial equality. As journalist Earl Conrad presciently wrote in late 1946 for the Chicago Defender, “Matters concerning…Negro Americans and other oppressed minorities have entered the United Nations to stay.” As a result, by shifting its focus towards human rights, the United Nations provoked an increase in global pressure for change upon the South’s racial hierarchy.

By late 1948, official UN actions had entered into direct conflict with Southern racial interests. On December 9 of that year, the UN General Assembly unanimously approved the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The Genocide Convention, as it was otherwise known, declared acts of genocide and mass extermination in violation of international law, and proposed that perpetrators face domestic or international prosecution. Critical to white Southerners, however, was the Convention’s definition of the word “genocide”; under Article II of the Convention, genocide included any act of violence “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Lynchings, commonly committed against blacks throughout the South, would thus qualify as genocide under the convention and lie subject to some form of legal punishment. Since the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution deems any treaty or international agreement “the supreme law of the land,” approval of the Genocide Convention by the US Senate in 1948 would have amounted to the enactment of a federal anti-lynching law, albeit with limited means of enforcement. The Convention thus threatened to dismantle an important tool in the maintenance of white of supremacy, placing the agreement in direct conflict with Southern whites’ racial interests.

Additionally, on December 10, 1948—one day after the General Assembly’s approval of the Genocide Convention—the same UN body voted to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). As with the United Nations Charter, the UDHR declared that all individuals are entitled to basic rights “without distinction of any kind, such as race, color…national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Unlike the UN Charter, however, the UDHR tasked the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights with responsibility for crafting a potentially binding international covenant. With majority control of the UN commission, a coalition of Communist and developing nations overcame US opposition to add detailed enforcement mechanisms to the emerging document. Hence, whereas the founding principles of the UN Charter were unenforceable, equal rights provisions in the UDHR would mandate an immediate end to racial codes if adopted by the United States.

Despite the apparent threat that both treaties posed to segregation, neither the Genocide Convention nor the UDHR received substantial attention from the Southern press. Indeed, most US papers in late 1948 prioritized coverage of other matters of interest during the UN summit, such as Korea’s induction as a member of the General Assembly and Israel’s bid for membership status. In particular, a number of prominent American newspapers, including major Southern publications, focused their UN reporting on the Soviet Union’s anti-western pronouncements. As a consequence, most newspaper outlets sidelined their coverage of both the Genocide Convention and UDHR, leaving the majority Americans, including Southerners, without substantial knowledge of either international treaty. So uninformed were most Americans in this regard that at least one top UN reporter noted his surprise at how little public attention either agreement had aroused in the United States.

While Southerners as a whole remained largely unaware of either treaty’s implications, however, Dixie’s political elite was quickly forced to grapple with UN actions. Since both the Genocide Convention and UDHR required Congressional approval, Southern representatives in Washington found themselves in 1950 opposed to not one but two international agreements sponsored by the United Nations. Both agreements proved more than just contrary to the South’s regional interests; they struck at the heart of white Southerners’ insecurities by threatening to upend the region’s strict racial hierarchy. Wilsonian or otherwise, the United Nations had effectively called for an end to the Southern way of life, a fact that gave at least some Southern legislators pause. “Of course, no one considered when they voted to ratify the United Nations Charter that they were doing anything that would upset our domestic laws,” Senator James O. Eastland of Mississippi wrote to a concerned constituent in 1950. Ironically, the very organization they had once championed posed a direct threat to their greatest domestic concern.

Moreover, as a forum for international debate, the United Nations quickly became a source for vocal criticism against Southern discrimination in the postwar period. Encouraged by UN discussions of racial oppression in South Africa and elsewhere, African-American civil rights groups joined forces with Communist and non-aligned UN member states to highlight the injustices of Jim Crow and segregation. In October 1947, the NAACP filed a petition dubbed An Appeal to the World to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The petition, written by W.E.B. Du Bois and publicly presented by the Soviet
DIXIE TURNS WITHIN

Union, boldly declared:

It is not Russia that threatens the United States so much as Mississippi; not Stalin and Molotov but Bilbo and Rankin; internal injustice done to one's brothers is far more dangerous than the aggression of strangers abroad.61

In 1951, just three years after UN adoption of the Genocide Convention, the Communist Civil Rights Congress (CRC) offered up a petition to the United Nations, alleging that the treatment of African Americans in the South effectively amounted to genocide. Amounting to a lengthy treatise, the CRC's petition detailed 153 killings and 344 other violent crimes committed against African Americans in the United States over the preceding six years.62 “[H]istory has shown that the racist theory of government of the USA. is not the private affair of Americans but the concern of mankind everywhere,” the document concluded.63 These cases served, among others, to publicly castigate Southern states for their overtly discriminatory policies, and to expose their injustices to the international community.

UN condemnation of Jim Crow endangered American foreign policy interests, as US officials sought to navigate the delicate terrain of early Cold War diplomacy. As Europe's overseas empires collapsed in the wake of World War II, a new class of non-white, developing nations emerged to play a crucial role in power struggles between the US and Soviet Union. Between 1941 and 1950, 17 such nations had either declared or won independence from their former colonizers, and by 1951, 35 majority non-white nations had become members of the UN General Assembly.64 These so-called “Third World” nations viewed contests between the two superpowers in terms of their own racial and anti-colonial interests. Consequently, as both American and Soviet leaders sought allies throughout the developing world, racial injustice in the American South could often sway non-white nations’ diplomatic allegiances more than either superpower's economic ideology.65

Moreover, seizing the opportunity, the Soviet Union began casting itself in contrast with the United States as the defender of racial egalitarianism. As one State Department report on the United Nations indicated, “The division of opinion on many issues…has sometimes tended to follow a color line, white against non-whites, with Russia seeking to be recognized as the champion of non-whites.”66 As a result, repeated criticism and exposure of Southern racial codes at the United Nations and other international fora transformed segregation from a domestic problem into a full-blown national security concern. “Finally,” wrote one black reporter to W.E.B. Du Bois in 1947, “we are beginning to see that America can be answerable to the family of nations for its injustices to the Negro minority.”67 For perhaps the first time in history, the United States faced considerable international pressure to right the country's racial wrongs, and the matter took on a heightened sense of importance.

Furthermore, existing US treaties with the United Nations threatened to offer a
new means of dismantling Jim Crow through domestic litigation. The Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution specifically stipulates that treaties ratified by the US Senate bear the full force of federal law. As a result, ratification of the UN Charter created opportunities for civil rights groups to challenge Southern racial codes as violations of the treaty. While the Charter’s equal rights provisions were explicitly non-binding, that did not stop civil rights groups and activist judges from attempting to use them to their advantage. In October 1947, for example, the NAACP asked the American Association for the United Nations (AAUN) to file an amicus curiae brief in two civil rights cases before the Supreme Court. Both suits, eventually consolidated into one landmark case known as Shelley v. Kraemer, involved the use of so-called restrictive covenants to keep blacks out of residential neighborhoods, and the NAACP sought to argue that these evictions constituted a violation of the UN Charter’s human rights provision.

While the AAUN ultimately rejected the NAACP’s argument, another effort at litigation proved initially successful. In April 1950, a three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals unanimously ruled in the case of Fuji v. California that the UN Charter invalidated California’s Alien Land Law. In his opinion, Judge Emmet J. Wilson argued that by explicitly preventing Japanese Americans from owning California property, the state’s Alien Land Law stood in direct violation of the UN Charter, which called on member state to guarantee basic rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” While the state Supreme Court invalidated Wilson’s ruling two years later, the case demonstrated how liberal judges might interpret the UN Charter to upend de jure segregation. At least one constituent took note; in a letter to Senator Eastland, Dr. J.A. Rayburn of Pontotoc, Mississippi, attached a newspaper clipping on the Fuji case. “My son John Jr. has just handed me the enclosed,” Rayburn wrote. “It looks dangerous to me. What are we coming to in this country?” Writing back, Senator Eastland agreed: “[T]he lower court’s decision will have been helpful in revealing how dangerous these treaties actually are and how we must be on guard constantly about their ratification.”

Put simply, the United Nations proved a far different organization in its first six years of existence than the one white Southerners had originally envisioned. At the signing of the UN Charter in 1945, white Southerners viewed the resulting organization as the realization of Wilson’s internationalist ideals; while the Charter may have included some seemingly inconsequential language on human rights, they expected the organization to function as a world peacekeeping force alone. Moreover, Southern politicians likely envisioned that UN member states would principally include white imperialist powers of pre-war era, just as the League of Nations had. What they got instead was an increasingly racially diverse organization with a strong commitment to promoting human rights and racial equality. Indeed, the United Nations’ egalitarian principles proved not just a nuisance but a threat to Jim Crow and racial segregation, policies that provided the foundations
for white supremacy and Southern society generally. Given all of the unanticipated consequences of UN ratification, Southern politicians might have understandably exhibited buyer’s remorse.

“A THREAT TO OUR WAY OF LIFE”: THE RISE OF ELITE OPPOSITION, 1950-55

Early signs of elite Southern opposition to UN emerged in 1950, as the Senate took up consideration of the UN Genocide Convention. As chair of the upper chamber’s Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Tom Connally of Texas managed to indefinitely stall efforts to bring the Convention up for a vote. Nevertheless, members of the Senate’s Southern Democratic Caucus took to the floor that year in protest of potential treaty ratification. In February, for example, Senators James Eastland and John Stennis of Mississippi jointly inserted testimony into congressional record to urge rejection of the Genocide Convention. “[The] United Nations Genocide Convention…if ratified, would compromise our system of constitutional government,” read the inserted letter.75 In May of that same year, Senator Clyde R. Hoey spoke in opposition to the Convention; “I cannot conceive of the Senate adopting this treaty in its present form,” North Carolina’s senior senator declared. “The American people are not willing to surrender [their policing authority]…under the pretense of preventing mass murders.”76 Had the UN Convention somehow made its way to the Senate floor, numerous other Southern senators would have undoubtedly spoken out in opposition.

At the same time, senatorial constituent letters began reflecting a marked shift in opinion. After pro-UN organizers sent their culminating petition to Senator Hoey’s office in January, for example, constituent letters being sent to Hoey on UN matters ceased entirely. This hiatus of sorts lasted until February 1951, when a letter arrived from Senator Irving E. Carlyle of the North Carolina General Assembly. While unrelated to federal legislation, Carlyle’s letter discusses a state General Assembly resolution passed two years earlier to allow federal officials to negotiate the formation of world government through the United Nations. In both tone and content, Senator Carlyle’s letter proves highly telling:

Dear Senator Hoey:
You are familiar with the Resolution adopted by the 1949 General Assembly of this State intended to strengthen the United Nations. This week, a Resolution has been introduced and is now pending before the Senate, to repeal this 1949 Resolution…Those of us who believe in the strengthening of world law and who are opposed to isolationism…would appreciate it very much…if you could write a letter to be used before the Committee…expressing your support for the 1949 Resolution.77
In its context, Carlyle’s letter demonstrates a marked shift in the political climate of North Carolina. Whereas in 1950, constituents had been writing in overwhelming numbers for Washington to expand UN authority, by 1951, supporters of a stronger UN were playing defense back home. The exchange thus reveals that anti-UN sentiment had increased among North Carolina legislators during this time, and that the observed shift occurred sometime around 1950.

That year, two consequential events transpired that might have influenced public opinion of the United Nations: Senate deliberations on the UN Genocide Convention and US intervention in the Korean War. While events during Korean War negatively impacted Americans’ views of the United Nations, polls showed that opinion only declined after Communist China’s entry into the conflict in December 1950,78 about ten months after Hoey’s office stopped receiving letters in support of UN Senatorial consideration of the Genocide Convention, however, began just four days after Hoey’s office received the culminating petition letter. Hence debate over the Genocide Convention appears to have proved critical in scuttling North Carolinian support for expanded UN powers.

Opposition to the Genocide Convention, however, marked just the beginning. As it happened, Southern congressional hostility to the United Nations emerged in full force in early 1953 as the Senate took up consideration of a new, radical piece of legislation. S.J. Res. 1, the third installment of what papers dubbed “the Bricker Amendment,” entered Congress on January 3rd of that year. The bill’s sponsor, Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio, was a freshman senator with little political clout and a long-running isolationist streak. His amendment, inspired by former American Bar Association President Frank Holman of Utah, proposed a radical shift in American diplomatic power by severely limiting the President’s treaty-making authority. Under Bricker’s proposal, treaties could alter domestic law “only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.” In addition, Congress would be empowered “to regulate all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international organization.”79 The passage S.J. Res. 1 proposed a seismic shift in diplomatic authority by seeking to place severe constraints upon US engagement in international compacts.

The Bricker Amendment principally emerged from both racial and constitutional concerns regarding the UN Genocide Convention and UDHR. Indeed, as debate over the amendment raged throughout the early 1950s, the amendment’s anti-UN objectives became less speculation than accepted public knowledge. In April 1953, for example, The New York Times described the bill as “directed particularly against the United Nations covenants on genocide (mass murder), humans rights, and women’s rights.”80 In February of the following year, Gordon B. Hancock, a prominent African-American journalist, wrote for the Negro Associated Press, “The object of the Bricker Amendment is to free the United States from any limitations from the UN which might restrain this country in its anti-
Negro attitudes.”81 However amendment supporters may have sought to portray Bricker’s proposal as a matter of high-minded constitutionalism, the bill’s underlying, racially conservative agenda proved clear.

Joining with a large cohort of isolationist Republicans, much of the Senate’s Southern bloc co-sponsored the Bricker proposal. This group included important Southern foreign policy leaders such as Richard Russell, chair the Southern Democratic Caucus and later architect of the segregationist Southern Manifesto. Russell’s senior counterpart, Walter George, so ardently supported Bricker’s proposals that he introduced a bill of his own with even stronger constraints on the treaty-making power. In a telling statement, Georgia’s foreign policy giant remarked of the Southern bloc, “Many of our people are fearful and suspicious of the way the treaty-making power...ha[s] recently been used.”82

Meanwhile, throughout senatorial debate on the Bricker Amendment, hundreds of constituent letters began flooding the offices of Southern senators in support of the resolution. As was the case during the early period, a remarkable number of these letters came from what might be called the South’s socio-economic elite – lawyers, business owners, local politicians, and even descendants of the region’s plantation aristocracy. Unlike earlier correspondence, however, these messages demonstrated an increasingly anti-UN sentiment. In January 1953, for example, V. H. Torrey, Jr. of Vicksburg, Mississippi, wrote that he supported Senator Eastland’s sponsorship of the Bricker Amendment, claiming that the resolution would protect American rights from “efforts to destroy them through means of covenants and treaties under the United Nations.”83 Another Mississippi letter read, “[Government by treaty] is still a serious threat to our way of life...In my opinion this generation is not ready for an international government.”84 Writing to Senator Richard Russell, E.F. Avery of Wildwood, Georgia, complained, “The United Nations looks like the Divided Nations to me...Why don’t we use our own tax money to develop our own underdeveloped areas here in the United States?”85 Clearly, just as Southern congressional opinion of the United Nations had shifted over the previous two years, so, too, had those of senators’ most activist constituents.

Because these letters represented the views of only a small subset of Southern voters, however, constituent correspondence alone presented a skewed picture of Dixie’s general foreign policy outlook. In reality, survey data suggest that most non-elite Southerners continued to harbor comparatively positive opinions of the United Nations throughout the early 1950s. As debate over the Bricker Amendment raged in 1953, for example, polls revealed that most Southerners disagreed with the statement that the United Nations was “too powerful in world affairs” and felt the organization had “justified its existence.”86 When asked in April 1954 if the United Nation made it “harder for us to do the things we’ve wanted to do in the world,” Southerners proved about as likely as Northerners of the same race to say that it had made US objectives easier.87 In July of that year, an AIPO poll
indicated that 78 percent of Southerners approved of the United Nations, compared with 73 percent of Northeasterners, 77 percent of Midwesterners, and 80 percent of Westerners. Hence while Southern politicians’ foreign policy views changed rapidly in the early fifties, Southerners back home maintained relatively positive opinions of the UN not much different from before.

Southern popular opinion as whole, however, apparently did little to shape the votes of Dixie’s representatives in Washington. On February 26, 1954, 18 out of 22 US Senators from the former Confederacy voted in favor of the Bricker Amendment. Of the eight Southern senators still in office who had voted to ratify the UN Charter in 1945, only two, William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) and Lister Hill (D-Alabama), opposed Senator Bricker’s attempt to effectively scale back the powers of that organization. Moreover, while over 85 percent of the Southern bloc voted for S. J. Res. 1, the Senate as a whole fell just short of the two-thirds— or 66 percent— needed to approve the proposed constitutional amendment. Southern support for Bricker thus substantially surpassed the senatorial average, with Southerners a full 25 percent more likely to have voted for the amendment than their non-Southern colleagues. Hence the South not only voted to effectively undermine the organization it had helped to create but did so in higher numbers than other regional blocs. As Joseph Fry concludes in his book Dixie Looks Abroad, “this vote demonstrated the region’s overwhelming rejection of any international involvement or influences that impinged on Southern race relations.”

Following the failure of S. J. Res. 1, Southern congressional support for the United Nations and other multilateral commitments fell further. From 1954 onwards, House and Senate roll call votes reflected increasing levels of Southern opposition to American participation in UN affiliates such as the IMF, IDA, IAEA and World Bank. Moreover, growing Southern animosity towards the United Nations appears to have impacted regional opinion of multilateral organizations generally. In 1950, 88 percent of Southern congressmen voted to support monetary contributions for international organizations, compared to just 63 percent of House members from elsewhere. By the time Congress revisited the issue in 1957, however, 62 percent of the Southern bloc voted to substantially cut those same international contributions, while only 39 percent of non-Southerners voted to do so. Southern support in the US House for the Mutual Security Program, having stood at around 87 percent in 1949, dropped precipitously in votes thereafter to a low of 41 percent in 1957, just as non-Southerner support for the program rose from 60 to 70 percent. By the end of the decade, only a small minority of Southerners in Congress continued to support international organization and cooperation outside of an explicitly military sphere.

While the rise of Southern congressional isolationism during this period may have stemmed in small part from membership turnover, many of these anti-multilateralist votes came from the very Southern senators and congressmen who had faithfully supported in-
ternational organizations in the early 1950s. Of the 58 Southern congressmen who voted in 1959 to cut contributions to international organizations, 15 had previously voted in favor of those payments nine years earlier. Similarly, 45 Southern US House members who had supported to original Mutual Security Act of 1949 opposed reauthorization within at least a decade. Shifts in Southern congressional opinion thus resulted not only from changes in the delegation itself but from a substantial policy reversal among older members.

Close examinations of these votes further suggest racial incentives behind the Southern bloc’s foreign policy reversal. For example, demographic studies of 1950s congressional districts reveal that the higher the African-American population of a given Southern district, the more likely its representatives were to oppose multilateral groups like the United Nations between 1953 and 1961. This phenomenon likely reflected the particularly acute racial insecurities of these areas, as white fears of both the collapse of Jim Crow and black enfranchisement proved especially severe where African Americans were numerous. Moreover, Southern congressional hostility to international organizations rose in concert with sectional opposition to foreign aid spending, particularly when intended for the few non-white, Third World nations emerging at this time. The fact that Southern opposition to the United Nations coincided with what were clearly racially-based foreign policy positions on foreign aid suggests how changes in Southern foreign policy as a whole during this time derived from domestic racial concerns.

Furthermore, even after deliberations on the Bricker Amendment, scores of anti-UN letters continued to flood Southern senatorial offices throughout the late 1950s. In a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond, for example, Ruth A. Myers of Summerville, South Carolina, urged the famed segregationist to support a renewed Bricker Amendment, declaring, “We don’t want the UN to have the power to change our way of living, which it has now.” From Clarksdale, Mississippi, Maggie R. Sample lamented in a 1959 message to Senator Stennis, “The United States is no longer master of its own foreign policy... We have put ourselves in the hands of the United Nations.” “[A]s an organization with power above our Constitution it [the UN] is no good,” Lucille Windham of Macon, Georgia, wrote in May 1955. “The American people are tired of being governed by...treaties to satisfy foreign governments.” Those most moved to write on UN matters, therefore, appeared to harbor far lower opinions of the organization and multilateralism generally than did constituent writers five years earlier.

As with Dixie’s congressional delegation, letters from the South disapproving of the UN often reflected underlying racist or xenophobic sentiments. While only a few letters proved overtly racist, many writers employed racially charged language to justify their positions. Indeed, phrases like “states’ rights,” “our heritage,” and “our way of life” used in several letters had long served as code for white Southerners in their defense of Jim Crow
and racial segregation.

Adding to these indicators, roughly half of the letters sent to Southern Senators came from members of highly conservative or nativist organizations, such as Daughters of America and the American Legion. Of these groups, by far the most active was Daughters of the American Revolution (D.A.R.), a group with a longstanding history of overt rac-

ism. In April 1953, D.A.R. National Defense Chairman Mrs. Bruce D. Reynolds tell-
ingly explained the group’s opposition to the United Nations, declaring that the United Nations “has caused unrest [and] discontent by preaching equality to peoples centuries apart economically, culturally, and militarily.” Racial prejudice and anxieties thus lay at the heart of UN hostility in these constituent letters, reflecting the organization’s grow-
ing connection to American racial politics. These constituent letters, however, reflected the opinions of only a fraction of the Southern public, drawing most from the ranks of Dixie’s highly informed political elite.

At the popular level, however, polling data suggest that broad-based Southern opinion looked favorably upon the United Nations until the late 1950s. Between 1946 and 1956, for example, polling on UN performance throughout the South yielded relatively consistent results, with Southerners at least as likely as Northerners to respond that they were satisfied with the organization’s work “so far.” Throughout this same period, as well, clear majorities of Southerners consistently supported establishing a United Na-
tions police force. Through the mid-1950s, therefore, Southerners generally maintained more positive views of UN affairs than did their own representatives in Washington.

“KEEP THEM OUT”: THE LOSS OF POPULAR SUPPORT, 1956-1960

Southern popular opinion of United Nations only began to shift around 1956, several years after the Southern congressional bloc had begun withdrawing their support for the organization. Whereas Southerners had been less apt to disapprove of the United Nations than had other Americans in 1954, for example, they proved more inclined than all but Westerners to do so in late 1957. Similarly, while most polls in the early period showed that Southerners believed “that it was important for us to make the UN a success” in numbers at least equal to those in the rest of the country, by late 1960, only 77 percent of Southerners thought so, compared with 86 percent of non-Southerners.

Despite the difference in timing, Southern popular hostility to the United Nations exhibited racially charged sentiments similar to those demonstrated earlier by Southern politicos. Critically, growing divisions among Southerners on foreign policy questions came to mirror differences in racial views. Before the late 1950s, only small differences in international opinion existed between racially conservative and liberal Southerners, and members of both groups proved equally inclined to support the United Nations.
1956, however, Southern segregationists and conservative newspapers exhibited greater hostility towards international cooperation than did their more racially liberal counterparts.\textsuperscript{110} In 1956, two NORC polls found that Southern segregationists were about 50 percent more inclined than integrationists to favor termination of US membership in the United Nations.\textsuperscript{111} By and large, racist Southerners preferred to rely on America’s European and Western allies than through the United Nations, which had supposedly become dominated by a Communist, anti-United States coalition.

This racialized foreign policy dogma reflected a broader increase in Southern racial anxieties towards the end of the 1950s, as events both at home and abroad threatened to upend Southern whites’ conception of racial hierarchy. At home, the US Supreme Court issued a series of crippling blows to school segregation, most notably in 1954 with \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} and then the following year with \textit{Brown II}. These rulings placed segregationists on the defensive and engendered a greater sense of urgency among white Southerners to protect Jim Crow.\textsuperscript{112} At the same time, global developments of the late 1950s marked the relative decline of white hegemony abroad, as numerous African nations began winning colonial independence after decades of European rule. Soon, many of these new countries began seeking official UN membership status, arousing deep discomfort among many racially conservative Southerners. “[O]nly qualified nations with stabalized [sic] experience, sound political and financial government [should] be admitted to the United Nations,” one Mississippian wrote to Senator Stennis in 1960. “None of the new African tribe governments meet these qualifications. Keep them out [of] UN and United States out of Africa if we expect to remain free and solvent.”\textsuperscript{113} As Dixie’s racial insecurities intensified, white Southerners increasingly began to equate pro-UN internationalism with racial liberalism.\textsuperscript{114} One segregationist interviewed in 1960 on world affairs summed up Southern resistance to engagement with non-Western countries:

> We feed these people and they don’t like our ways. We don’t like theirs either, and we will let them be if they will reciprocate. But they want to run our private affairs and rewrite our Constitution when they are unable to run their own intelligently.\textsuperscript{115}

Clearly, many white Southerners resented the hostility of non-white UN member states to Southern racial codes, as well as the increasing racial diversity of the United Nations in general. Thus, by the close of the 1950s, Southern international opinion as a whole finally caught up with that of Washington’s Southern bloc, but not until after several years of an unusual policy disconnect.
A REVOLUTION IN REVERSE: EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCIES IN SOUTHERN OPINION

Given the prolonged discrepancy between elite and popular opinion, it may seem as if Southern opposition to the United Nations developed in a politically backwards order. After all, it is intuitive to believe that politicians would reflect—not precede—changes in home state opinion. Lerche regards this as a safe assumption,¹¹⁶ and indeed, substantial research over the years seemingly validates the representation argument.¹¹⁷ When it comes to the United Nations, however, Southern shifts in opinion pose serious challenges to this assumption, as politicians and regional activists turned against the organization before the majority of constituents.

In the end, the historical uniqueness of Southern politics offers arguably the most plausible explanation for the observed enigma. Throughout much of Southern history, structural forces produced a decidedly elitist bent to the region's politics. At one level, poll taxes, the white primary, and other suffrage requirements throughout the South limited electoral participation. At another, Democratic Party dominance of the region robbed Southerners of viable political alternatives that could provide mechanisms of accountability for politicians.¹¹⁸ Moreover, even among eligible voters, a combination of disinterest and lack of information produced stunningly low rates of voter turnout.¹¹⁹ All of these factors served to enhance the influence of wealthy, educated elites at the expense of ordinary Southerners.¹²⁰ As historians Numan V. Bartley and V.O. Key, Jr. note, rural elites from areas of heavy black populations repeatedly employed these advantages to seize control over the direction of Southern politics.¹²¹ It would thus seem unsurprising if a similar group of elite activists guided the direction of Southern foreign policy during this time.

Additionally, Southerners’ comparative lack of political knowledge—particularly on foreign affairs—likely worked to produce initial difference between elite and mass opinion.¹²² With regard to the United Nations, Southerners as whole tended to be far less informed on UN activities than did Northerners.¹²³ In 1955, for example, only 19 percent of Southerners compared with 34 percent of Northerners had ever heard of UNESCO, and an even smaller ratio of Southerners of than of Northerners who had heard of it could articulate a rough description of its purposes.¹²⁴ Lack of popular awareness in the South on UN issues likely produced profound information asymmetry between elites and the ordinary Southerners. As the United Nations shifted focus rapidly during this time, it follows that information gaps would produce differences in elite and mass opinion.

With these facts in mind, a clear picture emerges to describe the staggered decline of Southern support for the international system. Throughout the early 1950s, many racially conservative Southerners remained unaware of the United Nation’s shift to promote
racial equality, and thus maintained positive views of the organization. At the same time, Southern political elites—a group particularly disposed towards writing letters to their representatives—responded more immediately to UN efforts with a growing hostility to the organization. Just as they had guided Southern politics on numerous occasions before, activist elites drove Dixie’s elected officials to adopt anti-UN positions in the early 1950s, a period when most Southerners retained favorable views of the United Nations. Hence Southern opinion split in the wake of racially progressive UN measures until the latter half of the decade, at which point the Southern public became more generally aware of UN actions. It is thus clear that positional shifts among Southern politicians presaged larger changes in regional opinion, and that Southern racial concerns provided at all levels the primary impetus for change.

THE TURN WITHIN: IMPLICATIONS AND AN ENDURING PAST

Fifteen years after ratification of the UN Charter, Dixie’s foreign policy doctrine had reversed itself entirely. Once the nation’s most outspokenly internationalist regional bloc, by 1959, Southerners had come to antagonize the very international system they helped to create. This drastic behavioral shift occurred within an unusually brief span of time, lasting fifteen years at most, and shaped course of American foreign policy in lasting ways. Stages within this change revealed profound information asymmetries between wealthy and ordinary Southerners and reflected a repeated theme in the region’s history—namely, the outsized influence of conservative elites upon Dixie’s elected representatives. Most importantly, events from this period show that Southern opposition to the United Nations did not emerge from the region’s economic upheaval, parochial culture, or any unique conception of sovereignty. Rather, Dixie’s unilateralist foreign policy derived from Southern whites’ own quest to maintain segregation and racial hierarchy at all costs. Seen through the lens of Jim Crow, it appears that the United Nations fell victim to the South’s racial insecurities. Viewed more broadly, the South’s mid-century foreign policy overhaul reflected a consistent theme in international history—namely that political constituencies in general interpret international affairs through a distinctly domestic lens.

In another sense, the rise of Southern hostility to the United Nations reflected the dawn of a new international era. For the first time in over three hundred years, the armies of Europe and the West receded across the globe throughout the postwar period. As Europe’s aged empires collapsed, so did the notion that Western civilization—and, by extension, the white race that formed it—was inherently superior to the darker-skinned peoples it dominated. In place of these colonial powers, non-white, Third World nations began for the first time in generations to govern themselves. As these new developing countries occu-
pied an increasing number of seats in the UN General Assembly, the darkening complexion of the United Nations appeared a sign of things to come. Given the pressure placed upon American white supremacists by the United Nations and its members, the end of Southern segregation can be seen as part of a much larger narrative, namely the global collapse of white supremacy. As white Southerners watched the world shift rapidly against their way of life, it only made sense that they should respond in kind. In this context, the abrupt fall of Southern internationalism proves highly understandable.

“The clerk will call the role,” Senator Chris Coons solemnly declared from atop the president’s desk. As the acting president pro tempore on December 4, 2012, the young Democratic Senator from Delaware bore witness throughout the day as progressives had grown increasingly despondent. By this point, members of the Senate’s internationalist wing were resigning themselves to the inevitable: the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was, quite amazingly, about to fail. Over the course of that winter day, it became increasingly clear that the 67 votes needed for passage were simply nowhere to be found, and that a coalition of Southern and Midwestern Republicans stood poised to successfully stonewall the treaty. Ultimately, the Convention failed by six votes, effectively undermining US participation in a non-binding task force to advance global disability rights. “I said off the floor that this was a shameful day for the Senate, and I meant it,” Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa spat. Many observers were equally shocked. How, they wondered, could so many United States Senators oppose a measure so simple and so benign? As Senate business drew to a close, however, and as Southern opponents of the treaty left the chamber triumphant, ghosts of the South’s enduring past trailed close behind them.

NOTES

1. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this paper employs Julius Turner’s definition of the “the South.” Turner defines the term to include all eleven states of the former Confederacy plus Oklahoma, which as a territory remained under Southern control throughout most of the Civil War. See Julius Turner, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1951), 131.


4. Ibid., 9.


12. To quote from V.O. Key, Jr.'s seminal work on Southern politics, “In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro. It is at times interpreted as the politics of cotton, as a politics of free trade, as a politics of agrarian poverty, or as a politics of planter and plutocrats…in the last analysis…[w]hatever phase of the Southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro.” See *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949), 5. Key’s emphasis on the primacy of race in Southern political life runs throughout his work on the topic and informs much of modern scholarship on the issue to this day.


28. AIPO 412 2/4/48 (3,185); NORC 157 and NORC 164 3/3/49 (1,300); NORC 143, 6/21/46 (1,307); NORC 243, 8/21/46 (1,286); AIPO 384; AIPO 386, 12/11/46; NORC 154, 12/4/47 (1,293); NORC 155, 2/25/48 (1,271); AIPO 417, 4/21/48 (3,165); NORC 160, 7/30/48 (1,300); AIPO 435, 1/5/49 (3,112); NORC 164, 3/3/49 (1,300); NORC 165, 4/19/49 (1,300); NORC 167, 6/30/49 (1,284); and NORC 171, 11/11/49 (1,300): cited in Hero, *The Southerner and World Affairs*, 230.

30. Granted, a number of developments in North Carolina made the state uniquely disposed towards the United Nations. As one of the boyhood homes of Woodrow Wilson, North Carolina took particular pride in Wilson’s accomplishments as president. Hence, many North Carolinians remained especially committed to the late president’s internationalist ideals. In 1937, political scientists at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill formed the Southern Council on International Relations. The group served to promote Wilsonian internationalism throughout the Southeast and translate much those ideals into support for US involvement in World War II. In 1941, North Carolina’s General Assembly became the first legislative body in history to endorse the profoundly internationalist principles of world government. Indeed, United World Federalists first emerged from a convention of world government supporters in Asheville, North Carolina. Nonetheless, relative shifts in support for the UN among North Carolinians may well prove illustrative of fluctuations in sentiment across the South.

31. To offer an example, in April 1948, Pastor George W. Blount of the West Burlington Methodist Church submitted a world government petition with over 57 signatures. “We have five hundred members,” Blount wrote. “Not all of them have had the opportunity to sign this, but I feel that all would do so. These people feel…that a world government…is our only hope for preserving peace.” See 22 April 1948, Ibid., Box 184. Blount’s letter is but one of several letters representing large numbers of North Carolinians that cannot possibly be included in the space here.

32. 17 January 1950, petition, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 184, David M. Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Durham. “S. J. Ervin, Jr.” clearly refers to future United States Senator Samuel J. Ervin, who was serving on the North Carolina Supreme Court at the time of this petition. Senator Ervin would prove a staunch opponent of the UN actions generally.


35. 10 July 1947, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 184.
36. Telegram, March 1948, Ibid.
37. 13 February 1948, Ibid.


50. US Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

51. In initial negotiations over the Genocide Convention, US State Department officials successfully lobbied for language to limit significantly the scope and impact of the proposed treaty. While void of clear enforcement, however, Southern politicians still viewed the agreement as a potential justification for federal prosecution of lynching cases. See Brucken, *A Most Uncertain Crusade*, 171-9, and Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992), 129.


55. See *Augusta Chronicle* (Augusta, GA), December 9, 1948, and *Dallas Morning News* (Dallas, TX), December 10, 1948. On December 9th the Chronicle included a front-page story on Korea's induction into the UN while making no reference to the Genocide Convention's upcoming vote that afternoon. Similarly, on the following day, *Dallas Morning News* prioritized coverage of Israel's UN membership bid over passage of the Genocide Convention, which received only passing mention in the subsection of a larger page-two article.


59. W. E. B. Du Bois first suggested the idea of a UN petition to the NAACP’s UN representative in a memorandum from late September 1946. In it, Du Bois notes, “The necessity of a document of this sort is emphasized by the fact that other groups of people, notably the Indians of South Africa, the Jews of Palestine, the Indonesians and others are making similar petitions.” See Papers of the NAACP, Part 14: Race Relations in the International Arena, 1940-1955, Group II, Series A, General Office File, United Nations, fol. 001439-014-0361. Also see Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire*, 85 for further background on how other international racial justice campaigns influenced black civil rights groups.


63. Civil Rights Congress, *We Charge Genocide*, xi, found in Ibid., 64.

64. “Chapter I: Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice,”


68. US Const. art. VI, cl. 2.


72. Ibid.


74. Letter to J.A. Rayburn, 30 April 1950, Ibid.


76. May 1950, Clyde Roarke Hoey Papers, Box 211, “The UN Genocide Treaty, 1950.”

77. 14 February 1951, issue correspondence, Ibid.

78. At first, joint US-UN operations in Korea proved effective at combating the southward aggression of communist forces under Kim Il-Sung. Under the leadership of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, allied troops managed to repel Kim’s army and even push Northern forces to the Chinese boarder. As Chinese forces entered the conflict and began making headway in against US troops, however, many Americans felt that other members of the United Nations had not contributed sufficiently to aid the coalition force. Polls inquiring on American satisfaction with the United Nations before and after Communist China’s entry into the conflict reveal a significant decline in public opinion for the organization nationwide. See NORC 288, 9/20/50 (1,254), and NORC 295, 12/28/50 (1,258), cited in Hero, *The Southerner and World Affairs*, 232.


84. C.E. Morgan to Senator James O. Eastland, 18 April 1953, ser. 3, subser. 1, Box 84 Eastland
DIXIE TURNS WITHIN


89. 100 Cong Rec S 2374-75 (1954).

90. 244.


92. See “International Organizations Contributions (H. J. Res. 334). Passage of bill,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 6 (December 13, 1950), 262-3; and “Gross (R Iowa) amendment to cut an additional $7,039,958 from the funds provided for United States contributions to international organizations: House Roll Vote No. 30,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13 (April 17, 1957), 338-9.


95. A map of this change reveals a relatively even distribution across the former Confederacy. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac 6, 262-3; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13, 338-9.

96. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac 5, 426-7; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 7, 262-3; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 9, 252-3; Congressional Quarterly Almanac 11; and Congressional Quarterly Almanac 13 (358-9).

97. Ibid., 430. It is important to note that before the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Southern voting laws significantly restricted black access to the franchise, such that even in black-majority congressional districts, Southern whites continued to dominate electoral politics and elect white representatives to Congress. Counterintuitively, therefore, districts with large African-American populations tended throughout the early twentieth century to elect the most racially conservative members of the Southern congressional bloc.

98. Ibid., 398, 419, & 430.

99. Ruth A. Myers to Senator Strom Thurmond, 29 April 1955, , Correspondence Series, Box 14, fol. 157, Strom Thurmond Collection, Clemson University Library.

100. 15 January 1959, File Series 2, Subseries: Passports, Visas, Peace Corps and UN, Box 5, fol. 47, John Stennis Collection, Mississippi State University Library.


the-american-revolution-more-black-members.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. The D.A.R. maintained a long record of excluding blacks members. The organization’s racial views proved so backward that Eleanor Roosevelt renounced her membership.


104. NORC 143; NORC 243; AIPO 384; AIPO 386; NORC 164; NORC 155; AIPO 417; NORC 160; AIPO 435; NORC 164; NORC 165; NORC 167; NORC 307, 5/24/51 (1,282); NORC 314, 11/22/51 (1,237); NORC 325, 5/28/52 (1,262); NORC 341-2, 6/30/53 (1,291); NORC 347, 8/21/53; NORC 337, 2/11/53 (1,291); NORC 351, 1/21/54 (1,300); NORC 374, 8/4/55 (526); NORC 386, 4/20/56 (1,226); and NORC 339, 11/15/56 (1,286): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 230.

105. NORC 155; NORC 157; NORC 158, 6/2/48 (1,295); NORC 162, 11/23/48 (1,300); AIPO 462, 9/29/50 (1,500); NORC 307, 5/24/51 (1,282); AIPO 517, 7/2/53 (1,545); AIPO 574, 11/7/56 (1,505); and AIPO release of 11/18/56: cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 229.


108. AIPO 637, 10/18/60 (2,993): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 238.

109. In 1946, for example, college-educated white Southerners who said that blacks were inherently less intelligent and who opposed Truman's civil rights program proved about as likely as racial progressives to believe in strengthening the United Nations. See Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 389.

110. Ibid., 397.

111. NORC 386, 4/20/56 (1,224), and NORC 390, 6/26/56 (1,275): cited in Hero, The Southerner and World Affairs, 398.


113. Walter Sillers to Senator John Stennis, telegram, 1 September 1960, File Series 2, Subseries: Passports, Visas, Peace Corps and UN, Box 5, fol. 47, John Stennis Collection, Mississippi State University Library.


115. Ibid., 420.

116. The Uncertain South, 26.


118. Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 303-4; Lerche, The Uncertain South, 158.

119. Between 1920 and 1946, no Southern state exceeded a voter participation average of over 30 percent in elections for United States Senate, compared with New York’s and Ohio’s averages of 60 percent and 56 percent, respectively. Turnout for congressional elections proved even more abysmal, ranging between 14.5 percent and 25 percent, compared with New York State’s 55 percent average. See Key, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 489-90, 501, 506.

120. Ibid., 307-9; and William C. Havard, ed., The Changing Politics of the South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1972), 678.

121. For specific instances, see Ibid., 9, 329; and Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance.


123. Ibid., 224.
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