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A Moment in Yale’s History
True to Her Traditions: The Yale Unit in World War

*Riley Scripps Ford, SY 2011*

Nearly 9,500 Yale students and alumni fought in World War I; of these, 227 lost their lives. Among the honored dead listed in the Woolsey Rotunda are the names of Albert D. Sturtevant ’16, Curtis S. Read ’18 and Kenneth MacLeish ’18, all naval aviators who were part of the famous Yale flying squadron. Later christened “The Millionaires’ Unit” by the press but known by participants and friends simply as “the Unit,” this group of 12 students exemplified Old Yale’s tradition of noblesse oblige and military service. All but two of the dozen were members of Skull & Bones or Scroll & Key, and most hailed from wealthy, well-connected families based in the northeast. Frustrated with America’s reluctance to enter the war in 1916, the Yale Unit bought their own planes, taught themselves to fly, and traveled to the European front when no one else would.

The leaders of the original twelve (a number that would swell after Wilson’s eventual declaration of war) were Frederick Trubee Davison ’18 and Robert Abercrombie Lovett ’18. On campus, Lovett was respected but feared. Notoriously introverted, he had a reputation as an elitist patrician; nevertheless, his classmates voted him “Hardest Working,” “Most Scholarly” and “Most Brilliant.” Long after the end of World War I, Lovett would be appointed Assistant Secretary of War in World War II and Secretary of Defense in 1951.

Trubee, on the other hand, was in many ways a real-life Dink Stover. Earnest and magnetic, he was a member of the hockey and crew teams; by the time Trubee arrived at Yale, his father had been named J.P. Morgan’s business partner and was enshrined in a fifty-seven
acre estate on Peacock Point, Long Island. The Davison manor would later serve as a base of operations for the Yale Unit as they trained for war in the summer of 1916.

It was Trubee who first suggested his group of friends join the Aerial Coast Patrol, whose job it was to scan Long Island Sound by sea and air for mines and U-boats. When the Navy rejected his offer, Trubee purchased a Model Y Curtiss Flying Boat and hired a washed-up flight instructor, David H. McCulloch, to teach him how to fly. That summer, ten of his friends joined him on Long Island. All were successful athletes and well-regarded on campus, and they learned quickly. Looking back in 1950, Alphie Ames ’18 reflected, “I doubt whether any of us who spent that summer at Peacock Point will be able to describe exactly our lives there and feelings about it. In my own case, it was a new life, and I think I had the happiest days of my life there.”

By the following spring, the members of the Yale Unit were the most experienced combat pilots in the country—but the military still refused to sanction their participation in the war. With a $100,000 donation from J.P. Morgan and another $150,000 from other sources, the Unit left Yale in March 1917 and traveled to Palm Beach to continue training on their own. Upon arrival, they took rooms at the famous Breakers Hotel, and representatives from secret societies traveled to Florida on Tap Night to induct the majority of the group. Of the thirty combined taps offered by Skull & Bones and Scroll & Key that year, members of the Yale Unit comprised over a third.

Finally, on April 6, Trubee received the best news of all: Wilson had reluctantly declared war on Germany. While the rest of the American military—which lacked an air force—
scrambled to organize, the Yale Unit was officially ordained and deployed to Europe. During their time there, shipping sunk by Germany was reduced by 100,000 tons, thanks in large part to their revolutionary approach to aerial sea patrols. In February 1918, however, crew captain Al Sturtevant was ambushed and shot down by German flying ace Oberleutenant Friedrich Christiansen. He was posthumously awarded the Navy Cross. A week later, Curt Read was navigating in for a landing at Dunkirk when he lost control of his plane and nose-dived into the ocean. Artemus “Di” Gates ’18, star of the football team, was on hand to watch him die. The following October, Kenny MacLeish ’18 was shot down in Belgium and died of starvation and exposure in No-Man’s Land.

Other members of the Yale Unit survived and moved up the ranks during the war. Crock Ingalls ’18 was given command of a Sopwith squadron and became the first and only Naval Ace of World War I. Lovett organized the Northern Bombing Group (NBG), a highly successful squadron that in the summer of 1918 made aerial bombardment a practical and efficient reality for the Allies. Trubee was eventually made a Lieutenant and lived to see the end of the war, surviving a crash that broke both of his legs in the process.

In a letter to Curt Read’s mother, sent on February 28, 1918, an officer present at Read’s funeral described how Curt was buried. “We did not know your wishes of course as to what you wanted done,” he writes, “So we buried Curt in one of his Naval Flying Corps uniforms, with his Yale sweater underneath.” Although his coffin was interred draped in an American flag, it was Read’s cherished varsity “Y” sweater that was placed closest to him.
During their junior year, history majors complete at least two seminars covering history from two different geographical categories. Majors can choose from a plethora of topics and often find inspiration for their senior theses in junior seminars where students can hone in on particular areas of interest. Ben Alter, a current senior in Davenport College, wrote this paper for Professor David Blight’s seminar “Problems in American Historical Memory,” a class devoted to analyzing the concept of “memory” among historians and the intersection (or divergence) of history and memory.
Junior Seminar

Even after the gravest constitutional crisis since the Civil War, the American people have demonstrated their profound inclination to put bad times behind them, let memories fade and ultimately allow those guilty of wrongdoing to gain a measure of rehabilitation.¹

Los Angeles Times, June 17, 1982
Ten Year Anniversary of Watergate Break-In

Visitors to the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California, know when they arrive at the right place. Driving down the mundane Yorba Linda Boulevard, replete with suburban strip malls and palm trees, one cannot miss the impressive complex, marked by a towering American flag and an exact replica of the White House East Room. Just yards away from the imposing stone structure, a Washington, D.C. building out of place among the red-tiled hacienda roofs of Southern California, sits the small, unassuming home in which the thirty-seventh president was born. The juxtaposition is startling and intentionally so – guests cannot help but empathize with the quintessentially American story of Richard Nixon’s rise from modest roots to the greatest heights of power. Here in this complex, both a birthplace and burial site, the fundamental myths of a nation and its leader are on display for tens of thousands of annual visitors.

Since its founding in 1990, the library has remained at the forefront of a national controversy over the Nixon Administration’s legacy. Dedicated as the centerpiece of the President’s campaign for rehabilitation, the museum and archival facility have been the breeding grounds for the loyalist narrative of Richard Nixon: a hard-working family man and a Cold War statesman, brought down by his liberal enemies in Congress and the media. Historians frustrated by the lack of full access to Nixon’s material records, and disturbed by the partisan nature of the museum, had written it off as what Stanley Kutler called “another Southern California theme park.”² Yet in 2007, following years of negotiations, the Nixon Library finally joined the federal Presidential Library system administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). Now caught between a number of vested interests, partisan ideologies, and public amnesias, the federally-supervised Nixon Library hopes to emerge from the disputes with a “balanced” voice on the thirty-seventh president’s legacy.³

Marred by curatorial and archival wars, igniting public and private controversies, the Nixon Library has proven just as divisive as the man it seeks to memorialize. This paper will examine the library’s history, probing its polemic story for lessons on history conducted in, and sponsored by, the public sector. When the dust settles, the new Nixon Library may serve as a

³ Ibid.
model for engaging and honest public history. Yet the difficulty it will face in getting to that point should serve as a warning to those who cling to unrealistic expectations of America’s ability to reckon publicly with its past.

Presidential Libraries: A Brief Overview

*Self-commemoration has become an integral part of the modern presidency.*

Benjamin Hufbauer

The first presidential library came into existence when President Franklin D. Roosevelt donated some of his land, presidential papers, and memorabilia to the National Archives in 1939. The purpose, as initially conceived, was to “preserve and to make available in one place all the historical materials from one Presidential Administration.” Yet in the decades since FDR established his upstate New York library, the scope and function of Presidential Libraries have transformed from their initially limited conception. In terms of sheer archival content, each presidency produces more materials than its predecessor, with technology such as email and the fax machine creating a wealth of additional documentation to process and store. Whereas the Roosevelt Library cost only $400,000, approximately $8 million in today’s dollars, the recently dedicated William Jefferson Clinton Library cost more than $160 million.

Most importantly, presidential libraries have taken on a memorializing function, operating museums and burial sites which pay testament to the president and his times. The museums, which attract hundreds of thousands of visitors each year, emerge from a public-private partnership between presidential foundations and the federal government. The process of constructing a presidential library usually begins when a president, upon leaving office, and his supporters form a private foundation to raise money for the establishment of an institution to honor the president’s legacy. The first museum exhibits, as well as facilities for archival research, are designed and built by the private foundations before being turned over to the National Archives for operation. While in principle the National Archives retains the “right to refuse the initial exhibit,” explains Sharon Fawcett, the current Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries, “it has never done so.” Furthermore, she writes, the National Archives “does not expect

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an exhibit to denigrate the president’s legacy.” The director of the presidential library is chosen only after both the Archives and the former president are satisfied with the candidate. Only the Nixon Library, as will be detailed later, initially remained outside of this private-public partnership, and for a number of reasons did not merge with NARA for its first seventeen years.

The reliance on private funding to build and operate presidential libraries has raised considerable concern for the historical accuracy and non-partisan credentials expected of a federally operated institution. In April 2004, historian Stanley Katz of Princeton University led a commission that identified the “considerable risk to present and future health of these presidential museums in current National Archives policy that requires the libraries to rely so heavily on support from non-profit partners.” Benjamin Hufbauer, the most prominent academic critic of the presidential library system, has argued that the specter of large private donations to build libraries and museums may influence a sitting president’s decision-making. Furthermore, he writes, “the Office of Presidential Libraries,” NARA’s division to oversee the libraries, “bows to presidents’ wishes for whitewashed museums.” The lack of publicly available funding has meant that NARA increasingly relies on private foundations to fund libraries’ “core operations.” The dependence on private and ideologically invested funding sources has led to calls for all presidential libraries to be administered as private memorials, rather than museums with federal stamps of approval.

Indeed, presidential museum exhibits often display hagiographic presentations and ignore historical blemishes on a president’s administration. Presidents are painted as “worthy of patriotic veneration,” and their failures are either slighted or virtually ignored. The Johnson Library has been criticized for lack of due coverage on the Vietnam War, the Reagan Library for its scant depiction of the Iran-Contra Scandal, and the Nixon Library for its initial portrayal of Watergate. An employee of the Truman Library explained that because of the process by which the exhibits are designed, it is to be expected and accepted that the end result is propagandistic, and to demand “rigorous and interpretive exhibits” is naïve. Yet the continued sanction and operation of these libraries by the National Archives threatens to damage the reputation of the federal government as an arbiter of non-partisan standards.

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9 Ibid, p. 31.
10 Joan Hoff, quoted in Cox, “America’s Pyramids,” p. 60.
14 Hufbauer, “Archives of Spin.”
17 Hufbauer, “Spotlights and Shadows,” p. 130.
Beyond concerns over private funds and partisanship affecting museum exhibits, a wealth of academic criticism of the presidential library system has emerged which places the stakes higher than the reputation of an individual president. Hufbauer writes:

[The rise of the presidential library] has populated the landscape of public memory in the United States with a series of history museums that promote an expansive view of presidential power. These museums also attempt to elevate individual presidents into the civil religion of the United States—that veneration that has existed since the country’s founding for particular events, people, and things.\(^{18}\)

The library system, Hufbauer claims, is a product of, and contributes to, the vast growth of presidential power since the start of the Cold War. Furthermore, reading these “presidential temples” as similar to other “sacred national places,”\(^{19}\) including the Lincoln Memorial, Hufbauer ties them into the national discussion on “civil religion” reinvigorated by Robert N. Bellah in 1967.\(^{20}\) Bellah’s writings advanced the idea that “civil religion”—the encyclopedia of practices and traditions which mold a national consciousness—helped to explain trends in American history and life and could “guard against uncritical patriotism.”\(^{21}\) More recently, Marcela Cristi has argued that civil religion serves to “force group identity and to legitimize an existing political order” through the spread of patriotic propaganda.\(^{22}\) Today’s presidential library system, officially sanctioned by the federal government, trends more towards Cristi’s critical interpretation of civil religion.\(^{23}\)

The existence of a federal system of hagiographic libraries is not merely a top-down imposition of state propaganda. Rather, the libraries form part of what Richard Cox calls the “permanent public memory business,” citing their role in tourism and local economies.\(^{24}\)

As historian and archival advocate R. Bruce Craig writes:

Presidential library exhibits tend to reflect what the public wants to see (often curiosities from the president’s gift cache) and what the public is comfortable with (narratives that provide little critical interpretation and hence do not offend or challenge beliefs). Rarely do exhibits challenge visitors to question biases, belief systems, or perspectives on past events…. Visitors … more often than not want to see their opinions of the president and his administration validated, else they would not bother to make the visit. NARA generally satisfies these expectations.\(^{25}\)

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18 Ibid., p. 118.
23 Ibid.
24 Cox, “America’s Pyramids.”
In this business, tourists and residents of the libraries’ communities often vote with their feet and their admissions costs to revel in their memories of an era in history. Since many presidential libraries are located in the towns and cities in which the president was born, these institutions are instrumental in building not only national consciousness, but also local identities. Whether these communities have a right to revel in their selective memories and biases is a question which deserves due consideration. Yet while presidential libraries masquerade under the federal stamp of “objectivity,” they present a disservice to visitors seeking to better understand the past.


*A strange conjuration of the past, subdued and defiant at the same time, like the man himself: an assertion of greatness, a denial of disgrace.*

*Time*, reporting on the dedication of the Nixon Library and Birthplace, 1990

On August 9, 1974, his resignation about to take effect, President Richard Nixon boarded a helicopter, flashed his trademark “V” for victory, and flew off into post-presidential life. As early as two weeks after his disgraceful resignation from the presidency, *Newsweek* reported, he was “asking aides for memos war-gaming the restoration.” Another source close to Nixon asserted that he had “planned this all for years in a very cautious and painstaking fashion.” The rehabilitation strategy that emerged was a multi-pronged effort to vindicate his embarrassing fall from power by repressing archives, promoting favorable scholarship, and, eventually, establishing a presidential library and museum in his honor.

The fight to prevent archival materials from being opened to historical review was first and foremost on Nixon’s agenda. Of particular concern were the tapes produced by the White House recording system, evidencing a range of both embarrassing and illegal behavior. It was a tape, after all—the “Smoking Gun” conversation of June 23, 1972—which had proven beyond reasonable doubt Nixon’s role in the Watergate cover-up, leading to his resignation.

On September 8, 1974, with these considerations in mind, Nixon signed an agreement with the General Services Administration, which oversaw the National Archives, giving the former president the unilateral right to destroy any tape after five years, with the remaining tapes

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28 Ibid., p. 20.
to be destroyed ten years later or after his death.\textsuperscript{29} Since Roosevelt’s deeding of documents and memorabilia to the National Archives, it was understood that a president controlled his own materials and voluntarily offered them to the people. Yet as Nixon prepared to destroy thousands of hours of valuable historical material, Congress stepped in and passed the 1974 Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA).\textsuperscript{30} The law, which seized Nixon’s documents and tapes and mandated that they remain in the Washington, D.C. area, cited the need to “provide the public with the full truth, at the earliest reasonable date, of the abuses of governmental power popularly identified under the generic term ‘Watergate.’”\textsuperscript{31} It went on to stipulate that any materials related to “abuse of government power” be released to the public as early as possible.\textsuperscript{32}

Nixon’s team cried foul, and claimed that PRMPA amounted to an illegal search and seizure of his personal property. Furthermore, he advanced the argument that the pending release of his tapes violated the doctrine of executive privilege by which all presidents have a right to confidential high-level communications. The Supreme Court rejected these claims, stipulating only that Nixon be compensated for the seized materials. On August 9, 1977, three years to the date after Nixon’s resignation, the tapes arrived for processing at the National Archives.\textsuperscript{33} These developments should have marked an overwhelming defeat for Nixon, as well as an important boost for the objective historical record.

Yet what ensued was a concentrated effort to further suppress the release of tapes, and to keep Nixon’s reputation from being further tarnished. Despite the fact that by 1987, all of the Watergate tapes had been fully processed by a team of archivists in College Park, Maryland, Nixon’s lawyers had successfully “orchestrated a delaying action inside the National Archives.”\textsuperscript{34} By 1992, only two percent of all processed Watergate tapes had been made public. This led Seymour Hersh to conclude at the time that “Nixon is winning one of the most significant battles of his life after Watergate: he is keeping the full story of what happened in his White House from the public.”\textsuperscript{35} “The tapes continue to be released in batches today, and full access is one of the chief goals of the Nixon Library under federal supervision.”\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{29} Seymour Hersh, “Nixon’s Last Cover-Up: The Tapes He Wants the Archives to Suppress,” \textit{The New Yorker}, 14 December 1992.
\textsuperscript{31} Hersh, “Nixon’s Last Cover-Up.”
\textsuperscript{32} Worsham, “Nixon’s Library Now a Part of NARA,” p. 37.
\textsuperscript{33} Hersh, “Nixon’s Last Cover-Up.”
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
Nixon’s successful initial suppression of the tapes bears serious implications for the practice of public history in the United States. The possibility to keep the tapes at bay relied on high-level support from the Reagan Administration, a government which certainly had a vested interest in maintaining the reputation of the Republican Party as well as of a powerful executive. Responding to challenges from Nixon’s legal team, the Justice Department in 1985 agreed that the National Archives was unfit to deal with Nixon’s claims of executive privilege. The Department drafted an administrative rule stating that the National Archives had to honor the executive privilege claims of any president, including, of course, President Reagan. Despite this rule’s clear infringement on the will of Congress as established by PRMPA, the National Archives, similarly controlled by the Executive Branch, acquiesced. According to Hersh, this meant that “Nixon could now restrict any document he wished to, and the burden would be on the Archives to challenge his claim.”

This incident demonstrates the limitations on the federal government’s ability to administer open and accurate libraries and museums. The same National Archives, which is today expected to present fair depictions of presidential administrations, caved in rather easily to the will of a partisan administration with obvious vested interests in the suppression of the record. Only small public interest groups, such as Public Citizen founded by Ralph Nader, and individual historians like Stanley Kutler, remained steadfastly in pursuit of access to the historical record.

Meanwhile, supporters and friends of the ex-President were preparing the next arm of their rehabilitation strategy: the establishment of a private foundation to support Nixon’s legacy and ideas. In 1978, supporters inaugurated the Richard Nixon Foundation and immediately began to raise funds for a presidential library and museum. Between 1984 and 1990, the foundation raised $26 million to build a library, and secured nine acres of land in Yorba Linda, California for its construction. Given the continued mandate of PRMPA, and the ongoing litigation over presidential records, no plans were in place for the Nixon Library to join the public National Archives system. Still, the successful fundraising campaign and the specter of Nixon “joining the club” of ex-Presidents marked an important step in the rehabilitation of Nixon’s image. Nixon would then receive, albeit without public validation, the “patriotic veneration” about which Hufbauer wrote. “He got his library,” Tom Brokaw declared the night that the

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37 Hersh, “Nixon’s Last Cover-Up.”
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
41 Worsham, “Nixon’s Library Now a Part of NARA.”
Yorba Linda complex opened, suggesting the inevitability of the moment as a presidential rite of passage.  

On July 19, 1990, the privately-administered Richard Nixon Library and Birthplace was inaugurated with ceremonious pomp. In attendance were all the living presidents with the exception of Jimmy Carter, the only Democrat. A heavily covered media spectacle, the country appeared ready to welcome Richard Nixon back on the national stage. Ever since Newsweek had declared, “He’s Back,” on the cover of a 1986 issue, discussion of Nixon centered on the question of political rehabilitation. In the wake of the dedication ceremony, few commentators shied from concluding that he was indeed back. Nixon biographer Stephen Ambrose called it “his final resurrection, his total recovery from the disaster of 1974.” Time’s Lance Morrow called the day “a strange conjuration of the past” and observed:

It was to be Richard Nixon’s day of vindication, his ultimate emergence from the wilderness that followed Watergate. It has been 16 years since he flew west to San Clemente in disgrace. He worked long, stubbornly and bravely, to rehabilitate his reputation. He wrote seven books, traveled the world, kept himself on a relentless forward trajectory. He was performing yet again his old miracle of self-resurrection. It appeared, for a moment, that Nixon had finally achieved the ounce of recognition he so craved since his fateful helicopter ride out of Washington.

Yet just as the media appeared prepared to recognize Nixon’s return, many were quick to notice the problems that the new facility was bound to present. Despite Nixon’s theatrical maneuvers, Watergate remained the proverbial elephant in the room. “Watergate’s a Whisper as Nixon’s Glorified at Library Dedication,” penned the Chicago Tribune, observing that the President’s tour of the new museum skipped the Watergate gallery. In a similar vein, the San Francisco Chronicle lamented, “W-Word Nearly Unspoken at Nixon Library Opening,” describing a tense situation when an eleven year-old boy asked his aunt what the “W-Word” meant. Only President George H.W. Bush mentioned the scandal by name, and “in passing.”

Further embarrassments came when Library director Hugh Hewitt claimed that researchers wishing to use the archival facility in Yorba Linda would be screened. Anyone seen as anti-Nixon would not be allowed to enter, and specifically described Bob Woodward as “not a responsible journalist.” Given Nixon’s strong Republican credentials, Hewitt claimed, it would

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44 Ibid, p. 196.
45 Morrow, “A Conjunction of the Past.”
47 Morrow, “A Conjunction of the Past.”
“taint” the President’s legacy “to let the premises be used indiscriminately by groups who oppose everything he worked for.” The implication of Hewitt’s comments was clear enough: the Nixon Library had no interest in any scholarship or journalism that would not glorify the legacy of its beloved president. Although the library corrected itself several days later, asserting that the Nixon Library would be an open scholarly forum, the damage was done. The events of July 1990 made several things clear: President Nixon was not returning to the national stage at peace with himself, ready to reflect on his administration’s failures. The siege mentality of the Nixon years—a mentality of enemy lists and dirty political tricks—had found its home in Yorba Linda.

“Another Southern California Theme Park”:
Nixon’s Museum under Private Control, 1990-2007

Everybody who visited it, who knew the first thing about history, thought it was a joke... you didn’t know whether to laugh or cry.59

David Greenberg, author of Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image

The story of Watergate is enormously complex ... Watergate is a word that has come to mean many things to many people. What it was before June 17, 1972, was a luxury apartment, office, and hotel complex in Washington, D.C. What it became over the course of the next 26 months was a catchword for every misjudgment, miscalculation, or crime, imagined or real, that had ever been contemplated by anyone even remotely connected with the Nixon Administration.50

Excerpt from “Watergate: The Final Campaign” Exhibit

After paying the admissions fee, visitors to the Nixon Library are directed into a large auditorium which continuously plays a single film, entitled, “Never Give Up: Richard Nixon in the Arena.” The film offers the triumphalist narrative of Richard Nixon’s rehabilitation: he is a man who “never failed to turn a setback into an opportunity.” After opening with clips from two major Nixon comebacks—the 1968 Republican National Convention and his 1990 return to Capitol Hill—the 28-minute film details Nixon’s career as a series of defeats overcome. Even after the “deepest valley” of Watergate and resignation, highlighted by images of White House staffers sobbing during Nixon’s farewell speech, he was back, now as an elder statesman, advisor, and author.51 Nixon’s story of unwavering determination and unlikely triumph is painted as a quintessentially American story. Allowing for his rehabilitation vindicates the nation as well.

49 David Greenberg, quoted in Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start With Watergate.”
50 Howard, “A Scholarly Salesman Takes Over the Nixon Library.”
This narrative is further highlighted on the grounds of the library, where Nixon’s modest roots are celebrated. Across from the main museum building, at the end of a reflecting pool, sits Nixon’s birthplace, an unimpressive white frame house built by Frank Nixon at the turn of the century. In a tour conducted for Larry King Live, Nixon sought to frame the birthplace as celebrating both his story and that of the American dream: “someone could come from a very modest house in a tiny little town of less than 200 and go to the very top in the United States.” Another White House—the East Room replica—looms over visitors as they exit the birthplace, reinforcing the rags-to-riches story which “humanizes this controversial figure.”

Just feet away from Nixon’s birthplace is his final resting place, a simple black marble tombstone inscribed with a quote from his 1969 first inaugural address: “The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker.” The entire museum plays up Nixon’s foreign policy credentials, lauding him as a bold Cold War statesman with the audacity to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and to re-envision the U.S.-China relationship. A prominent statue displays the iconic scene of Nixon stepping off his plane in China, warmly extending his hand to the stoic Chou En-lai. A section of the Berlin Wall looms high over the foreign affairs gallery, reminding viewers of the tense world order Nixon inherited. The Vietnam War and the domestic social chaos it created are short-changed. A tragic low point of the Nixon era—the shooting of four students at an anti-war rally at Kent State University in 1970—is displayed as an accident, or even the students’ fault: “The guardsmen were pelted with rocks and chunks of concrete. Tragically, in the ensuing panic, shots rang out [sic]. Four students lay dead.”

Yet it is the Watergate gallery—to date the only gallery removed under federal supervision—that generated the most controversy. Situated in a long, dimly-lit corridor, “Watergate: the Final Campaign” presented a version of the scandal fundamentally at odds with the historical record. As the title suggested, Nixon’s version of Watergate was akin to a campaign, described as “a bloody political battle fought… with no hold barred.” Democrats, it explained, were “hoping to win through Watergate what they had failed to win at the polls.” Because politics is a dirty game, Nixon’s whitewash insisted, there is nothing particularly unusual about the actions undertaken by members of his administration. This depiction of Watergate as a two-sided political battle overlooks the fundamental wrongdoing: a series of power abuses which took undue advantage of executive branch control.

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52 Frick, Reinventing Richard Nixon, p. 186.
54 Ibid.
56 Ibid. p. 191.
The gallery’s treatment of the “Smoking Gun” tape, as Daniel Frick writes, traded “individual distortions for full-blown revisionist history.” This tape refers to the recorded conversation of June 23, 1972, between President Nixon and Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, during which Nixon clearly demonstrates his awareness of the ongoing cover-up of the Watergate break-in several days earlier. He acknowledges he is willing to pay bribes to keep people silent, and decides to order the FBI away from their break-in investigation. This tape was released to the public when the President lost the landmark *U.S. v. Nixon* case, and is widely acknowledged as leading to his resignation just days later.

One would not know it after a tour of this gallery. The issue was introduced by claiming that “according to President Nixon’s critics,” the tape shows evidence of obstruction of justice. In reality, Nixon critics agreed that the tape showed evidence of crime, and without the agreement of some of his prominent supporters on the House Judiciary Committee, Nixon would not have been compelled to resign. Visitors were able to listen to a “heavily edited” version of the tape which made Nixon seem innocuous. The panel describing the tape spent as much time discussing the incriminating content as it did Nixon’s decision two weeks later to allow the FBI to proceed, portraying the President as correcting a simple mistake.

Nixon’s fate was continuously equated with national self-sacrifice. In the panel describing increasing calls for resignation, a letter from the wife of a Vietnam POW urged, “Don’t let the bastards get you down, Mr. President.” This phrase, a direct reference to the rallying cry of American prisoners at the Hanoi Hilton, would suggest that Nixon’s opponents, like the Viet Cong enemy, were fiercely un-American. The “Decision to Resign” panel held that the resignation “decision” was a selfless act of sacrifice for his country. “He could not,” the panel read, “ask the nation to endure the agony of an impeachment debate.” Visitors hoping to bring this Nixon-as-Christ analogy home with them can still purchase the “What Would Nixon Do” bumper sticker from the Museum Gift Store.

The Watergate Exhibit, Frick observed, did not “invite lingering.” The long, dark corridor – because “this was the darkest time” – culminated in a giant and illuminated photograph of Nixon getting on his helicopter and moving on. “Move on!” the gallery

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61 Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid., p. 185.
66 Ibid.
suggested, from this physical space, as well as from our national grudge with Nixon over Watergate. The image was literally a light at the end of the tunnel—suggesting in full force the redemptive and triumphalist narrative advanced by the Nixon Foundation.

In March 2007, director-designate of the federal Nixon Library Timothy Naftali would order the Watergate gallery destroyed, ushering in a new era for the troubled library. ⁶⁷

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It would be an exaggeration to say that a small museum exhibit in Orange County was ever powerful enough to completely rehabilitate Richard Nixon, dislodging his place in collective memory. After all, he seems to be for now and forever, “The president who resigned.” ⁶⁸ Collective negative associations regarding Watergate—corruption, crime, abuse of power—surround Richard Nixon. Yet the library would continue to serve as a platform for a concentrated assault on popular memory of Watergate. At times, the narrative would remain local, serving a conservative community seeking to celebrate its native son. At other times, the narrative would be thrust into the public sphere, commanding the entire nation’s attention.

One such moment arrived on April 27, 1994, when Richard Nixon was laid to rest beside his wife Pat, just yards from the house he was born in 81 years earlier. If the library dedication had been an indication of rehabilitation, the funeral was proof that, in part, it had succeeded. Each of Nixon’s successors—Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton—made the trip to Yorba Linda to pay their respects. The crowd included Nixon loyalists, like Gordon Liddy, and those straight off the enemies list, like George McGovern. Henry Kissinger lauded Nixon’s foreign policy vision. Bob Dole lachrymosely declared him “an American hero.” The coup de grace, however, was President Clinton’s official state eulogy, pleading the nation: “May the day of judging President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and career come to a close.” ⁶⁹ It was clear that two decades of intensive labor had paid off: Nixon had received his second presidential pardon.

Certainly, there were detractors to this vision. Hunter S. Thompson, referring to the 21-gun salute bidding farewell to the President, wrote, “it is fitting that Richard Nixon’s final gesture to the American people was a clearly illegal series of 21 105-mm howitzer blasts that shattered the peace of a residential neighborhood and permanently disturbed many children.” ⁷⁰ Print media around the country published obituaries and opinion pieces which rehashed all the

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⁶⁷ Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
⁶⁸ Schudson, Watergate in American Memory, p. 201.
⁶⁹ Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow, p. 340.
standard criticisms of Richard Nixon.\textsuperscript{71} To those who lived through the nightmare of Watergate, Richard Nixon would always remain “Tricky Dick”; no amount of post-presidential posturing would change that.

But the story Clinton told that day was that Watergate—as a moment in the narratives of Richard Nixon and of the United States—was an anomaly, a one-time incident that should not forever delegitimize the guilty man or his office. At the end of the day, Clinton insisted, Richard Nixon was still a decent man and the leader of a great nation. The American presidency, one of great executive power, was still a force for good. Decades after Watergate, even if Americans had not completely forgiven Richard Nixon, it appeared that this narrative had taken root. Confidence in American democracy and its laws was shaken, but not destroyed. Perhaps this is because, as Michael Schudson writes, Watergate appears “as a drama on the surface of history rather than a structure deep in the bowels.”\textsuperscript{72} It is much easier to reckon with a historical moment than with an endemic flaw. Though Nixon was dead, and in some ways resurrected, the battle would continue.

**Negotiating Narratives: NARA Prepares to Adopt the Nixon Library**

It is true, as Brokaw announced, that Nixon “got his library.” Yet the continued mandate of PRMPA meant that Nixon’s presidential papers would remain in Washington, and Nixon’s library would—like Nixon—be the odd one out. The Foundation staff tried to use this fact to raise support—a sign in the Museum Gift Shop once advertised membership, boasting “The only Presidential Library that does not accept [sic] taxpayer’s funds.”\textsuperscript{73} But the ongoing stalemate between the National Archives and the Nixon Foundation only served as a reminder of Watergate and the peculiarity of the Nixon years.\textsuperscript{74} It was evident that so long as the Nixon Library remained out of NARA’s circle, its credibility and Nixon’s rehabilitation would never be accepted.

Longstanding talks to reunite the Nixon papers and “normalize” the library reached a breakthrough in 2004. Congress repealed the provision of PRMPA requiring that the Nixon presidential materials remain in the Washington area and permitted NARA eventually to accept the existing private Nixon Library into the federal system. Earnest discussions began between John Taylor, then-director of the Nixon Library, and Allen Weinstein, Archivist of the United States. They agreed to a rough timetable: the Nixon Library would join the federal system, a federally-appointed director would assume archival and curatorial control, and the Foundation

\begin{footnotes}
\item[71] Greenberg, *Nixon’s Shadow*, p. 342
\item[72] Schudson, *Watergate in American Memory*, p. 57.
\end{footnotes}
would remain responsible for maintaining the birthplace and gravesites and would assist in museum renovation.\textsuperscript{75}

A 2005 controversy over a cancelled conference threatened to derail plans for the coming public-private partnership. The academic conference, entitled, “Richard Nixon as Commander-in-Chief: The History of Nixon and Vietnam,” was scheduled for April and was to feature a number of prominent scholars and Nixon critics, including Stanley Kutler and David Greenberg.\textsuperscript{76} Any excitement that the library was finally ready to serve as an open forum on the Nixon years dissipated when the Nixon Foundation abruptly cancelled the conference, eight weeks before it was set to take place, citing “fear of a low turnout and resulting financial loss.”\textsuperscript{77} Nixon scholars were livid. Jeffrey Kimball blasted the foundation, citing “the public’s right to know their history.”\textsuperscript{78} David Greenberg called the cancelation “another Nixon pardon,” imagining Nixon “waging his image campaign from beyond the grave.”\textsuperscript{79} The American Library Association and the sixteen academics that were slated to speak filed an official petition with Congress to cut off funding for the coming archive transfer and incorporation of the library into NARA. Given the Nixon Library’s “unprofessional behavior,” the petition argued, it was unfit to join the family of Presidential Libraries.\textsuperscript{80}

Both the National Archives and the Nixon Foundation were quick to defend the coming transfer. John Taylor, insisting that politics played no role in the cancelation, claimed that the Nixon Library was “turning over a new leaf and was prepared to take in … open and honest discussion.”\textsuperscript{81} He went on to envision the library under NARA control:

The Nixon Foundation is unwaveringly committed to free, full, total, and unmediated access to the public records of the Nixon Administration in a NARA library at Yorba Linda. When the records arrive here, they will be administered, conserved, and provided to scholars and researchers strictly by NARA officials and employees. NARA will also take over administration of our museum. The Nixon Foundation will become a public programming partner of NARA, just like Presidential foundations at other libraries.\textsuperscript{82} In these comments, Taylor comes across as strangely eager to appear subordinate to the National Archives. In a later interview, he would stress that “the director of the Nixon library is the final authority” with total “autonomy in all matters having to do with exhibits and access to

\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{78} Shenkman, “Nixon Library Cancels Vietnam Conference.”  
\textsuperscript{81} Shenkman, “Nixon Library Cancels Vietnam Conference.”  
Indeed, federal supervision would be the seal of authority giving sanction to the narratives spun in Yorba Linda. Though the foundation would cede a degree of control over Nixon’s legacy, the transfer would be a necessary step in legitimizing his rehabilitation.

In the coming years, the Nixon Foundation would not prove to be the conciliatory “partner” it publicly pronounced itself to be. Cooperation and financial assistance for NARA programming would be rare, and opposition to any NARA move against the museum’s hagiography would be staunch. Whether or not the federal Nixon Library can escape its past—and all the other trappings of public history—remains to be seen.

Timothy Naftali’s Quest for Nonpartisanship: Challenges and Hopes for Federal Supervision

*I can’t run a shrine.*

Timothy Naftali, Director of NARA’s Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum

Despite the Vietnam Conference mess, plans for the incorporation went through. On July 11, 2007, the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum officially joined the National Archives. Serving as the first federal director was historian Timothy Naftali, a Cold War scholar not yet tainted by the Nixon Wars. Naftali’s first task, which he began even before being officially instated as director, was to convince those who had been following the saga in Yorba Linda that he was serious about change. “The day we open [as a federal facility],” said Naftali, “we’re a different institution.” Accessibility and nonpartisanship were to be the driving principles of the new Nixon Library.

Naftali gave several interviews to local and national media detailing his proposals for revamping the museum. First, he announced that he would tear down the previous Watergate gallery, the most egregious example of revisionist hagiography among the exhibits. He promised that his new and improved gallery would provide a “360 degree look at the issue.” This would entail video displays of oral interviews with key Watergate players, allowing for an “interactive, self-curated experience.” The new gallery, Naftali promised, would steer away from definitive

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83 Howard, “Scholarly Salesman Takes Over Nixon Library.”
85 Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
87 Howard, “A Scholarly Salesman Takes Over the Nixon Library.”
answers or historical analysis, fearful of “replacing one form of didacticism with another.” In each interview, Naftali was careful to offer some praise and some criticism of Nixon, never definitively declaring his own opinion.

Naftali and the federal incorporation of the Nixon Library were well-received in the press and by the Nixon scholars who had long been pushing for access. Described as “thin and excitable” and “cheerfully caustic,” one gets the impression that each journalist to interview Naftali was similarly charmed. The editorial page of the New York Times chimed in with a piece entitled, “The Nixonian Whitewash, Scrubbed.” Eagerly anticipating Naftali’s success in rearing “the good, the bad, and the ugly” of the Nixon record, the New York Times looked forward to improvement upon the “privately run, propagandistic Nixon library.” The Los Angeles Times similarly portrayed Naftali’s ascent as a “truth-goes-marching-on” moment, detailing his extensive plans for reform in Yorba Linda. David Greenberg lauded the new leadership, saying it “changed things 180 degrees.” Yet more than most commentators at the time, he recognized the difficulties that lay ahead: “I’m sure it won’t be easy for Naftali either in his new job.”

Greenberg’s comments were prescient. On certain fronts, Naftali has faced considerable difficulty in instituting the types of reforms he feels the library needs. Christopher Goffard, writing in the Los Angeles Times, summed up the gist of the challenges which would lie ahead:

How do you tell a story as ugly as Watergate in a building that bears Nixon’s name? How do you chronicle a president’s most shameful episode just a few yards from the clapboard farmhouse where he was born and the black marble gravestone he lies beneath? What do you put in, and what do you leave out, in a city where his birthday is a holiday?

These representational questions threaten to disarm Naftali’s hopes for a “self-curated experience.” Indeed, as Frick observed, the Nixon Library “works from the moment we enter to prepare us for its message.” Given the larger context of the museum, situated at a birthplace and gravesite, designed to invoke patriotic veneration of Nixon and the presidency, there is no guarantee that several curatorial changes will leave visitors with an “objective” lesson in history.

Even Michael Schudson, author of Watergate in American Memory and someone who was actively engaged in critical analysis of the museum, fell prey to the humanizing magic of Nixon’s library. He concluded his section on the Nixon Library with the following sentimental rumination:

88 Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
91 Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Frick, Reinventing Richard Nixon, p. 188.
At the same time that I join in outrage at Nixon’s manipulation of the past, I resist condemning American culture at large for forgetfulness. If we are too skilled at forgetting, we may also be unusually capable of forgiving, and for this there is reason to be grateful … As I toured the Nixon Library, still gnashing my teeth from the Watergate exhibit, I went out through the garden to the restored wood-frame house where Nixon was born in 1913. This is where he lived until he was nine, sharing with his brothers an attic room so small he could not stand up in it … I pictured that boy and my mood changed as I approached the Nixon homestead…. Here is something that gives pause, or should, in the midst of self-flattering feelings of moral indignation. There is something of this plain goodness in Nixon himself, I think, as redeeming as the house he was born in.95 There is nothing wrong with Schudson’s kind reflection on the nobler aspects of the thirty-seventh president. Yet these sentiments, so carefully extracted and invoked to absolve Richard Nixon of historical guilt, threaten to warp understanding of his serious crimes and misgivings, particularly to unsuspecting visitors.

Amending this sentimental culture has proven far more difficult than any specific curatorial changes. Any move to dismantle the cult of personality around Nixon celebrated in Yorba Linda elicits an overwhelmingly negative response from the proud community. As Goffard pointed out, Yorba Linda celebrates Nixon’s birthday as a holiday, and feels entitled to honor his legacy in his hometown. Georgia Mallory, a 62 year-old docent in the museum, expressed this in a recent interview, saying, “the most difficult part for us is that [Naftali’s] attitude is that this is supposed to be a bipartisan place… This is the Richard Nixon Library!”96 Naftali understands that he is working within a tightly-knit community of memory and has promised to stay true to the historical record while remaining “respectful to parts of a community that may view it in a different way.”97 Indeed, this is the promise enshrined in NARA’s Presidential Libraries Manual, which pledges exhibits which are “consistent with the dignity of the presidency and will present historically accurate and balanced interpretations.”98 Yet this fence is oftentimes difficult to straddle, particularly in the cases when the historical record cannot feasibly coexist with the “dignity of the presidency,” cannot viably respect the beliefs of an ideological community, and cannot remain “balanced.” These contradictions constrain NARA’s actions as they try to build a new openness at the Nixon Library.

In 2009, these constraints were revealed during a local controversy over statues of Communist Chinese leaders in the museum. In the museum’s “Hall of Leaders,” a gallery containing plaster statues of world leaders Nixon felt “made a difference,” sits Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in spirited conversation. The U.S.-China relationship is central to the museum;

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97 Goffard, “Nixon Library’s Changes Start with Watergate.”
Nixon’s diplomatic opening with the People’s Republic in 1972 is his strongest claim to Cold War statesmanship. This narrative depends on the fundamental assumption that it was wise and moral to bring China into the community of nations, and Nixon’s supporters have vested interest in whitewashing the repressive nature of Communist China. Angered by the presence of Mao in the museum, a Chinese expat and local activist organized a protest outside the Nixon Library on the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic. The NARA leadership sought immediately to distance itself from the statue. Naftali placed a prominent sign in the “Hall of Leaders” explaining that “the presence of the statues in this gallery does not imply that the United States government … takes a position on their legacies.” In interviews with the press, Naftali insisted that “Mao was a mass murderer” and that his statue was “out of place in a publicly funded museum.”

Naftali’s clear distaste for the statue was evident. That he refrained from immediately removing it displays an environment at the library in which he must choose his battles. He explained that the “Hall of Leaders” would be renovated in due time and that at the moment his primary focus was the Watergate gallery. Yet perhaps more telling was the negative outcry which ensued when Naftali appeared willing to alter Nixon’s vision for the “Hall of Leaders.” The volunteer docents, often older community members who have supported Nixon’s political career for decades, tend to steadfastly oppose any change which might reflect poorly on “their hero.” Naftali himself acknowledges this difficulty, remarking, “I’m changing a culture here. There are people who are upset at any changes we make—small, medium, or large—because they like the way things were.” Any progress the federally-supervised Nixon Library hopes to make in arriving at nonpartisanship will be continuously kept in check by this local community of memory.

Naftali’s most important task, however, and the one in which he has been the most successful, has ramifications for Nixon’s place in popular memory far beyond the borders of Yorba Linda. Honesty and openness about the Nixon Era requires first and foremost that the full material record of the presidency be made available to the public. The NARA-supervised Nixon Library has made enormous strides in this area, and this progress speaks to the constructive role the federal government can play in fostering an accurate historical record. In the last three years, NARA has released a prominent batch of tapes once a year, including other notable documents. Despite the setbacks Naftali faces at the Nixon Library itself, he is winning the battle over archives.

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100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
Ever since Nixon was sued in 1974 to release recorded conversations relating to Watergate, his supporters have led a consistent battle to suppress these tapes. This should come as no surprise: every time the tapes have been released, national media have run embarrassing stories about the ex-President. In 1991, for example, when a new series of Watergate tapes were released to the public, Time ran an article entitled, “Notes from the Underground: A Fresh Batch of White House Tapes Reminds a Forgiving and Forgetful America Why Richard Nixon Resigned in Disgrace.” The most recent tape batch was released in June 2009 and received immediate national attention. A New York Times article focused on Nixon’s disparaging remarks towards Jews and African-Americans, as well as previously undisclosed opinions about abortion. The nation-wide embarrassment in the wake of each tape release, as Schudson writes, “[throws] a monkey wrench into Nixon’s campaign for rehabilitation.” Moreover, the recent tape releases have led to a flourishing of new scholarship on the Nixon Years, serving the Archives fundamental purpose of illuminating the historical record. This process does more to keep Nixon’s peculiarities alive than forces in Yorba Linda could do to cover them up.

Conclusions

The story told here is one of discrepancies between history conducted in the public sphere and the often sought-after “objective” past. In analyzing the history of the Nixon Library, I have attempted to highlight certain structural problems that lead to public distortions of the historical record. First, in all presidential libraries, the dilemmas of public cooperation with ideologically invested funding sources have brought about a family of “presidential temples,” which foster patriotic veneration for their presidents’ namesakes. The federal government, of course, is also invested in promoting the civil religion of the United States, and the libraries have come to represent lieux de memoire for collective processing of the past. In Richard Nixon, the public watched as a disgraced president dedicated his entire post-presidential career to rehabilitating his legacy. This involved a sustained and well-supported campaign to suppress archival materials, build a hagiographic museum and research center, and involve the nation in several extremely visible media spectacles indicating his “resurrection.”

Those historians and journalists pressing for archival openness and curatorial honesty only sometimes had an ally in the federal government. When the federal government did not cooperate, as was the case in the 1980s, archival material was kept private. This demonstrated how a partisan administration with, sensibly, no interest in revealing historical blemishes could play a significant role in shaping popular understanding by the withholding of information. When the federal government has cooperated with the push towards historical accountability, as

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103 Schudson, Watergate in American Memory, p. 200.
has been the case in recent years, the public witnessed how even the most concentrated efforts to effect change were met with fierce resistance. As long as the federal government partners with ultra-partisan foundations that value unscathed legacies over openness, the resulting historical forums will be compromises. Still, archival processing and some curatorial moderation has shown that federal involvement in the public history business, while flawed, still plays an important role in airing the historical record.

Public history remains interwoven with common expectations for the past and the need for it to serve ongoing identity projects. After all, public history does not belong to historians and universities; it belongs to the public. R. Bruce Craig’s initial observation rings true—public libraries and memorials will above all reflect the values and beliefs visitors want to have confirmed. Particularly in ideologically invested communities such as Yorba Linda, institutions such as the Nixon Library imbue day-to-day life with meaning. To deny individuals the chance to participate in a local or “civil” religion is to wage a war on the very tools of identity formation.

Yet to allow these public history forums to produce problematic narratives while masquerading under a federal seal of “objectivity” presents even more danger. History contains lessons in civics and national identity; presidential libraries often distort the truth and blur those lessons. If Americans learn nothing from moments of national embarrassment— from Watergate, from Iran-Contra, from Vietnam—they deny themselves a degree of collective historical accountability which keeps national leaders in check. That American government and dedicated scholars have inserted themselves into this world is to be lauded for while the project of public history is endemically flawed, to remain on the outskirts would allow even more treacherous narratives to brew in American culture.
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Directed Studies

Liberty and the State: An Evaluation of Lockean and Rousseauian Conceptions

Jonathan Yang, BK 2013
History and Politics
Professor Steven Smith
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Jonathan Yang, currently a sophomore in Berkeley College, wrote this essay for Professor Steven Smith’s History and Politics course. The class is part of Directed Studies, a program for freshmen by competitive application consisting of three year-long courses in the foundational texts of Western civilization.

John Locke (1632-1704) was an English philosopher and physician of the Enlightenment era. His works on political and social contract theory had a decisive influence on the progenitors of modern liberal democracy, particularly the American Founders. His seminal Second Treatise of Government is often counted among the intellectual inspirations for the American Revolution.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a Swiss philosopher, writer, and composer. His writings on liberty, politics, and the social contract were profoundly influential on the architects of the French Revolution. Rousseau’s ideas on society and man’s state of nature, outlined in his essay On the Social Contract, would prove motivational for liberals, socialists, and anarchists alike.
In the proposed states of both John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, liberty is the ultimate and central purpose for the creation of the state. Yet the writers base their respective designs on fundamentally different conceptions of liberty and the role of the state: while Locke takes the view of liberty as a birthright to be preserved, Rousseau redefines liberty as the refined product of the state. What is for Locke an individual interest commonly preserved becomes for Rousseau a unifying end collectively pursued. Though both capture fundamental aspects of liberty in their respective accounts, neither one is entirely successful; while Rousseau’s redefinition renders his definition intuitively implausible, Locke’s overly individualistic definition ignores the power of a society to achieve progress. What finally arises from an evaluation of the two conceptions is a realization of the fundamental tensions inherent in defining liberty.

For Locke, liberty is a fundamental birthright characterized as the freedom to act as one desires. Every man is born into this “state of perfect freedom,” in which an individual possesses the “natural liberty of man.”¹ Basing the moral element of this liberty on his belief in the dominion of God as creator over all of humanity, Locke argues for a law of nature justifying the sanctity of the individual’s property.² Thus “free from any superior power on earth,” each individual is regarded as the best judge of his own interest, trusting no one over his own human reason and faculties. It is the degree to which he can act on the determinations of these faculties that an individual enjoys liberty.³

But liberty – as well as life and estate, the other two components of property – is a fragile and tenuous condition in the state of nature, thus necessitating the creation of states to secure them for individuals. The law of nature requires enforcement in order to persist in the face of the “inconveniences of nature” posed by the anarchy of man’s initial state, and it is the individual freedom to decide when force is justified and subsequently applied that “the members hath quitted … into the hands of the community.”⁴ Able to draw on the resources and manpower ceded by each citizen, the state gains the power to preserve the fundamental requirements for the exercise of the individual’s liberty.

For Locke, the creation of the state changes liberty not in nature, but merely in degree. Among the three aspects of property, liberty stands at the center; without liberty, life is meaningless, and, without estate, life has little else to pursue. Liberty exists before society, and the end of the state is to preserve this birthright by leaving as much free from restriction as possible; to enjoy “freedom of men under government” is thus to have “a liberty to follow [one’s] own will in all things where the rule prescribes not.”⁵ Individuals are left to determine their own best interest and the means of pursuing it; society itself exists as a unifying force precisely because it provides a means of achieving the universal interest of preserving one’s own property. Of course, the freedom to succeed and act nobly is also the freedom to fail and act brutally, and Locke noticeably assigns no moralizing role to the state; whether motivated by animalistic desires or high ideals, such as hate or love and greed or charity, the ways in which an individual exercises his liberty are of no concern to his government. Government, as Rousseau will argue

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² Ibid., 9.
³ Ibid., 17.
⁴ Ibid., 12, 46.
⁵ Ibid., 17.
later, can pass strictures on only those issues which concern the common good, for anything otherwise
“becomes particular, no longer within the range of the sovereign’s competence.”

Built around a conception of liberty that is inherently individualistic, Locke’s state thus has a
focus on preservation that creates a fundamentally stable but static state. Interacting only as much as
needed to maintain a preexisting notion of liberty, individuals play little civic role in each others’ lives
outside of this cooperation. Because of this limited role for the state, any change or growth occurs through
individual achievements in their private spheres rather than any collective development. The state itself is
thus unconcerned with progress and pursues no unifying ambition, existing only as a foundation for the
exercise of liberty by each citizen.

Rousseau fundamentally differs from Locke in that he views true liberty as the refined product,
rather than merely the object of protection, of civil society and the state. Although he shares Locke’s
conception of a liberty that exists from birth in the state of nature, Rousseau is not satisfied that this
represents the purest and most free state of an individual. Both describe an exchange of a “natural liberty”
for “civil liberty,” but Rousseau further introduces the addition of a “moral liberty, which alone makes
man truly the master of himself.” This third component is key to securing liberty, and can only be
created and promoted through the collective power of the state; whereas Locke’s state need only maintain
a preexisting liberty, Rousseau’s conception of liberty sees an unfulfilled potential that necessitates
communal effort and towards which his state must progress.

What Rousseau defines as moral liberty might alternatively be termed liberation, a sort of
freedom from the lower desires to act upon nobler motivations. Whereas Locke is concerned only that an
individual be free to act in order to claim liberty, Rousseau is very much concerned with the motivations
behind such actions, arguing that “to be driven by appetite alone is slavery, and obedience to the law one
has prescribed for oneself is liberty.” Liberty is thus not merely the degree to which action is unrestricted,
but rather the degree to which an individual adheres to the morality that “substitutes justice for instinct”
and can be unearthed through reason. That which an individual gives up in becoming a citizen of a state
is the pursuit of “everything that tempts him and that he can acquire;” it is from this base animalistic
desire in all its forms that individuals can be liberated through the state. As Rousseau subsequently
argues, his state institutes a nobler code of conduct based on reason, adherence to which constitutes a
certain “dignity as a man” that is intrinsically human. The liberty that emerges from his state leaves a
citizen such that “his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas are broadened, his feelings are
ennobled, his entire soul elevated to such a height,” transforming him from “a stupid, limited animal into
an intelligent being and a man.” Appealing to human aspirations of progress, liberty becomes a unifying
end around which the state is formed.

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(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 158.
7 Ibid., 151.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 150.
10 Ibid., 151.
11 Ibid., 144.
12 Ibid., 151.
Since Rousseau views moral liberty as the creation of the state, its meaning is inseparably intertwined with the mechanism by which it is secured. Rousseau attributes this role to the general will, which through a counterintuitive structure identifies and enforces human morality. Civil liberty, the realm of unregulated action that mirrors Locke’s liberty, is “limited by the general will,” which creates the laws that restrict raw freedom. These limits placed on action are not merely pragmatic considerations as they are in Locke’s state, instituted out of necessity to preserve remaining liberties; instead, Rousseau gives such determinations a moral weight by virtue of their creation through reason. By holding each citizen to the eventual determinations of the general will, Rousseau argues that individuals will make decisions for the common good and “conform their wills to their reason.” Each individual considers the ramifications of his or her personal temptations writ large, and the populace is able to collectively condemn those rampant and animalistic desires to which they individually might have succumbed. In doing so, the state establishes standards of right and wrong based on obligations beyond self that Rousseau considers fundamentally noble.

In Rousseau’s state, the general will thus empowers an individual to act freely by marshaling the enforcement arm of the state to ensure that he adheres to the dictates of his reason. Each citizen necessarily participates in the formation of the general will, and each individual’s reason ideally leads him to the same shared understanding of the common good. In practical terms, a majority is sufficient to speak for all, resulting in the infamous scenario in which an individual is “forced to be free.” When a citizen disagrees with the general will, he has incorrectly determined what is in the best interests of all, and thus the course of action that he truly prefers but is at the moment unable to see. Rousseau’s citizens must share his faith in the collective power of the general will to reason out tenets of morality, as well as be comfortable with instances of compulsion that nonetheless fulfill the long-term, big picture understanding of liberty that initially brought him into the contract.

In evaluating these two conceptions of liberty, Locke’s is attractive for its simplicity and individualism—particularly in contrast to Rousseau’s strained attempts to justify forced compliance as liberty. Proclaiming the self-sufficiency of the individual’s reason to determine his own best interest, Locke’s idea respects the intrinsic self-confidence that makes liberty so deeply cherished to begin with. Yet Locke also recognizes the danger that results from the unregulated intersection of individual liberties, and thus the tradeoff of sacrificing some liberties in order to secure the rest addresses a troublesome reality of the world. Though he echoes some of Locke’s ideas, Rousseau places greater emphasis on the intended results of liberty rather than the exercise of it, describing liberty in a counterintuitive manner. The notion that liberty can include forcing a citizen to act against his will on the grounds that he is acting as he would have acted had he reasoned properly downplays the importance of the citizen’s own perception of the scenario. Although the actions of Rousseau’s general will might be justified in terms of morality or order, to label the described scenario of compulsion as liberty would be a redefinition that would render the word meaningless: what he describes is simply not liberty.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 162.
15 Ibid., 150.
Yet Locke’s austere depictions of both liberty and the state that preserves it lack a sophistication that Rousseau does manage to incorporate into his own conception. Though the specific mechanisms he prescribes are fraught with problems and self-contradictions, Rousseau’s recognition that liberty in its truest form cannot just be action unrestricted by society captures a fundamental question about what truly makes an individual free. Locke denies the need for any judge other than human reason to determine one’s best interests, yet human experience might question whether or not such professed independence ignores inherent human weaknesses. Even the best intentions often fail to translate into action; in such instances, Rousseau’s warning that action can become enslaved to appetite becomes all the more relevant. The reason of any one individual is insufficient to master the prevailing power of an individual’s emotions, passions, and desires.

Rousseau argues for the redemptive power of society as a means of progressing towards higher and nobler collective intentions, highlighting the limitations of Locke’s individualistic notion of liberty. There is some truth to the abstracted process by which the citizenry of Rousseau’s state determines the general will; the human obligation of belonging to a group or society compels individuals to set aside private passions and reach more altruistic and noble conclusions. The moralizing power of Rousseau’s state brings in the collective power of society to provide both the motivation and the means to control human appetites, bringing each individual closer to the self-mastery. Even Locke recognizes the inherent “necessity, convenience, and inclination” that drives individuals to form societies, and yet his individualistic states leaves this deep hunger for community unsatisfied.16

Despite its centrality to any political philosophy, liberty persists as a concept forever caught between contradictions. The difficulty both of these two great writers faced in attempting to capture the entirety of the meaning of liberty underscores the indefinable quality of the concept. Human aspirations and pride push toward an individual, self-contained conception of liberty, yet human weakness and realistic considerations compel individuals to seek liberty collectively; few but the ideologues at either extreme can deny that each view is by itself incomplete. The eternal quest of self-mastery ultimately centers on the question of an individual’s faith in him or herself, and, on this fundamental issue of self-reflection, no definitive determination may ever be possible.

16 Locke, Government, 42.
The At-Large Category encompasses papers written by Yale sophomores, juniors, and seniors that fall outside the range of Junior Seminar papers and Senior Essays. Joshua Silverstein ’10 wrote this essay as a sophomore in Professor Theodore Bromund’s International Studies course on the Grand Strategies of the Great Powers. While many focus on Winston Churchill’s career with respect to World War II, Silverstein examines his grand strategy during the First World War, using Gallipoli and the Dardanelles as case studies to support his thesis. Silverstein is currently studying at the University of Cambridge as a Gates Scholar.
Introduction: Search for a Solution

I think it is quite possible that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other’s line in the Western theatre … My impression is that the position of both armies is not likely to undergo any decisive change – although no doubt several hundred thousand men will be spent to satisfy the military mind on the point … On the assumption that these views are correct, the question arises, how ought we to apply our growing military power. Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders … If it is impossible or unduly costly to pierce the German lines on existing fronts, ought we not, as new forces come to hand, engage him on new frontiers?

- Letter from Winston S. Churchill to H.H. Asquith, December 29, 1914

In this letter written at the start of World War I, Winston Churchill articulated the question that would preoccupy him for the next four years. Every operation, plan, or enterprise he crafted from 1914 to 1918 can be interpreted as a response to this question: the search for a better and less costly way to attack the enemy was a dilemma that confronted the British throughout the war. Even before the murderous offensives at the Somme and Passchendaele, Churchill had realized trench warfare provided an enormous advantage for the enemy because it defended enemy troops from the advancing Allied forces. He wrote, “We are … in the unsatisfactory position of having lost our ground before the defense under modern conditions was understood, and having to retake it when the defensive has been developed into an art.”

This development in the methods of waging war made attacks on the Western Front, the war’s primary battleground, strategically ineffective. Yet for four years the British and French threw themselves against entrenched machine gun positions only to gain insignificant swaths of muddy land and lose millions of soldiers. Before, during, and years after these events, Churchill asked himself and all those who participated in that bloody conflict whether there was a better way to wage war. He contended that there was.

As the character of this “total war” grew clearer, Churchill adopted two goals. He never wavered from his intent to defeat the Germans, although he endeavored to avoid what many believed as necessary carnage on the Western Front. As the war progressed, Churchill developed a grand strategy that served this double purpose. He sought to weaken Germany by attacking its vulnerable periphery and opening new fronts in distant theaters. He believed that these peripheral attacks would achieve battlefield victories that would then bring new followers to the Allied cause. Churchill wanted to force Germany to reallocate its military and economic resources away from its Western Front defenses, creating a military situation in which a coordinated Allied offensive on the Western Front would have enough strength and surprise to overwhelm the German defenses, break the stalemate of trench warfare, and ultimately end the war itself. At its core, this premise depended on Churchill’s holistic conception of combat that strove to maximize the effect of one theater on another. He formulated a grand strategy to attack the Germans on multiple fronts in order to weaken the decisive one, the Western Front.

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This strategy was unique not for its tactical and operational elements but for its ability to integrate politics, economics, and war. Churchill himself wrote, “The distinction between politics and strategy diminishes as the point of view is raised. At the summit true politics and strategy are one.” Churchill’s strategy recognized that all events impacted direction of the war. For example, he carefully noted that bringing a new ally to the cause could be as important as winning a battle. Conventional military views at the time seemed to ignore this truism; military leaders focused on a fallacy that equated “operational intensity and decisiveness with casualties, the latter in reality only reflecting tactical disjointedness.” By contrast, Churchill’s strategy conceived of the war as a whole and refused to compartmentalize it. It represented the nexus of two divergent schools of thought, which dominated Allied strategic thinking: the Western and Eastern schools. Because it contained elements of both – namely, recognition of the Western Front’s importance and acknowledgement that affairs on the periphery could be equally crucial – the strategy appealed to multiple members of the War Cabinet. This is not to say that Churchill was the only man seeking an alternative solution; many officials, both civil and military, dedicated themselves to uncovering a strategy that would shorten the war. Churchill’s strategy, however, was consistently the most nuanced and most far-reaching in its implications. His advocacy for different operations changed with the situation, but the kind of operation he envisaged was always the same in that it reflected his basic strategic convictions.

While recognizing the strengths of this strategy – to attack the enemy’s less significant flanks in order to weaken its Western Front defenses – one must ask whether it was theoretically sound and if it was successful when implemented. Churchill conducted many operations that exhibited elements of his basic strategy, but he employed it most fully in Turkey where he attempted to end the war. He fervently believed that if he applied the tenets of his strategy – flanking action, overwhelming force, and surprise – to this peripheral theater of war, he could set in motion a chain of events that would end in Germany’s defeat. The rewards of the gamble he took in the spring of 1915 could have been monumental; such great promise made the campaign’s complete failure that much more bitter. The failure of Churchill’s strategy in Turkey drove Churchill out of government and his strategy back into the disastrous tactics he had hoped to avoid. To understand his strategy and its failure is to understand why World War I became the war that it did and, more importantly, how it could have been different.

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6 The Western or Continental school focused principally on actions taken in the West, as they believed only a defeat of the prime German military force could precipitate an end to the war. By contrast, the Eastern or Maritime-peripheral school believed that actions taken on the periphery could in their own right lead to an allied victory.
Background to a New Kind of War

World War I was in no way Churchill’s first experience with war: rather, it was the culmination of a lifetime spent studying war’s intricacies and living through its hardships. Churchill was a soldier in four conflicts before World War I. He had fought in battles around the world, in Cuba, the Northwest Frontier, South Africa, and the Sudan, among others. These experiences gave him a comprehensive perspective, for he knew what a battle of maneuver could achieve and what a battle of exhaustion and attrition could become. He spent five years in the army before moving into politics; his military experiences were instrumental in shaping his perceptions of strategy and tactics that would define his political career. In India and the Sudan, he had experienced traditional Victorian wars in which British cavalry dominated their opponents and success depended upon the ability to maneuver around the enemy and flank his position. These were examples of decisive campaigns in which one battle was often able to determine the course of a war.

Churchill’s experience in the Boer War, however, suggested a new and disturbing stage in the evolution of warfare. In South Africa, he witnessed the horrible power of technology against even the most courageous soldiers. Of this experience, he later wrote, “I had carried away from the South African veldt a very lively and modern sense of what rifle bullets could do.” Only one week after arriving in South Africa and declaring the Boers obviously inferior to the British, Churchill was forced to concede this point, stating, “It is astonishing how we have underrated these people … a long and bloody war is before us – and the end is by no means as certain as most people imagine.” The Boer War became a brutal struggle because of the indecision among military leaders and the few maneuver options the harsh terrain afforded. This war had a lasting impact on Churchill’s conception of war in the modern world.

In these early experiences, Churchill began to discern the elements that would later characterize total war and thus World War I. He saw the Boers use both entrenched positions to defend against superior enemies and interior lines to prevent breaks in the front from gaining momentum. His Boer War experiences indicated that the presence of machine guns or barbed wire could render impotent British military strengths that had been effective for centuries. On the battlefields of France, older generals who had spent their young lives in the glory of the Victorian age often failed to respond to this new kind of warfare in which the immense numbers of men and material involved neutralized the efficacy of small-scale maneuvers. For Churchill, the Boer War prefigured the loss of strategic mobility and

9 Churchill would often look to the Battle of Omdurman against the Mahdi in the Sudan as a perfect example of this kind of operation. This battle, led by then Major General, Herbert Kitchener, caused the death of over 10,000 Mahdists, while fewer than 500 British soldiers were killed. This single battle determined the fate of not simply the Mahdist campaign, but that of the nation of Sudan. "Omdurman, Battle of." *Encyclopædia Britannica.* 2008. Encyclopædia Britannica Online. (accessed 15 Apr. 2008) available from <http://search.eb.com/eb/article-9057084>.
slaughter that defined the Western Front. Churchill’s combat experience in wars of maneuver and the first quasi wars of attrition led him to develop a strategy to bridge the gap, and his background gave him the capacity to bring maneuver and actual strategy to the Great War, a conflict that had degenerated into meaningless violence.

Churchill argued that this violence was futile because the lives lost in the many Western Offensives had not been sacrificed in the execution of a sound strategy. He recognized the need for grand strategy in a war of this scale and deplored the lack of strategic direction displayed in the assaults undertaken before the decisive year of 1918. These attacks represented a failure of the military to respond to a way of war that was strikingly different from past experiences.13 Churchill quoted General William Robertson, who, in writing after the costly offensive at Passchendaele, had the audacity to say, “I confess I stick to it more because I see nothing better, and because my instinct prompts me to stick to it; than because of any good argument by which I can support it.”14 These words illustrate Robertson’s and other military leaders’ lack of real strategic thought. These words are not constructive; rather, they reveal the resignation to the gruesome state of affairs. Churchill decried this attitude, writing in response, “These are terrible words when used to sustain the sacrifice of nearly four hundred thousand men.”15 Churchill did not deplore sacrifice itself, for he repeatedly called for actions that he knew would cause great loss of life. He considered it unconscionable and wasteful to sacrifice lives in attacks motivated by nothing more than habit and despair. The military’s refusal to alter its methods, despite their blatant uselessness, inspired Churchill to create his own solution.

For this reason, Churchill believed that strategy in total war, which mobilized not just armies but “whole nations,” had to be controlled at the highest level.16 The military arm was simply one element in the larger conflict between states. To explain this new relationship, Churchill wrote in The World Crisis:

The general no doubt was an expert on how to move his troops and the admiral upon how to fight his ships. But outside this technical aspect they were helpless and misleading arbiters in problems in whose solution the aid of the Statesman, the financier, the manufacturer, the inventor, the psychologist, was equally required.17

Because war was no longer simply a military matter, Churchill considered it folly to let the military direct the war.18 With this new reality in mind, as First Lord of the Admiralty and Minister of Munitions,

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15 Ibid, 52.
16 In a speech to a munitions factory in 1917 Churchill was quoted as saying that the Great War “was not a war only of armies, or even mainly of armies. It was a war of whole nations.” David Jablonsky. Churchill, The Great Game and Total War. (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 51.
18 Churchill was vindicated in this opinion when in the war’s wake people were able to realize that following the Battle of Ypres in November 1914, the military never developed an effective strategy to counter the German defensives in the West. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill: Volume III, Challenge of War, 1914-1916. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971, 137.)
At-Large

Churchill made it his purpose to develop a strategy that would combine actions at all levels of warfare in all theaters of conflict.

Components and their Manifestations

Having identified the origins and foundations of this grand strategy it is important to ascertain how Churchill implemented his vision at the operational level. The early operations and plans of the war involved several key tactics which, when executed, exemplified Churchill’s ideal methods of warfare. The basic thinking behind his strategy was that if one accepts that breaking the enemies’ lines is impossible or prohibitively costly, then one should not try to break them. All of Churchill’s operations and maneuvers, both tactical and technical, sought to defeat the Germans without attacking the bulk of German forces stationed on the Western Front. These tactics were not simply military maneuvers, for they also had political, economic, and psychological dimensions.

His strategy was to rout the enemy without actually routing him, to flank him on land or at sea, to open entirely new fronts against his weakest points. 19 During his tenure as First Lord, Churchill constantly stressed the importance of the flank in the operations he suggested to the War Council. For example, one can see his concern for the British flank and excitement at turning the German one in his operations to defend Antwerp. By September, “Antwerp was the only fortress left in Allied hands between the Germany Army and the sea.” 20 As both armies raced to the sea in an attempt to outflank the other, Churchill recognized the importance of this Belgian port not only in interrupting the German advance, but also in potentially stopping the advance altogether. In a cable to several members of the War Cabinet, Churchill highlighted this opportunity stating, “The Admiralty regard the sustained and effective defense of Antwerp as a matter of high consequence…. It safeguards a strategic point which, if captured, would be of the utmost menace.” 21 Churchill spent three nights personally overseeing the defense of the city with the aid of his two Naval Brigades and admittedly allowed the city to hold out for an extra seven days. 22 In March 1918, the King of Belgium lionized Churchill, writing, “Only one man of all your people had the preview of what the loss of Antwerp would entail and that man was Mr. Churchill…. Delaying an enemy is often of far greater service than the defeat of the enemy…. These three days allowed the French and British armies to move NW. Otherwise our whole army might have been captured.” 23 Churchill’s operation on the German flank slowed the German advance to the sea and diverted forces from the thrust of their attack. This and other flanking operations served both offensive and defensive purposes, slowing German forces and forcing them to reallocate their resources.


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Another key belief Churchill developed was that the British should only go on the offensive when in possession of overwhelming force. In his influential memorandum, “Munitions Program 1919,” Churchill wrote, “Offensive action can only be based on overwhelming superiority in one form or another.” By this point, the Allies had painfully recognized the four to one advantage trench warfare afforded the defender. Churchill had also realized the lack of depth and loss of momentum inherent in offensives against an enemy with interior lines. In his memorandum, “Variants of the Offensive,” Churchill stated:

It has been abundantly proved that the first lines can be taken without undo loss; but the difficulties of taking the second lines have hitherto proved insuperable. The first lines are thinly held and can be dominated by our artillery; but by the time the guns have been moved forward...the enemy has brought up reserves and our numerical preponderance at the second line is very much less than at the first.

Churchill was describing the problem of advancing into an area of elastic defense, a tactic in which multiple lines of resistance are formed so as to diminish the thrust of an offense. As the war progressed, Churchill understood the terrible power of this tactic in blunting British offensives. On March 24, 1918, he ruefully told David Lloyd George, “Every offensive lost its forced as it proceeded. It was like throwing a bucket of water over the floor. It rushed forward then soaked forward, and finally stopped altogether until another bucket could be brought.” Churchill confronted a situation in which attempting to breach the Western Front was prohibitively costly; the British could never conquer enough territory to make offensives strategically or psychologically feasible.

For this reason, Churchill came to deplore the catastrophic attacks that achieved little success because they prevented the Allies from building up sufficiently dominant strength. In a memo written after the Battle of the Somme, Churchill argued that, “the pent-up energies of the army [were] being dissipated” by such offensives. In this memorandum, Churchill wrote at length about the importance of gaining superiority not only in manpower but in machine and technical power as well. In a speech on March 5, 1917, he declared, “Machines save lives, machine-power is a substitute for man-power, brains will save blood, maneuver is the great diluting agent to slaughter, and can be made to reduce the quantity of slaughter required to effect any particular object.” In favoring superiority over parity, Churchill not only stressed the need for dominant troop strength, but also turned to the power of technology to augment the power of numbers.

If superiority and flanking were two tenets of Churchill’s strategy, then surprise was undoubtedly the third. Early in the war Churchill recognized that the ability to surprise the enemy by the strength, location, timing, or direction of an attack was often the key to the attack’s success or failure. Ironically, in a memorandum written only weeks before the debacle of the Gallipoli operation began, Churchill wrote of the importance of “secrecy, silence and suddenness” and their power to “mystify and mislead the enemy, baffle his spy organization, and tend to destroy his confidence in it.” 29 For Churchill, surprise – which consisted of “novelty and suddenness” – multiplied force and efficacy, increasing the actual power of an attack without augmenting its objective strength. 30

Churchill’s experience in the development and deployment of the tank best represent his feelings on surprise. He was instrumental in supporting the tank as a useful device to overcome the stalemate in the West, and he fervently believed that a good deal of the tank’s power derived from its novelty. In December, 1915, he wrote that no tanks “should be used until all can be used at once. They should be disposed secretly along the whole attacking front.” 31 Churchill recognized that once the Germans became familiar with tanks, it would be significantly harder to shock them into submission. Thus, the first appearance of the tank on the battlefield was an incredibly important opportunity that Churchill felt could not be squandered. So when he learned that thirty-five of these machines were to be used in the Battle of the Somme in small ineffective groups throughout the line, he was furious. 32 Churchill saw this as a wasteful expedient for an inconsequential gain. He wrote,

The immense advantage of novelty and surprise was thus squandered while the number of the tanks was small, while their condition was experimental and their crews almost untrained. This priceless conception … was revealed to the Germans for the mere petty purpose of taking a few ruined villages…. The enemy was familiarized with them by their piecemeal use.” 33

Churchill would have rather advanced without the tank at all than reveal its technological secrets to the Germans prematurely. Indeed, tanks were not effective in changing the balance of power in the Battle of Somme because there were so few of them and because they were not employed with overwhelming force. Churchill expressed his feelings on the tank’s potential in “Munitions Program 1919,” writing, “If we had developed tanks in secret … and then used them as they were used at the Battle of Cambrai, only on a much larger scale … we in turn might have broken up the German front and driven their armies into a continuous retreat.” 34 While Churchill recognized the massive potential of the tank, he believed that its

31 Ibid, 1304.
34 Winston Churchill, “Munitions Program, 1919,” memorandum to the War Cabinet, March 5, 1918, in Winston S. Churchill. The World Crisis: 1916-1918, Part II. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1927). p.112. The Battle of Cambrai was fought on November 29, 1917. Churchill refers to it as a perfect example of how tactical surprise could augment the power of an offensive. He believed that had Cambrai itself been larger, or been followed by three or four battles of equal size the Germans could have been soundly defeated. David Jablonsky, Churchill: The
initial deployment did not reflect his strategic principles. In these lines, Churchill stressed that had surprise been combined with overwhelming superiority over the length of the front, the war could have been ended with a single battle.

Finally, Churchill sought to use both overwhelming superiority and surprise in actions on the enemy’s flank to confuse German intelligence and determine the deployment of German resources. In viewing the war as a whole, Churchill recognized that events in other theaters could greatly impact the German disposition, even if the events themselves were not militarily decisive. This was why Churchill saw that the flank, even if distant from the decisive theater of war, could be the enemy’s most vulnerable position. Churchill’s Ostend operation was a prime example of these principles working in tandem. As the British Expeditionary Force retreated in the face of the German onslaught in August 1914, Churchill dispatched several thousand marines to the coastal village of Ostend. In his order to Sir George Aston, Churchill wrote, “The object of this movement is to create a diversion, favorable to the Belgians … and to threaten the western flank of the German advance… The object in view would be fully attained if a considerable force of the enemy were attracted to the coast.” Churchill was correct in his predictions as “the German High Command was disturbed by rumors of large British troops landing on the Belgian coast.” At a key moment during the Battle of the Marne, the Germans suspected that anywhere from 3,000 British to 80,000 Russians menaced their flank. An even more convincing example of this principle in action can be found in the crucial linkage between the Marne and Tannenber battle. At the height of the Battle of the Marne, German commander Moltke diverted six corps from the West to participate in the destruction of a Russian army in the East. At a crucial moment in the West, when the Allies were being driven to the sea, an event in another theater of the war forced the Germans to rearrange their deployments in such a way as to completely ruin the Germany’s Schlieffen Plan, which provided for a swift victory in the West in order to avoid a two-front war.

The three fundamental principles of Churchill’s strategy at the tactical and operational levels were thus: the use of overwhelming force and the exploitation of surprise in combination to attack the vulnerable flanks on the enemy’s periphery. Alone, each gave their user formidable advantage; together, Churchill considered them invincible. In using overwhelming force Churchill believed he could limit the likelihood of attrition by focusing on massive single offensives that achieved grand strategic objectives. With surprise, Churchill thought he could augment the power of that force by tactical and technical measures to shock the enemy into panic and submission. Churchill believed these traditional principles most effective when battling in the periphery or flanking the enemy. Churchill concluded that if the tactics of overwhelming superiority and surprise could be exploited to their fullest extent in a flanking action, such as the one he would attempt to execute in Turkey, the periphery of the war, the war would favor the

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35 Other examples of operations in which these principles can be discerned includ Churchill’s “Dunkirk Circus,” the defense of Antwerp, and the all the operations he planned for the Baltic and the North Sea.
38 Ibid, 56.
At-Large

Allies. It was in Turkey that Churchill attempted execute his strategy and test its effectiveness. He hoped that his grand strategy would end the Great War.

Case Study: The Dardanelles and Gallipoli

While Churchill’s grand strategy was sound in theory, it was less reliable when implemented. The operations at the Dardanelles and on Gallipoli, his greatest and worst campaigns of the war, were undoubtedly the largest and most complicated endeavors that Churchill conducted as First Lord of Admiralty. They represented the best opportunity for him to carry out his strategy on a grand scale in a way that could change the course of the war. In examining these two battles we can determine whether Churchill’s initial plans were inherently sound and how his strategy was put into practice. It will become clear that there were two fundamental inconsistencies within the conception and execution of the Turkish campaign. First, these operations failed because the execution was inept to the point of incompetence. Egregious failures at the operational and tactical levels of war prevented these plans from claiming any modicum of success. Second, these ill-executed maneuvers failed to represent accurately Churchill’s guiding strategic principles. As a result of the exigencies of war, bureaucratic squabbling, and diffuse leadership, neither operation embodied the assertive and novel operation that was Churchill’s ideal.

Churchill’s background, his strategic principles, and his particular position in the government made him an ideal candidate to see the advantage that could be gained from an operation against Turkey. While Turkey had originally been neutral, with the appearance of the Goeben and the Breslau, two German ships, on August 10, 1914, in the Sea of Marmara, Turkey began a slow but decided shift into the German camp. Immediately, Churchill took note of the opportunity this presented the Allies. In the words of preeminent Churchill biographer Sir Martin Gilbert, “For Churchill, the entry of Turkey into the war was of importance entirely because of the effect it could have upon the fortunes of the war in Europe.” Churchill saw an opportunity to use Turkey’s aggressive stance as pretext for convincing the heretofore ambivalent Balkan states into allying against their ancient enemy and creating a hostile front of Austria’s southern border. He moved quickly to exploit this chance to open a new theater in a peripheral area, creating a vulnerable target his grand strategy could exploit.

But the consideration of actions against Turkey was not a new phenomenon. A report by the General Staff in 1906 and one by the Committee of Imperial Defense written in 1907 addressed the question of how to attack Turkey, should such action become necessary. Their conclusions were not promising: both reports recognized that military and naval attacks presented possibly insurmountable difficulties. Even in 1914, Major Cunliffe-Owen, a military attaché in Turkey, wrote a telegram in which he stated quite emphatically:

A mere fleet entry is not calculated to have any permanent effect.... To command situation properly at Dardanelles requires also use of military force and point arises

39 Ibid, 40.
40 Ibid, 200.
41 Ibid, 294.
whether substantial enterprise should be attempted in a quite subsidiary theater of war.”

Even Churchill initially believed that only a joint naval-military operation had any chance of success. Yet, there were also reasons to believe than an action against the Dardanelles or Gallipoli could be promising. The Turkish military had declined since 1906 as a result of several major losses in Balkan Wars; the Turks were fighting in the Caucasus, stretching their resources thin; and most notably, British military technology had improved dramatically. Churchill recognized that an attack against Turkey, though difficult, could have the effect of seriously destabilizing the Central Powers while bringing new allies to the cause.

Two events that occurred in early January completely altered the debate over action against Turkey. With the plea of Russian Grand Duke Nicholas on January 1 for some sort of aid against the Turks and the telegrams of Admiral Sackville Carden on January 5 and 11 proclaiming an ability to breach the Dardanelles by ships alone, the likelihood of some sort of naval action was drastically increased. Politically, the War Council considered it imperative to make some demonstration of solidarity with Russia. Militarily, Carden proposed that such a demonstration could actually produce decisive results. Based on the increasing need of Russia and the possibility of great success with little cost outlined by Carden, the entire War Council was absorbed by the possibility of effective offensive action. Suddenly, a seemingly unimportant front had become the site of an action that could drastically alter the nature and direction of the war. Even the recalcitrant War Secretary Horatio Kitchener and First Sea Lord John Fisher were enthusiastic at first. Based on these factors, on January 13, the War Council officially authorized Carden and the Admiralty to begin preparing for a naval operation against the straits of the Dardanelles.

Beyond the basic exigencies and opportunities that these men hoped the events of January 1915 would cause, there were untold advantages to be gained shoul a Turkish campaign be successful. Many at the time believed that by breaching the straits of the Dardanelles, the British could effectively remove Turkey from the war. Once the straits were breached, the British navy would only have to destroy the paltry Turkish fleet and bombard Constantinople into submission to secure Turkish surrender. Sir Martin Gilbert summarized the possible rewards when he wrote, “The Royal Navy was in a position to destroy Turkey at a single blow, to relieve Russia, to provide the bait with which to force each Balkan State to turn against the Central Powers, and … bring the whole war to an end.” At a meeting of the War Council on January 28, A.J. Balfour elaborated on these ambitious possibilities stating, “[The campaign] would cut the Turkish army in two; it would put Constantinople under our control; It would give us the

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advantage of having the Russian wheat, and enable Russia to resume exports."  

Balfour hit on the economic benefit to be gained by freeing Russia from the Turkish threat in addition to the obvious military advantage of destroying Turkish naval power.

Politically, Churchill and others quickly recognized that an action against Turkey could also have the effect of uniting the then uncooperative Balkan neutrals into a powerful coalition. In a letter written to Liberal MP Noel Buxton on August 31, 1914, Churchill stated, “The creation of a Balkan Confederation comprising Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, Montenegro and Greece … must be the common dream of all their peoples…. By acting together in unity … the Balkan states can now play a decisive part.” Churchill indicated that uniting the Balkans against the Central Powers was not only in the interest of Allies, but also to the Balkans’ own advantage. He saw the importance that alliance politics could play in defeating the enemy without necessarily sacrificing thousands in the process. David Lloyd George pinpointed the benefit to be gained from a loyal Balkan confederacy, writing that with such a grouping, Austria would be forced to face an army of 1.5 million men on its weak and porous Southern border. A Balkan Confederation was thus the equivalent of a flanking movement in that it would force the Central Powers to contend with a new threat and redeploy their forces accordingly. There existed strong military, economic, and political reasons for this action, which would seek to combat the Germans not only with armed force, but also with allies and new economic strength. This front would not be another trench war, but an aggressive offensive against a vulnerable outpost to be executed with speed and surprise. It would be exactly the kind of operation that total war demanded and hopefully rewarded.

Having decided on the necessity of an operation and assuming that the British fleet acting alone could achieve success, Churchill began to plan the operation. How accurately and whether these original plans reflected Churchill’s strategy must be the basis for any assessment of his grand strategic vision. At the tactical level, the goal of the naval operation was to breach the straits by bombarding the forts to the North and South and breaking into the Sea of Marmara. Once in the Sea, the fleet would destroy the Turkish navy and the gun installations surrounding Constantinople. This kind of operation was always popular because if it was unsuccessful, the ships could simply retreat and take up another operation. A defeat did not have to be disastrous. Even at this early stage though, Churchill hoped that troops would

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50 It was also the case that many on the War Council feared that either Bulgaria or Greece might support the Central Powers if action were not taken to sway them otherwise. Were they to do so, Serbia would be stuck between two very powerful belligerents and would likely face annihilation. Martin Gilbert, *Winston S. Churchill: Volume III, Challenge of War, 1914–1916*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), 280.
be available to support the operation. Kitchener however, would be consistently reluctant to commit manpower to what he saw as a naval operation. Kitchener claimed that no sufficient military force was available to support the operation.\(^{53}\) No one adamantly opposed him, both because no one had the authority to do so and because most still thought a naval action could be decisive.\(^{54}\)

On the surface, this initial naval plan seemed capable of achieving great success, but the procedure for its implementation failed to embody Churchill’s primary tenets of speed and surprise. Certainly, this strategy presented the navy with an opportunity to take an active position in prosecuting the war.\(^{55}\) It proposed to use a large fleet to overwhelm weak fortifications and defeat Turkey’s vastly inferior navy. It also had the advantage of forcing the Turks to cease their battle in the Caucasus and focus on the British. Nevertheless, while the operation seemed to meet the criteria of overwhelming force, it failed to incorporate surprise and the aggressive application of that force. One of the lessons to be learned as a result of this operation’s failure is that time blunts force. If one applies a strong force, but only in increments over a long period, its power diminishes as the enemy recovers. When Churchill agreed to support a “plan of methodical piecemeal reduction of forts” it appears that he violated his own beliefs on the importance of surprise.\(^{56}\) While it would have been dangerous, even foolhardy, to try to breach the straits with the kind of speed surprise would have necessitated, this plan alerted the enemy to British intentions and allowed the Turks to prepare accordingly.

As the date of the naval attack neared, many advisers began to voice concerns that the navy could not succeed alone. Sir Henry Jackson expressed the feelings of these dissenters best when he wrote, “To complete [the forts'] destruction, strong military landing parties… will be necessary…the naval bombardment is not recommended as a sound military operation, unless a strong military force is ready to assist.”\(^{57}\) In response to such criticisms, on February 16, the War Council voted to prepare 50,000 men for the operation. When the War Council decided to contribute a significant number of troops to the enterprise, the plan changed accordingly. The new goal became to take the Gallipoli Peninsula by force and press on to Constantinople. The army would take the lead, with the fleet supporting it. However, from the start, Kitchener balked at sending troops. David Lloyd George thought that as many as 97,000 troops should be assigned to Gallipoli, as did Churchill.\(^{58}\) They wanted to ensure success and had come to

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\(^{54}\) Gilbert, 274.


believe that large troop deployments were necessary for a decisive victory; yet Kitchener remained obstinate and refused to send the 29th Division or any other regular British troops for weeks.

The underlying flaw of this operation becomes clear when considering this strategic impasse between Kitchener and Churchill. By mid-February most members of the War Council had come to accept that the Turkish campaign would need a significant level of military strength to succeed. They had also come to believe that victory in this campaign was key to success in other theaters of the war. Yet, because of Kitchener’s hesitation and the Council’s failure to persuade him, the troops that everyone agreed were vital were not prepared. When Kitchener finally agreed to provide the requisite number of troops, naval operations had been halted for over a month while waiting for those regiments. Tactical advantage, initiative, audacity, and surprise were all lost. In this time, the Turks had prepared their land defenses. But more fundamentally, Churchill and many members of the War Council approved of an operation that was to be executed under less than ideal conditions. The operation they accepted was executed in a way that diverged from many of their basic strategic principles. The operation Churchill oversaw was not his ideal operation. Sir Martin Gilbert aptly described the situation when he wrote, “[Churchill] so believed in the need for victory that he was prepared to go ahead with the plans for an entirely naval attack. However much he continued to argue these plans might fail, by agreeing to go ahead with them, he made himself responsible for the very disaster he forecast.” Churchill allowed the operation to proceed despite his own apprehensions, which proved to be well founded and accurate.

The sequence of the events that led from the naval assault to the Gallipoli landings gave credence to every fear and concern Churchill had harbored about these operations. The naval attack commenced with the bombardment of the outer forts on February 19. By February 25, four of these forts had been destroyed. The next challenge was to confront the minefields and coastal defenses of the Narrows. However, as of March 7, Vice-Admiral Carden had become convinced that landing parties would be necessary to render the forts fully disabled. As politicians argued over the feasibility and logistics of sending troops, the attack slowed. The naval assault finally resumed on March 18 when, under new Vice-Admiral John de Robeck, three vessels were sunk and one was critically damaged. In spite of Churchill’s ardent desire to press the naval attack, the operation ceased until sufficient troops could be deployed to support it.

The campaign resumed as a joint naval-military operation with the landing of 30,000 men at two locations on the Gallipoli Peninsula on April 25. These men reached none of their objectives as individual

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50 Gilbert, 293.
units were completely separated from the chain of command and had little decisive leadership. General Sir Ian Hamilton, the operation’s commanding officer, had no personnel on ground reporting back to headquarters. By 8 AM, there were over 8,000 British troops on the Peninsula facing only 500 Turks, but in the confusion of the landing this advantage was not pursued. “None of the advantages gained…were exploited. Easy landings, minimal resistance, numbers far greater than those of the Turks…were of no value if neglected.”65 The rapidly growing Turkish forces encircled the British regiments and trapped them on their beachheads. The massive offensive Hamilton planned for May 6 gained only 500 yards.66 At this point, the Turkish campaign took on the same character as the war in France; the trenches were simply in Turkish sand and stone rather than the European mud. Confirming this similarity, Jack Churchill wrote to his brother on May 9, stating melancholically, “It has been siege warfare as in France. Trenches and wire beautifully covered by machine gun fire…and then attempts to make frontal attacks in the face of awful musketry fire.”67 When the British pulled out on January 9, 1916, they had spent 259 days of gruesome trench warfare in Turkey68 and had achieved not a single military, economic, or political objective.

Anatomy of Failure

With a failure of this magnitude it is vital to ask why the events unfolded in this way. Why did operations that had consumed the effort and planning of Britain’s entire military-political apparatus for weeks meet with stunning defeat? There were many contributing factors to this rout that pertain to military strategy and domestic politics. The failure occurred not only on the ground in Turkey, but also in the meetings of the War Council and the halls of Parliament. It was a failure of tactics and strategy because the tactics themselves did not accurately reflect Churchill’s grand strategy. With this dual failure in mind, the naval and army operations must be analyzed separately, for they each failed for different reasons and at different levels of strategic thinking.

Ironically, the naval assault failed mainly because it was not fully executed. De Robeck refused to press the attack after March 18, despite the fact that reports suggested the Turks were low on ammunition.69 Churchill had also impressed upon Carden the importance of maintaining constant naval pressure, writing that the whole operation was at stake in the effort to take the Narrows and that great losses would be acceptable in the name of victory.70 Both Carden and de Robeck effectively ignored these injunctions. Speaking before the Dardanelles Commission Churchill vindicated his position, declaring, “German and Turkish officers have repeatedly stated that the naval attack would have succeeded if it had been persevered in…It is said that only three rounds a gun remained after the 18th of March for the heavy

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65 Gilbert, 404.
66 Ibid, 415.
68 Gilbert, 428.
69 Ibid, 337.
guns in the forts of the Narrows.”71 Churchill was convinced that had the Navy pushed harder, they could have broken through. Thus, it was this failure of determination that caused the operation to fail more than anything else.

By contrast, the Gallipoli landings fountered because the military failed to pursue obvious advantage at the tactical and operational level and squandered a situation that was ripe for victory. The opening stage of the operation was a complete tactical failure. The chain of command between those creating strategy and those implementing it was broken.72 One flagrant example of this failure is that at Y beach (a landing point on Cape Helles) the British were able to drive off the enemy, but chose to abandon their position. “There had been more British troops ashore at Y beach than there were Turks in the whole Helles area.”73 Individual incidents such as this one abound in the account of these first landings. Such early problems were key to the operation’s demise because the operation depended on a swift attack that employed surprise and overwhelming force. The presence of such numerical superiority in the early stage of the landings was made impotent as the Turks were given time to regroup. Time once again blunted the strength of what could have been a powerful forward thrust. In the aftermath of Gallipoli Churchill wrote, “Force and time in this kind of operation amount to almost the same thing… A week lost was about the same as a division… Three divisions in February could have occupied the Gallipoli Peninsula with little fighting. Five could have captured it after March 18. Seven were insufficient at the end of April.”74 The landings failed because the strategy was not executed as it had been intended and the linkage between Churchill’s grand strategy and operational maneuvers was severed.

The question of Churchill’s complicity in the failure of the Turkish Campaign is complicated because there is conflicting evidence that supports his exoneration and his condemnation. The cause for these failures at the operational and tactical level did not emanate from him; he cannot be blamed for the failure of de Robeck to be decisive or of Hamilton and his officer corps to direct an operation properly. It is also true that Churchill never stopped pushing Kitchener to provide the requisite amount of manpower to assure success, even when doing so enraged his colleagues. Fisher scuttled Churchill’s attempts to convince de Robeck to continue the attack75 and Kitchener’s stubborn resistance spoiled Churchill’s demands for more troops. Churchill pushed for changes that would have made these operations more successful and yet was overruled by two colleagues, both of whom possessed considerable leverage in the Prime Minister’s cabinet.

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73 Gilbert, 407.
75 The role Lord Fisher played not only in the troubles of Gallipoli but also in the fall of Winston Churchill from political life in May 1915 cannot be understated. Unbeknownst to Churchill, Fisher worked tirelessly to undermine the Gallipoli campaign and Churchill’s ability to control its direction. Fisher was able to forestall another naval attack after March 18 by threatening resignation and despite having initially supported the attack, schemed against Churchill endlessly to cuts its support and disengage.
A vital point is that Churchill approved, and in fact pushed for, a campaign that he realized possessed serious deficiencies. He recognized the failings in both the naval and military attacks and continued to support them even as they were taking shape in ways that did not reflect his strategic principles. In retrospect, it seems clear that Churchill should not have pressed for such operations, but should have argued against them. To argue for an operation that carries risk is reasonable, but to argue for one that is flawed at a basic strategic level is illogical and dangerous. In his defense, Churchill stated to the Dardanelles Commission, “It is not right to condemn operations of war simply because they involve risk and chance…one can only balance the chance…All war is hazard. Victory is only wrestled by running risks.” Even as the strategic possibilities of the operation were withering, Churchill continued to believe that the risks were worth the objectives. He believed that success at the tactical and operation level would outweigh the plan’s strategic incoherence. He would always admit that the Turkish Campaign was a gamble, but for the gains it promised, it was a “legitimate” gamble.77

The Turkish Campaign failed not because the strategy Churchill formulated throughout World War I was flawed, but rather because the campaign itself was not accurate representation of that strategy. The operations at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli were operations on the flank of the enemy, but they were also operations that lacked the tenets of Churchills grand strategy: surprise, initiative, and the aggressive application of overwhelming force. These schemes ignored basic operational principles that Churchill argued were vital to success, even as he was asserting the importance of the campaign as a whole. Maurice Hankey, Secretary of the War Council, articulated this basic inconsistency when he wrote, “Although on general principles the operation is brilliantly conceived, and quite correct, I am not at all satisfied that it is being carried out in the best possible manners.”78 He identified that the concept behind the operation was genius, but that when the operations were actually planned and later executed, they were robbed of those traits, which would have assured them success. Hankey went on to say, “We have given the Turks time to assemble a vast force, to pour in field guns and howitzers, to entrench every landing place, and the operation has become a formidable one.”79 It was failure to adhere to Churchill’s strategy in its totality that doomed both operations.

In a case of tragic irony, a strategy that was intended to circumvent the kind of grudging trench warfare that came to define the Western Front led to the birth of an operation that met the same kind of stalemate. The operations in Turkey were Churchill’s great opportunity to implement his conception of grand strategy on the largest possible scale. It was his chance to attack on the war’s periphery in the hopes of diverting the enemy’s resources, forging coalitions, freeing clogged trade routes, and ultimately defeating the Germans without piercing their lines. Because of personal, political, economic, and military reasons the campaign failed to satisfy British objectives. Churchill was constrained by his own personal

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79 Ibid, 701.
At-Large

pride, domestic politics, the British economy, and military infighting, so he could not shape an enterprise that embodied his grand strategy.

Churchill failed not as a strategist, but as politician and policy-maker. He and his colleagues met with defeat, but his strategy, as an ideal to strive toward, should bear no blame. Churchill failed because his ego, his ambition, his calculations and his fervent conviction that he could end the Great War drove him to accept an operation that defied his most basic precepts of war. Considering the reservations both he and others expressed, he obviously believed that successes at the tactical and operational levels could mask the fundamental problems underlying the operation. British military officers also believed that the attacks Churchill condemned would mask the lack of grand strategy. Churchill’s faith was misplaced, and failures at both the tactical and strategic levels doomed a concept that might have been profoundly successful. The idea of fighting on the enemy’s periphery to create change in the decisive theater of the war was revolutionary in its attempt to unify various theaters of battle into one vision of total war. Its failure signaled for Churchill the end of true strategy in the war and doomed the British to fight a conflict of mindless and savage attrition.

The End of Strategy…

Thereafter, the fire roared on till it burnt itself out. Thereafter events passed very largely outside the scope of conscious choice. Governments and individuals conformed to the rhythm of the tragedy, and swayed and staggered forward in helpless violence, slaughtering and squandering on ever-increasing scales, till injuries were wrought to the structure of human society. 80

The foundering of Churchill’s strategy in Turkey put to rest all hopes of avoiding or forestalling offensives against the Western Front. What followed over the next two years was some of the most brutal carnage the world had ever seen, executed with no strategic objective. In Churchill’s view the “art of war” had fallen into “hopelessness.” 81 The leaders of armies and nations had become ignorant of strategy and in many ways, the underlying political purpose of war. Grand Strategy is the use of all the instruments of national power in pursuit of a political objective. World War I became a war dominated solely by military thought. 82 Economics, politics, and psychology became subservient to military considerations and their intricate relationships were ignored. This dearth of strategy culminated in British victory only because of German miscalculations. The British did not win through cunning, but rather through savage manslaughter. Churchill’s strategy had promised to rescue the British from the ruin that would meet both victor and vanquished if the war was fought to its conclusion along the Western Front. His strategy was not effectively implemented and the outcome was a debilitating war that consumed the strength and vitality of all armies. It is impossible to know for certain what would have happened had Churchill been able to execute his strategy as he saw fit. The evidence suggests that the failure at Gallipoli, while costly,

81Jabonsky, 11.
82Ibid, 37.
damning, and humiliating, was not a failure of the grand strategy he articulated. In fact, the defeat at Gallipoli was a vindication of that strategy. Through its failures, it validated Churchill’s faith in the importance of surprise and the assertive application of overwhelming force. The operations foundered primarily because they lacked these vital elements of Churchill’s vision. The defeat of the Turkish campaign in 1915 demonstrated the validity of Churchill’s strategic thinking and the comparative scarcity of grand strategic thought that was to follow.

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Yale professor Joanne Freeman, who received her Ph.D. from the University of Virginia in 1998, teaches undergraduate and graduate courses on early national politics and culture, including the popular junior seminar *The Age of Hamilton and Jefferson*. She is the author of *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic* and the editor of *Alexander Hamilton: Writings*. Next spring Professor Freeman will be on leave to work on her new book, a history of the violence in Congress before the Civil War, and she was kind enough to sit down and discuss her background, what history can teach us, advice for students, and her newest project.
How did you become a historian?
This is actually not my first career. I first thought I wanted to make documentary films. I went off into advertising after college, so I could make broadcast-quality video. But I really, really, really didn't like advertising. I was an English major [at Pomona College], and ended up working at South Street Seaport Museum doing education about New York history. I had been reading about [the Founding] time period for a long time, since I was about fourteen years old, so around this time I started getting hired as a consultant. I started being a freelance Founding-era consultant, and after doing that for a while, I realized it would be really smart of me to get back and get a graduate degree. I thought I was going to go back to museums, but I loved teaching when I started in graduate school.

How do you deal with people criticizing your own work?
In a classroom, I think it's great when people disagree with me. In a seminar, I don't often assign my own stuff because it's hard for students to debate when I'm sitting right there. But I think it's great when people want to discuss. I remember when I was sitting in on a section for my lecture course and a student with his back to me said, “I don't agree with what Professor Freeman said in lecture today,” and I thought, “Great!...what a gutsy kid.” I learn things from my students in seminar all the time.

There are trends in the craft of history saying that unless you draw larger, cultural conclusions, then your research won't be taken as a contribution to historical dialogue. The exploration of historical stories for the sake of historical stories is waning. I'm wondering if you think that's true and how you deal with students who want to explore the stories.
I like stories, too. I'm sitting here telling you stories. I don't think that historians, professional historians, have only told stories much...Most historians, if you ask them, will say that they are trying to say something broad. In my field, people are thinking about culture and politics a lot more than they were thirty years ago. That happens to be what is happening now. And in thirty years it will be something different. And that's fine...I don't think it's bad to tell stories, but in a real work of history, you're telling stories with the aim of saying something.

After studying these early politicians, does it change your view of today's politicians?
It's really hard to draw straight lines [between then and now]. That said, there are some things that echo throughout. Even though now we have political parties, and particularly right now we have particularly entrenched local parties, there's still a personal dimension to American politics. Themes and dimensions of the 1790s seem to reappear. Imagine back to the very early political era, after the first two or three presidential elections. Americans never really liked the political insider and always liked the political outsider...We always want the guy to come and shake up the system because he's against the evil insider, whoever the evil insiders are. You can also see people play all kinds of games with reputation destruction. Nowadays, it's
complicated because of cell phones and the internet. In the past, you could say something stupid and it would percolate for a while, but now if you say something stupid in two seconds the entire world has access to it.

**Do you have a favorite historical anecdote?**
I wouldn’t say I have one favorite. One that I end up using a lot because it ends up demonstrating the politics of the period really well is one at the beginning of my book. I always think of it as Alexander Hamilton’s Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Day. Hamilton stands up before a crowd of people and basically tells them that they have no right to have an opinion… [the crowd] throws rocks at his head. There’s a moment when Hamilton and the crowd were figuring out how much political power the people should have, which is one of the big things being acted out in the 1790s.

**What books, fiction or nonfiction, do you feel should be required reading for anyone interested in history?**
For fiction, I have two books -- one that I love (but that’s not exactly what I would call an "everyone should read it" book): "The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman," by Laurence Sterne. It is truly, weirdly post-modern. For example, when Sterne wants you to imagine a dark night, he gives you a page that’s completely black. But it’s also funny, and weirdly representative of the humor and culture of the eighteenth century, when it was wildly popular. Love the book. But not an easy read.

The other is Angle of Repose, by Wallace Stegner. A really great novel -- a great story -- actually, a story in a story -- that also happens to be about history and the telling of history beautifully. Pulitzer-prize winning. You won’t be able to put it down.

For non-fiction, a book that I end up recommending to lots of people falls more into the "primary source" category than the historical study category: The Adams-Jefferson Letters, ed. by Lester Cappon. The book includes all of the letters between Jefferson and Adams -- but what’s particularly fun in the volume is the section containing the letters that they exchanged in their old age, when they were both ex-presidents and already becoming "Founders" with a capital F -- and they know it. They talk about everything. Old friends. Old enemies. Past fights. They are amazing letters, all collected together in a book that I somehow always find myself recommending to people.

**What are you working on now?**
The book I’m working on now is on violence in Congress up until the Civil War. I have almost two-hundred fights at this point in the House and in the Senate: guns, knives, fistfights, duel challenges -- massive amounts of violence between 1830 and 1860.

**If you could force all Yale undergraduates with an interest in history to internalize something, if you could be History czar at Yale, what would you tell them to do?**
To think like historians. By that, I mean two things: put yourself in the mind of people from another time, and don’t assume things based on what you assume. If you go looking for something, you will always find it. But rather than saying “I’m going to go look for the rise of the first party system,” in which case you will always find it, let the evidence talk to you. Related to that, be willing to dig and play around and find evidence. There’s always new ways to look at old things.
Part of the mission of the Yale Historical Review is to show how the past is relevant to the present. This paper, written by Brendan Ternus for Professor Paige McGinley’s class, *Site Specific Theatre and Performance*, is an examination of the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin. In considering the nature and purpose of monuments, the author asks us to consider how we remember the past, and in what ways we incorporate collective or cultural memory into our individual lives. This paper, in the spirit of the Holocaust Memorial, encourages active “memory work.”
At the opening ceremony for Berlin’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe, Holocaust survivor Sabina van der Linden cited Elie Wiesel in absolving the descendants of the Nazis from personal responsibility for their forebears’ misdeeds, while simultaneously acknowledging a different burden: “We must never blame them for what their elders did. But we can hold them responsible for what they do with the memory of their elder’s crime.”¹ This task, known in German as Vergangenheitsbewältigung, translated as “coming to terms with the past,” formed a major aspect of the national identity of reunified Germany. “Tortured by its conflicted desire to build a new and just state on the bedrock memory of its horrendous crimes,”² Germany needed to come to terms with its history. Thus, the memorial needed to be both a concrete acknowledgment of past wrongs and a keystone to Germany’s ongoing engagement with its history.

In deference to the personal nature of this task, the final design intentionally left much unsaid and unresolved. Its architect, Peter Eisenman, recognized that he had not satisfied all viewers; he maintained that “[that] cannot have been our intention. To have done so would have been to have done nothing.”³ He saw monumentalizing something that was already settled—a universal consensus—as a pointless task. Instead, Eisenman envisioned an abstract, incomplete design that would encourage dialogue and invigorate further “memory-work.” Featuring issues of personal and individual responsibility, Eisenman’s design provides authentic support for the discourse into which it fits, engaging the controversies surrounding it. As a complex acknowledgment, it offers a new beginning that is still linked to the past. Participation in the memorial is a reflection of participation in the “memory-work” that underlies the German state today.

The final design for the memorial came about through a long series of artistic and bureaucratic conflicts. Upon securing governmental support, the citizen’s initiative behind the memorial hosted a public artistic competition. The plans of architect Simon Ungers and Christine Jakob-Marks emerged as the two front-runners. Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, was dissatisfied with the final recommendation to implement Jakob-Marks’ design. His veto placed the project in a serious crisis.⁴ A new, narrower contest was announced, from which emerged an early version of Eisenman’s eventual piece, designed in collaboration with sculptor Richard Serra. After further negotiation, a modified plan was approved: 2,711 concrete monoliths arranged in a grid on a sloping, wavelike terrain, varying only in height. The monument is open on all sides, seeming to welcome visitors inside. This initial feeling of openness and receptiveness contrasts with the experience of being inside the system of rigid, blank slabs when the walls seem to be closing in. When walking among the stelae, one is only able to see along the specific row and column in which one stands, inspiring a feeling of isolation; other people are virtually invisible even if close by.

In designing the memorial, Eisenman and Serra set out to challenge the very notions around which memorials are based. Proceeding from the creators’ “deep distrust of monumental forms,” such as figurative statuary, “in light of their systematic exploitation by the Nazis,” the monument adheres to abstract representation. The memorial’s pylons “more passively accommodate all memory and response, as the blank-sided obelisk always has.” Thus, it encourages viewers to engage with the monument and their own memories in an active way. As a “performative piece” that requires participation, it “initiates a dynamic relationship between artists, work, and viewer, in which none emerges singularly dominant.” The memorial is not something to take in passively — it is fundamentally a relational work.

The blankness of the design also stimulates self-reflection. Wolfgang Thierse, President of the German Bundestag, describes how the work communicates “the difficulty to find an artistic form that could somehow be appropriate to the Inconceivable.” The memorial questions memorial form itself. As a gesture to its creation and past, its form mimics the viewer’s own struggle, commemorating an inability to fully conceive of what has preceded. The fact that the stelae are blank — and that the memorial has no signs or markers identifying what they are or what they signify — indicates that the work of ascribing meaning is left up to the viewer. This is the nobility of the monument: it does not presume to tell the viewer how he or she should understand and remember the past. Rather, Eisenman’s work encourages and guides the viewer to draw his or her own meaning from its empty corridors and unmarked walls.

This openness to interpretation is an important element of the design because the memorial exists to prompt personal “memory-work.” The site reinforces this purpose. Placed at the heart of Berlin, “its integration into the newly built parliament and government district signifies an official recognition of historical responsibility.” Opponents of the memorial, however, point to this specificity as inauthentic and potentially harmful to the country’s “memory-work.” Paul Spiegel, President of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, spoke out against the site, arguing that the only true places of significance, engagement, and remembrance are the sites of the atrocities themselves. Seeing these sites as imbued with the actual essence of the crime and responsibility, he expressed his worry that the new memorial will allow people to forget about these authentic sites.

But this argument ignores the designers’ intentions in placing the memorial where they have. They seek to centralize the message and tie it symbolically to Germany’s new society and government. Acknowledging that they “cannot replace the historical sites of terror where atrocities were committed,” they seek to form a locus of new responsibility exactly where responsibility was so long abandoned.

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5 Young, 27.
6 Young, 33.
7 Young, 33.
Although one can still visit the authentic sites of tragedy, the memorial embodies a new authenticity, representing the future’s approach rather than one that is fully engrossed in hindsight.

The monument reflects a forward-looking standpoint, in which the nation’s past is fundamentally acknowledged as a part of its present identity. It also addresses the fear prevalent among many young “memory workers,” that by monumentalizing tragedy and atrocity in a monolithic form, we are able to close ourselves off from commemorative responsibility. “Instead of searing memory into public consciousness, they fear, conventional memorials seal memory off from awareness altogether.” In innovating this form, the designers intended the memorial to play an active role in the lives of citizens. Instead of fostering removed reverence, they envisioned a more quotidian role. Eisenman says of his design, “I like to think that people will use it for short cuts, as an everyday experience, not as a holy place.” By making it a part of their daily lives, people are able to come to terms with the Holocaust and actively bear this acknowledgement by themselves.

Thus, as people experience the memorial under different circumstances, its meaning changes and evolves. People are able to participate in the work in many different ways, especially if they can overcome the implicit veneration that exists for all monuments. There is no threat that the memorial will become dated and inaccessible because it is so open to interpretation, even as it remains extremely evocative, which challenges the traditional monumental form. It acknowledges and accommodates modern, ever-evolving attitudes. As Eisenman puts it, the memorial presents “a new idea of memory as distinct from nostalgia … We can only know the past today through a manifestation in the present.” The memorial provides the basis for changing impressions and further discourse.

Eisenman’s belief directly counters critics’ views that “no artistic monument could represent the full horror of the Holocaust” so that the memorial is “neither a witness to the past nor a sign to the future.” It certainly addresses a course of action, future memory-work, and the role it must play. In doing so, it transcends its artistic context and takes on greater social significance. When viewing it as art, historian James E. Young recommends “an alternative critique,” which considers “the many ways this art suggests itself as a basis for political and social action… what role the monument plays in current history.” More than a mere physical site in central Berlin, the work occupies an abiding socio-cultural or historical site. Thus the “art” of the memorial requires something much more significant than a decontextualized, purely artistic analysis, and thus, the creators are rendered nearly irrelevant. “In 50 years,” says Eisenman, “nobody will remember who the artist and the architect were.” Furthermore, the physical presence and “objecthood” of the work is sidelined by the social discourse that it occupies and intensifies. To consign this memorial to the realm of ‘mere’ art would be to rob it of its broader-based

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12 Young, 28.
14 Eisenman, “Berlin opens Holocaust Memorial.”
16 Young, 12.
17 Andrews.
historical importance and societal implications. It is an integrated part of Germany’s holistic “memory-work”: transposing the past into the cultural consciousness and conveying cognitive information while still evoking deep sentiments and unsettling reactions. As President Thierse put it, “It is, in the true sense of the word, an open work of art.”

Not only is the work “open” in its accessibility to people of all levels of understanding and all walks of life, it is open to myriad interpretations and diverse understandings of its message. In isolating its participants both physically and phenomenologically, it allows for each participant to have a deeply personal response. In addition to the inability to walk through the monument “collectively,” Thierse expressed that the memorial “makes possible an emotional and sensual conception of isolation, torment, threat.” The possibility that it provides, however, is an important distinction from a memorial that attempts to force this effect. Eisenman conveyed the hope that the memorial would help provide the basis for remembrance and deep engagement without goading anyone into it. He sought to “to begin a debate with open-endedness… allowing future generations to draw their own conclusions. Not to direct them what to think, but to allow them to think.”

The work’s significant incompleteness and simplicity allow for ongoing, durational “memory-work,” but do not dictate nor impose it. The memorial has prompted contentious arguments about everything from building materials to the nature of memory. In provoking such intense debate, the monument plays a fundamental role in discourse without overwhelming it. Taking this further, Young posits that perhaps, instead of a physical monument, the “perpetual” irresolution of the resultant debates may actually be the “surest engagement” with memory and the past. This dialogue may actually comprise Germany’s ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung,’ the only way that the country can both forge a new identity and acknowledge its past. On an individual level as well as a national one, the monument addresses this responsibility. Because of the lack of extrinsic compulsion, it “remains the obligation of passersby to enter into the art.”

This responsibility is integral to a sustained remembrance and confrontation with the issue of the Holocaust. In the wake of the homogenous ultra-nationalism that dictated how people expressed themselves and participated in society and government, most traditional monuments would have proven vastly inappropriate. To fashion a shared experience in conventional ways such as those used in unifying propaganda would have been to ignore the lessons learned from the Fascist era. The memorial seeks to inspire personal accountability for the task of memory-work, following a period when no one would or could take responsibility of his or her own. It is not an echo of dictatorial mandate, a monument to end all war, nor a penance that will do more harm than good. Nothing is imposed, but everything is offered. Each individual is given the opportunity to enter into memory-work and shoulder the responsibility of discourse and remembrance for him or herself. Those who do are building a new starting point for a nation that has both a past and a future.

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18 Thierse.
19 Thierse.
20 Eisenman, “Speech at Opening Ceremony”.
21 Young, 21.
22 Young, 33.
Outside of Yale

Radicalism and Rationalism: The Changing Conditions of Frankish Rule for the Native Peoples in the First Kingdom of Jerusalem

Spencer Zakarin, Princeton University 2011

*Junior Independent Paper*

*Professor Helmut Reimitz*

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The Outside Essay category provides one non-Yale student the opportunity to publish an essay in the Yale Historical Review. Spencer Zakarin, a senior at Princeton University, wrote this essay for a Junior Independent Work Paper required by Princeton’s history department. His advising professor was Helmut Reimitz, and Spencer's piece was selected from over one hundred essays submitted to The Yale Historical Review. This essay explores the changing rule of the Franks in Jerusalem after the First Crusade.
Under Jesus Christ, our leader, may you struggle for your Jerusalem, in Christian battle-line, most invincible line, even more successfully than did the sons of Jacob of old – struggle, that you may assail and drive out the Turks, more execrable than the Jebusites, who are in this land, and may you deem it a beautiful thing to die for Christ in that city in which he died for us.¹

With these words, Pope Urban II opened what would become one of history’s most fascinating and compelling periods, the Crusades. His speech at the Council of Clermont on November 27, 1095 changed the course of history across continents, cultures, and centuries, leaving an indelible mark that exists to this day on Christian-Muslim and East-West relations. His call to arms to defend Christianity and free the Holy City of Jerusalem from the “heathen” hands of Muslim infidels resounded across Europe, uniting thousands under the banner of the Cross. Men and women, nobles and peasants, priests and soldiers all rallied to the Church.

Over the ensuing months, Christians throughout Western Europe prepared for the long journey to the East. Urban II declared that all property belonging to the Crusaders would be protected and that all interest on debts would be frozen while these devout Christian men and women performed God’s work. In August of 1096, nine months after Pope Urban II’s speech at Clermont, the Crusaders began their march across Europe to Jerusalem. The path was long and arduous, befitting a religious mission. Throughout their travels, the crusading masses maintained their devout belief that God was willing them onwards. Finally, on May 16, 1099, nearly three years after they first set forth from Europe, the Crusader forces began their final approach to Jerusalem.

To this day, it remains unclear what Pope Urban II actually intended the Crusaders to do once they arrived in Jerusalem. There is no universally accepted transcript of his speech, nor is there any record of his motives or intentions elsewhere. However, it is almost certain that he did not foresee the progression of events that ultimately occurred. The insinuation of small numbers of Western European Christians into a land of religious diversity led to the fascinating evolution of Frankish interactions with Muslims, native Christians, and Jews. At first, intense religious fervor propelled the Crusaders to commit horrendous acts of violence against these non-Franks. However, over time, a modus vivendi developed out of necessity and mutual self-interest.

Word of the approaching Crusader armies traveled faster than the armies themselves, reaching the ears of the Fatimid governor of Jerusalem, Iftikhar al-Daulah. In an effort to bolster the defenses of the city, he poisoned all of the surrounding water supplies, hoping to weaken the Frankish forces through lack of water. He expelled all of the native Christians from the city, seeking to remove any

² The term “Frank” in Crusading history does not refer to people from France specifically, but rather is used to refer to all Western European Christians in the Levant. For more information, see Alan V. Murray, ed, The Crusades: An Encyclopedia, s.v. “Franks.”
potential spys or traitors from within the walls. Eventually, the Crusader armies themselves arrived in Jerusalem fatigued and in dire straits. Even after these grueling years of travel, the sight of their goal, the city of Jerusalem, spiritually invigorated and physically energized the Crusaders.

Their excitement and energy, however, initially led to overzealousness in their attacks. On June 13, the Franks made their first attempt at taking Jerusalem. This attack was poorly planned and hastily carried out, ending in retreat for the Crusaders, who now realized that their future efforts would have to be well calculated and involve extensive use of siege weaponry. Unfortunately, the Franks lacked adequate supplies of lumber and did not have the tools or artisans among them to properly produce the necessary siege weapons. In what could only be interpreted by the Crusaders as the hand of God, a fleet of Genoese ships arrived at Jaffa on June 17, bringing with them foodstuffs and, more importantly, the very artisans and tools that the Crusaders required for a siege. Every single person among the Crusaders worked for months from sunrise to sundown to prepare the siege engines for the attack. In doing this work, “the old men forgot their age, the sick men forgot their maladies, in their hearts the women and children strove to do great things.”

In what was viewed as another sign from God, Peter Desiderius, a Provencal priest among the Crusaders, had a vision during the night of July 5 in which the recently deceased Bishop Adhemar informed him that if the entire company of Crusaders fasted and walked barefoot around the city walls, the Franks would successfully take Jerusalem. While this vision suggested a questionable military strategy, the Franks listened to this foretelling and, doffing their shoes, began to walk around the city of Jerusalem. Presented with such easy targets, the Fatimid soldiers within Jerusalem took advantage of the defenseless Franks and killed a number of the participants, many of them members of the clergy. This blatant lack of respect further incensed the Crusaders.

As time passed, tensions between the Crusader forces outside the city and the Muslims within increased. Terror tactics and shows of brute force were publicly utilized to strike fear in the hearts of the enemy. Christian soldiers catapulted a captured Muslim spy, still alive, onto the rocks at the base of the walls of Jerusalem. The Muslims, for their part, erected crosses atop the walls, upon which they proceeded to spit and urinate. These brazen acts of religious disrespect and debasement only

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6 Asbridge, The First Crusade: A New History, 305.
8 William of Tyre, A Middle English Chronicle of the First Crusade: The Caxton Eracles, 661.
reinforced the Crusaders’ pervasive view that they were on a mission for God. Whenever the Franks encountered difficulties, a solution miraculously presented itself to them, seemingly by an act of God.

One of these “acts of God” actually gave the Franks the key to conquering Jerusalem. In an ironic turn of fate for Ifikhar al-Daulah, the Christians expelled from Jerusalem were responsible for the city’s undoing. When the Franks attacked the city with their siege towers, the Muslims countered with what they believed was their deadly secret weapon, a projectile that spread a fire that could not be quenched by water. This would have been a major disaster for the Franks, as all of their siege weaponry was made of dry wood, but the expelled Christians knew of this secret weapon and warned the Crusaders, thereby giving the Franks ample time to prepare. The soldiers atop the siege towers had bags full of vinegar that they used to douse the flames, rendering the Muslims’ secret weapon impotent.  

Even still, the fortress city of Jerusalem held off the Frankish attacks throughout the first day of the assault. Some among the crusading forces grew disheartened, believing that God had abandoned them. As if God heard their thoughts, another divine symbol appeared. “Upon the Mount of Olives appeared a knight who was neither known nor could ever be found [afterward]. This knight began to shake and move his shield… to signal our people that they should return to the assault immediately.” Once again spiritually reinvigorated by the grace of God, the Crusaders returned to their assault with religious fervor. The Franks soon overwhelmed the Muslim defenses and stormed over the walls into Jerusalem.

Upon entering Jerusalem, the Crusaders could not contain their zeal or pent up hostility towards the non-Christian inhabitants of the city. As one chronicler describes the capture of the city, “large groups of footmen went into the… town wielding large poleaxes, swords, mauls and other weapons in their hands [and] slaying all the Turks they could find, because these were the men whom our men hated most in this world and would most gladly put to death.” According to Ibn al-Athir, an Arab Muslim historian, “in the Masjid al-Aqsa [the al-Aqsa Mosque]… the Franks slaughtered more than 70,000 people, among them a large number of Imams and Muslim scholars who had left their homelands to live in the pious seclusion of the Holy Place.” As in nearly every existing primary source dealing with this event, the numbers are likely greatly exaggerated. However, there is no doubt that vast carnage occurred because Christian sources have been corroborated by their Muslim counterparts. The Crusaders ravaged Jerusalem in the first few days after taking it, massacring the non-Christians in a spasm of bloodlust.

Albert of Aachen, a Christian chronicler of the events of the First Crusade, provides a graphic description of the atrocities committed after the capture of Jerusalem. “They [the Crusaders] were piercing through with the sword’s point women who had fled into the turreted palaces and dwellings;

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13 William of Tyre, A Middle English Chronicle of the First Crusade: The Caxton Eracles, 669.
15 Ali ibn al-Athir, al-Kamil fi at-Tarikh, quoted in Michael Foss, People of the First Crusade, 1st U.S ed. (New York: Arcade Pub; Distributed by Little, Brown and Co., 1997) 177. Please note that Michael Foss does not provide any reference to this work, so I do not know which translation he is using or whether he has translated it himself.
seizing by the soles of their feet from their mothers’ laps or their cradles infants who were still suckling and dashing them against the walls or lintels of the doors and breaking their necks.”16 Raymond of Aguilers, another Christian chronicler, wrote that “with the fall of Jerusalem and its towers one could see marvelous works…. Piles of heads, hands and feet lay in the houses and streets, and men and knights were running to and fro over the corpses.”17 He later wrote that the bloodlust “was a just and splendid judgment of God that this place should be filled with the blood of the unbelievers, since it had suffered so long from their blasphemies.”18

Raymond’s description is noteworthy in that he describes the carnage as “marvelous works,” indicating that Raymond adhered to the nearly universal Christian view of the time. The Christian soldiers had traveled across continents, battling disease, hunger, thirst, and Muslim enemies to recapture Jerusalem from the “heathens.” Thus, no act of violence was seen as excessive, nor could it be when examined from the perspective of the Crusader, for they believed that their actions fulfilled the God’s will. As St. Augustine wrote, “the account of the wars of Moses will not excite surprise or abhorrence, for in wars carried on by divine command, he showed not ferocity but obedience; and God, in giving the command, acted not in cruelty, but in righteous retribution.”19 In the eyes of the Franks, this battle merited St. Augustine’s reasoning more than any other.20

Not every witness viewed the atrocities as justifiable and palatable. According to William of Tyre’s chronicle, one witness commented that “it was impossible to look upon the vast numbers of the slain without horror…. It was still more dreadful to gaze upon the victors themselves, covered in gore from head to foot.”21 However, only a small minority of Franks shared this opinion. In fact, according to one chronicle, the Crusaders “gained such joy and happiness of this honor which our Lord had given them, [that being] the grace to see the day when the Holy City was saved from the enemies of Jesus Christ by their labors, so that they [neither] cared about nor set [value upon] the remaining days of their lives.”22 After the massacres of the first day, the Crusaders went “rejoicing and weeping from

20 It is important to note that St. Augustine was referring to religious conflicts between Christian groups in North Africa, not to inter-religious struggles in the Holy Land. Pope Urban II and other religious leaders reapplied St. Augustine’s message in this context.
21 William of Tyre, *Historia Ierosolimitana*, Quoted in Foss, *People of the First Crusade*, 180. Again, Foss does not include bibliographic information so it is unclear which translation of William of Tyre he is using.
excessive gladness to worship at the Sepulchre of [their] Savior Jesus.”23 That the Crusaders felt it appropriate to turn directly from bloodshed and violence to prayer demonstrates how passionately they believed their deeds virtuous. The Crusaders, because of their conviction that their actions were righteous, were able to commit and justify the terrible acts of violence they inflicted upon the defenseless citizens of Jerusalem. According to Albert of Aachen, “there was such great bloodshed that streams even flowed out across the very floors of the royal court, and the stream of spilt blood was ankle deep.”24

The bloodshed was not limited to the Muslims in Jerusalem but extended to Jews as well, although they were not the official enemy of the Crusade. When the Crusaders entered Jerusalem, many of the Jews took refuge in their temple, hoping that this holy place would protect them, or at least that the Crusaders might respect the sanctity of its walls. Unfortunately, these hopes were misplaced. The Crusaders barred the doors to the temple and set it alight, condemning the Jews inside to fiery deaths and those who escaped to slavery. According to the chronicler Baldricus Dolensis, these Jewish slaves were sold “thirty for a piece of silver.”25 This was an act of malice rather than an attempt at profit because this price would have hardly been adequate for thirty slaves. Tancred, a leader of the Crusader armies, saved some Jews to sell into slavery, but if the price he received did not satisfy him, he beheaded the hostage out of anger.26

The atrocities did not end after the capture of Jerusalem. It seems that the Crusaders’ bloodlust could not be sated in one day, even though close to forty thousand people had been killed in the space of a few hours during the first day.27 Three days after taking Jerusalem, the Franks went through the city searching out any survivors from the initial violence and slaughtering all the non-Christians they found. Albert of Aachen observed that the Franks “were beheading or striking down with stones girls, women, noble ladies, even pregnant women, and very young children, paying attention to no one’s age…. Some were wound about the Christians’ feet, begging them with piteous weeping and wailing for their lives and safety…. But they were making these signals for pity and mercy in vain.”28 Any Jews that had not already been killed were forced to clean up the gore and remove the bodies from the city.29 Eventually, these atrocities stopped because few enemies remained within Jerusalem. The Crusaders were then confronted with a problem they had not planned for: what to do once Jerusalem was theirs?

At first, the immediate defense of the city occupied the Crusaders. Word arrived that the Fatimid forces in Egypt were mounting an offensive to retake the city. Godfrey, one of the leaders of the Crusaders who was appointed ruler of Jerusalem after its conquest, led the Franks to victory against the Fatimid forces at Ascalon. However, once the city seemed to be temporarily secure, many Crusaders

23 Quoted in Asbridge, The First Crusade: A New History, 318. Asbridge does not make it clear whether he is quoting from Fulcher of Chartres, the Gesta Francorum, or Raymond of Aguilers here. His bibliographic notes are ambiguous on this point.
24 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 431.
27 Kostick, The Siege of Jerusalem, 131.
28 Albert of Aachen, Historia Ierosolimitana, 433.
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departed. As historian James Lea Cate observes, many of the Crusaders were homesick pilgrims, not colonizers.\textsuperscript{30} The remaining Franks under Godfrey were left to protect and rebuild the city of Jerusalem and its environs. To do this, they conquered neighboring towns and cities, which mitigated the threat of attack from nearby Muslim rulers, and they consolidated loyalty within Jerusalem itself. Godfrey and Baldwin I realized that Jerusalem would be lost unless the territories under Christian control could be expanded and protected from nearby Muslims. Baldwin I, Godfrey’s successor and the first official king of Jerusalem, spent many years conquering Muslim towns, especially those on the coast that blocked Christian trade, communication, travel routes, and the potential passage of reinforcements.\textsuperscript{31}

During the first few years following their capture of Jerusalem, the Franks attempted to establish the Kingdom of Jerusalem through force and persecution of non-Latins.\textsuperscript{32} Ibn al-Qalanisi, a Muslim historian, observed that the Franks killed or enslaved all of the inhabitants of Saruj when they conquered the city.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, a Muslim merchant describing the Frankish conquest of his city wrote, “I am from a city which God has condemned, my friend, to be destroyed. They [the Franks] have killed all its inhabitants, putting old men and children to the sword.”\textsuperscript{34} Ibn Jubair, a Muslim traveler and scholar, described the early Frankish method of conquest. “The Franks ravished it [Acre] from Muslim hands... and the eyes of Islam were swollen with weeping for it.... Mosques became churches and minarets bell-towers.”\textsuperscript{35} Lamentations from the Jewish population also abounded. One such document states that “the inhabitants of the navel [i.e. Jerusalem, the navel of the earth] were defiled and handed over to a foreign nation...their houses became the prey of the thief’s [sic] and there was nothing left not even a hovel when the sword was drawn from its scabbard.”\textsuperscript{36}

The Muslims reacted to the loss of Jerusalem and the ongoing persecution of Muslims in the Levant with both horror and shame. According to historian Michael Foss, the Muslims believed that "if Mecca was the body of the faith, then Medina was one wing and Jerusalem was the other."\textsuperscript{37} The visceral reaction can be most easily seen in the work of Muslim poets. Al-Abiwardi, an Iraqi poet, expressed his disgust that Muslim leaders in Baghdad had not responded:

Sons of Islam, behind you are in battles in which heads

\textsuperscript{32} ‘Latin’ is another term commonly used in Crusades history to denote Western European Christians. It is used interchangeably with ‘Frank’.
\textsuperscript{34} ‘Imad al-Din, Kharidat at-qa‘ar, Vol. II (Damascus, 1959), quoted in Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 71.
\textsuperscript{37} Foss, People of the First Crusade, 182.
Rolled at your feet.
Dare you sleep in the blessed shade of safety,
Where life is as soft as an orchard flower?
Must the foreigners feed on our shame, while you
Are lost in pleasures, as if the world is at peace?  

Similarly, Al-Modhafer, another Muslim poet in Baghdad, bemoaned the loss of Muslim life and the passivity of Muslim leaders. Al-Modhafer is specifically incensed by the physical and moral assault on Muslim women by the Frankish conquerors:
How much blood has been shed! How many beauteous maidens have nothing but their hands with which to hide their charms?
Will the chieftains of Arabia sit down under such an insult? Will the warriors of Persia submit to such debasement?
Would to God that if they will not fight for zeal of religion, they would show themselves jealous of the honor of their women.

Despite the emotional entreaties of poets and scholars, the Muslim rulers in Baghdad made no attempt to retake Jerusalem or protect the Levantine Muslims. The absence of any military response can be attributed to the overall lack of unity among Muslims during this period. Religious and political authority, traditionally unified under the Caliph, had been split between the rival Fatimid and Abbasid Caliphs, with the result that levels of religiosity were relatively low. According to Ibn al-Athir, many Muslims actually believed that the Fatimids had asked the Franks to come to the Levant to disrupt the Abbasids’ rule.  

As occurred during the initial conquest of Jerusalem, Muslims were not the only objects of Frankish persecution. Orthodox Christians and Jews also were subjected to such treatment. In 1101, the Franks expelled the local clergy in Jerusalem from the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and replaced them with Latin clergy. In Haifa, Jews, who had been granted special privileges by their Muslim rulers, fought alongside the Muslims to protect the city from Frankish conquest. Word of the Franks’ persecution spread throughout the Levant. Jews, along with Muslims, emigrated in masse to either Egypt or Damascus to escape the atrocities they heard had been committed during the capture of Jerusalem and other cities.

Even more telling of Frankish cruelty and violence is the fact that in 1102, native Christians surrendered their towns to the Turks rather than submitting themselves to Frankish tyranny. These Eastern Christians preferred their prior status during Muslim rule of Jerusalem to their subjugation under Frankish rule. Under the Franks, their religions were deemed inferior to Catholicism and they were unable to pray in the Holy Sepulchre. Some accounts even maintain that Arnulf, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, had Syrian priests tortured until they revealed the location of the True Cross. The Jews

38 Al-Abiwardi, quoted in Foss, People of the First Crusade, 182. Again, Foss does not note a source.
39 Foss, People of the First Crusade, 159.
41 Prawer, Latin Kingdom, 236.
42 Foss, People of the First Crusade, 184.
shared the Eastern Christians’ preference, fondly remembering the days under Muslim rule when they felt they had been treated with tolerance and fairness.

The Crusaders’ religious fervor eventually subsided as the goal of their Crusade, conquering Jerusalem and protecting it from “heathen” rule, was completed. As duties of the Crusader shifted from conquering to governing, many of the Europeans felt that they had done their holy duty and began their journey back to the West. As a result of these departures, the violent Frankish campaign eventually subsided and was replaced by a far more tolerant and unifying approach. This drastic change in policy was a necessary reaction to the demographic realities of the Kingdom. Given the levels of immigration from Europe, Jerusalem could not be maintained as a homogenous Christian kingdom. Fulcher of Chartres, one of the most famous chroniclers of the Crusades, correctly observed that “they [the Europeans] came on to Jerusalem; they visited the Holy of Holies, for which purpose they had come. Following that, some remained in the Holy Land, and others went back to their native countries...For this reason the land of Jerusalem remained depopulated.”43 The Franks realized that they could not continue to persecute and alienate the non-Latins because they actually needed them for survival.44 Thus, cooperation, both commercially and militarily, between Franks and non-Franks was paramount.

After coming to this realization, Franks became fairer and more tolerant toward non-Franks, which in turn led to increased cooperation from the non-Latins. The Franks realized that only through amicable dealings with their Muslim neighbors could the Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem be viable. As early as 1108, there are reports of Muslims and Franks fighting together.45 Many treaties were signed between Muslim rulers and the Franks during the first half of the twelfth century. According to Carole Hillenbrand, these treaties were motivated by “shared local territorial interests and by the need for military help against political rivals.”46 The poet Ibn al-Khayyat explains that due to the fragmented condition of the Muslims and the focus of many rulers on maintaining their individual power rather than promoting Islamic ideals, the Franks were able to play successfully Muslim rulers off each other and form alliances with them in order to bolster the defenses and position of the Frankish Kingdom of Jerusalem.47 The Franks found that friendly interactions with the Muslims were to their advantage. Out of political necessity, they exchanged their religious zeal for a keen understanding of statesmanship.

Baldwin I imposed very few restrictions on the Muslims, allowing them relative independence within their communities and significant levels of freedom within the larger community as well. If there was a dispute involving a Muslim and a Frank, there was a higher court, which would hear the case fairly, listening to witnesses from both parties. A Muslim could even call a Frank to trial by combat if the

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46 Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 391.
47 Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives, 70.
crime was significantly serious, such as murder.\textsuperscript{48} The Muslims were required to pay a poll tax that Christians did not have to pay, but this was no different from the traditional Muslim practice of imposing the \textit{jizya} on non-Muslims under their control. The Muslims maintained their own traditional laws and autonomous court system, under which they policed themselves, and were allowed to practice their religion in safety. Within Jerusalem itself, deference to the holiness of the city caused tighter restrictions, but in the villages the locals were essentially left on their own. Local headmen, or \textit{rayises}, lead the local villages, and these \textit{rayises} were Muslim vassals to the Frankish feudal lords. They owned large estates and were a well-respected part of the Frankish administration. The Frankish lord would even stay in the \textit{rayis}' home when visiting the village and would take advice from him on how to best govern the village.\textsuperscript{49} According to ‘Imad ad-Din, the “Franks changed not a single law or cult practice of the [Muslim inhabitants]” in Nablus.\textsuperscript{50} The Arab geographer Yaqut concurred with ad-Din’s statement, noting that “the Franks changed nothing when they took the country [of Bethlehem].”\textsuperscript{51}

Aside from making conditions for Muslims under his control far more comfortable, Baldwin I also sought out neighboring Muslim rulers as possible allies. He sent envoys to Tughtikin, the ruler of Damascus, throughout 1108 and 1109, eventually signing a peace treaty in 1109 which stated that one third of the crops in the Biqa valley would go to the Franks in return for a non-aggression agreement.\textsuperscript{52} Tughtikin, like many other Muslim leaders, realized that “it was safer to have the Franks as a neighbor than a Moslem power which would try to ‘save it’ from the Infidel, only to become its master.”\textsuperscript{53} Baldwin I allowed foreign Muslim merchants to cross his territories and provided them armed escorts once they paid reasonable tolls and fees. In a similar vein, Baldwin I granted declarations of safe-passage to Muslim sea captains to allow for overseas trade and mutual prosperity. In 1115, Baldwin I opened Jerusalem to merchants of all religions and abolished the entry toll for these merchants.\textsuperscript{54}

The Franks granted a significant level of religious freedom granted, which reflected how far religious motivation had been subsumed by pragmatic decision-making. For example, Muslims were allowed to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem and pray at the various shrines throughout the kingdom. The Franks not only allowed the Muslims to practice their own religion with their own shrines, but also on occasion allowed them to worship alongside the Christians in mosques that had been converted to churches. Ibn Jubair describes two such churches in Acre in which the \textit{mihrab} had been kept to enable proper Muslim prayer.\textsuperscript{55} He also notes the Franks’ religious sensitivity in preserving shrines. In

\textsuperscript{49}Benvenisti, \textit{The Crusaders in the Holy Land}, 218.
\textsuperscript{50}‘Imad al-Din, \textit{Kharidat at-gar}, Vol. II (Damascus, 1959), quoted in Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades}, 70.
\textsuperscript{51}Yaqut, quoted in Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades}, 70. Riley-Smith does not record what source this quotation comes from.
\textsuperscript{53}Prawer, \textit{Latin Kingdom}, 17-8.
\textsuperscript{54}Fulcher of Chartres, \textit{A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem, 1095-1127}, 232.
\textsuperscript{55}Richard, \textit{The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem}, 142.
describing a shrine at 'Ain el Baqar, he says that “in the hands of the Christians its venerable nature is maintained and God has preserved it as a place of prayer for the Muslims.”

The Muslims, for their part, soon realized that cooperating with the Franks was more advantageous than fighting them as it became clear that no large-scale Muslim assault on Jerusalem was coming from Baghdad. The chiefs realized that they could concentrate on their quotidian lives without having to worry about being overrun by armies when Jerusalem was at peace. Albert of Aachen wrote that “the Ascalonites...rejoiced in peace and, because the hand of the king [Baldwin] was unoccupied by war, they too likewise were at peace, working not a little on their crops and vineyards.”

The Muslims, like the Franks, came to practice a form of realpolitik in order to maintain some semblance of power and independence. Muslim leaders tended to be more interested in worldly affairs than in religious unity. Ridwan, the leader of Aleppo, even attached a cross to the minaret of Aleppo’s main mosque as a sign of friendship with the Franks.

One is struck by how quickly conditions and perceptions of the Muslims in the Kingdom of Jerusalem changed. Ibn Jubair, in describing the town of Toron under Frankish rule, wrote, “The Moslems are masters in their own dwellings and order their affairs as they think best.” He continues, “Many Moslems long in their hearts to settle here, when they see the condition of their brethren in districts under Moslem government, for the state of these latter is the very opposite of comfortable. It is unfortunate for the Moslems that...they have nothing but praise for the conduct of the Franks, on whose justice they can always rely.” This description comes from the Muslim scholar who described the Frankish rulers as sows and hogs and asked Allah for their destruction. His wish for the destruction of the Franks, juxtaposed with his lofty description of life under their rule provides assurance that his description is almost indisputably true and shows how far the Franks had altered their treatment of the Muslims in the span of a few years. Similarly, the Muslim writer Usama ibn Munqidh praised the Frankish justice system for its fairness in dealing with a case against a Frank that he brought before the Frankish courts. According to many historians, the Muslims in the kingdom lived under almost identical conditions as the Christians.

The Frankish view of the Muslims improved dramatically as well. In the mid-twelfth century, Otto of Freising wrote, “…the whole body of Saracens worship one God and receive the Old Testament law and the rite of circumcision. Nor do they attack Christ and the Apostles. In this one thing alone they

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are far from salvation, in denying that Jesus Christ is God and the Son of God and in venerating the seducer Mohammad as a great prophet of the supreme God.” However negative a view of Mohammad it may have been, this is an overwhelmingly positive portrayal of the Muslims and of Islam, especially as compared to the intense hatred previously harbored by the Franks towards the Muslims. Otto comes as close to accepting Islam as a legitimate religion as Christian doctrine would reasonably allow. His inclination to approve of the Muslims, but for their rejection of Jesus Christ, shows that the Franks had come to appreciate or at least accept the Muslims because of their frequent interactions with them. Scholars and other learned men such as Stephen of Antioch used of Muslim knowledge, translating Arabic medical articles into Latin, and King Amalric himself obtained a Muslim doctor to examine his son when he fell ill.65

The growing Frankish inclination to accept Muslims and their culture was not limited to the rulers and scholars alone, but permeated throughout the broader society, and seems to have been reciprocated by the Muslims. Christians and Muslims interacted commercially, lending money to each other regularly.66 Many Franks stopped eating pork so as to enable Muslim guests to dine in their homes. Usama ibn Munqidh wrote in his autobiography that he dined with a Frankish knight who told him that he had Egyptian cooks and that “the flesh of pigs never enters...[his] house.”67 He also recollected that “there was a respectable Frankish knight who had come from their country to make a pilgrimage and then return. He made my acquaintance and became so intimate with me that he called me 'my brother.'”68 It has often been argued that ibn Munqidh’s autobiography is mostly fictional, but the message conveyed by this passage reveals a trend in Frankish society, whether or not the story is true. It is certain that the Franks did in fact come to respect the Muslims. One knight remarked that “no one could find more powerful or braver, or more skilled warriors than they [the Muslims],” if only the Muslims were Christians.69 The knight’s caveat serves to maintain the position of the Franks atop the social hierarchy, but seems to be hastily added for sake of propriety.

Muslims also warmed to the Franks. Ibn al-Athir noted in his writings that the Templars and Hospitallers, two Frankish knightly orders, “were devout men who upheld fidelity to a pledged word.”70 The most compelling of all anecdotes, however, is told by Fulcher of Chartres. In his chronicle,

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63 Otto of Freising, quoted in Boase, *Kingdoms and Strongholds of the Crusaders*, 68. Boase does not specify the source for this quotation.
64 Boase, *Kingdoms and Strongholds of the Crusaders*, 72.
65 Munro, *Kingdom of the Crusaders*, 117.
66 Munro, *Kingdom of the Crusaders*, 114.
69 Quoted in Munro, *Kingdom of the Crusaders*, 110. The original source of this quotation is not provided by Munro.
Outside of Yale

he wrote that upon learning of the death of King Baldwin I in 1118, “the Franks wept, the Syrians shed tears, and so did even the Saracens.”

Frankish treatment improved not only towards Muslims but also towards all of the non-Franks in the Levant. As far as the Franks were concerned initially, the native Christians were schismatics who did not deserve equality under the law with the pious Franks. Under the early Frankish law codes, the native Christians were inferior to Franks of any class. However, Frankish treatment of the native Christians improved with time, though perhaps not as much as the native Christians might have hoped. When they were rebuilding Jerusalem after the conquest, the Franks gave free housing to any Eastern Christian who wished to settle in the Jewish quarter. However, this policy does not seem to have been extremely well received because, at the very least until 1115, the Franks were still trying to settle native Eastern Christians in Jerusalem to fill the city. While their common religious beliefs provided a semblance of identification between the Franks and the native Christians, the Franks viewed the native Christians as inferiors, essentially equal to the Muslims. As such, native Christian’s status was hardly better under Frankish rule than it had been under Muslim rule. Generally, Muslim leaders were not authoritarian toward non-Muslims and granted non-Muslims a significant amount of religious freedom and autonomy. At least initially, “Palestine was…not a land whose liberation from Moslem rule would sound the trumpets of salvation” for the native Christians.

The Franks did make efforts to heal the wounds they had initially inflicted upon their Christian brethren. Gone were the days in which the Patriarch of Jerusalem tortured Eastern religious leaders. The Franks did confiscate some Eastern Christian properties, but for the most part the Eastern Christian religious institutions grew and thrived throughout the kingdom. The native Christians were exempted from paying the poll tax, a tax they had been required to pay under Muslim rule, which the Muslims and Jews paid. The judicial system was amended to allow for more equal judgment under the law. Native Christians, while still not equal to the Franks, could accuse Franks in court and receive a fair trial. Eastern Christians could even hold positions in the government and administration, evidenced by the Armenians in Antioch. The Frankish leaders took additional steps to foster good will among the native Christians, including intermarriage. Kings Baldwin I and II both married Armenian Christians and Baldwin III and Amalric married Greeks. These unions, it seems, proved successful and garnered the loyalty of the native Christians.

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73 Prawer, *Latin Kingdom, 40*.
74 Benvenisti, *The Crusaders in the Holy Land, 54*.
75 Prawer, *Latin Kingdom, 232*.
76 Prawer, *Latin Kingdom, 231*.
77 Boase, *Kingdoms and Strongholds of the Crusaders, 137*.
The Frankish treatment of the Jews, while also more conciliatory than it was originally, remained slightly more restrictive than the treatment of the Muslims and Eastern Christians, at least in that the Jews were the only people prohibited from owning land.\textsuperscript{79} Logically, this is consistent well with the \textit{realpolitik} motivation for Frankish rapprochement with the non-Franks in the Levant. The Jews possessed a small population, and thus their potential contribution and threat to the Frankish kingdom remained limited. Thus, there was less imperative for improving the conditions under which the Jews lived as compared to the native Christians or the Muslims, so the Jews’ conditions were less favorable. Nevertheless, the Frankish disposition towards the Jews was quite remarkable. As compared to contemporary treatment of Jews in Europe, the Franks’ conduct towards the Jews, even at its worst, was remarkably tolerant. Jews, like the Muslims, were barred from living in Jerusalem but could live anywhere else within the kingdom and did so according to their own traditions and laws. Even the prohibition of living in Jerusalem seems to have been relaxed as time passed, for in 1146 we know of at least one Jew who had resettled there.\textsuperscript{80} Furthermore, Jews were allowed to visit the city for religious or commercial reasons without paying any tax or toll.

Many Jews had fled the Levant during the Frankish conquest. After the conquest and the resulting Jewish emigration, Jews constituted only about one half of one percent of Acre’s population and only a little more than one percent of Tyre’s population.\textsuperscript{81} However, as news of the improved condition for Jews spread, large numbers returned to their homes. The Jewish community in Tyre, for instance, was composed of multiple Jewish congregations because of the Jewish immigration from other countries.\textsuperscript{82} Due to the remission of multiple Jewish congregations because of the Jewish immigration from other countries.\textsuperscript{82} Due to the remission of the entry polls and taxes on merchandise as well as other commercial incentives, Jews thrived as merchants and artisans in the kingdom. According to Benjamin of Tudela, a famous Jewish traveler, some Jews owned boats and participated in marine trade.\textsuperscript{83} In many towns there were Jewish master dyers who often paid a fee to receive an official monopoly in the trade from the King or local ruler. The Jews were also involved in the glass making, an important trade in the Levant.

Although the Jews were not critically important to the survival of the kingdom, they served as merchants and artisans, and were thus courted in the Franks’ reconciliatory efforts. As Jonathan Riley-Smith notes, shared sacred spaces were common in the kingdom of Jerusalem. One example of such shared spaces was a church-mosque in ‘Ain el Baqar in which Jews prayed alongside Muslims and Christians.\textsuperscript{84} Jews were also allowed to maintain their own religions institutions and holy places. During the first half of the twelfth century, Jewish academic and spiritual institutions thrived throughout the kingdom, especially in Tyre and Acre, cities that had previously had small Jewish populations.\textsuperscript{85} Such

\textsuperscript{79} Munro, \textit{The Kingdom of the Crusaders}, 126.
\textsuperscript{81} Benvenisti, \textit{The Crusaders in the Holy Land}, 27.
\textsuperscript{82} Prawer, \textit{History of the Jews}, 52.
\textsuperscript{84} Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades}, 71.
\textsuperscript{85} Riley-Smith, \textit{The Crusades}, 73.
growth could not have been sustained without the acceptance and perhaps the aid of the ruling Franks. A true testament to the acceptance and tolerance of the Jews and their religious practices can be seen in the operations of the hospital in Jerusalem. The hospital, which regularly admitted patients regardless of religion or ethnicity, was so sensitive to the religious practices of its patients that it maintained a second kitchen used to prepare kosher foods for Jewish patients.

The siege and conquest of Jerusalem was the culmination of the Frankish Crusaders’ arduous journey and the fulfillment of their divine mission. The Muslims within the city taunted the pious Franks, demeaning their symbols and attacking their religious leaders. Upon taking the city, the Crusaders’ pent up hatred for the enemy was released in a paroxysm of violence that can be looked upon today only in disgust. Men, women, and children of all ages, whether Muslim or Jewish, were hunted down and massacred throughout the city. Blood flowed throughout the ancient stone streets in one of the world’s holiest places. After the storm of violence subsided, the Franks began to establish and secure their new territories by engaging in armed conflict with neighboring Muslim rulers, often treating the non-Latins with the same violence as they had treated the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

The Franks’ intolerance and violence was the natural vestige of their long and burdensome religious pursuit to conquer Jerusalem, the result of years of focusing on Muslim enemies with intentions to destroy them. In the initial stages of Frankish rule, all non-Latins were essentially bundled together as one enemy. Muslim towns were sacked, mosques torn down, and inhabitants slain. Eastern Christians were persecuted and their religious leaders tortured. Jews were burnt alive in their temples and forced to flee their ancestral lands. Conditions throughout the Levant were such that all non-Frans, whether Muslim, Jewish, or even Christian, bemoaned the fall of Muslim rule in Jerusalem and prayed for its return.

However, as the number of Franks inevitably dwindled to a meager force, the remaining Franks were confronted with the dilemma of how to control, secure, and maintain the territories now under their control. It became clear that there would never be sufficient immigration from Europe to sustain the Kingdom of Jerusalem or protect it from its neighbors. The survival of a homogenous Frankish state and society, surrounded and massively outnumbered by enemies, would not be possible.

Wisely, the Franks understood that their precarious position necessitated collaboration with, and the active participation of, the non-Frans in both commerce and the military. The Crusading spirit had to dissipate or the Franks risked losing what they had traveled so far, lost so much, and fought so hard to attain. The Franks’ treatment of, and behavior towards, non-Frans completely changed from harsh, violent, and intolerant to liberal and lenient.

Out of necessity, the Franks began to view the Muslims as potential allies, not enemies. They made peace treaties with them, fought alongside them, and conducted business with them. Sometimes Frankish Kings even borrowed money from them. Muslims were given protection under the law.

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86 Riley-Smith, *The Crusades*, 77.
granted relative autonomy in their own communities, and included in the hierarchical system of the Frankish society. The Franks allowed the Muslims to practice their religion in peace inside the holy city of Jerusalem. Because the Islamic world had no unified leadership, the various Muslim principalities, kingdoms, and city-states opened their doors to the Franks to maintain the status quo. Individual Muslim rulers were more interested in maintaining their position of authority and power than in fighting the Christians, so they accepted the Frank’ goodwill.

A direct result of the adoption of these changes in treatment of the Muslims was the increased proximity and frequency of contact between Frank and Muslim, often leading to the development of friendships that transcended religious differences, the evolution of mutual cultural appreciation, and the exchange of knowledge and information. The Franks learned about medicine from the Muslims, and some Franks even adopted the practice of eating only proper Muslim foods so their Muslim guests could dine comfortably with them. The Franks came to appreciate the Muslims’ bravery and skill in military affairs. Similarly, the Muslims were impressed with the Franks, noting that many among them were honest and god-fearing men.

The Franks also altered their treatment of the Jews and native Christians within their kingdom. The marginalization and persecution of the native Christians ceased and they were Franks embraced and involved them in all aspects of society. They were given fair treatment under the law, were exempted from poll taxes, and were able to hold government positions. Four Frankish kings married native Christian women. As for the Jews, whereas at first they had been massacred or sold into slavery, they soon became an integral and valued part of the Levantine economy. They, like the Muslims, were allowed to practice their religion freely and to govern themselves according to their traditions and customs. Jewish population and religious institutions flourished in the lands of the Franks, attracting immigrants from many countries.

The Franks’ tolerance, acceptance, and in some cases, celebration of other religions and other peoples is a testament to their ability to adapt and react to circumstances in a highly pragmatic and sophisticated manner. When confronted with a situation in which they were faced with the possibility of losing Jerusalem to the Muslims or dealing intimately with the Muslims, they chose the latter. What began halfway across the globe in the town of Clermont in France in 1096 as a spiritual journey and a religious war developed and, arguably, evolved into a religion-based yet secularized multinational state in which each faction was valuable and, more importantly, valued. The Crusaders had come into Jerusalem as zealous warriors and became open-minded politicians. Inter-religious struggles occurred periodically because there were always Christian fringe groups that attempted to maintain the earlier division between Latins and non-Latins. However, after the consolidation and integration of the kingdom, this separation and differentiation was far more difficult to enforce or maintain. Until its fall, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, though consisting of many religions and peoples, was united under one government, one legal code, and one ruler.
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Senior Essay


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2010

Every history major must complete a senior essay of no more than 12,500 words during their senior year. Effective senior essays utilize a myriad of primary and secondary sources in order to render a complete and focused picture on a topic of the student's choosing. Jason W. Gilliland, through archival research and historiographical analysis, addressed the question of how and when Georgia became a solidly Republican state. For his efforts, Jason was awarded the Edwin W. Small Prize for "recognition of outstanding work in the field of American History."
On July 2, 1964, a crowd gathered in the East Room of the White House as Lyndon B. Johnson prepared to sign the Civil Rights Act into law. It was the seminal achievement of his presidency, curtailting discrimination at the polls and the racial segregation of public facilities. The signing came as the culmination of a legislative effort that had begun over a year prior, when President Kennedy first proposed the bill. Following Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, Johnson took the reins with his characteristic force and eventually pushed the legislation through both chambers of Congress.¹ In doing so, he ran roughshod over his former Senate colleagues, the “Southern Bloc” of Democrats under the leadership of Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell. Russell, who was serving his sixth consecutive term, was at the time likely the most powerful legislator in Washington. The veteran Senator utilized his influence to launch a filibuster of the bill when it arrived on the Senate floor, proclaiming defiantly, “We will resist to the bitter end any measure or any movement which would have a tendency to bring about social equality and intermingling and amalgamation of the races in our [southern] states.”²

The conservative effort fell short of killing the bill, but Johnson knew that this had not been merely another political fight— the Civil Rights Act of 1964 had ushered in a new era in party politics. As the President signed the legislation, with Martin Luther King, Jr. over his shoulders, he turned to an aide, Bill Moyers, and whispered, “We have lost the South for a generation.”³ It was indeed a watershed moment, and yet thirty years would pass before southern states would make their final realignment from the Democratic to the Republican Party.

Among the states of the Deep South, Senator Russell’s Georgia was the very last to realign. It was not until 2002 that Georgia elected its first Republican Governor since Reconstruction, Sonny Perdue. Within two years, the GOP controlled the state legislature as well. After decades spent advocating for balanced two-party politics in Georgia, the Republicans had taken less than one election cycle to restore one-party domination.

GOP rule in Georgia did not come as the automatic victory that President Johnson had predicted; instead, it proceeded slowly and haphazardly until finally taking hold. To understand the realignment process as it unfolded, one must look to a broad set of interrelated events that shaped Georgia’s political history from the Civil Rights Era to the present: state electoral reform to shift the locus of privilege from rural to urban voters in 1962, the re-enfranchisement of black voters in the mid-1960s, and the divergence of state from national Democratic Party politics following continued waves of civil rights legislation. Added to those fundamental changes was demographic transformation in the South, suburbanization that shore up the southern middle and upper-middle class, and the mobilization of Republican Party infrastructure in the 1970s.

² As quoted in Andrew P. Napolitano, *Dred Scott’s Revenge: A Legal History of Race and Freedom in America* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2009), 188.
³ Ibid.
and 1980s. Finally, the growth and politicization of the evangelical movement met the evolution of campaign strategy, providing the final constituency for solid realignment. These were the necessary conditions of Republicanism, and they fell into place one at a time. The path towards GOP rule in Georgia was not a straight or easy one, nor was it as inevitable as Lyndon Baines Johnson predicted. We can learn a great deal about political realignment, the rise of the New Right, and federalism from the alternating gains and setbacks Republicans encountered in their long struggle to build a party in Georgia.

The Georgia case suggests that the growth of evangelism as a politically conscious movement and its alignment with the GOP represents a final stage—rather than an early catalyst—in the shift towards a Republican majority. It was with this step that the GOP united suburban and rural white voters under a single umbrella and achieved grassroots organization throughout the state. The eventual marriage of evangelicals and Republicans did not come easily, but ultimately the alliance proved a political necessity.

An analysis of Republican campaign strategy at four critical moments in the realignment process elucidates the essential qualities of the Republican ascent. First is the 1966 gubernatorial campaign of Republican businessman Howard “Bo” Callaway. Employing a campaign strategy ahead of its time but naïve in its underpinnings, Callaway nearly defeated rabid segregationist and Democratic candidate Lester Maddox for the governorship. Second is Newt Gingrich’s successful 1978 bid for Congress from Georgia’s Sixth Congressional District, in which the young opportunist packaged economic conservatism with traditional values to become the voice of white suburbia, encroaching upon the Democratic countryside along the way. Third is the 1986 election in which St. Simons’ Mack Mattingly turned his back to suburban-rural coalition building and failed to defend his seat as Georgia’s first Republican U.S. Senator since Reconstruction. Fourth, and finally, is the 1992 election in which Atlanta Republican Paul Coverdell narrowly defeated Democratic incumbent Wyche Fowler to reclaim the same Senate seat. Incorporating evangelicals as the final component of Georgia’s New Right coalition, Coverdell broke the Democratic hold on rural Georgia, setting the course for the final stages of realignment. The Republican takeover of Georgia was far from complete in 1992, but following Coverdell’s victory, the necessary elements were in place.

A Party in its Infancy

To explain partisan trends in the South over the past half-century, historians invariably turn first to the Civil Rights Movement and the social and political upheaval that followed. For most southern states, civil rights alone represents a sufficient starting point in any discussion of the rise of Republicanism. But among southern states, Georgia was peculiar. There, the issue of state electoral reform in the early 1960s proved to be an equally important harbinger of partisan change.
In his 1949 classic *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, political scientist V. O. Key notes a peculiar pattern in Georgia politics, a strong and enduring “rural distrust of cities.” The descendants of the same rural elites who had overthrown Republican rule during Reconstruction clung to their long-standing power, utilizing whatever means necessary to uphold white supremacy and counter the influence of Atlanta’s growing business class. For decades, the Georgia Democratic Party’s peculiar county unit system dominated the state’s political landscape. Put in place in 1917, the county unit system functioned similarly to the Presidential Electoral College. The entirety of each county’s “unit votes” in Democratic primaries for statewide offices went to the candidate with the highest popular vote in that county. In devising this system, Democratic leaders ensured that rural counties held a disproportionate share of power. The state’s eight most populous counties received six unit votes each, the next thirty most populated counties received four, and the remaining 121 counties each received two unit votes. Apportionment in the General Assembly followed the same formula. By this warped electoral arithmetic, a few thinly populated counties in South Georgia could equal urban Fulton County’s total unit vote and representation in the legislature—an absurd electoral imbalance. Additionally, it was common for rural Democratic bosses to push through measures to subdivide their home counties into new counties, multiplying their share of unit votes. This trend left Georgia with 159 total counties, second only to Texas. In 1940, 34 percent of the state’s voters lived in Georgia’s eight most populated counties, and yet these counties accounted for only 12 percent of the state’s total unit votes.

The distortions inherent in the county unit primary system engendered a particular culture of leadership in Georgia. Any serious candidate for statewide office needed to appeal strongly to rural voters. As a result, many successful politicians of the period embraced a certain racialized populism that paired white rural values against the increasingly liberal social and racial attitudes of many white Atlantans. The greatest exemplar of this class of political demagoguery was Democrat Eugene Talmadge, who was elected Governor of Georgia four separate times between 1932 and 1946. “The poor dirt farmer ain’t got but three friends on this earth,” Talmadge would proudly proclaim, “God Almighty, Sears Roebuck, and Gene Talmadge.” The cult-like popularity Governor Talmadge achieved among rural whites—he often bragged that he never needed to carry a county with a streetcar line—all but ensured his continued electoral

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5 For an analysis of the roots of rural dominance in Georgia’s political culture, see Steven Wrigley, “The Triumph of Provincialism: Public Life in Georgia, 1898-1917” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 1989).
6 Key, *Southern Politics*, 118-120.
8 At the time, Georgia Governors served two-year terms.
success under county unit rule.\textsuperscript{10} The Talmadge era left a bitter taste in the mouths of sophisticated urban voters, a taste that would linger and would weaken the already tenuous allegiance many of these voters held to the Democratic Party.

Despite this tension between rural and urban white voters, the Democratic Party retained a monopoly on state politics in the decades leading up to the Civil Rights Movement. In 1960, William Kiker was the lone Republican serving in the state legislature. Kiker was from Fannin County in mountainous North Georgia, an area where unionist sentiment was strong during the Civil War.\textsuperscript{11} Locals possessed a fondness towards Republicans that has persisted to the present day. But at the state level, the Georgia GOP was at best the loose skeleton of a working political organization. The party functioned primarily as a system of political favoritism, whereby national Republicans would recruit delegations to attend the national convention and vote for their Presidential ticket, with the assumption that a Republican President would later dispense political patronage to the delegates.

In the years immediately following World War II, a group of prominent Atlanta businessmen began to view the state party’s role at the Republican National Convention as one which could not only attract Presidential patronage, but which could also serve as a lightning rod for the development of a true state party. With state politics still monopolized by the Democrats, this group reasoned that to break the stranglehold they first had to prove that national Republicans could appeal to Georgia’s voters. Two figures central to this effort were Elbert Tuttle, a lawyer who relocated to Atlanta from Hawaii, and Kil Townsend, a Long Island native who moved to Atlanta to practice law following his discharge from the military. Townsend remembers Tuttle approaching him bluntly at the Atlanta Lawyer’s Club: “You must be a Republican because you’re from up there in New York.”\textsuperscript{12} Indeed, a large portion of Georgia’s earliest Republicans – many of whom went on to play major roles in the growth of the party over ensuing decades – were businessmen who had moved to the state from outside of the South. Few multi-generation Georgians seemed able to escape the monolithic hold of the Democratic Party.

Townsend’s first task as leading organizer for Atlanta’s Republicans was to drum up support for Tom Dewey, the Republican nominee for President in 1948. Townsend and others saw in Dewey an opportunity to convince party leaders of Georgia’s potential in national elections, as a state that a conservative Republican could conceivably carry. But with Dewey’s


\textsuperscript{11} Georgia, Secretary of State, “Members of the General Assembly, State Senate and House of Representatives Second Session 1959-60” (Atlanta: Secretary of State, 1960), 7-10.

narrow loss to incumbent Harry Truman, Townsend and his comrades returned to the doldrums. “Nobody heard about us or spoke about us for about two years,” he recalls.¹³

When General Dwight D. Eisenhower threw his hat in the ring as a Republican contender for President in 1952, Townsend again saw an opportunity to move the party forward. He recruited fifteen like-minded friends—a group he called “absolute nobodys like me”—to lead GOP efforts in the state. Eisenhower was, in Townsend’s words, a “liberal Republican” running against the “almost ridiculously conservative” Ohio Senator Bob Taft for the party nomination.¹⁴ After a controversial battle at the national convention, Georgia became the “pivot state” essential to clinching Eisenhower’s nomination.¹⁵ Ike went on to win thirty percent of Georgia’s votes in the general election, far outpacing Republican returns in prior elections.¹⁶ For the first time since Reconstruction, Georgia began to receive serious attention from the national party. “[Vice President] Nixon catered to Georgia constantly after that,” Townsend recalls.¹⁷ Presidential patronage came, too. Eisenhower appointed Tuttle to a judgeship on the Fifth Circuit of the Court of Appeals, a position Tuttle would leverage to great effect in partisan battles down the road.¹⁸

The remainder of the 1950s entailed little for the infant Georgia GOP to celebrate, but emerging demographic and economic trends gave reason for hope. The state’s urban population began to swell with the steady inflow of migrants from the North and elsewhere, and during this time Atlanta began its ascent towards becoming a major industrial city. Georgia’s population grew by a modest 14 percent during the decade—less than the national figure—but the state’s total urban population increased by nearly half.¹⁹ Hardly more than a third of Georgians lived in metropolitan areas in 1950. By the close of the decade, almost half of them did.²⁰ Concurrent with these demographic trends was a wholesale rearrangement of the state’s economy. In the years following the Second World War, the old plantation system of agriculture began to whither away. Through the 1950s the state saw a net migration outflow of 213,000, as black agricultural laborers left the countryside and moved north in pursuit of opportunity.²¹ But as the farm sector shriveled, new industries proliferated. The war effort itself represents an early

¹³ Ibid.
¹⁴ Ibid.
¹⁶ Georgia, Secretary of State, “Official State of Georgia Tabulation by Counties for Presidential Election Results and 46 Constitutional Amendments: General Election Nov. 4, 1952” (Atlanta: Secretary of State, 1952), 5.
¹⁷ Townsend, Oral History.
²⁰ Ibid., 156-176.
stimulus in this process, bringing substantial defense spending to the state and leaving behind lasting economic infrastructure.

Nearly all of the out-of-state migrants who came to Georgia in the 1950s were chasing opportunity in a blooming Atlanta, an encouraging development for Townsend and his peers. Through the fifties and sixties, when most southern cities descended into bitter racial unrest, Atlanta stood as a proud exception, at least rhetorically. “Agitators who would exploit race tension in the South have found the pickings lean in Atlanta,” The Saturday Evening Post reported in October 1953. Mayor William Hartsfield bragged that Atlanta was “the City Too Busy to Hate,” and the tagline stuck. Combined with the city’s pro-business political culture, this reputation for tolerance made Atlanta a favorite destination for new business and the skilled employees that followed.

1964: The Birth of a Party

As V. O. Key predicted, many of the newcomers who began to flood Georgia in the post-war period – Elbert Tuttle and Kil Townsend included – possessed a “fellow feeling with northern Republicanism.” But to even begin to threaten the Democratic Party’s monopoly on Georgia politics, Republicans needed something more than a steady influx of migrants. They needed structural change, an upending of the system that all but guaranteed one-party rule in the state. They got just that in 1962. In Baker v. Carr, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that electoral practices entailing clear inequities among voters were constitutionally unlawful. Georgia’s urban electorate wasted no time in filing suits against the county unit system. Elbert Tuttle, by this time Chief Judge on the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, played a major role in shaping the events that would follow. He chaired the panel that decided in which courts the suits were tried, and, after those courts invalidated county unit in all of its forms, he personally ordered that the legislature’s reapportionment to give urban and suburban citizens – many of them immigrant Republicans – a fair share of voting influence. Tuttle and Townsend’s collective efforts to gain national patronage in 1952 had indeed proven critical for the Georgia GOP.

State electoral reform was not the only catalyst for the Republican Party’s growth, for it was in 1964 that the civil rights question came to the forefront in national politics, and the quiet tension that had hitherto existed between national and southern Democrats exploded into an

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23 Ralph McGill, “You’d Think He Owns Atlanta,” The Saturday Evening Post, October 31, 1953, 29.
25 Key, Southern Politics, 119.
26 Bartley, Modern Georgia, 196.
27 Carter, Turning Point, 28-41.
outright divide. This was the year of Lyndon Johnson’s Civil Rights Act and his prediction that the South would become Republican ground for a generation. Johnson’s prediction would in time prove premature, but it was indeed in 1964 that the Republican Party penetrated the once-solid Democratic South on the most significant scale since Reconstruction.

The GOP fielded socially conservative candidates and rode a reactionary wave to win both national and state elections. The figurehead of this conservative backlash was Arizona’s Barry Goldwater, the right-wing Republican nominee for President. Beyond his traditional conservative views, Goldwater embraced a platform of explicit opposition to civil rights legislation.28

Many white Georgians, both rural and urban, admired Goldwater’s firm racial conservatism, especially when compared to the liberal Johnson. But Barry Goldwater was no Gene Talmadge. Whereas Georgia’s backcountry populists merged racial vitriol with the “help the little guy” economic policies of the New Deal, Barry Goldwater was an uncompromising advocate of the free market, favoring tax cuts and deregulation at every turn.29 Through a compound of fiscal and racial conservatism, Goldwater was able to unite Georgia’s rural whites with Atlanta’s ascendant business class, who had been unshackled from county unit rule only two years prior. In fact, the Arizona Senator reversed a long-existent trend of Democratic domination of the thinly populated agrarian parts of the state, actually winning by the widest margin in those counties where his Republican predecessors had won but a handful of votes.30

President Johnson went on to win reelection with a record Electoral College majority, but Goldwater swept the Deep South, carrying Georgia with 54 percent of the vote.31 Since that watershed election, the majority of white Southerners have voted for the Republican candidate in every Presidential election. But, as Southern political historians Earl and Merle Black point out, only a fraction of Southern whites actually identified themselves as Republicans in 1964.32 “Republicans in the South called themselves Goldwater Republicans—not Republicans,” reported The Atlanta Constitution.33 It would take time for party identification to begin to budge, particularly at the state and local level. In Georgia more than anywhere, Democratic allegiance remained an ancestral compulsion.

29 Black and Black, Rise, 148-149.
31 Ibid.
Senior Essay

Goldwater’s success enlivened Atlanta’s Republicans, motivating many to become politically active. Jim Tysinger was among this wave, winning election to the State Senate in 1968, where he would go on to serve thirty years. Tysinger recalls that, before Goldwater, “there was no DeKalb Republican Party to speak of.”34 Goldwater’s campaign apparatus subsequently became the party. He and many of those elected on Goldwater’s coattails represented a new breed of Georgia Republicans—these were, first and foremost, social conservatives. Founding Republican Kil Townsend and his few fellow moderates felt marginalized; in fact, Townsend’s own party resisted his successful run for the State House in 1965. “They thought I was too liberal,” he recalls.35 It was a sign of a nascent trend, one that would develop gradually in the decades to come.

Just as the end of the county unit system, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Goldwater campaign were beginning to upset the old political balance in Georgia, yet another transformative ripple shook state politics. Before the 1960s, Georgia blacks were almost entirely disenfranchised. The Democratic Party used the all-white primary and then poll taxes and literacy tests to block black votes. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 brought about a practical end to the use of literacy tests, and a 1966 constitutional amendment eliminated the poll tax in all its forms.36 With these hurdles overcome, successful voter registration drives on the ground meant blacks began voting in greater numbers. Alienated from the Republicans by the nomination of Barry Goldwater and his explicit opposition to Civil Rights legislation, African-Americans in Georgia identified overwhelmingly with Lyndon Johnson’s Democratic Party from this point onwards.37 But to brush aside the potential for black voters to cross party lines—as many historians have done—is a mistake, for there were critical elections in which Georgia Republicans garnered sufficient black votes to overcome their Democratic opponents.

The early conditions for Republican advancement are evident in the election of Howard “Bo” Callaway as Georgia’s first Republican Congressman since Reconstruction—the party’s most important achievement in the watershed 1964 election cycle. Callaway was the son of wealthy Georgia businessman Cason J. Callaway, industrialist and founder of the 13,000 acre Callaway Gardens resort near Columbus. After graduating from West Point, Bo Callaway served in the Korean War, ultimately resigning his Army post in 1952 to return home and take over as president of the Gardens.38 Owing both to his inheritance and to his successful efforts at

35 Townsend, Oral History.
36 Bass and DeVries, Transformation, 47-48.
37 Black and Black, Rise, 171-172.
expanding the Gardens, Bo Callaway was an extraordinarily wealthy man. In the ten years leading up to 1965, he paid over $12 million in income taxes.39

Before 1964, Callaway’s only service in public office came as a director on the state university system’s Board of Regents. Yet Republican Party leaders saw potential in his family’s local popularity – and his ability to self-finance a campaign – and approached him about a potential run for Congress in west Georgia’s Third District.40 He quickly accepted, and the campaign began in earnest following Goldwater’s nomination.

Callaway understood that, in the rural Third District, his success would depend on his ability to piggyback on Goldwater’s reactionary conservatism. He crafted his campaign platform to dovetail neatly with Goldwater’s own, proclaiming that his first two priorities were the repeal of the Civil Rights Act and the return of the right to voluntary prayer in public schools.41 Throughout the race, Callaway sought to link his Democratic opponent, Garland Byrd, to the liberal Johnson–Humphrey Presidential ticket. He emphasized the need for a restoration of law and order, reminding voters that, before Johnson took office, “There were no wild mobs in our streets.”42 Byrd attempted to counter Callaway’s momentum, ridiculing his opponent’s wealth before crowds of rural voters: “That boy has never held a hoe in his lands. He has nothing in common with the working people.”43 In the face of a regional electoral tide, Byrd’s tactics fell short, and Callaway won the Congressional seat with 57 percent of the vote, carrying fourteen of the nineteen counties in the Third District.44 He became Georgia’s first Republican to hold national office since Reconstruction.

Callaway’s success marked the birth of the modern Republican Party in Georgia. A decisive confluence of events in 1964 – the end of county unit rule, the Goldwater movement, and Callaway’s historic election to Congress – transformed what had once been a laughable band of unorganized Atlantans into a legitimate political organization. The change in Georgia’s electoral landscape following the end of county unit was sweeping. Fulton County alone expanded its share of representatives in the state House from three to twenty-four, picking up two seats in the Georgia Senate as well. Kil Townsend would win one of those newly open House

40 “Go ‘Bo,’ Bo Callaway Election Eve, November 7, 1966.”
41 “Callaway Campaigns in Lee County,” Campaign News Release, Folder 58, Box 2, Subseries A, Series I, Callaway Papers.
42 “Callaway Calls for a Change,” Speech in Unadilla, Ga, October 31, 1964, Folder 58, Box 2, Subseries A, Series I, Callaway Papers.
seats in 1964, representing the wealthy Buckhead community. He was not alone. Where in 1960 there had been only one Republican legislator in the Capitol, suddenly there were twenty-four, elected exclusively from Atlanta and from the state’s larger cities. For the remainder of the decade, all Republican state legislators would be elected from what were then the state’s six most populous counties—Fulton, DeKalb, Richmond, Chatham, Bibb, and Muscogee. Georgia’s fast-growing urban and suburban population had been liberated from political obscurity.

Opportunity Lost: The 1966 Gubernatorial Election

Two years after his election to Congress, Bo Callaway ran for Governor, hoping to do what no Republican had done since 1868. His opponent in the 1966 race was virulent segregationist Lester Maddox, who had upset liberal former Governor Ellis Arnall in the Democratic primary, casting Arnall as a “wild socialist who is the granddaddy of forced integration.” Maddox first gained national attention two years prior for his notorious “last stand” at his Pickrick Restaurant in Atlanta. Rather than complying with the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by beginning to serve black customers, Maddox determined to maintain the Pickrick’s whites-only policy. Brandishing axe handles, he and a number of his customers and employees confronted racial demonstrators forcefully one afternoon in early July. As he ran red-faced through the Pickrick parking lot, Maddox screamed that he would never integrate: “I’ll use axe handles, I’ll use guns, I’ll use paint, I’ll use my fists, I’ll use my customers, I’ll use my employees, I’ll use anything at my disposal.” Maddox ultimately lost a suit to uphold the segregation of the Pickrick, but, faced with the prospect of serving black customers, he elected to close the restaurant instead. The debacle made Maddox a martyr in the eyes of many of Georgia’s hard-nosed segregationists—and a despised figure within the black community.

Maddox’s upset primary victory caught Bo Callaway’s campaign team by surprise. Suddenly, the young Republican faced a Democratic challenger more conservative than himself. E. D. Cashore, head of a political consulting firm advising Callaway on campaign strategy, made matters clear: “The entire ballgame is changed.” Against Maddox, Callaway could not campaign as the clear-cut conservative candidate, a strategy which had delivered him to Congress in 1964.

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“We are now confronted,” wrote Cashore, “with an apparent identity of political philosophy, in which party labels mean very little except to those who have always traditionally voted Democratic.” Those “traditional” Democrats represented a majority of the electorate. Unless Callaway could distinguish himself in a substantive way, the election would be Maddox’s to lose.

Rather than competing on the issues, the Callaway campaign attempted to make the election one of personal distinctions. In a thirty-minute television advertisement aired on the eve of the election, Bo appears as a wholesome family man, surrounded by wife and children. The segment emphasizes his education, leadership in the military, success in running Callaway Gardens, and, most importantly, his respectability and commitment to lawful government. Callaway’s tone is relentlessly progressive. Georgia, he argues, is on the cusp of the “greatest era of educational and economic advances” the state has ever known. “We cannot afford to stop dead in our tracks and let our sister states pass us by,” he says. “The man who leads our state for the next few years must be a man of principle,” and he must act through “normal legislative processes, within the law.” The Congressman never mentions Maddox, but the underhanded gesture is obvious.52

Though this progressivism resonated with many uptown voters, it backfired among those rural whites who had been so crucial to Callaway’s election to Congress two years prior. In a memo circulated among campaign staff, state party chairman G. Paul Jones highlighted the flaws of Callaway’s strategy. “There is a very strong feeling [among party leaders] that future television appearances should be devoted to issues,” he wrote, “and that the public has seen enough of the Callaway Family.” By branding himself as a sophisticated and wholesome family man against the unrefined Maddox, Callaway complemented Maddox’s persona as a man of the people. “When you attempted to say ‘Look at the people around Maddox,’” Jones wrote, “too many people in Georgia felt that you were talking about the low income ‘average man’ who tied himself in with Maddox,” a gesture that many rural whites found offensive.53 The clear display of Callaway’s wealth during the campaign — after all, he was able to purchase a thirty-minute segment on prime-time television — only exacerbated this image.

Another serious misstep cost Callaway rural votes. The Christian Index, a bi-weekly newspaper published by Georgia Baptists, asked each candidate to complete a questionnaire on various hot-topic moral issues, from prayer in schools to gambling and drug use. Maddox completed the questionnaire promptly, and his firmly conservative responses were published in the Index just before Election Day. Callaway failed to respond, claiming that he was too busy

51 Letter to Bill Amos, 1 October 1966, Folder 9, Box 8, Subseries A, Series II, Callaway Papers.
52 “Go ‘Bo,’ Bo Callaway Election Eve, November 7, 1966.”
53 G. Paul Jones, Jr., “Meeting on Tuesday, November 15, with County Leaders from Fulton, DeKalb, Cobb, Clayton, and Spalding Counties,” Memo to Howard C. Callaway, Folder 8, Box 1, Subseries A, Series II, Callaway Papers.
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campaigning. The effect of his non-response was substantial. “The Christian Index affair,” G. Paul Jones would tell Callaway, “was a gross mistake.”54 At the time, evangelicals may have maintained a low profile in Georgia’s political landscape, but to ignore them so bluntly was a major strategic misstep.

Even more detrimental to Callaway’s rural appeal was his cautious approach to the issue of race. Conscious that blunt racial conservatism might alienate his base of sophisticated urban and suburban voters, he avoided the topic at every instance. Nowhere in Callaway’s campaign literature was there an explicit reference to race. Instead, Callaway embedded his racial conservatism in the language of free choice and law and order. But if he thought that was enough, that he could sweep race under the rug, he was wrong. This was 1966, the year when racial unrest throughout the South had reached a boiling point. Though Callaway was certainly a segregationist, he had never been a fire-breathing one; Lester Maddox ran on racism alone. “I do hope you will get your integration wishes,” Maddox told opponents of his whites-only policy in 1961, “a stomach full of race-mixing, and a lap full of little mulatto grandchildren, so you can run your fingers through their hair.”55 Racism was an easy way to win votes in 1966, and Maddox had the upper hand.

Results from Election Day confirmed Callaway’s weak appeal among rural voters. Maddox swept the rural vote, earning substantial majorities even in those Third District counties that Callaway had carried in his run for Congress two years prior. In tiny Webster County, where Callaway beat his Democratic opponent two-to-one in 1964, Maddox won with 62 percent of the vote.56

On the other hand, Callaway dominated the urban and suburban vote. Nearly a third of his total vote count came from the state’s two most populous counties, Fulton and DeKalb. In Fulton County, Callaway carried sixteen separate precincts with over 90 percent of the vote, with majorities reaching as high as 97 percent.57 Though Callaway managed to split the black vote with Ellis Arnall, the effect was negligible.58 Black voter registration had only recently reached a

54 Ibid.
55 As quoted in Bob Short, Everything is Pickrick: the Life of Lester Maddox (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 43.
57 “Gubernatorial Campaign 1966: Vote Statistics,” Folder 1, Box 5, Series II, Callaway Papers.
meaningful level. In the 1966 cycle, African-Americans accounted for a mere 13 percent of the South’s total vote.\textsuperscript{59}

Despite his failure to appeal to rural voters as he had done in 1964, Bo Callaway nonetheless won a slim plurality of the vote in the 1966 gubernatorial election, edging out Maddox by roughly 3,000 votes. But the futile “Write In Georgia” effort launched by Ellis Arnall’s supporters garnered the moderate former governor over 50,000 votes, sufficient to rob Callaway of an outright majority.\textsuperscript{60} Georgia’s state constitution has no provision for a runoff in such instances; rather, the General Assembly is tasked with selecting the governor from the two leading candidates. Given the heavy Democratic majority in the legislature, this technicality sealed Callaway’s fate. With a vote of 182 to 66, Lester Maddox became governor.\textsuperscript{61}

Callaway’s failed strategy in the 1966 gubernatorial race signaled a reversion to the urban-rural dichotomy that had existed in the years prior to Goldwater’s candidacy, whereby Democrats dominated rural Georgia while Republicans garnered nearly all of their votes from whites in the state’s most populous urban and suburban areas. These results place GOP successes in the 1964 elections in historical perspective. While state Republicans had used race tension and Goldwater enthusiasm to penetrate rural Georgia in 1964, those gains proved short-lived. In the decades to come, the Republicans’ greatest challenge, and the element most essential to their success, was to somehow break the Democratic machine and achieve a lasting presence in rural Georgia.

Bo Callaway’s efforts in the 1966 election were not entirely in vain. Not only had he been the first Republican on Georgia’s gubernatorial ballot since Reconstruction, he had beaten a populist Democrat in the general election and had nearly moved into the Governor’s Mansion. Like Goldwater before him, Callaway’s campaign rallied critical supporters behind the Republican cause, demonstrating that even the highest of state offices was now vulnerable. Republicans Fletcher Thompson and Ben Blackburn took advantage of Callaway’s presence on the ticket, winning Congressional seats in two of Georgia’s most urban districts.\textsuperscript{62}

But by neglecting to take definitive stances on issues, Callaway failed to distinguish himself from his conservative opponent. Callaway’s background, his tepid approach to racial and moral issues, and his demeanor during the election alienated rural whites, who found a more comfortable alternative in Lester Maddox’s outspoken racial conservatism. Outflanked on the


\textsuperscript{60} “Official State of Georgia Tabulation: General Election Nov. 8, 1966,” 2.

\textsuperscript{61} Bass and DeVries, Transformation, 142-143.

racial right, Bo Callaway crafted a platform of family values, law and order, and economic progress. Interestingly, his strategy proved to be a forerunner to successful Republican campaigns fifteen years later. By then, race had subsided as a serious and explicit campaign issue, and the very same constellation of values Callaway had unsuccessfully endorsed carried waves of New Right Republicans to public office nationwide. The failure of that packaging of values in 1966 indicates a pre-New Right moment when racism still ruled. With party-loyal moderates casting write-in votes for Ellis Arnall, Bo Callaway became the unfortunate man in the middle. Had he run a more effective campaign (and had Ellis Arnall not been a factor), Callaway might have won an outright majority, and the state Republican Party’s advance would most certainly have proceeded at a far quicker pace than it did. Paul Coverdell, future Senator and chief architect of the state party’s ascent in the late seventies and eighties, stated it plainly: “those fifty thousand write-in votes dramatically changed the history of the state. Georgia might have been at the front of the development of the Republican Party versus at the rear of it.”

In the years following his failed bid for the Governor’s Mansion, Bo Callaway came to terms with the flaws of his campaign. He realized the need to establish clear distinctions between the two parties on the issues. Republicans had to force the Democrats to commit to one end of the political spectrum, rather than continuing as a party with no clear-cut ideology—one that could accommodate conservatives, liberals, and everyone in between. This broad-umbrella strategy served the Democrats well, particularly as the Civil Rights Movement began to fragment the national party along various ideological lines. “The result of this,” wrote Callaway in 1970, “is that they have been able to sell themselves to a sizable number of our own Republicans as well as the independents.” Only by seizing certain issues as their own—as Callaway regretted he had not done in 1966—could the Republicans begin to break down the many precarious alliances that held the Democratic juggernaut together.

In December of 1969, Georgia’s Republican leaders prepared a document outlining the state of the party. Despite the electoral gains of the last decade, the party organization itself remained in tatters. “The Georgia State Party lives on a hand-to-mouth desperation situation and has not been solvent for several years,” the document reads. Only through the patronage of a half-dozen wealthy contributors—Callaway included—was the GOP able to stay afloat. Lacking necessary funds, the party was without an organized candidate recruitment or development program. Republican leaders instead hoped that occasional switchovers from the Democratic Party would help fill their ranks. This was no sustainable strategy. Party leaders did seem to

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63 Paul Coverdell, Interview by Clifford Kuhn, March 4, 1989, Georgia Government Documentation Project, Series B: Public Figures, Georgia State University Library, Atlanta, 4.
64 Letter to Robin Armstrong, 4 September 1970, Folder 2, Box 5, Subseries B, Series II, Callaway Papers.
66 Ibid., 9-10.
recognize a growing opportunity to brand Republicans as Georgia’s conservative party, particularly with “the rising influence of liberals within the Democratic Party.” But in order to begin corroding the staunch Democratic loyalty of rural whites, the Republican Party needed to become a centralized organization with deliberate planning on a scale far beyond what existed at this time.

Despite the state party’s near-desperate condition at the close of the decade, the 1960s had indeed been a period of significant progress. The Republicans began the decade with only one legislator in the General Assembly. They finished with thirty—seven senators and twenty-three representatives, along with a pair of twice-elected U.S. Congressmen, Fletcher Thompson and Ben Blackburn. Republican mayors were elected in Columbus, Macon, and Savannah. As Georgia’s Republicans gained momentum, the national Democratic Party continued to splinter. By 1968, many southern Democrats resigned themselves to the irreconcilable nature of their dispute with the party’s growing liberal contingent. Alabama Governor and hard-line segregationist George Wallace launched a third-party bid for the Presidency, attracting a substantial following across the South. Amid a frenzy of protests and riots, a deeply divided Democratic Party nominated liberal Hubert Humphrey for President at the 1968 National Convention. In response to this fiasco, a group of five Georgia Democrats switched in unison to the GOP. Among them were two public service commissioners, the Comptroller General, Commissioner of Agriculture, and State Treasurer—offices never before held by a Republican.


On the heels of the 1966 gubernatorial election, Georgia entered a period of rapid change, in which demographic and economic trends that had developed throughout the post-war period accelerated. The New South was in the midst of its economic ascent, with Atlanta as its capital. Georgia’s population boomed. In every decade from 1970 to 2000, population growth

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67 Ibid., 5.
68 Ibid., 10.
73 Black and Black, Rise, 210.
in the state far exceeded the national average. Almost all of that growth accrued to the state’s metropolitan areas—with Atlanta and its suburbs representing the vast majority of that category. During the 1970s, Georgia’s population grew by 19 percent, nearly double the national figure, and the state’s metropolitan population expanded by 44 percent. Skilled workers seeking jobs in the state’s booming economy flooded into Georgia. 88 percent of new migrants during the 1970s became urban dwellers. As new industries proliferated, Georgia’s total gross product more than tripled between 1963 and 1975. In another ten years it would triple again. In 1959, Georgia’s per capita income stood at 73 percent of the national average. By 1989 that figure reached 95 percent.

The tremendous expansion of Georgia’s economy throughout this period led to the rise of a substantial white middle and upper-middle class, a new feature in a state heretofore dominated by a concentrated elite. The emergence of this new breed of Georgian would have far-reaching political implications. Recent migrants and their children generally lacked the inherited Democratic allegiance of so many native-born Georgians. Within this upwardly mobile electorate, economics dominated decisions at the polls. Favoring low taxes and minimal government interference in the economy, suburban high-earners increasingly perceived the GOP as the party most in line with their economic interests.

Alongside demographic change and economic growth came a trend enduringly tied to the rise of the New South—suburbanization. Atlanta was the locus of Georgia’s growth through the post-war period; by 1970, 44 percent of the state’s population lived within the metropolitan area. But that growth was not without a sinister undercurrent. The image Atlanta had cultivated of itself in the fifties and sixties—that of a boomtown where the races peacefully coexisted—was far from sincere. Beneath the city’s polished exterior, troubling developments brewed. School desegregation, which had in fact been orchestrated to occur on only a small scale in 1961, became the lightning rod for a downward spiral in relations between white and black Atlantans. Through the early and mid-1960s, the city was fraught with tension as black families escaped the city’s crowded interior and began encroaching upon previously all-white neighborhoods. Combined with growing unrest over the accelerating rate of school desegregation, this trend sparked what historian Kevin Kruse chronicled as “white flight,” a process of wholesale white abandonment of the city limits. 300,000 whites lived in the city in

78 Black and Black, Rise, 4-7.
1960. Over the following two decades, 160,000 would leave.\textsuperscript{80} Hundreds of businesses followed suit, relocating alongside their employees. “Of all the major sunbelt cities,” wrote one historian in a study of the rise of the suburban South, “Atlanta stands at the greatest social and economic disadvantage in relationship to its suburban ring.”\textsuperscript{81} Whites fled for the metropolitan area’s outer reaches, flooding into North DeKalb and North Fulton along with emergent suburbs in Cobb and Gwinnett Counties, where new migrants followed.\textsuperscript{82} White flight became the means of Atlanta’s re-segregation. By 1980, two-thirds of city residents were black.\textsuperscript{83} Further suburban sprawl has characterized Atlanta’s growth pattern ever since, a trend inseparable from racial unrest during the years of desegregation.

### The Trying Seventies and the Rise of a New GOP Vanguard

The demographic and economic trends that persisted throughout the period following the Goldwater breakthrough clearly favored the GOP’s efforts at establishing two-party rule in Georgia. In the 1972 presidential election, Richard Nixon carried the entire South on the effectiveness of his notorious “southern strategy,” which paired economic conservatism with a firm commitment to law and order and an opposition to measures aimed at bringing about social and economic equality among the races.\textsuperscript{84} Underlying the language of Nixon’s campaign was a clear effort to exploit racial fears among rural and suburban whites.\textsuperscript{85} It worked. Nixon carried Georgia with 75 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{86} Four-fifths of southern whites voted for Nixon, a proportion unprecedented since the days of Franklin Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{87} The national Republican Party seemed poised to lift its Georgia counterpart to new heights.

Instead, national events would plunge the Georgia GOP into a period of despair. The Watergate scandal and Nixon’s 1974 impeachment weakened Republicans’ appeal among white southerners, and the popularity of Jimmy Carter, first as Governor and then as Georgia’s native son in the White House, further undercut any traction the Republicans had gained over the past decade. A rural Georgian and farmer, Carter championed serious reform as Governor, restoring

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\textsuperscript{82} Ibid., 243.

\textsuperscript{83} Bartley, \textit{Modern Georgia}, 203.


\textsuperscript{87} Black and Black, \textit{Rise}, 211.
Democratic respectability in the wake of Lester Maddox. The fallout of these twin developments is most evident in the fate of the five Georgia Democrats who became Republicans following the 1968 Democratic National Convention. Following their highly publicized switches, not one of them would ever win another election. Bob Bell, Republican Party chairman from 1983 to 1985, would later lament this debacle: “It sent a message to others: Don’t do this.”

Despite Nixon’s landslide victory two years prior, the 1974 cycle saw Georgia Republicans lose two senators and five representatives, bringing the GOP delegation down to 29 of 236 legislators in the General Assembly. Fletcher Thompson had surrendered his seat in the U.S. Congress in a failed bid for the Senate in 1972. In 1974, Congressman Ben Blackburn succumbed to anti-Nixon sentiment, failing to win re-election and thus leaving the state party without a Republican in Washington for the first time in a decade. The bloodletting continued—by 1978, the Republican caucus in the state legislature had dwindled to twenty-five.

For the GOP, Mack Mattingly’s 1975 election as chairman of the state party represented a bright spot amid the rubble of the seventies. Like so many of Georgia’s early Republicans, Mattingly was a northern transplant. Born in Indiana in 1931, he spent four years in the U.S. Air Force stationed at Savannah’s Hunter Air Field. After his service, Mattingly attended Indiana University before returning to Georgia to work as a salesman for the IBM Corporation out of coastal St. Simons Island. It was a story typical of the thousands of new Georgians finding professional careers in the state’s growing economy. Mattingly first became politically involved in the early 1960s as vice chairman of the Republican Party in south Georgia’s Eighth Congressional District, later serving as Goldwater’s district chairman during the 1964

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89 Galloway, “GOP Vying to Crack Democrats’ Control of Georgia Politics,” 18A.
campaign. In 1966, Mattingly launched a failed bid for Congress from the rural Eighth District. Not until his election as chairman of the state party did he return to the spotlight.

A vanguard of new Republican leaders soon emerged around Mattingly, and over the two decades that followed these men would become the protagonists in the GOP’s eventual rise to power. Among this group was Newt Gingrich, whose fame would later reach far beyond Georgia. By the late 1980s, Gingrich was the New Right’s most recognizable crusader, and in 1994 he would lead the Republican takeover of Congress, ending forty years of Democratic control of that chamber. The roots of his ascent reach back to his home state of Pennsylvania, where in 1958 a fifteen-year-old Gingrich announced to his English teacher that his family was moving to Georgia, where he planned to “form a Republican Party and become a congressman.” He did it, too, although with plenty of help.

Gingrich’s first forays into Georgia politics incorporated very little of the hard-right conservatism he would later embrace. In 1968, he ran the southern primary efforts of presidential hopeful Nelson Rockefeller, a man whom many fellow southern Republicans felt was too liberal. Having received his Ph.D. from Tulane University, Gingrich joined the faculty of West Georgia College as a history professor in 1970. He brought his politics along with him, founding the college’s environmental studies program and quickly earning a reputation on campus as an open-minded progressive. Gingrich may have been a moderate at heart, but with time he would privilege political opportunity over personal ideology.

Even before he ever held office, Newt Gingrich became likely the most visible public figure among state Republicans. Ultimately, however, it was neither he nor Mattingly who would play the greatest role in charting the Republicans’ eventual ascent. That credit is due to the third and final member of the party’s new vanguard, Paul Coverdell. Like Gingrich, Mattingly, and so many Republicans before him, Paul Coverdell was Yankee bred. Born in Iowa, his family moved constantly following his father’s work as a traveling salesman. By the time Coverdell graduated from high school, the family moved to Atlanta, where he would return after studying journalism at the University of Missouri. Coverdell’s first forays into politics came in the mid-1960s. From the start, he was a non-ideological moderate, actually volunteering for Ellis Arnall’s gubernatorial campaign in 1966. But before long Coverdell’s enthusiasm for the former moderate governor fizzled, and by Election Day he had turned his support to Bo

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94 “Goldwater for President,” Press Release, Folder 3, Box 1, Series VI, Mattingly Papers.
97 Ibid., 16-18.
Callaway. The 1966 gubernatorial election proved critical to the politics the young Coverdell would ultimately embrace. “I do think the Lester Maddox election was probably what made the political party identification decision for me,” he would later say.\(^9^8\) Compared to the crude politics of the Maddoxites, the Republican Party seemed poised to become an agent of reform. For Coverdell, this was its most appealing quality.

In 1968, Coverdell registered to run as a Republican in Georgia’s 56\(^{th}\) Senate district, representing a wealthy suburban swath of Fulton County. The ordeal of Coverdell’s registration is indicative both of his political inexperience and, more importantly, of the difficulty newcomers had in ingratiating themselves with Georgia’s political establishment. “I had to call the only person I knew that was a Republican and ask him where in the world the Republican Party was located,” he remembered. It was the first time Coverdell had even shown his face in Republican circles. “They spent all day trying to get someone else to run and couldn’t get anybody else to do it.”\(^9^9\) After earning his place on the ballot, Coverdell had other hurdles to overcome. “Because I was new to the city,” he recalled, “I had to start recruiting friends.” The campaign team eventually reached about fifty people, but what Coverdell had made up for in manpower he still lacked in funding. His Democratic opponent, Jack Hardy, spent nearly a hundred thousand dollars on the campaign. Coverdell spent seven thousand.

Given this humble beginning, it was not surprising when Paul Coverdell lost his bid for the State Senate, polling forty percent to Hardy’s sixty. But although Coverdell must have seemed like a hopeless political amateur, he quickly caught up. In the 1968 election, he began to show the analytical and methodological rigor that would characterize his political career. The General Assembly intended to redistrict the 56\(^{th}\) but failed to do so in time for the 1968 elections. Unbeknownst to most everyone, the legislature had actually approved a set of redistricting plans—it had simply not put them into effect. Coverdell picked up on this, acquiring a map of what by 1970 would be the 56\(^{th}\) district. He realized that the changes would tip the balance slightly in his favor. “I had fully planned to run in ’68 as a prelude to ’70,” he remembered. “If we made it, great.”\(^1^0^0\)

Following his loss, Coverdell kept right on campaigning. “By [1970] I had analyzed that district virtually by lot,” he recalled. “We probably knocked on every door.” Coverdell’s campaign team registered six hundred voters, and he edged out Hardy by 384 votes.\(^1^0^1\) He joined twenty-eight Republican legislators in the General Assembly and quickly emerged as a leader of the small delegation. Coverdell’s colleagues elected him minority leader in 1974, a

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\(^9^8\) Paul Coverdell, Interview by Clifford Kuhn, March 4, 1989, 1-3.
\(^9^9\) Ibid., 8-9.
\(^1^0^0\) Ibid., 10.
\(^1^0^1\) Ibid., 11-13.
position he would occupy for fifteen years.102

Alongside Mack Mattingly and Newt Gingrich, Coverdell rounded out the Republican Party’s triumvirate of new leadership. The day after Mattingly’s election to the chairmanship, he organized a long-range planning committee tasked with shaping and enacting party strategy. It would be the most significant act of his tenure. Beyond Mattingly, Gingrich, and Coverdell, the loosely organized committee consisted of a handful of leading state Republicans at any given time.103 Paul Coverdell quickly became the long-range planning committee’s intellectual leader, resigning from other posts within the party to focus on the new role. The strategic thinking that the task demanded suited Coverdell perfectly. The group met every third week, eventually settling on Coverdell’s office as its gathering place.104 Coverdell recalled that, within a few years, his involvement with the committee reached “total immersion.” Pairing his influence in this select group with his authority in the Republican legislative caucus, he began assembling what he considered to be the building blocks of a viable political party: administration, finance, candidate-recruitment, and party development.105 Coverdell later reflected on the significance of the long-range planning committee. The committee “brought Mattingly, Gingrich, and Coverdell together, and that is a thread that goes through this new era,” he recalled in 1989. “That was the turning point.”106

**Strategic Breakthrough: Newt Gingrich ‘78**

If the disappointments of the early seventies taught Georgia Republicans anything, it was that they could not wait for another national political tide to carry the state party to power. “If this strategy didn’t work in 1972, it is doubtful that it ever would, because we aren’t likely to have a bigger tide in this century,” Coverdell wrote in 1975, in one of many lengthy memos he prepared for the long-range planning committee. “Georgia Republicans have no choice except to develop their own plans for a home-grown party which can stand on its own two feet.” By 1972, white Georgians increasingly came to view national Democrats and Georgia Democrats as two entirely different groups. A Georgian could consider himself a national Republican, Coverdell explained, “without having to vote against old Joe the Democratic Sheriff.”107

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102 Ibid., 34.
104 “Long-Range Planning Committee Membership and Minutes; Aug. 2 1975 – Nov. 4 1977,” Minutes, 7 May 1976, Folder 7, Box 165, Series III, Coverdell Collection.
105 Paul Coverdell, Interview by Clifford Kuhn, March 4, 1989, 28.
106 Ibid., 29.
107 “Long-Range Planning Committee Membership and Minutes; Aug. 2 1975 – Nov. 4 1977,” Coverdell Collection.
A necessary step in the process of state party development is the targeting of critical elections. The long-range planning committee’s first major target became west Georgia’s Sixth District Congressional seat. The Sixth comprised a swath of suburbia to the south and west of Atlanta, as well as much of rural west Georgia. After a narrow loss there in 1974, Newt Gingrich mounted a second attempt at unseating Democrat John Flynt in 1976. During both campaigns, the young Gingrich cast himself as a reform candidate set to shake up the corrupt Democratic establishment, making ethics and the environment his main issues.\textsuperscript{108}

Gingrich began appealing to traditional family values in the 1974 election, a tactic that would eventually become a hallmark of his campaigns. “America needs a return to moral values,” Gingrich told voters, making his wife and children fixtures on the campaign trail.\textsuperscript{109} At the same time, however, he eschewed outright appeals to religion. Lee Howell, Gingrich’s speechwriter and press secretary during the campaign, recalls an incident when Gingrich became annoyed with Howell’s use of religious references in a speech composed for the campaign kickoff. “Newt had me take out all the references to God, because he was not very religious—and isn’t very religious. He went to church in order to get a nap on Sunday morning.”\textsuperscript{110}

Despite Watergate and the electoral thrashing so many of his Republican peers received in the 1974 cycle, Gingrich managed to carry 49 percent of the vote. He polled majorities in four of the district’s suburban counties, but Flynt dominated rural west Georgia.\textsuperscript{111} The narrow loss didn’t slow Gingrich down. “He has not quit running,” the Atlanta Journal-Constitution Magazine reported in September of 1975, “He continues to campaign almost as if the November 1974 election had not taken place.”\textsuperscript{112} But by 1976, the Republican Party brand had continued to disintegrate, and, with Jimmy Carter atop the ticket, Gingrich faced an even taller task. He campaign furiously, emphasizing the same issues as two years prior. Again Gingrich fell a couple percentage points short, and again it was Flynt’s big majorities in rural counties that made the difference.\textsuperscript{113}

Emblazoned by his second narrow loss, Gingrich prepared for yet another effort in 1978. Recent developments gave reason for optimism. With Carter’s diminished popularity, national Republicans began to regain momentum. Moreover, following establishment conservative John

\textsuperscript{108} Osborne, “Newt Gingrich: Shining Knight of the Post Reagan Right,” 17.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{112} Shannon, “A New Face for the Georgia GOP,” 37.
Flynt’s retirement, Gingrich faced a new and less daunting Democratic opponent in 1978. The long-range planning committee saw the potential in the Sixth and allocated a lion’s share of the state party’s funds to support Gingrich’s campaign.\(^{114}\) Sniffing opportunity, the Republican swung hard to the right. As a young moderate in 1974 and 1976, Gingrich let family values and social issues take a backseat to ethics and reform. In 1978, he brought them to center stage. “By ’78, Newt was rock-hard conservative,” remembers former staffer, Chip Kahn. “He emphasized different things—he talked about welfare cheaters, he painted [his moderate opponent] like she was a liberal extremist. On some of the social issues, he moved when he realized how central they were to the Republicans.”\(^{115}\) Seizing on budding electoral trends, Gingrich had converted to the New Right, an early indication of the unrestrained opportunism that would characterize his political career.

Unlike many of the mild-mannered Republicans before him, Gingrich seemed willing to say or do whatever it took to get elected. “One of the great problems we have in the Republican Party,” he told a gathering of College Republicans during the 1978 campaign, “is that we don’t encourage you to be nasty.”\(^{116}\) Gingrich’s campaign manager, L. H. Carter, would later say, “The important thing you have to understand about Newt Gingrich is that he is amoral. There isn’t any right or wrong…only what will work best for Newt Gingrich.” With this attitude, Gingrich left behind a trail of enemies. “It doesn’t matter how much good I do the rest of my life,” Carter continued, “I can’t ever outweigh the evil that I’ve caused by helping him be elected to Congress.”\(^{117}\)

Ugly as it may have been, opportunism worked. The campaign was vicious, and Gingrich topped his opponent with 54 percent of the vote. By swerving to the right, he had cut deep into the Democratic hold on rural west Georgia, providing a needed exception to a gloomy trend for state Republicans—by the 1978 election cycle, the party had reached its lowest level of representation in the state legislature since 1966. “Gingrich’s victory,” reported a GOP newsletter following the election, “re-awakened hopes of Republicans throughout the state that a resurgence of the party was in the making.”\(^{118}\) After a four-year hiatus, Georgia Republicans once again had a man in Washington.

The Death of Rural Rule and the Birth of a New Right in the 1980s

Following success in the Sixth Congressional District, the long-range planning committee set its sights on the U.S. Senate, where no Georgia Republican had served since Reconstruction.

In 1980, Mack Mattingly ran against four-term incumbent Herman Talmadge, son of Eugene Talmadge and heir to his throne. Herman served as Governor of Georgia from 1948 to 1955 and then as a U.S. Senator from 1957 onward. Though he never matched the demagoguery of his father, Talmadge had indeed been a virulent segregationist—and a popular figure among rural whites. By 1980 he had softened his tone significantly, and, with Jimmy Carter atop the ticket for reelection, the odds seemed stacked in the old Democrat’s favor.

Leading up to November, a plethora of personal problems arose in unison to plague Talmadge’s campaign. He went through a heated and highly publicized divorce from his wife Betty, received a Senate denunciation for the mishandling of public funds, and suffered from apparent bouts of alcoholism. The election had fallen into the GOP’s lap. Despite Jimmy Carter’s success in carrying Georgia handily, Mattingly upset Talmadge with 51 percent of the vote, rattling the state’s political establishment. “After a half century,” *The Atlanta Constitution* editorial page reported the following day, “the curtain falls on the Talmadge political dynasty in Georgia.” As in previous Republican victories, the suburbs were critical. While Mattingly won by a mere 27,500 votes statewide, in suburban DeKalb County alone he outpolled Talmadge by nearly 65,000. Essential as the suburban vote had been to Mattingly’s election, by 1980 Republicans expected to dominate the suburbs. The exceptional feature of the 1980 race was not the suburban vote but the African American vote. Black voters represented 15 percent of the South’s total turnout in the 1980 elections. Mattingly garnered a third of the black vote in Georgia, an extraordinary share for a Republican, and enough to tip the scales in his favor. An accidental coalition of blacks and suburban whites had delivered the coup de grace to the Talmadge dynasty.

Still, to attribute Mattingly’s victory to political strategy is a stretch. “Republican breakthroughs,” argue Earl and Merle Black regarding this period in the South, “were generally a result of temporary disarray within the Democratic Party, rather than the inherent grassroots strength of the Republicans.” Talmadge’s scandal-ridden campaign certainly fit this description. Pierre Howard, at the time a Democratic State Senator from DeKalb County, would

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125 Black and Black, *Rise*, 126.
later say, “Mattingly didn’t get elected. Herman got unelected. My mother voted against Herman ‘for what he did to Betty.’ I think that is the only time she has ever voted Republican, and she is 96.”

Also coming to Mattingly’s aid was a sustained national shift to the political right, orchestrated by Republicans. Though the first figurehead of the conservative counterrevolution was President Nixon, who owed his election to reactionary sentiment following a decade of dramatic social change and civil unrest, it was Ronald Reagan who was most responsible for forging the New Right in its contemporary form. In his successful 1980 Presidential campaign, Reagan perfected a strategy that bundled economic conservatism, a firm stance on national defense, social controls, and racist undertones—a package that both suburban and rural southern whites could embrace.

Newt Gingrich capitalized as well as anyone on the New Right’s repackaging of issues. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Gingrich lauded his district’s fusion of traditional values with modernization and prosperity. “What they find here,” he said, “is a sort of Norman Rockwell world with fiber optic computers and jet airplanes. But the values that would have been the *Saturday Evening Post* of the mid-50’s are the values of most of these people now.” Underlying Gingrich’s idealization of suburban Atlanta was an underhanded but unmistakable effort at race baiting. “These people want safety,” he said, “and they believe big cities have failed and are controlled by people who are incapable of delivering goods and services.” The “big city” to which he referred, inner-city Atlanta, was by then 70 percent black. Cobb County, representing nearly all of his redistricted Sixth Congressional, was 90 percent white. Gingrich avoided mentioning race, but it was glaringly present: “What people worry about is the bus line destroying one apartment complex after another, bringing people out for public housing who have no middle-class values and whose kids as they become teenagers often are centers of robbery and where the schools collapse because the parents who live in the apartment complexes don’t care that the kids don’t do well in school.”

Gingrich was not the first Georgian to imbed racialized language in references to family values, law and order, and economic prosperity. Bo Callaway had tried the same thing in his 1966 bid for Governor, appealing to an almost identical constellation of values in his campaign against Lester Maddox. In 1966, the conditions were not yet ripe for such a strategy, as race remained front-and-center in Georgia’s political dialogue. No one wanted the embarrassment of another Lester Maddox, and the suburbs were full of transplanted Northerners who did not think of themselves as racist anyway. Explicit racism was a province populated by extremists.

126 Pierre Howard, Interview by author, February 3, 2010, in the author’s possession.
only, and serious candidates had to pursue alternate means at exploiting latent racial tension. Gingrich did so masterfully, realizing that moral values could stand in for racist appeals among voters who believed that the Civil Rights Movement, the urban riots, and the War on Poverty had undermined “morals.” This was the demographic moment, where a story beginning with white flight triggered the coalescence of economic conservatism, traditional values, and racial fear within a singular and growing suburban electorate. National Republicans—Gingrich included—had leaped on the opportunity; the question became whether the rest of Georgia’s Republicans could successfully follow.

Mattingly’s Strategic Miscalculation in 1986

During his term as Georgia’s first Republican U.S. Senator since Reconstruction, Mack Mattingly deviated sharply from the image he had cast of himself during the 1980 campaign—that of a free-market, strong national defense, low-tax Ronald Reagan conservative. Senator Mattingly opposed private school tax credits, fought hard to fund urban mass transit, and criticized President Reagan’s interference with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.129 The freshman senator—who had launched his political career on the coattails of Goldwater—had sensed the importance of the black vote in swinging the 1980 election in his favor, and he was eager to defend his appeal among this electorate.

By moving left on key issues, Mattingly hoped to seize political opportunity. In 1986, he ran for reelection against moderate Atlantan Wyche Fowler, who lacked the rural appeal of Herman Talmadge. As such, Mattingly’s campaign team believed it could target the black vote without sacrificing a strong showing in rural Georgia. Mattingly campaigned hard in Atlanta’s black neighborhoods, predicting he would carry as much as a third of the black vote.130

He was supremely misguided. In 1980 Mattingly ran against an old racial demagogue, a relic of a dead era, but in 1986 he faced a young moderate without the bitter associations of white supremacy and segregation. Despite the small steps he took as a sitting senator, Mattingly could not fully disassociate himself from the party of Ronald Reagan, and Georgia’s African American voters returned to their Democratic allegiance. Majority black Fulton County, where Mattingly had won by 27,000 votes in 1980, turned against him by 51,000 votes. Moreover, in distancing himself from the hard-line conservatism of President Reagan and the New Right, Mattingly disheartened his core of suburban white voters. Amid a massive drop in voter turnout, suburban DeKalb County favored Fowler with 55 percent of the vote, despite Mattingly having carried nearly 70 percent of DeKalb’s votes in 1980.

Wyche Fowler unseated Mattingly with 51 percent of the total vote. One headline put it bluntly: “Anti-Talmadge vote was gone—and so was Mack Mattingly.”\textsuperscript{131} Tim Ryles, political scientist and future Commissioner of Insurance for the state, composed a detailed analysis of the defeat. “By broadening his constituency rather than intensifying commitments of his 1980 New South voters,” he wrote, “Mattingly erred…from a long-term perspective, continued pursuit of this strategy is roughly equivalent to selling life insurance policies on the Titanic.”\textsuperscript{132} These conclusions clearly resonated with Paul Coverdell, who saved Ryles’ obscure report in his personal collection. To win, Republicans had to pose a complex conservative alternative to progressive Democrats, never venturing far from the party line.

**Towards a Republican Majority: The Robertson Insurgency and 1991 Reapportionment**

The movement that would ultimately unite Georgia’s suburban and rural white voters came not from within the Republican Party’s own ranks, but from without. In the 1980s, evangelism became an increasingly politically conscious movement, due largely to Ronald Reagan’s incorporation of religious appeals as means of wooing the once solid Democratic South. Thousands of ministers, televangelists, and the like hitched themselves to the New Right’s bandwagon, bringing their congregations with them.\textsuperscript{133} By 1980, conservative political action committees drew millions of dollars from Christian fundamentalists, and televangelist Jerry Falwell announced that the evangelical vote had delivered Reagan to the White House.\textsuperscript{134} But until the late eighties, religion remained a secondary issue in Georgia politics. No doubt, Georgia had a sizable evangelical population, and candidates who failed to broadcast their faith suffered, as was the case with Bo Callaway following his disregard for the *Christian Index* survey in 1966. But most Georgians simply did not view faith as a partisan issue. Even as national Republicans cornered the evangelical vote in the early eighties, Georgia Democrats continued to receive endorsements from fundamentalist religious groups.\textsuperscript{135}

Given the sheer scale of the evangelical movement, Georgia could not remain insulated forever. In 1988, the Christian Right latched onto the state Republican Party apparatus. Evangelicals’ attempt to ingrain themselves into the political fabric of the state party came not as a friendly overturing, but as a hostile takeover. Televangelist Pat Robertson announced his candidacy for President on the Republican ticket, and a sizable base of Georgians arose in his

\textsuperscript{131} Mike Christensen, “Anti-Talmadge vote was gone—and so was Mack Mattingly,” *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, November 9, 1986, A1.


\textsuperscript{135} Galloway, “GOP Vying to Crack Democrats’ Control of Georgia Politics,” A16.
support. Robertson’s campaign eventually fizzled, but his supporters in Georgia did not fade away, even sending a protesting delegation to the national convention in New Orleans.  

Soon thereafter, they launched an effort to seize control of the state Republican Party. *The DeKalb Neighbor* reported in February 1989 that Robertson’s foot soldiers planned to “take over the precinct meetings across the state, later the county conventions and then win enough delegates to the state gathering to put their own slate of officers in command.” The Republican establishment attempted to downplay the threat of the Robertson insurgency. Indeed, Robertson’s followers ultimately failed to meet their lofty goals in 1989. Regardless, they had shaken up the party, signaling evangelism’s permanent intrusion into Georgia’s political dialogue.

As the Christian Right banged on the Georgia Republican Party’s door, more ominous developments threatened state Democrats. With the white suburbs firmly in Republican hands, an unlikely coalition of blacks and white rural conservatives represented the lifeblood of the Democratic Party. Black Democratic officials were conscious of the need to avoid straining the already tense relationship with their white counterparts, and they made certain sacrifices to that end. When Governor Joe Frank Harris refused to meet with liberal Presidential candidate Walter Mondale in 1984, many leaders in the black community denounced the move. But Calvin Smyre, a representative from Columbus and president of the Georgia Association of Black Elected Officials, kept legislators silent. Making a controversy over gestures like Harris’ would only fragment the party, and, in Smyre’s words, “To have control of nothing is nothing.” Calculated strategic moves such as this bolstered the Democrats, allowing them to resist the waves of Republican gains other southern states experienced during the Reagan years. Leading up to the 1984 elections, a mere 17 percent of Georgia’s state officials were Republicans – the lowest proportion in any southern state. Black leaders seemed willing to incur an occasional slight for the sake of continued Democratic rule. Within a few years, new strains would test the strength of that commitment.

In 1991, Georgia underwent redistricting, and white Republicans and black Democrats suddenly found common ground. By constructing majority black districts, leaders in each camp knew they could help black candidates unseat liberal white incumbents. Republicans favored such plans, realizing that the concentration of black voters in “max-black” districts would reduce their numbers in surrounding districts, thus buoying Republicans’ chances. White Democrats

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138 Galloway, “GOP Vying to Crack Democrats’ Control of Georgia Politics,” A18.
139 Ibid.
were the only losers in this equation. Following considerable controversy, a set of max-black redistricting plans finally passed, establishing two additional majority black congressional districts along with numerous majority black state legislative districts. Beyond the immediate electoral fallout, the 1991 reapportionment signaled an end to selfless party devotion among the state’s black Democratic officials, ushering in a period of opportunism. “We have no permanent friends and no permanent enemies,” a leading black representative would later proclaim. “We only have permanent interests.” Rural whites, who once wielded the Democratic Party to whip the rest of the state into submission, saw the party of their ancestors slipping further and further from their control.


Paul Coverdell was fortunate to learn from failure. He witnessed Bo Callaway’s failure to carry Georgia on the suburban vote alone in 1966. He witnessed the failure of Newt Gingrich’s early campaigns for Congress, wherein his stance as a moderate reform candidate gained insufficient traction against a conservative Democratic opponent. And he witnessed Mack Mattingly’s failed bid for re-election to the senate in 1986, when Mattingly attempted to reach out to black voters in a context where it was no longer possible, sacrificing suburban votes along the way. Coverdell also witnessed the party’s struggles with evangelicals firsthand in the late eighties. From these diverse threads, the longtime state senator wove together a campaign strategy that he believed would finally work, one that joined economic conservatism with direct appeals to evangelicals. He put it to the test in a 1992 effort to unseat Wyche Fowler in the U.S. Senate.

Coverdell’s strategy sought to accomplish a singular goal: to attract rural whites while holding on to the suburbs. To that end, Coverdell did two things. First, he embraced a platform of economic conservatism and traditional values while repeatedly typecasting Fowler as “too liberal for Georgia” – a strategy not dissimilar from Newt Gingrich’s 1978 run for Congress. Coverdell brought in notorious political operator Tom Perdue as his campaign manager. Together, they “made Wyche Fowler into Walter Mondale and Michael Dukakis,” according to journalist Dick Williams, who covered the race for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. One television advertisement featured a singing grandmother from tiny Cuthbert Georgia, who “got so fed up with all those slick commercials for Wyche Fowler” that she wrote Coverdell a jingle to

140 Tommy Hills, Red State Rising: Triumph of the Republican Party in Georgia (Macon, GA: Stroud and Hall, 2009), 54-55.
help get him elected, tying Fowler to Washington’s liberal establishment. The folksy ad did not seem like the stuff of a man often derided as a “country club Republican,” but it worked.

Coverdell’s second means of penetrating rural Georgia was his embrace of evangelical voters. Sponsored by state Democrats, a public referendum to establish a state lottery for education appeared on the 1992 ballot. The Christian Coalition went up in arms against gambling, and Coverdell welcomed the evangelicals into his camp. Long perceived as a social moderate, Coverdell seemed an unlikely crusader for the Christian Right. “For almost as long as Mr. Coverdell has been active in party politics, he has fought with the religious right,” wrote one Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporter. But by becoming opportunistic at an ideal moment, Coverdell played circumstance to his advantage. He began making direct appeals to fundamentalists, even speaking from their pulpits. “Paul Coverdell does not take a pro-life stance,” admitted one Christian Coalition organizer, “but he’s miles closer than Wyche Fowler on pro-family, pro-life issues.”

Still, it was an uphill fight. In the general election, Coverdell came 35,000 votes shy of Fowler’s total, but with a third-party candidate carrying three percent of the vote, Fowler fell short of an outright majority. The election went to a runoff. With support from the national party, Coverdell continued campaigning hard throughout the rural areas where evangelical sentiment was the strongest. The state lottery had narrowly passed on Election Day, rousing fundamentalist voters against the Democratic Party. The momentum swung towards Coverdell, and he defeated Wyche Fowler in the runoff by a narrow 16,000 votes. Coverdell’s share of the suburban vote actually contracted slightly between the general election and the runoff, but by enhancing his share of votes in nearly all rural counties by a consistent five to ten percent, he more than made up for the difference. The fusion of economic conservatism, family values, and – most importantly – evangelism, had won the day. Paul Coverdell had taken Newt Gingrich’s New Right rhetoric a step further, using evangelism to bridge the suburban-rural divide and create a united white majority in Georgia.

Assembling the Majority

One afternoon in February 1985, Paul Coverdell took a stroll outside of the state capitol with his close friend, Democratic State Senator Pierre Howard. Howard, Coverdell knew, had ambitions that reached higher than the state legislature. As the two circled the capitol before the afternoon session, Coverdell turned to Howard abruptly, “You know that you should hurry up and run if you want to win. You’re not going to be able to hold this coalition together much longer.”

Confused, Howard responded, “What coalition?”

“The rural whites and the blacks,” Coverdell responded. “The rural whites won’t stay with you. Why would they?”

Howard smiled and replied, “Sherman. You’re forgetting about Sherman – he burned Atlanta.”

It was an important point. For 150 years, white Georgians had been the most reliable Democrats in the country. Theirs was a loyalty born in the days of slavery, stoked by Sherman’s fires, and deepened once more by Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. Even when the Civil Rights Movement seemed to signal a crisis of allegiance, Georgia’s Democrats endured. As the civil unrest of the sixties faded in the early seventies, they wiped the dust off and surveyed the landscape – not only were they still standing, they were gaining seats. Georgia had proven Lyndon Johnson wrong, remaining blue for decades after the President had written the South off as Republican territory.

But by 1992, the chains of ancestral memory had grown weak. The Civil Rights Movement and growing divide between conservative southern Democrats and their national counterparts is but one element in this story. From 1962 to 1992, a barrage of locally specific developments steadily corroded white Georgians’ Democratic loyalty: the end of rural rule through the overturn of county unit apportionment, the massive influx of Republican-leaning migrants, economic expansion, suburbanization and the concurrent rekindling of racial tension, the ascent of Ronald Reagan and the New Right, and the weakening of the black-white Democratic coalition following apportionment battles like those of 1991.

These forces took their toll on state Democrats, but the makings of a realignment were not in place until Paul Coverdell reached out to evangelicals in his 1992 election to the U.S. Senate. Coverdell’s victory signaled a new era in the history of the Georgia Republican Party, one in

149 Pierre Howard, Interview by author, February 3, 2010, in the author’s possession.
which white suburbia and rural Georgia merged under a single partisan umbrella. “The Coverdell campaign showed that traditional Republicans and religious conservatives could submerge their differences in the common cause of defeating a liberal Democrat,” wrote The Atlanta Journal- Constitution’s Whit Ayres. Victory came with a necessary tradeoff—the abandonment of any hope for a viable African American contingent within the Republican Party. Coverdell carried a mere 14 percent of the black vote in 1992, less than half the share Mattingly had achieved in 1980.

For those who search for causes of the rise of the New Right, the Georgia lesson suggests that national conservative trends must be put in deep local context in order to explain the Republican realignment in the South. Georgia was the last state of the old Confederacy to turn red at the state level, doing so following the election of rural Democrat-turned-Republican Sonny Perdue as Governor in 2002. The fact that Georgia was atypical among southern states actually illuminates the central feature of southern realignment. Having tried and failed with countless strategies aimed at creating a sustainable majority, Georgia’s Republicans proved that there was no alternative: in order to overcome the Democratic monolith, Republicans had to become monolithically conservative. They did so by embracing evangelical voters, incorporating them as the final component of Georgia’s New Right coalition. In his 1992 election to the U.S. Senate, Paul Coverdell wrote the final chapter in a narrative that Bo Callaway began in 1966. Following that watershed election, the necessary parts were in place for the realignment to finally unfold—Georgia Democrats could no longer resist the momentum of history.

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151 Black and Black, Rise, 300.
Today’s American South is Republican territory, more so than any region of the country. The magnitude of Republican influence in the South, particularly in national elections, seems to cloud collective memory— to many Americans, the notion of a Democratic South is so foreign that to even hint at its recent existence seems absurd. Perhaps this explains why, when I mention my interest in Georgia’s partisan realignment, the most common response seems to be, “When was that? The sixties?”

“No,” I respond, “more like 2002.”

Provoked by this consistent misunderstanding, I set off on a journey through nearly fifty years of Georgia’s political history, intent to explain why the Civil Rights Movement did not signal the death of the state Democratic Party, why it took Georgia’s Republicans so long to assemble a reliable majority, and how they finally did it. Georgia was the last southern state to complete its realignment. Through deep local analysis of this atypical case, I hoped I might uncover insights into the realignment process neglected by historians more preoccupied with national political trends.

In order to strengthen my understanding of the broader thrust of southern political history in the period stretching from the early Civil Rights Era to the late 1970s, I read Jack Bass and Walter DeVries’ The Transformation of Southern Politics: Social Change and Political Consequence Since 1945. Bass and DeVries’ 1976 classic is the most in-depth study of the early stages of southern realignment—chronicling the civil rights legislation of the fifties and sixties, economic and demographic growth, the rise of African-Americans as a critical component within the southern electorate, the gradual ascent of southern Republicans, and Democratic responses to their nascent challengers. Transformation provides useful insights into the Georgia case in particular, illuminating the centrality of the rural-urban dichotomy in state politics—the significance of which I did not originally appreciate. The authors detail the dominance that rural whites held within the Democratic Party and the state government. Their appeal, Bass and DeVries write, “was a compound of ruralism, racial conservatism, and populism.”

From Transformation, I moved on to a more recent work by Earl and Merle Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans. Black and Black take a more targeted approach, tracing the Republican ascent from its roots in Johnson’s Civil Rights Act and the watershed Goldwater breakthrough of 1964. In their highly quantitative study, the authors detail the great urban migration that transformed the South through the sixties and seventies, demonstrating that the emergence of a suburban middle and upper-middle class was the first necessary condition for
Republican Party-building in the South. Republicans had to achieve a lasting presence in the suburbs before they could even contemplate penetrating the solidly Democratic rural white vote. But, even as the demographic fault line crept steadily in the Republicans’ favor, the suburbs alone would never be enough for majority status. “Given their steady deficit of roughly nine to one among blacks,” write Black and Black, “Republicans needed to secure about three-fifths of the much bigger white vote in order to win a majority of the total southern vote.” This required incorporating rural whites within the party. Republican attempts to do so constitute the narrative backbone of my study.

I must admit that the unexplored nature of this subject was its most appealing quality from the start. When I began my work, the story of Georgia’s realignment was all but untold, except secondarily within regional or national accounts like those already discussed. Then, in November 2009, Tommy Hills released *Red State Rising: Triumph of the Republican Party in Georgia*. The work provides some useful insights. Hills succeeds in identifying Paul Coverdell, Mack Mattingly, and Newt Gingrich as the strategic vanguard that rejuvenated the state party following the doldrums of the 1970s. He also highlights the crucial role of the max-black controversy of 1991 in fracturing the Democratic Party’s weak coalition between African-Americans and rural whites. But, apart from a few rare insights, *Red State Rising* is inadequate as a chronicle of the Republican Party’s ascent, and the book is polluted by Hills’ own partisan leanings as a Republican-nominated officeholder. Hills devotes but a quarter of his study to the period spanning from 1964 to 1992, choosing instead to focus on Republican electoral tactics leading up to Sonny Perdue’s breakthrough election as Georgia’s first Republican Governor since Reconstruction in 2002. However tactically impressive the Perdue campaign may indeed have been, the makings of the realignment were in place a decade prior to his campaign. In overemphasizing Perdue’s role in the takeover, Hills neglects the real ideological and strategic roots of realignment.

Reinvigorated by renewed hope that my story was more or less untold, I began conducting serious primary research. My goal from the start was to narrow the focus of the project upon the crucial moments and personalities of the realignment process. Through the secondary works I had thus far encountered, it seemed that the three figures most central to the Republican takeover of Georgia were Howard H. “Bo” Callaway, Mack Mattingly, and Paul Coverdell. I turned first to the Callaway and Mattingly papers, both at the University of Georgia’s Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies. These two collections elucidated the early failures of Georgia Republicans and revealed the significance of Newt Gingrich in rejuvenating the struggling party in the late 1970s. I then examined Paul Coverdell’s Georgia Senate papers at Georgia College and State University in Milledgeville. Spanning

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154 In 2003, Republican Governor Sonny Perdue named Tommy Hills Chief Financial Officer of the State of Georgia.
Coverdell’s career in the State Senate from 1970 to 1989, the papers reveal the importance of the long-range planning committee in articulating and enacting successful electoral strategies from the mid-1970s onwards. Paul Coverdell was the intellectual leader of this new vanguard, a fact made abundantly clear in dozens of prolific strategic memorandums he composed for the committee.

In consultation with archivists at the University of Georgia’s Russell Library as well as Georgia State University’s Georgia Government Documentation Project, I evaluated numerous interviews of politicians and civic leaders involved in the realignment process. Additionally, I personally conducted an interview with former Democratic State Senator and Lieutenant Governor Pierre Howard, a close friend of Paul Coverdell’s and firsthand witness to the latter stages of the Republican takeover. Mr. Howard provided helpful guidance throughout the writing process.

Newspaper articles, drawn primarily from *The Atlanta Journal-Constitution*, supplemented my primary research, providing public reception and critical interpretation of events transpiring throughout the realignment process. Likewise, economic and demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau, along with electoral returns and statistics, allowed me to contextualize the narrative within a meaningful quantitative timeline.

As I began this project, it seemed as though the national political developments of the 1960s had heralded the inevitable extinction of southern Democrats, setting Republicans on an inexorable course towards majority status throughout the South. But as I completed my research, I came to recognize the role of local agency in charting the trajectory of Georgia’s political history. Georgia’s peculiarity as the final southern state to realign makes it an ideal testing ground for deterministic theories of the southern realignment. The repeated fumblings of Georgia Republicans through the 1970s and 1980s suggest that Republicans could not resign themselves to the thrust of history, waiting for national political tides to lift them to power. Rather, Georgia’s Republican leaders had to proactively seek out and implement a political strategy capable of assembling a majority.
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